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RON. AUGUSTUS H. GARLAND, OF ARKANSAS. 
APPOINTED MARCH 6, 1885. 
ACCRUED PENSIONS. 
The terms "accrued pensions," as used in section 4718, Revised Statutes, 
mean the amount of money unpaid by the Government to which a pen-
sioner, or a person who had a valid claim for pension pending, was en-
titled at the time of his death. 
The receipt by a pensioner of a check for the amount due him on his pen-
sion, which was indorsed but not transferred by him in his life-time, is 
not payrnent. The amount so due is accordingly "accrued pension," 
and is payable to those only who are entitled thereto under such sec-
tion. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 16, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter of the 12th of April, 1887, you request 
my opinion ~'upon the question as to when, under the provis-
ions of section 4718, Revjsed Statutes, payment of pension to 
a pensioner is so completed that the amount due by way of 
pension becomes assets and ceases to be accrued pension." 
The question with reference to the usual mode of paying 
pensions is more fully stated in the communication of the 
Commissioner of Pensions in his letter to you of the 11th 'of 
April, 1887, transmitted with yours, as follows: ~'Whether 
or not, under the provisions of section 4 718 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, where a check has been trans-
mitted by a pension agent through the mails to a pensioner 
and received by him, and thereafter, whether the pensioner 
dies having indorsed and not negotiated the check, or dies with-
out having indorsed the check but having the same in his pos-
session, payment is so completed, and title to the amount 
called for by the check so vested in the pensioner, that the 
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check can properly be considered part of the assets of the 
decedent, and as such assets collected by his legal represent-
atives and the proceeds be subject to the payment of the 
debts of the deceased." 
The phrase "accrued pension," as used in this section, 
means the amount of money unpaid by the GO\·ernment to 
which a pensioner, or one who had a valid pending claim for 
pension, would be entitled at the time of his death. The 
statute declares, first, this unpaid money shall be paid to the 
widow of the pensioner if be leaves· one ; second, if there be 
no widow, it shall be paid to his child or children under six-
teen years of age; if he leave no widow or child or children 
under sixteen years of age it shall not be paid at all, ''except 
so much as may be necessary to reimburse the person who 
bore the expenses of the last sickness or burial of the decedent, 
in case where he did not leave sufficient assets to meet such 
expenses." That the " accrued pension " shall be paid to no 
oth~r than as above stated is strongly emphasized by the 
provision that '' such accrued pension shall not be considered 
a part of the assets of the estate of the deceased nor liable to 
be applied to the debt of such estate in any case whatever, 
but shall inure to the sole and exclusive benefit oi the widow 
or children ; and if no widow or child survive, no pa:rment 
whatsoever of the accrued pension shall be made or allowed." 
This clause imposes upon the officers of the Government the 
obligation to neither make nor allow to be made any payment 
of the "accrued pension" to the executors or administrators of 
the decedent for the general payment of debts or distribution, 
with the possible single exception that if they have borne the 
necessary expenses of his last sickness and burial and he 
shall have died without sufficient funds to re-imbm:se them, 
so much of the accrued pension may be paid them as they 
shall have paid for those purposes. In no event can they 
reeei ve any part of the " accrued pension " merely as the 
legal representatives of the decedent. 
Unless, then, the pension was paid to the decedent in his 
life-time and became a part of his general assets, it can not 
pass to his legal representatives so as to be subjected to the 
payment of the debts of the decedent. The question is thus 
reduced to, what is a payment to a pensioner in his life-time! 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 3 
Accru.ed Penslous. 
In the absence of special contract the presurnptio~ is that 
the payment of an obligation shall be made in money. This 
presumption applies to a pensioner as well as to any one else. 
Till he gets his money or that which in law is its equivalent, 
he is not paid nor is the Government discharged. If here-
ceives a check but never transfers it nor gets the check 
cashed he has not received his money; for a "banker's check 
is not money" (Chitty on Bills, 399). If he receives a check 
and payment is refused he has no right of action against the 
bank. "The holder of a bank check can not sue the bank for 
refusing payment in the absence of proof that it was accepted 
by the bank or charged against the drawer." 
The fact that the check was properly drawn on a national 
bank (a public depository) by an officer of the Government 
in payment of a public creditor does not alter this general 
rule, (Bank of Republic Y. JJ1illa'rd, 10 Wall., 152). "The payee 
of a check before it is accepted by the drawee can not maintain 
an action upon it against the latter, as there is no privity 
of contract between them." So held, where a check·of the 
Treasurer of the United States upon a national bank duly 
designated as a depository of the public money, having been 
paid upon an unauthorized indorsement of the name of the 
payee, suit to recover the amount of the check was brought 
by its true owner against the bank (First National Bank v. 
Whitman, 94 U. S., 343). A check, then, until presented, 
accepted, or marked good by the drawee, is only a personal 
obligation of the drawer. "vVhen the United States by its 
unauthorized officer become a party to negotiable paper they 
have all the rights and incur all the responsibility of individ-
uals who are parties to such instruments. We know of no 
difference except that the United States can not be sued." 
(United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Peters, 392; and 
United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S., 30.) 
Tlie United States, then, stands upon the same plane as 
others who issue negotiable paper, except that the United 
States can not be sued. The general rule is, if a debtor 
give his creditor his own promissory note or obligation of no 
higher order than the original debt, the debt is not thereby 
paid nor the debtor discharged (Peter v. Beverly, 10 Peters, 
a67; James v. Hackly, 16 Johns, 277). It is stated bs Kent, 
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Chief-Justice, in the People v. Howell (4 Johns, 304), "unless 
a check is paid it is no payment." 
In the case of Burnet v. Smith (10 Foster, 264), it is ruled: 
''Until cashed, it (a check) is no payment of a pre-existing 
debt any more than a promissory note is payment of such 
debt without an agreement to receive it as such." 
This principle is sustained by abundant authorities, and 
except in Maine and Massachusetts is the generally accepted 
rule both in the United States and England. A single ex-
pression occurs in the opinion of the court in the case of 
Downey v. Hicks (14 How., 240), which would seem to be 
inconsistent with the rule above stated, as follows: "In 
ordinary transactions a check on a specie-paying bank on 
demand is payment. And if the holder of the check present 
it to the bank and direct the amount to be placed to his 
credit as a deposit, and the bank should fail, the loss would 
be the depositor's." A careful examination of this case will 
show that the first clause of this quotation must be read in 
connection with the last, to properly interpret the principle 
of the decision, and as a whole no more is to be derived from 
it than that a check presented and passed to the credit of a 
payee is a payment. 
It is therefore concluded that the receipt of a check by a 
pensioner, which he has only indorsed but which has not 
been transferred by him in his life-time, is not a payment but 
is only one step in the process of payment. The amount yet 
remains as" accrued pension" and only payable accordingly 
to those entitled thereto. The indorsement alone by the 
decedent does not constitute a transfer. An indorsement and 
delivery are both essential; for until delivery in pursuance 
of indorsement, the indorser still retains the power to cancel 
the indorsement and personally present for payment, or at his 
option, if guilty of no laches, return to the drawer, or until pre-
sented to the drawer may countermand payment. Nor can 
the executors or administrators of the payee, by mere delivery 
without their own indorsement, consummate the trans fAr (Par-
sons on Notes and Bills, 159 and Note X). If known by them 
to be "accrued pension," they can not, by their own indorse-
ment and delivery a.ft~r the death of the pensioner, lawfully 
transfer the check, for by the provisions of the statute the" ac-
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crued pension" is not the assets of the decedent and does not 
pass to them. The law clearly contemplates that the widow 
and children, as provided by the statute, shall be the bene-
ficiaries and not the general creditors of the pensioner, and 
unless the payment has been legally received by the pensioner, 
it is incumbent on those intrusted with the administration of 
the law neither to make nor allow payment to be made to 
any other person. In repiy to your inquiry, the sending of a 
check to a pensioner, which has been indorsed by him but 
not transferred in his life-time, is not a payment "so com-
pleted that the amount due by way of pension becomes as-
sets and ceases to be accrued pension." 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
REMISSION OF FORFEITURE. 
Opinion of March 19, 1887 (10 Opin., 584), namely, that the Secretary of 
the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture of a vessel condemned 
for being engaged in unlawfully killing fur seals (the case not arising 
in either of the islands St. Paul and St. George), re-affirmed. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 16, 1887. 
SIR: At your request I have reviewed my opinion in the 
ease of the schooner San Diego in the light of the brief 
submitted by the claimants. 
I am still of opinion that you have no power to remit the 
forfeiture of the schooner, which was condemned for the 
offense of being engaged in unlawfully killing fur seals. 
Inasmuch as the law under which the forfeiture was in-
curred is not a law "for laying, levying, or collecting any duties 
or taxes," or a law " concerning the register·ing o.nd recording of 
ships or vessels," or a I a w "concerning the enrolling and licens · 
ing ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries 
and for regulating the same," it seems to me very plain that 
the power of remitting forfeitures under the act of the 3d 
of March, 1797 (1 Stat., 506), is not given you in this case by 
that act, nor is it given you by section 5293, Revised Statutes, 
Belli loa of 1'orteU11re. 
which confines your power of remission to cases ansmg 
"u~d~r any provisi<•ns of law relating to fur seals upon the 
islands of St. Paul .and St. George," and consequently does 
not embrace this case, which arose in neither of said islands. 
In my opiniqn the law restricting yonr power of remission 
t& these o islands is a legislative declaration that the laws 
~ng to fur seals do not belong to the class of laws to 
· h the act of 3d of March, 1797, applies, and that the 
power of remission under those laws must be confined to the 
i lands named, in which places alone the killing of fur seals 
in .Alaska was made lawful under certain express COQditions, 
d consequently, in wh.ich places alone, in that Territory, 
Violations of the laws for protecting fur seals were likely to 
occur under circumstances calling for a power to dispense 
With the penalties of the law. 
It is thus not by the capricious or arbitrary exercise of 
power, but in accordance with a reasonable q,nd proper inten-
tion, that the power ·of remis~ion has been confined to cases 
occurring in the above-named islands by the law authoriz-
iDJ. th.e killing of fur seals there. 
The ease in 6 Opinions, 488, which arose under laws for the 
regulation of passenger vessels, lends no support to the at·-
gument presented in the claimant's brief, because those laws 
came within the terms of the first section of the act of the 
8d arch, 1797, which expressly extends the power of remis-
sion to penalties and forfeitures incurred under laws regulat-
ing ships or vesl;lels, and because the law of 1847, one of tlie 
laws involved, expressly said that forfeitures declared by it 
" should be prosecuted as forfeitures are under the act to regu-
lclte duties on imports "Or tonnage" (p. 490), which was taken 
to mean that the two acts should be on precisely the same 
footi g as to forfeitures and their incidents. 
It iB not necessary to consicler whether the power of remis-
sion gil"en by the seventh section of the act of 1st of July, 
1870 (16 Stat., 1~2), in cases arising in the waters adjacent to 
the islands of St. George and St. Paul, is still in force, not-
withstanding tbe silence of section 5293, Revised Statutes, in · 
that particular, because it does not appear that the offense 
for which the forfeiture was declared was committed in 
waters adjacent to either of those islands, unless we adopt 
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the interpretation of the claimants and abandon the ordinary 
sense of the adjective adjacent and make it synonymous with 
u·ctters of Alaska, thus ignoring the settled rule of interpreta-
tion that words must be taken in their usual sense unless it 
is manifest that another sense was intended. 
I beg to add that, owing to the desire of the claimants to be 
beard and the failure of their counsel to reach here in time to 
get a hearing before my opinion was given, I have thought 
proper to depart from the practice in such cases of merely 
stating my adherence to the opinion given, and to consider 
the subject with reference to what has been advanced by way 
of answer to the positions taken in the opinion. . 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
1 A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY. GENERAL. 
Where the question submitted by the head of a Department relates to 
duties of Territorial officers in a matter touching which such Depart-
ment has no administrative concern, it is not deemed proper for the 
Attorney-General to give an official opinion thereon. 
DEP AR1.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 19, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter of the 15th of April, 1887, you request 
my official opinion "'relative to the qualifications of electors 
in Utah Territory, as prescribed by circular of information 
to registration officers, issued by the Commission, March 19, 
1887." 
No facts are stated to indicate that any question is pend-
ing in the Department of the Interior, nor any duty to be 
performed by the Department, to the proper discharge of 
which the solution of any question of law is a prerequisite. 
From all that appears in your letter, with its accompanying 
transmittals, the question of registration of voters in Utah 
can not by appeal ever come before you for determination, 
nor is the question one in which you have any official con-
cern. Therefore, while I will eYer take pleasure in affording 
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any assistance in my power to aid you in solving any ques-
tions of law which may arise in the discharge of your duties, 
I am limited by law to replying to legal questions arising in 
the administration of a Department, and, as is well stated by 
.Attorney-General Bates, in 10 Opinions, 220, ''when the so-
lution of the question is not necessary to the discharge of 
any duty properly belonging to the Department it is not the 
duty of the .Attorney-General to give an opinion thereon, and 
such opinion would consequently be extra-official and unau-
thorized." As, then, the question submitted appears to be 
one applicable only to duties pertaining to officers of the 
Territory O\er whose action in the matter referred to you 
have no official control, it would be improper for me to give 
an offieial opinion upon it. If, however, you do not concur 
in this view I will cheerfully reconsider it if a fuller statement 
of facts or reasons which you may see fit to suggest renders 
it proper to do so. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
NOLAN LAND-CLAIM IN NEW MEXICO. 
Semble that as to the Nolan claim to certain land in New Mexico, known 
as c1aim No. 39, there has not as yet been any ''final action by Con-
gress," as contemplated in the eighth section of the act of July 22, 1854, 
chapter 103. 
The proviso in the fourth section of the act of July 1, 1870, chapter 202, 
confirming the Nolan grant, No. 48, does not include the above-men-
tioned claim, No. 39. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 23, 1887. 
SIR: I have duly considered the question presented in tl1e 
accompanying papers, which were transmitted to me by you 
some months ago, touching the Nola-n claim to certain land j 11 
New Mexico, known as claim No. 39, and in compliance with 
your request I now haYe the honor to submit my opiniou 
thereon. 
By the eighth section of the act of July 22, 1854, chapter 
103, it was made the duty of the surveyor-general of New 
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Mexico, under instructions of the Secretary of the Interior, 
to ascertain the orjgin, nature, character, and extent of all 
claims to lands under the laws, usages, and customs of Spain 
arid Mexico, and for this purpose he was thereby authorized 
to issue notices, summon witnesses, administer oaths, and do 
and perform all other necessary acts in the premises. He 
was by the same section required to make a full report on all 
such claims as originated before the cession of the territory 
to the United States by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 
1848, denoting the various grades of title, with his decision as 
to the validity or invalidity of each of the same under the 
laws, usages, and customs of the country before its cession to 
the United States; and that report, which was to be made in 
accordance with such form as the Secretary of the Interior 
might prescribe, was required to be laid before Congress for 
such action thereon as might be deemed just and proper, 
with a view to confirm bona fide grants and give full effect to 
the treaty of 1848 between the United States and Mexico . 
..And the same section declared that, ''until the final action 
of Congress on such c'la.irns, all lands covered thereby shall be re-
~erved from sale or othm· disposal by the Government," etc. 
tbe 27th of February, 1860, a claim in behalf of the 
widow and heirs-at-law of Gervacio Nolan was filed in the 
office of the surveyor-general of the Territory of New Mexico 
covering a tract of land situated in that Territory, alleged to 
have been granted by the Mexican authorities to the said 
Nolan and two others (Aragon a11d Lucero) his associates, in 
the year 1845. Claimants alleged that said Nolan died in-
testate some two years before filing their claims, and that 
previous to his decease he had purchased all the interest of 
his two associates in the premises. This claim was subse· 
quently investigated and passed upon by the surveyor-gen-
eral, who approved the same and transmitted his report and 
decision thereon (dated July 10, 1860), together with copies of 
the documents filed in the case, to the General Land Office, 
and in .January, 1861, these were laid before Congress by the 
Secretary of the Interior. (See Ex. Doc. No. 28, House of 
Representatives, Thirty-sixth Congress, second session.) 
Afterwards, in the same year (1860), another claim in be-
half of the widow and heirs-at-law of said Nolan was filed in 
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the office of the surveJor-general of the Territory of New 
·Mexico. Thh~ claim embraced a large tract of land, different 
from the one above mentioned, which was then within that 
Territory, but is 11ow in Colorado, and wllich was alleged to 
have been gran~ed by the Mexican authorities to said Nolan 
alone in the year 1843. It was investigated by the surveyor 
general, and a report and decision thereon (dated October 8, 
1861) were made by him, affirming its validit,y and recom-
mending its confirmation by Congress. These,withcopies of 
the papers filed in the case, etc., were forwarded to the 
General Land Office, and in .May, 1862, the Secretary of the 
Interior laid the same before Congress. (Ex. Doc. No.l12, 
House of Representatives, Thirty-seventh Congress, second 
session.) 
The latter claim was numbered 48. The former, though 
numbered 9 in Ex. Doc. No. 28, cited above, is elsewhere des-
ignated and is now known as claim No. 39. 
By a resolution of the House of Representatives, adopted 
February 10, 1868, at second session of the ~.,ortieth Con-
gress, both of these claims, along with several others that 
had previously been reported upon by the surveyor-general 
of New Mexico and laid before Congress, were referred to the 
Committee on Private Land Claims, with direction to report 
by bill or otherwise. On July 1, 1868, the committee sub-
mitted a report to the House, recommending that certain of 
the claims be confirmed, but for reasons therein stated the 
two Nolan claims, numbered 39 and 48, were" withheld for 
further investigation." (Report No. 71, House Reports of 
Committees; Fortieth Congress, second session.) 
In regard to claim No. 39, no report thereon has since been 
made by that committee to the House, nor has any action 
whatever affecting the same since been taken by Congress, 
unless such action appears in what follows. 
During the first session of the Forty-first Congress, namely, 
on lVIarch 29, 1869, a bill (H. R. No. 314) was introduced in 
the House to confirm the title of the heirs of Gervacio Nolan 
to certain lands in the Territory of Colorado, and was there-
upon referred to the Committee on Private Land Claims. 
This bill embraced only lands which were co\ered by claim 
No. 48. It was reported back by the committee, with amend-
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ments, on April 23, 1870, during the second session of the 
same Congress, accompanied Ly an elaborate report recom-
mending the confirmation of that claim to the extent of 11 
square leagues, and was then discussed but not put on its 
passage. (See Congressional Globe, vol. 91, pp. 2932 et seq.) 
Neither in that report nor in the discussion on the bill is any 
reference made to claim No. 39. 
A few days later, on the 26th of April, 1870, a bill in terms 
the same precisely as the one before the House, just adverted 
to, was introduced in the Senate (S. No. 843) and referred to 
the Committee on Private Land Claims. Shortly afterward 
it was reported back without amendment, the Senate Com-
mittee, in so doing, accompanying the same with the report 
that had been made by the House Committee as above, which 
was adopted by the former committee. The bill was passed 
by the Senate as reported~ June 14, 1870 (see Congressional 
Globe, Yol. 92, p. 4415). It also passed the House, without 
amendment, June 29, 1870, and became a law. In the pro-
ceedings which took place on the bill in either body, claim 
No. 39 is not mentioned. The law thus enacted is the act of 
July 1, 1870, chapter 202, entitled "An act to confirm the 
title of the heirs of Gervacio Nolan, deceased, to certain 
lands in the Territory of Colorado." • 
By the :first section of this act the grant to the said Nolan, 
designated as number 48, is confirmed to the extent of 11 
square leagues. The second and third sections provide for 
adjusting the exterior lines of the llleagues so confi.rmed, and 
the claims of actual settlers falling within the limits thereof, 
etc., also for running the public surveys within the grant, 
etc. The fourth section is as follows: ''That upon the ad-
justment of said claim of the heirs of Gervacio Nolan, accord-
ing to the provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the 
surveyor-general of the district to furnish properly approved 
plats to said claimants or their legal representatives, which 
shall be·evidence of title, the same to be done according to 
such instructions as may be given by the Commissioner of 
the General Land Office: P'rovided, however, That when said 
lands are so confirmed, surveyed, and patented, they shall 
be held and taken to be in full satisfaction of all further 
claims or demands against the United States." 
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The question to which reference is hereinbefore made is 
this: Whether the proviso in the last-named section should 
be construed to include claim numhf'r 39 aforesaid. On its 
de.termination depends the point whether a restoration of the 
lands embraced in that claim to settlement and entry under 
the general land laws is warranted. If the claim is within 
the proviso, then it may well be deemed that the'' final action 
ofCongress, within the meaning of the act of1854, bas already 
been bad thereon, and that the provision of the same act, 
requiring the reservation of lands co-yered by such claims, 
no longer applies thereto. On the other hand, if the claim 
is not within the proviso, the provision of the act of 1854, 
just mentioned, still remains applicable to it, and the require-
ment thereof ought not to be disregarded. 
The language employed in the proviso, taken literally, is 
broad enough to include all manner of claims against the 
United States. But it was manifestly not intended to be so 
understood. It must be viewed as used with respect to the 
particular subject with which Congress was dealing, and is 
accordingly to be understood in a less general sense. 
There is nothing in the act of 1870 itself, nor in the pro-
ceedings that preceded its enactment, which indicates that, in 
passing it, any other matter was considered and acted upon 
by Congress than claim number 48, and the claims of actual 
settlers within the limits thereof. That claim, as stated in 
the report to the House, made at the second session of the 
Forty-first Congress, embraced about 1,000,000 acres, and it 
is confirmed for less than 50,000 acres. The proviso would 
undoubtedly operate upon claims or demands upon the Gov. 
ernment .relating to the unconfirmed portion of said claim, 
if any such were made. But can it fairly be regarded as 
extending to claim number 39-notwitbstanding the absence 
of any reference thereto in the act or in the above-mentioned 
proceedings ~ While the latter circumstance in some degree 
favors the negative of this question, there are other circum-
stances which, to my mind, bear even more strongly in the 
same direction. 
Claim number 39, as regards Nolan, is partly original and 
partly derivative. It rests upon an alleged grant to him and 
two other persons, Aragon and Lucero, whose interests in 
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the_premises be is said to have acquired by purchase. The 
grant, when made, may have been invalid as to him (in view 
of his previous graut) under the Mexican colonization laws, 
but valid (at least for not exceeding 11 square leagues each) 
as to the other grantees; in which case a claim under them 
would be good, whether made by Nolan or any one else. Such 
claim might be prosecuted for confirmation in the names of 
the original grantees (United States v. Sutter, 21 How., 170), 
as it is only their title, or rather the original grant, with which 
Congress is concerned. Thus claim number 39 is, in the eye 
of Congress, not a claim of Nolan simply, but one of Nolan, 
Aragon, and Lucero, and viewed in that light it seems hardly 
reasonable to infer, from the mere generality of terms used 
in a statutory provision having sole reference to a claim of 
the former description, embracing the right or title of a sin-
gle individual, an intention on the part of Congress that such 
provision should also apply to a claim of the latter character, 
comprising rights or titles of different individuals. 
A proviso similar in. terms to that contained in the act of 
1870 is found in section 3 of the act of March 3, 1869, chap-
ter 152, entitled, "An act to confirm certain private land 
claims in the Territory of New Mexico." In this act it is de-
clared that the confirmation thereby made" shall only be 
construed as a quit-claim or relinquishment of all title or 
claim on the part of the United States to any of the lands not 
improved by or· on behalf of the United States, and not in-
cluding any military or other reservation embraced in either 
of said claims," etc. Here the claims designated in the act 
were confirmed for the entire area of each, excepting lands 
within the limits thereof which were improved as aforesaid, 
or included in any military or other reservation, and the sole 
object of the proviso would seem to be to cut off any addi-
tional claims that might be made for the lands so excepted. 
The proviso in the act of 1870 was doubtless copied from the 
one in the act of 1869, and was probably designed only to 
effect a like object with the latter, namely to bar all further 
claims in respect of the unconfirmed portion of the particu-
lar grant mentioned in the statute, i: e., number 4§. 
The fore2'oing considerations lead me to the conclusion that 
the proviso in the act of' 1870, which is the one in question,. 
I 
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should not be construed to include claim number 39, and that 
as to this claim there has not as yet been any " final action 
of Congress." 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
ALLOTMENTS OF LAND TO INDIANS. 
The allotments of land to Indians provided for by the act of Februar) 
8, 1887, chapter 119, should, under the requirements of the third section 
of that act, be made jointly by an agent specially appointed for that 
purpose and the agent in charge of the reservation. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 4, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 16th of April, 1887, addresserl to 
me, states: 
"In the preliminary steps taken by this Department for 
the execution of the law of the 8th of Febrt1ary, 1887, for al-
lotments of lands to Indians, the question has arisen whether 
the law requires that allotments to Indians on each reserva-
tion shall be made jointly by a special agent and the agent 
in charge, or whether the agent in charge of each reservation 
shall be required to make the allotments on the reservation 
or reservations under his charge; or whether the work of 
making the allotments may be performed by the agents in 
charge of reservations or by special agents appointed for that 
purpose, as in the judgment of the Executive the best inter-
ests of the service may require." 
The law to which you refer is an act for the partition of 
lands held by the Indian tribes among the individual Indians 
to be held in severalty. The first section provides for the 
survey and the amount to be set apart to each. The second 
section describes how and by whom the selections of lat1ds 
shall be made. The third how and by whom the lands after 
selection shall be allotted and certified. 
The objeet of the act is far-reaching and important. The 
duties to be performed in the allotments in many instances 
may be difficult and delicate, requiring a high order of dis-
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cretion and intelligence. The third section, which provides 
for the allotment, is "That the allotments provided for in this 
act shall be made by special agents appointed by the Presi-
dent for stwh purpose, and the agents in charge of the re-
spective reservations on which the allotments are directed to 
be made, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary 
of the Interior may from time to time prescribe, and shall be 
certified by such agents to the Commissioner of Indian A.:fl'airs, 
in duplicate, one copy to be retained in the Indian Office and 
the other to be transmitted to the Secretary of the Interior 
for his action, and to be deposited in the General Land Office." 
The language," the allotments * * • shall be made by 
speCial agents appointed by the President for such purpose, 
and the agents in charge of the respective reservations," is 
in the conjunctive. That the special agents shall be ap-
pointed for that purpose implies that in the allotment the 
agent in charge of the reservation whose appointment was 
not made with reference to special qualifications for this new 
and responsible duty should be joined in its discharge by an-
other, in whose appointment the very work to be performed 
would be had in view by the President, and the selection of 
the appointee made with express reference to his qualifica-
tion for that work. The distinction between the selection of 
the land provided for in section 2, which may be made by 
one agent, and the allotment provided for in section 3, 
which requires two, is recognized in the latter part of the 
proviso to section 2, which clearly indicates that they are 
different and successive steps in the proceedings for partition. 
In· reply to your inquiry it is therefore concluded the act 
requires the allotment should be made jointly by an agent 
specially appointed for that purpose and the agent in charge 
of the reservation. 
I am, sir, yours, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SEORETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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FOREIGN CONSUL. 
A foreign consul, resident in the United States, must look for protection 
in his person and property to the laws of the State in which be re-
sides. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 5, 18~7. 
SIR: In reply to your communication of the 21st of April, 
1887, calling my attention to certain complaints of the Im-
perial German consul at Cincinnati, Ohio, I beg to say that 
as the case does not come within section 4062, Revised Stat-
utes of the United States, the consul must look for protec· 
tion to the laws that protect the rights of the community in 
which he resides. The laws that protect the President of 
the United States in his person and property are the same 
as those that protect the humblest citizen, and if the per-
sonal or property rights of that high functionary should ever 
be violated in the city of Cincinnati he would have to look 
for prot tion to the laws of the State of Ohio. Certainly 
a foreign consul can not justly complain that he is not better 
protected than the highest officer of the Government of the 
United States. 
It results, then, that the case presented is not one in which 
I can give Assistant United States Attorney Bruce any in-
structions. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
DESIGNS FOR COINS. 
The provisions of section 3510, Revised Statutes, do not authorize the 
Director of the Mint, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, to accept and pay for new designs for existing coins. His author-
ity thereunder, as regards the preparation of original dies, is limited 
to those intended for new coins. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
6, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter inquire : 
" Has the Director of the Mint, with the approval of the Sec-
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retary of the Treasury, authority under section 3510 of the 
Revised Statutes to accept and pay for new designs for ex-
isting coins to be submitted by artists as contemplated in in-
closed circular, or only designs for new coins~" 
Section 3510 provides: "The engravers shall prepare from. 
the original dies already authorized an the working-dies re-
quired for use in the coinage of the several mints, and~ when 
new coins or devices are authorized, shall, if required by the 
Director of the Mint, prepare the devices, models, molds, and 
matrices, or original dies for the same, but the Director of 
the Mint shall nevertheless have power, with the approval of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, to engage temporarily for this 
purpose the services of one or more artists, distinguished in 
their respective departments of art, who shall be paid for 
such service from the contingent appropriation for the mint 
at Philadelphia." 
This is a re-enactment of the eighth section of the" Coin-
age Act of 1873." By it two classes of dies are provided for-
the original dies and the working dies; also two classes of 
coins-those already in circulation and new coins. With ref-
erence to the coins already in circulation, the section assumes 
the original dies have been authorized, as they were by the 
act of 1873 and prior coinage acts. It requires the engraver 
to prepare from the original dies already authorized the work-
ing dies for the old coins. He is not empowered to change. 
The limitation of his power to the preparation of working 
dies is equivalent to a denial of his power to prepare original 
dies, unless further authority be granted by Congress. This 
view is supported by the fact that as to new coins be is ex-
pressly empowered to prepare new dies. The intent of the 
act is doubtless to give stability to the coinage, to avoid the 
changes to which it might be subjected if the power to change 
the die was left to be exercised as often as the taste or judg-
ment of those in charge of the mint might change. The use 
of the coin is intended to be world-wide, as a medium of ex-
change, a measure of value, a standard of value, and a store 
of value. That the whole world should know the coin, its 
nativity, and value upon sight is commercially important. 
Frequent changes in the design or device upon the coin would 
greatly impair its usefulness. If a change became necessary 
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or proper in consequence of the advance of science or taste, 
Oongress determined to hold in its own hands the power to 
determine when the emergency for a change shall have arisen. 
The section therefore only authorizes the preparation of 
working dies by the engraver for existing coins which are 
now in circulation, and the clause as to the preparation of 
original dies by him is limited to new coins. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
The proviso in section 7 of the act of March 3,1883, chapter 121, subject-
ing to a duty of "100 per centum ad valorem upon the actual value 
of the same," coverings of imported merchandise designed for use 
otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of such merchandise to 
the United States, etc., applies to free as wdl as to dutiable importa-
tions. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
]}Jay 9, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 26th of April, 1887, contains the 
following submission: 
''Referring to opinions received from your Department, 
under date of September 17 and 27, and December 1, last, 
relative to the dutiable character of coverings for imported 
merchandise, I have the honor to request a further expres-
sion of your views, as to whether the provisions of the law 
therein considered (section 7, l\Iarch 3, 18S3) apply to such 
coverings of imported free goods as are other than the usual 
and necessary coverings for the transportation. of such goods, 
and which might, if containing dutiable merchandise, be lia-
'ble to duty under the proviso in said section at the rate of 
100 per centum ad valorem." 
Section 7 of the act of 1883 is: "That sections twenty-nine 
hundred and seven and twenty-nine hundred and eight of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States and section fourteen of 
the act entitled 'An act to amend the customs revenue laws, 
and to repeal moities,' approved June twenty-second, eight-
een hundred and seventy-four, be, and the same are hereby, 
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repealed, and hereafter none of the charges imposed by said 
sections or any other provisions of existing law shall be esti-
mated in ascertaining the value of goo·ds to be imported, nor 
shall the value of the usual and necessary sacks, crates, 
boxes, or covering, of any kind, be estimated as part of their 
value in determining the amount of duties for which they are 
liable : Provided, That if any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, 
or coverings of any kind shall be of any material or form 
designed to evade duties thereon, or designed for use other-
wise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the 
United States, the same shall be subject to a duty of one 
hundred per centum ad valorem upon the actual value of the 
same." 
This section is a part of the tariff act of that date. The 
act is a general modification of the tarift' laws. It includes 
in its provisions merchandise both dutiable and free. That 
part of section 7 which precedes the proviso repeals the laws 
imposing and regulating the addition of the value of the cov-
erings as a part of the dutiable value of merchandise on 
which by law duties were imposed. The subject of the enact-
ment in the seventh section, taken alone, does not relate to 
the free list. The question to be solved is, shall the proviso 
receive a restricted interpretation, limiting it to the seventh 
section alone, or an enlarged construction, embracing the 
whole subject of coverings of merchandise referred to in the 
act. The language of the proviso if taken as a guide cer-
tainly included both dutiable and free goods. The proviso 
is, " That if any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings 
of any kind shall be of any material or form designed to 
evade duties thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in 
the bona fide transportation of goods to the United States, 
the same shall be subject to a duty of one hundred per 
centum ad valorem upon the actual value of the same." 
To limit its language to dutiable goods to the exclusion of 
free, it is necessary to interpolate in it after the word "cover-
ings" the words "of dutiable goods," so that it would read 
"that if any packages, sacks, crates, boxes or coverings of 
dutiable goods of any kind," etc. The only fact to warrant 
such interpolation is that the preceding part of the section 
refers to such goods, but this fact is met by the faet that the 
20 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Hospital Point Light Station. 
law as a whole includes both dutiable and free goods. The 
doctrine that all the parts of an enactment must be considered 
in interpreting any clause therein, is especially applicable to 
tariff legislation; for as it usually treats of many different 
subjects, a special qualification which shoulc.l apply to each 
is seldom attached to each, but all, falling within the same 
reason, are generally intended to be covered by a single 
qualification. The reason for the proviso under consider-
ation, which imposed an unusually high duty upon goods 
which are imported as coverings to evade the revenue, or for 
other purposes than as coverings, applies with equal force 
to free as to dutiable goods. This high tax was intended to 
discourage the use, as coverings, of goods intended for other 
uses. The recognition of this intent would be more impor-
tant as to free than dutiable goods; for as duties are not to 
be collected on the former, the processes of appraisement, 
which in many instances are the means by which fraud or 
evasion are detected, are largely inapplicable to free goods. 
The seventh section relieves from duty all coverings not 
within the proviso and places them on the free list. The 
proviso is intended to place a duty on goods which, by their 
use as coverings, are very liable to be by evasion wrongfully 
introduced free, and which should be taxed. 
The language of the law, the reason, and the probable in-
tent, concur in em bracing the free and tbe dutiable goods 
alike in the provisions of the proviso, and it should be so 
administered. 
Very respe~tfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
HOSPITAL POINT LIGHT STATION. 
The grant to the Government of the site of the Hospital Point Light 
Station in Massachusetts, which is bounded by a line running to the 
shore and thence by the shore, etc., does not indude the shore. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 13, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 5th ultimo, inclosing a letter of the 
Light-House Board, and other papers relating to the site of 
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the Hospital Point Light Station in Massachusetts, presented 
for my consideration the question'' as to the rights of the 
United States to a rocky margin between high and low water 
mark adjoining the said site." 
The premises thus described appear to include only the sea-
~hore which forms the easterly and southerly boundary of the 
site in question. 
Under the law of Massachusetts the owner of land bor-
dering on the sea holds to low-water mark, but not extending 
to more than 100 rods below high-water mark (Storer v. Free-
man, 6 Mass., 435). He may alienate upland without the 
shore, or the latter without the former. (Ibid, 439; see also 
Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick., 360; Drake v. Ou,rtis, 1 Cush., 
413). The shore does not pass as appurtenant to the upland. 
(Commonwealth v. Alyer, 7 Cush., 80). 
In the present case, as it seems, the grantor of the light-
bouse site owned both the upland and the shore, and in the 
deed to the Government the premises thereby conveyed are 
thus described: "Beginning at a stone post fixed in the 
ground, etc., and running thence 85 degrees east, * * * 
to the shore, thence by the shore in a southerly and westerly 
direction to meet a line running from said post south 18! 
degrees west * * * to the shore, thence by said last-
mentioned line to said post." 
It was held in thecaseof Storerv. Freeman, above cited, that 
a grant of land bounded by a line running to the shore, and 
thence by the shore to other land, did not include the shore. 
I deduce from the foregoing this result : that under the 
deed granting the light .. house site to the Government it de-
rived no title whatevAr to· the sea-shore bordering on the site, 
but that the title thereto remained in the grantor. Such title, 
however, is subject to the general right of the public for the 
ordinary purposes of navigation until the flats are built upon 
or inclosed. (City of Boston v. Lecraw, 17 How., 426.) 
Had the site been bounded in the deed on or by the sea 
instead of by the shore, the result would have been different. 
This wouldcarrythegrant to low water, and include the shore. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
22 RON. A. H. GARLAND 
Claim of s. B. Peterson. 
CLAIM OF S. B. PETERSON. 
The crew of an American vessel, wrecketl on the South Pacific Ocean, 
were supplied with necessary clothing by a United States consul, who, 
on learning that wages were due them, applied to the master of the 
vessel to pay for the clothing out of the wages due, which the latter 
did. On their arrival in the United States the crew brought suit 
against the owners of the wrecked vessel for their wages, and recovered 
a judgment therefor: .Advised, that such owners have no valid claim 
against the United States for the money paid by the master, as above; 
that their remedy, if any they have, is against the consul and the sure-
ties on his bond. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
j,fay 14, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 21st April, 1887, request-
ing an opinion on the claim of S. B. Peterson, esq., asking to 
have refunded to him by the United States the sum of $218.99, 
being the amount, including costs, decreed against the 
owners of the wrecke<l brig Levi Stevens by the United States 
district court for the district of California in a suit for wages 
brought against said owners by the crew of the said vessel, 
the ground of the claim being that nearly the whole of the 
amount of the wages recovered had, at the time of suit 
brought, been already paid by the master of the said vessel 
to the United States consul at _1\.pia, and by him applied to 
what he claimed to be due for clothing furnished the crew of 
the wrecked vessel. 
The Levi Stevens was wrecked in the South Pacific Ocean 
in November, 1885, on the Suwarrow .Reef. The crew suc-
ceeded in landing on the island of Su warr·ow, where they re. 
mained until the following :March, when they took shipping 
for .Apia, in the island of Samoa, where they arrived in the 
following month of April. 
The United States consul at Apia, Mr. Greenbaum, at-
tended to their wants, supplying them with the necessary 
clothing, amongst other things, and upon learning that 
wages were due them he applied to the master to pay for 
the clothing furnished out of the wages due. This the mas-
ter did as to all of the crew except one, but without their 
assent, he borrowing the necessary money on the credit of 
the owners of the wrecked vessel. 
It is found as a fact in the said case by the district court 
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that the consul, when asked by the crew who was to pay for 
the clothing furnished, replied, "the United States ; " and 
also that the consul, at the time he furnished the clothing, 
had no information that wages were due the crew. 
' It was urged by the owners of the wrecked vessel, in de-
fense to the case made by the libellants, that the payment by 
the master in obedience to the consul's direction or demand 
was, to that extent, a lawful discharge of the amount claimed 
in the libel. 
But the district court did not consider the defense of pay-
ment a valid one, and, proceeding on the ground that the 
case fell within section 4577, Revised Statutes, held that the 
crew were" destitute" in the sense of said section, and so enti-
tled to have their necessities supplied and to be sent home 
at the expense of the United States, and decreed accordingly 
for the several amounts claimed. 
It is upon this state of facts, presented considerably more 
in detail, that l\Ir. Peterson's claim rests. 
In my opinion be bas no valid demand against the United 
States fo~ the money paid by the master of the unfortunate 
vessel to Consul Greenbaum. 
Section 1697, Revised Statutes, provides that ~very consul 
shall, before receiving his commission, give a bond with such 
sureties as the Secretary of State shall approve "for the 
true and faithful accounting for, paying over, and delivering 
up of all fees, moneys, goods, effects, books, records, papers, 
and other property which shall come to his bands, or to the 
hands of any other person to his use as * * * consul 
* "" * under any law now or hereafter enacted; and for 
the true and faithful performance of all other duties now or 
hereafter lawfully imposed upon him as * * "" consul 
* • "" ." And the bond so required "shall be deposited 
with the Treasury." 
Section 1735, Revised Statutes, provides as follows: "When-
ever any consular officer willfully neglects or omits to perform 
seasonably any duty imposed upon him by law, or by any 
order or instruction made or given in pursuance of law, or is 
guilty of any willful malfeasance or abuse of power, or of any 
corrupt conduct in his office, he shall be liable to all persons 
injured by any such neglect or omission, malfeasance, abuse, 
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or corrupt conduct, for all damages occasioned thereby; and 
for all such damages he and his sureties upon his official 
bond shall be responsible thereon to the full amount of the 
penalty thereof, to be sued in the name of the United States 
for the use of the person injured. Such suit, however, shall 
in no case prejudice, but shall be held in entire subordina-
tion to the interests, claims, and demands of the United 
States, as against any officer under such bond, for every will-
ful act o( malfeasance or corrupt conduct in his office." 
Section 1736, Revised Statutes, provides as follows: " If 
any consul or commercial agent neglects or omits to perform 
seasonably the duties imposed upon him by the laws regulat-
ing the shipment and discharge of seamen and the reclama-
tion of deserters on board or from vessels in foreign ports, 
or is guilty of any malversation or abuse of power, he shall 
be liable to any injured person for all damage occasioned 
thereby; and for all malversation and corrupt conduct in 
office he shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than Olle year and by a :fine of not more than ten thousand 
dollars and not less than one thousand." 
It thus appears that Congress has addressed itself with 
some care to the subject of providing security against the 
unfaithfulness of persons holding consular offices, and we 
are not at liberty to say that the provision thus made is not 
entirely adequate. 
It can not be doubted that this legislation was the result 
of the well-settled principle that the United States is not 
liable to its citizens for the consequences of the wrongs or 
shortcomings of its officers. "No government," says 1\fr. 
Justice Miller in Gibbons v. United States (8 Wall., 269, 274), 
"'has ever held itself liable to individuals for the malfeasance, 
laches, or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers and 
agents." The same doctrine bas been often laid dowJ{ by the 
same court (Minturn v. United States, 106 U. S., 437; United 
States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wh., 720; United States v. VanZandt, 
11 Ib., 184; Dox v. Postmaster-General, 1 Pet., :us). 
It is thus very clear that if the claimant, Peterson, bas 
any remedy it is against the consul and the sureties on his 
bond, and not by any possibility against the United States. 
This would seem to dispose of the case. 
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It might be considered as hardly proper if I were to go 
further and indicate an opinion on the abstract question as 
to the meaning of the word "destitute" as used in section 
4577, Revised Statutes, in view of the conflict in that partic-
ular between the Department of State and the United States 
district court for the district of California. The question is 
a judicial one, and should be settled, it would seem, by the 
courts. At the same time, if it were before me as a practical 
.question, I should dispose of it as any other question. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
STEAM ENGINEERS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
Section 7 of the act of February 28, 1887, chapter 272, withdraws from the 
operation of section 6 of that act all steam engineers holding Federal 
or State licenses. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 17, 1887. 
SIR: I have the honor to say, in reply to the question sub-
mitted in the letter of Mr. Commissioner W. B. Webb to 
you of 3d May, 1887, and by you referred to me, that in my 
opinion the seventh section of the act of 28th February, 1887, 
entitled "An act to regulate steam engineering in the District 
of Columbia," withdraws from the operation of the sixth sec-
tion of the act all persons licensed as steam engineers by the 
United St~tes or any State. 
Congress appears to have proceeded on the idea that there 
is no necessity to apply the act to any person who has been 
declared by Federal or State authority competent to act as a 
steam-engineer~ If a persop is fit to run a marine engine, 
there would seem to be no ground to doubt his qualification 
to run a stationary engine. 
This recognition of Federal and State licenses in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was, no doubt, intended to prom?te public 
convenience, but if, as intimated, some State authorities are 
not vigilant enough to prevent the licensing of unfit persons 
as steam engineers, that fact may be a proper ground for 
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amending the law, but it can have no influence in its inter-
pretation. The law must have effect according to the mani-
fest sense of its words, which exempt from its operation all 
engineers holding Federal or State licenses. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE BY ALIENS. 
The provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 340, restricting the 
ownership of real estate in the T~rritories to American citizens, etc., 
apply to mines, these being real estate. 
But stock in a corporation is personalty, and consistently with those pro-
visions an alien may hold shares of stock issued by an American cor-
poration owning mineral lands in the Territories; yet where the hold-
ing by aliens exceeds 20 per cent. of its stock, such corporation can 
neither own nor hold hereafter acquired real estate while such holding 
by aliens in excess of 20 per cent. continues. . 
So an alien may hereafter advance money for the purpose of developing 
mining property in the Territories; but he can not thereby acquire any 
interest in such real estate. 
An alien may lawfully contract with an American owner to work mines 
by a personal contract, contract for hire, or a bona fide lease for a. 
reasonable time. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 20, 1887. 
SIR: A reply to your inquiries must be derived from an 
interpretation of the act of the 3d of March, 1887, entitled 
"An act to restrict the ownership of real estate in the Terri-
tories to American citizens, and so forth" The inquiries are, 
First. Was the act intended to and does it apply to mines Y 
Second. Can aliens lawfully acquire, own, and hold shares 
of stock issued by an American corporation which is the 
owner of mineral lands in the Territories Y 
Third. Would the ad vanceme~t of money by aliens for the 
purpose of developing mining properties be lawful under the 
act! 
Fourth. Can aliens lawfully contract with American own-
ers for working mines or making any proper use of mineral 
lands for a term of years Y 
The first section of the act forbids aliens, who have not de-
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clared their intention to become citizens of the United States, 
and alien corporations, ''to hereafter acquire, hold, or own 
real estate so hereafter acquired, or any interest therein, in 
any of the Territories of the United States or in the District 
of Columbia," except in the cases enumerated in the exception 
and proviso to the section. 
The second section forbids the operating, holding, or own-
ing of such real estate hereafter acquired, by any corporation 
or association in which more than 20 per cent. of the stock 
is or may be owned by persons, corporations, or associations 
not citizens of the United States. 
The third section forbids corporations other than railway, 
canal, or turnpike companies, to hereafter acquire, hold, or 
own more than 5,000 acres of land hereafter acquired, and 
limits railway, canal, and turnpike companies in their acqui-
sition to such lands as may be necessary to the proper opera-
tion of their roads, canals, and turnpikes. 
The fourth section provides for fnrfeiture of the property 
for violations of the provisions of the act. 
The property forbidden to be acquired, held, or owned in 
the first section is "real estate, or any interest therein." The 
term real estate is very comprehensive. It includes lands 
and every estate that may be inherited which is annexed to, 
arises out of, or is exerchmble therein. This term embraces 
agricultural, mineral, desert, and timber lands, and town sites, 
alike. The phrase "any interest therein" is somewhat am-
biguous. It might bear the construction that a lease for 
years is an interest in land; and land is real estate; there-
fore a lease for years is an interest in real estate. 
It admits of another construction: that the words " any 
interest therein" must refer to an interest in real estate; that 
a lease for years, or any estate less than a freehold in land, is 
not real estate, but a chattel real, and is so known in the 
law; that the word "therein" refers to what in law is known 
as real estate, and as a lease for years is not so known it does 
not include a lease. In this view of the act the term would 
signify any proportionate part or interest in what is known 
in law as real property, which, as such, would pass at the death 
of the ancestor to the heir, and not to the administrator or 
executor. 
., 
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It was not the purpose of the law to change the whole 
\ 
policy of the Government to such an extent as to exclude 
emigration and forbid to an alien even a lawful temporary 
residence in the Territories of the Government and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Yet the first construction suggested 
would effect that result. Under it the owner of property 
in the District of Columbia could not lawfully lease, even 
for a month, a dwelling to one not a citizen. The alien 
emigrant to the Territories who had hoped and intended, as a 
citizen in the future, to make his home there, could not lawfully 
obtain a building in which to shelter his family. Such con-
siderations as these enforce the view that the latter construc-
tion is in accordance with the intent of the legislature, and 
that bona fide leases are not intended to come within the 
inhibition of the act. The exception to the first section re-
lieves from its provisions such real estate or interest therein 
as may be acquired in the ordinary course of justice in the 
collection of debts contracted before the passage of the act, 
but those provisions attach with full force to debts contracted 
since its passage. The expression in the second section "no 
corporation :tto * * shall hereafter acquire or hold or own 
any real estate hereafter acquired" relates to all future opera-
tions of any corporation in real estate in the Territories or 
the District of Columbia. It does not divest any rights now 
existing, nor preclude American corporations from holding 
real estate now owned by them, even although more than 
20 per cent. of their stock may be owned by other than citi-
zens; but in case more than 20 per cent. of their stock now 
is, or at any future time should be, held and owned by others 
not citizens or American corporations, while such per cent. 
of stock is so held and owned no further acquisition can be 
made of real estate by any such corporation. The act does 
not deny the right of American owners to borrow money 
from aliens, nor to secure such loans on real estate, but in 
the event of a sale on a future loan the alien creditor could 
not at such sale become a purchaser. 
I therefore reply to the inquiries submitted as follows: 
First. As mines are real estate, or inheritable interests in 
real estate, the act does apply to them. · 
Second. As stock in a corporation is personalty, an alien 
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can lawfully have, own, and hold shares of stock issued by an 
American corporation which is now the owner of mineral 
lands in Territories; but if the holding by aliens exceeds 20 
per cent. such corporation can neither acquire, hold, nor own 
hereafter acquired real estate while more than 20 per cent. 
of stock is held and owned by aliens. 
Third. Under the act, the advancement of money hereafter 
by aliens for the purpose ot developing mining property 
is lawful, but no interest in the real estate can be acquired 
by such advancement, nor would an alien have the right to 
purchase the real estate, nor any interest therein, on a loan 
made since the passage of the act, even if sold on his own 
security or lien. 
Fourth. Aliens may lawfillly contract with American own-
ers to work mines by personal contracts for hire, or by bona 
fide leases for a reasonable time. 
I am, sir, with great respect, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
BRIDGE ACROSS THE MISSOURI AT OMAHA. 
The plans for the bridge authorized by the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 
356, to be built across the Missouri River between the cities of Omaha 
and Council Bluffs, should not be approved by the Secretary of War 
unless they provide for a structure of sufficient strength to bear trains 
of cars drawn by locomotives. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J~tne 2, 1887. 
SIR: An opinion is asked on the point whether the plans 
for the bridge authorized by the act approved March 3, 1887, 
entitled "An act authorizing the construction of a bridge 
across the Missouri River between the cities of Omaha, Nebr., 
and Council Bluffs, Iowa, and for other purposes," can be 
properly approved by the Secretary of War unless they pro-
vide for a structure of strength sufficient to bear trains of 
cars drawn by locomotives. 
It seems clearly the intention of Congress that the bridge 
provided for shall be built in such a way as to accommodate all 
sorts of land-carriage and traffic; ''a combined railway and 
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wagon bridge for the safe and convenient passage of wagons, 
carriages, stock, steam, cable, and street cars, foot passengers, 
and all road travel." 
It was the evident intention of Congress that the bridge 
should be maintained as much for the transit of rail way 
trains as for any other kind of carriages or cars upon paying 
the lawful tolls. 
To allow a bridge to be built not adapted for the use of 
railway companies entitled to use it would be to defeat the 
obvious intention of Congress. 
Very respectfully yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
ACCOUNTS FOR EXPENDITURES BY THE POST-OFFICE 
DEPARTMENT. 
The adjustment of accounts for expenditures of the Post-Office Depart-
ment under the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill 
can be done by such accounting officers in the Treasury Department as 
t.he Secretary of the Treasury may assign to that duty. It is notre-
quired by statute to be performed by the Sixth Auditor. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J~tne 6, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant inquires what officer 
of the Treasury Department is charged with the duty of 
adjusting the accounts for expenditures by the Post-Office 
Department under the legislative, executive, and judicial 
appropriation bill. 
It suggests that there seems to be " doubt and uncer-
tainty in the statutes," and that the adjustment of the ac-
counts has been made by different Treasury officials. 
By section 277, Revised Statutes, .the Sixth Auditor "re-
ceives, audits, and settles all accounts arising in the Post-
Office Department, or relative thereto." His duties are de-
fined. 
There are, however, " other duties in relation to the finan-
cial concerns of the Department" which may be assigned to 
him by the Secretary of the Treasury, but are not his offi-
cial duties unless so assigned. 
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The language of the statute limits his duties "to all ac-
counts arising in the Post-Office Department, or relative 
thereto." Their enumeration in found in sections 277,292, 
293, 294, 295, and 296, Revised Statutes, and section 4, pages 
154 and 224, of the Supplement to the Revised Statutes. 
The fact that these duties are thus enumerated implies an 
exclusive enumeration, and the implication is fortified by the 
reference to "other financial concerns of the Department'' 
that may be his duties also. 
The duties enumerated are his official duties absolutely; 
the "other" duties are not his official duties absolutely. 
The meaning of the phrase, " accounts arising in the Post· 
Office Department, or relative thereto," is significant, consid-
ered apart from the context of the section. These accounts 
are of a fiduciary character, dependent upon the discretion 
of the Postmaster-General under authority of law, and gen-
erally refer to the postal service, and go direct to the Sixth 
Auditor. 
The accounts ofthe disbursing clerk under the legislative, 
judicial, and executive bill are not included among the " ac-
counts arising in the Post-Office Department," as enume-
rated, but are accounts arising directly under the appropri-
ation bill mentioned, are of a determinate character, where 
the discretion of the Postmaster-General is not the control-
ling authority, exc~pt in certain contingent expenses common 
to all disbursing clerks of the executive departments. These 
accounts go to such accounting officers in the Treasury as 
the Secretary of the Treasury may direct. 
Very respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER GENERAL. 
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BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 
Consideration of a. claim presented by Mr. S. C. Reid, jr., on account of 
alleged advances made by him as agent and attorney for claimants, in 
the prosecution of the claim of the owners, officers, and crew of the 
brig General A.rmBt1·ong. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 9, 1887. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the reeeipt of your 
communication of the 6th instaBt, in which yon request an 
opinion from me" on a question of law which has been raised 
before the Department (of State) in relation to the distribu-
tion of the fund in the case of the brig General Armstrong, 
under the act of Oongress approved April 20, 1882." 
I understand that the question relates to the validity of 
1 a claim presented by Mr. S. 0. Reid, jr., against the United 
States on account of certain advances made by him as agent 
and attorney for claimants in the prosecution of a claim of 
~he ''owners, captain, officers, and crew of the General Arm-
strong," but its precise scope I am not sure that I correctly 
apprehend. If,_ therefore, in the opinion that follows, I fail to 
pass upon the exact question you intended to bring to my 
attention, I hope you will make further and specific inquiry. 
The liability of the United States under the act of April 
20, 1882, is measured by the losses which the "captain, own-
ers, officers, and crew" of the General Armstrong sustained 
through the destruction of that brig. 
The liability is to such " owners, captain, officers, and 
crew," their legal representatives or assigns, and if any part 
of the fund now under your control is paid to Mr. Reed it 
must be paid to him for and on account of those to whom it 
has been adjudged. 
In order to warrant such payment to him his authority to 
receive their money must be established. 
The authority claimed by virtue of the documents for-
warded as exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, with your communica-
tion, has been negatived in a well-co~sidered opinion of my 
predecessor, Mr. Brewster, which has been acted on by the 
the Department of State, and in which I COJ}Cur. His claim 
upon the fund by reason of services rendered in the capacity 
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of agent or attorney for the "owners, captain, officers, and 
crew" in creating it were considered~ adjudicated, and liqui· 
dated by your precedessor, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 
The amount of money expended by the agent in the ser-
vice of his principals was as much an element to be consid-
ered in fixing his compensation as the time and skill given 
to their cause. 
It is therefore probable that the compensation allowed 
J\fr. Reid was intended to cover money expended, as well as 
personal service rendered. 
If this is untrue in fact, and if a proper showing for re-
opening the question could B.ave been made at the proper 
time, the decision of your predecessor might have been re· 
viewed. Upon such review, if the authority of the Secretary 
of State to adjudicate the rights of the agent of the "owners, 
captain, officers, and crew" against them and their funds in his 
hands, as held by .Mr. Frelinghuysen, was maintained, the 
question of the amount to which Mr. Reid was entitled by vir-
tue of his service rendered and money expenued in their behalf 
might have been considered and determined de novo. In 
reaching such determination the stipulations in the so-called 
assignment to Captain Reid, as to the amount of his comptm-
sation, would be persuasive only as to the rights of Mr. Reid, 
jr., if proper for consideration at all, since it has been deter-
mined that Captain Reid could not assign his rights and 
powers under that instrument, and therefore that Mr. Reid, 
jr., is not Captain Reid's successor thereunder, but a stranger 
to its provisions. Now, however, it appears that four-fifth 
of the fund has been distributeu to those entitled thereto, 
and you have no further control over it. 
Control of the fund was the only possible ground for any 
adjudication by the Secretary of State of Mr. Reid's right in 
it, and jurisdiction over the right was lost by the distribu-
tion of the fund. 
:Mr. Reid's suggestion that his present claim, which existed, 
if at all, as a charge against the whole fund, be charged upon 
the small balance still in your hands awaiting the call of its 
owner or owners, could not for obvious reason~ be seriously 
entertained, much less adopted. 
If any good ground exists for reopening Mr. Frelinghuy-
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sen's adjudication of this question, and I express no opi!!ion 
upon the subject, a claim by Mr. Reid,jr., for a pro rata pay-
ment out of the balance in your hands or any increase in the 
allowance to him mig·ht be considered. 
Very respectfu Uy, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
IMPROVEMENT OF GREAT KANAWHA RIVER. 
Advised that the provision in the act ?f August 5, 1886, chapter 9~9, 
namely: ''Improving Grtat Kanawha River, West Virginia. Continuing 
Improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thousand :five hundred 
dollars," does not, by implication, authorize the purchase of land for 
said improvement. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 10, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter to me of the 20th of April last states that 
the land originally needed for the site of lock and dam No.2, 
Great Kanawha River, West Virginia, was acquired by deed 
and by condemnation under the ])rovisions of the river and 
barbor act of March 3, 1881, chapter 136; that it is proposed 
to purchase additional land now found to be necessary for 
the same site, and pay for it out of the appropriation made by 
the river and harbor act of August 5, 1886, chapter 929; and 
requests that if such proposed purchase can be legally made 
under the provisions of the last mentioned act, the United 
~tates attorney for the district of West Virginia be instructed 
to prepare an abstract of the title to the premises, etc. 
I have the honor to adv1se you that upon examinat.ion of 
the act of August 5, 1886, I entertain grave doubt whether 
the proposed purchase is authorized thereby. The only pro-
vision made by it for the Great Kanawha appears to be this: 
''Improving Gr~at Kanawha River, West Virginia; con-
tinuing improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thous-
aml five hundred dollars." And unless authority to purchase 
land needed for the improvement is here necessarily implied 
such authority does not exist. 
I find that similar provisions have been regarded bJ· Con-
~ress al'l contait1ing no implication of authority to make pur-
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chases of that character. Thus in the river and harbor act 
of1881 above cited, in which many provisions of that kind 
appear, it was thought necessary to provide in express terms 
that " such parts of the money appropriated by this act for 
any particular improvement requiring locks and dams as 
may be necessary in the prosecution of such improvement 
may be expended in the purchase, Yoluntary or by condem-
nation, as the case may be, of nectssary sites," etc. So in the 
river and harbor act of July 5, 1~84, chapter 229, it is ex-
pressly provided '' that out of the money herein appropriated 
for the Kentucky River the sum of two thousand dollars, or 
so much thereof as may be necessary, may be expended for 
the purchase of land for the construction of lock and dam at 
Beattyville, and so much thereof as may be necessary may 
also be expended for the same purpose at lock number six." 
These provisions of the acts of 1881 and 1884 indicate that 
legislation such as that of the act of 1886 quoted above is not 
meant by Congress to include the purchase of land, and that 
for this something more explicit is required. 
The foregoing considerations seeming to me to render un-
necessary at this time any investigation of title to the prop-
erty which it is proposed to purchase, I have not sent any 
instructions to the United States attorney in reference 
thereto. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
KLAMATH INDIANS. 
The Klamath River, where it flows through the Klamath Indian Reser-
vation, is a navigable stream, in which the Indians occupying that res-
ervation do not have an exclusive right to fish, but only a right in 
common with the public at large. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 11, 1887. 
SIR: The question presented by your communication of 
the 3d June instant arises upon the following state of facts: 
On the 16th November, 1885, the President of the United 
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States set apart as a reservation tor the Klamath Indians " a· 
strip of territory commencing at the Pacific Ocean and ex-
tending 1 mile in· width on each side of the Klamath River, 
for a distance of 20 miles. with the provision, however, that 
upon a survey of the tract a sufficient quantity be cut off 
from the upper end thereof to bring it within the limit of 
25,000 acres authorized by law." (Executive orders relating 
to Indian Reservations, page 3037 ~) 
The Klamath Indians, consisting of about400, are self-sup-
porting and rely for subsistence almost exclusively on the 
salmon with which the Klamath River abounds. 
Within less than a month past a small steamer from Ellens-
burg, Oregon, bas entered the Klamath River with the inten-
tion of fishing in that part of it flowing within the limits of 
the reservation, and as it is feared the Indians may resort to 
violence to repel what they regard as an invasion of their 
rights, an opinion is asked as to the power of the Govern-
ment to protect these Indians in the enjoyment of what they 
claim to be" fishing privileges in the Klamath River within 
the limitM of their reservation." 
The Klamath River has been declared by the legis'lature of 
California to be "navigable from its month to the town of 
Orleans Bar," a point some distance above the eastern and 
upper limit of the reservation. 
The Klamath River being a navigable stream, the public 
have the right to fish there and use it in any other way that 
does not amount to an interruption of or interference with 
interstate or foreign commerce or navigation, or a violation 
of some law of the State of California. 
In the case of McOready v. Virginia (94 U.S., 391, 394), the 
Supreme Co,urt says: " The principle has long been settled 
in this court that each State owns the beds of all tide-waters 
within its jurisdiction unless they have been granted away." 
(PoZlartls Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How., 212; Smith v. Ma.ryla~d, 
18 How., 74; Mumford v. Wardtrell, 6 Wall., 436; Weber v. 
Harbor Oo·mmissioners, 18 id., 66.) In like manner the States 
own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them, so far 
as they are capable of ownership while running. For this 
purpose the State represents its people, and the ownership 
is that of the people in their united sovereignty. (Martin v. 
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JVaddell, 16 Pet., 400.) The title thus held is subject to the 
paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which, in 
respect to foreign and interstate commerce, has been granted 
to the United States. There has been, however, no such 
grant of power over the fisheries. These remain under the 
exclusive control of the State, which has consequently the 
right, in its discretion, to appropriate its tide-waters and 
their beds, to be used by its people as a common for taking 
and cultivating fish~ so far as it may be done withopt ob-
structing na\igation. 
It follows, then, that so long as the acts of persons resort-
ing to these waters to take fish fall short of invading the 
right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
or among the several States, no case for Federal interference 
can be said to exist. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
\ 
TELEPHONE LINES. 
Telephone companies are not within the provisions of title LXV of theRe-
vised Statutes, or entitled to avail themselves of the privileges thereby 
granted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 21, 1887. 
SIR : On the 16th instant you submitted the following : 
" The owner of a system of telephone lines reaching from 
Creur d'Alene, Idaho, via Spokane Falls and other towns to 
Walla Walla, and thence to Pendleton, Oregon, proffers ac-
ceptance of the conditions prescribed in title LXV of the 
Revised Statutes, and solicits the privileges thereby granted 
to telegraph lines; and the question is raised whether such 
a telephone company or line is within the category of the 
grantees of the privileges conferred by that statute. Ire-
;spectfully request your opinion upon the point." 
The subj(':ct of title LXV of Revised Statutes is telegraphs. 
In all its sections the words H telegraph," " telegraph com-
pany," and "telegram," define and limit the subject of the 
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legislation. When the law was made the electric telegraph, 
as distinguished from the older forms, was whatthelaw-makers 
had in view. The ~lectric telegraph, when the law was made, 
as to the general public, transmitted only written communica-
tions. Its mode of conduct is yet substantially the same. 
This transmission of written messages is closely analogous to 
the United States mail service. Hence the acceptance of the 
provisions of the law by the telegraph company was required 
to be filed with the Postmaster-General, who bad charge of 
the mail service. Under the several sections embraced in 
the title, in consideration of the right of way and the grant • 
of the right to pre-erupt 40 acres of land for stations at inter· 
vals of not less than 15 miles, certain privileges as to priority 
of right over the line, also the right to purchase, with power 
annually to fix the rate of compensation, were secured to the 
Government. Go,ernmental communications to all distant 
points are alr:~wstall, if not all, in writing. The useful Govern-
mental privileges which formed an important element in the 
legislation wollld be entirely inapplicable to telephone lines, 
by which oral communications only are transmitted. A pur-
chase of a telephone line certainly was not in the mind of the 
law-makers. In common and technical language alike, tele-
graphy and telephouy ha\~e different significations. Neither 
includes all of the other. The science of telephony as now 
understood was little known as to practical utility in 1866, 
when the greater part of the law contained in the title was 
passed. Telephone companies; therefore, are not within the 
"category of the grantees of the privileges conferred by the 
statute." If similar privileges ought to be granted to tele-
phone companies; such a grant would come within the s~ope 
of legislative rather than administrative power. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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FOREIGN MAIL SERVICE. 
Under section 393, Revised Statutes, the Postmaster-General has power, 
with the approbation of the President, to conclude a postal convention 
with a foreign country for admission to and transmission through the 
mails exchanged with such foreign country of parcels of mail matter of 
either class exceeding 4 pounds in weight. The limitation as to weight 
of mail packages in section 3879, Revised Statutes, applies only to do-
mestic mail service. 
DEP ARTl\fENT OF JUSTICE, 
J'ltne 30, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 27th instant received. You request 
an ''opinion and advice whether the Postmaster-General, by 
and with the advice and consent of the President, under au-
thority of section 398 of the Revised Statutes, can, by a postal 
convention with a foreign country, pro\ide for admission to 
and transmission through the mails exchanged with such for-
eign country of parcels of mail matter of either class exceed-
ing 4 pounds in weight." And you call my attention, in this 
connection, to the Postal Union Convention, wherein a weight 
of 4 pounds and 6 ounces is fixed as a limit. 
Section 398 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows: 
"For the purpose of making bbtter postal arrangements 
with foreign countries, or to counteract their adverse meas-
ures affecting our postal intercourse with them, the Post-
master General, by and with the ad\ice and consent of the 
President, may negotiate and conclude postal treaties or con-
ventions, and may reduce or increase the rates of postage on 
mail matter conveyed between the United States and foreign 
countries." 
The only interpretation that has ever been given totheabo\..,.e 
section of the Revised Statutes wil1 be found in 15 Opinions, 
462, where Mr. Attorney-General Devens, in passing upon 
the authority of the Postmaster-General to negotiate a postal 
convention providing for the payment of indemnity for the 
loss of registered letters, says : 
"In reply, I have the honor to say that the authority given 
to the Postmaster-General, by and with the ad vice and con-
sent of the President, to negotiate and conclude treaties or 
conventions under section 398 cf the Revised Statutes is a 
limited one, and must be construed in connection with the re-
, 
BON. A. H. GARLAND 
Jlorelgn Mall Servlee. 
ntaining provision of the section thathemayreduceor increase 
the rates of postage on mail matter between the U niteu States 
and foreign countries. Undoubtedly, by such a convention, 
such reduction or increase may be agreed upon, and all mat· 
ters may be provided for which are appropriate subjects of 
regulation by the Post-Office DepaP'tment." 
That authority has been conferred on the Postmaster-Gen-
eral under section 398 of the Revised Statutes to provide by 
postal convention with a foreign country for admission to 
and transmission through the mails exchanged with such 
foreign country of parcels of mail matt~r, of either class, ex-
ceeding 4 pounds in weight, can not be doubted. 
These matters are appropriate subjects of regulation by 
the Post-Office Department; and, inasmuch as the statute 
in any case is paramount to any postal convention or treaty 
made pursuant thereto, such authority has not, by reason 
thereof, been abridged. 
An examination of the treaty of the Postal Union Oon-
vention in connection .with section 398, Revised Statutes, 
does not, however, disclose any conflict. No treaty or Postal 
. Union Oonvention has been fount\ subsequent to the one con-
cluded J nne 1, 1878 (20 Stat., 734:). By article 23 of said 
treaty-
" All stipulations of the treaties, conventions, arrangements, 
• • • in so far as those stipulations are not in accordance 
with the terms of the present convention are abrogated, 
without prejudice to the rights reserved by article 15 above." 
By article 15 of the conveption of the Universal Postal 
Union (20 Stat., 743) certain rights are reserved to the conn-
tries which become parties to the same by the signatures of 
their respective representatives. 
The article reads as follows: 
''The present convention involves no alteration in the 
postal legislation of any country as regards anything which 
is not provided for by the stipulations contained in this con-
vention. 
"It does not restrict the right of the contracting parties to 
maintain and to conclude treaties, as well as to maintain 
and establish more restricted unions, with a view to the 
improvement of postal relations." 
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If I understand the question presented by you aright, the 
postal convention or treaty now under consideration, and 
which raises the question of your authority under the sec-
tion of the Revised Statutes referred to, is for the purpose of 
maintaining and establishing a more restricted union with 
a foreign country, which is a party to the Postal Union Con-
vention, with a view to the improvement of postal relations. 
A precedent is found in the agreement made with the Re-
public of France, November 13, 1880, under the reservations 
and in the exercise of power contained in Article XV of the 
convention of the Universal Postal Union, concluded at 
Paris on the lst June, 1878. (21 Stat., 786.) 
Unless there is some act of Congress limiting the grant of 
power conferred on the Postmaster-General by section 398 
of the Revised Statutes, your proposition, considered in con-
nection with such section and the Postal Union Convention, 
must be answered in the affirmative. 
The only limitation as to the weight of mail packages is 
found in section 3879 of the Revised Statutes, which pro-
vides that" No package, weighing more than four pounds, 
shall be received for conveyance by mail, except books pub-
lished or circulated by order of Congress." 
By a careful examination of sections 398 and 3879 of the 
Revised Statutes it will be seen that they were enacted for 
different purposes, and the latter does not limit the provis-
ions of the former. The former relates to the foreign and 
the latter to the domestic mai.l service. That such was the 
intention of Congress is shown by the manner the respective 
sections were originally enacted, as well as by the manner 
of their transfer into the revision of the statute laws. 
In the Revised Statutes, section 398 appears in Title IX 
which prescribes the general powers of the Postmaster-Gen. 
eral, as well as the duties of subordinate officers of the Post-
OffiJe Department, but section 3879 is placed in chap_ter 3 of 
Title XL VI which regulates domestic mail matters. This 
clearly shows the distinct objects of the two sections. And 
this view of the intention of Congress is further sustained by 
examination and consideration of the act of June 8, 1872, 
chapter 335 (17 Stat., 301, 304). 
Sections 134 and 167 of the act of June 8, 1872, correspond 
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with sections 398 and 3879 of the Revised Statutes. The re-
spective positions in which the two sections are placed in the 
act of June 8, 1872, show that it was not intended to make 
the one limit the powers granted b~· the other, or that there 
should necessarily be an~· material connection between the 
same. 
Upon careful examination of the question I have reached 
the conclusipn that section 398 relates to the foreign and sec-
tion 3879 to the domestic mail service, and that such sections 
were enacted for distinct objects. 
This construction gives full force and operation to these 
sections of the same act, which is one of the elementary rules 
of construing statutes. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that you have the power, 
under section 398, ReviRed Statutes, by and with the advice 
and consent of the President, to conclude a postal conven· 
tion for the purpose mentioned in your communication. 
Respectfully, 
I A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
KANSAS AND ARKANSAS VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY. 
Under thf'l act of June 1, 1886, chapter 395, authorizing the Kansas and 
Arkansas Valley Railway Company to construct a railroad through 
the Indian Territory, that company has no right to go beyond the limits 
of the right of way therein prescribed for the purpose of taking timber 
or other materials for the construction of such railroad. 
The courts named in the eighth section of that act have jurisdiction over 
controversies between said company and the Cherokee Nation growing 
out of the takipg of timber and other materials by the former beyond 
said limits. But the ri~ht of the Cherokees to go into court does Jtot 
diminish in any degree the duty of the Executive Department of the 
Government to use its power for their protection. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,• 
June 30, 1887. 
Sm: The questions submitted by your communication of 
the 16th instant, growing out of the claim of the Kansas and 
Arkansas Valley Railway, Company to have authority to go 
outside of the limits of their right of way through the reser· 
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vation of the Cherokee Nation of Iudians and. take from the 
reservation such timber and other materials as may be 
needed for the construction of its railway, are as follows: 
"Whether under the grant contained. in the act the eom-
pauy is authorized to proceed with the work of construction, 
taking material of earth, sand, stone, and timber for that 
purpose from the common domain outside of but adjacent to 
the right of way, or whether the disputes now existing be-
tween the company and the nation in relation thereto are 
not properly referable to the courts under the eighth section 
of the act above quoted; and, if so, what, if any, action shall 
be taken by the Department looking to permission or prohi-
bition of construction pending judicial decision on the point 
at issue." 
The Kansas and Arkansas Valley Railway Company is 1a 
corporation created by the State of Kausas, and its authority 
to project, build, and operate a railway through that part of 
the Indian Territory reserved for the use of the Cherokee 
Nation is derived from an act of Congress approved 1st June, 
1886, chapter 395, entitled "An act to authorize the Kansas 
and Arkansas Valley Railway to construct and operate a rail-
way through the Indian Territory, and for other purposes." 
(Pamphlet laws, 1885-'86, p. 73.) 
I shall first address myself to the question whether it was 
the intention of Congress by the act referred to to give this 
company authority to leave the limits of their easement over 
the reservation for the purposes above mentioned. 
As it will be found to have some bearing on this question, 
I propose to begin by considering, briefly, the character of 
the title by which the Cherokee Nation holds the country 
traversed by the line of the railway. 
The Cherokees were among the most powerful of the 
aboriginal nations, and occupied the principal part of the 
country now comprising the States of North aud South Caro-
lina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. It was as the re-
sult of several treaties that they relinquished that great do-
main and were finally seated in comparatively limiteu terri-
tory now occupied by them, and which was accepted by them 
as an oxchange for the territory they had abandoned and 
ceded to the United States. 
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The territory thus accepted, the United States, by repeated 
treaties, pledges its faith shall be a " permanent home " 
(treaty 28 May, 1828, preamble, 7 Stat., 311) to the Cherokees, 
and "be and remain theirs forever" (ibid.), and guaranties 
them "the quiet and peaceable possession of their country," 
and that it shall be conveyed to them by patent subject to 
the single condition that the lands ceded shall "revert to 
the United States" in case the Indian grantees shall become 
extinct or shall abandon them. (Treaty 12th April, 1834, 7 
Stat., 414; act 28 May, 1830, sec. 3, 4 Stat., 411.) 
It was in the state of things produced by these treaties 
that Congress passed the act of 1st June, 1886. 
The first section provides " that the Kansas and Arkansas 
Valley Railway, a corporation created under and by virtue 
of the laws of the State of Arkansas, be, and the same is 
hereby, invested and empowered with the right of locating, 
cobstructing, owning, equipping, operating, using and main-
taining a railway and telegraph and telephone line through 
the Indian Territory," and then goes on to name the terminal 
points and courses of the main and branch lines. 
The second section is in these words: 
''That said corporation is authorized to take and use for 
all purposes of a railway, and for no other purpose, a right of 
way one hundred feet in width through said Indian Territory 
for said main line and branch of the Kansas and Arkansas 
Valley Railway, and to take and use a strip of land two hun-
dred feet in width, with a length of three thousand feet, in 
addition to right of way, for stations for every ten miles of 
road with the right to use such additional ground where 
there are heavy cuts or fills as may be necessary for the con-
struction and maintenance of the road-bed, not exceeding 
one hundred feet in width on each side of said right of way, 
or as much thereof as may be included in said cut or fill: 
Provided, That no more than ~aid addition of land shall be 
taken for any one station: Provided further, That no part 
of the lands herein authorized to be taken shall be leased 
or sold by the company, and they shall not be used except 
in such manner and for such purposes only as shall be neces-
sary for the construction and convenient operation of said 
railroad, telegraph, and telephone lines ; and when any por-
I 
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tion thereof shall cease to be so used, such portion shall re-
vert to the natiou or tribe of Indians from which the same 
shall have been taken." 
With the exception of the eighth section, which will be 
considered with some particularity furtller on, the other sec-
tious of the law have no application to the questions sub-
mitted, and therefore call for no further reference. 
It appears, then, that if the right exists, as claimed, of 
going outside of the limits of the right of way granted for 
the purpose of taking timber or other materials for the con-
struction of the railway, it must be found somewhere in the 
first or second sections or both together. 
Looking then at the first section, I do not think it possible 
to infer such a right in the company from the power given It 
to locate, construct, own, equip, Ollerate, use and maintain a 
railway and telegraph and telepllone line, because the grant 
of power to do any or all those things does not involve a 
grant by implication of the materials, any more than of the 
money, which the company must be able to command before 
it can put in operation the faculties so derived. I have 
never understood that granting a license to do a thing en-
tailed the further duty of putting the licensee in a condition 
to enjoy his privilege. As well might it be said that the 
language of this particular section afforded ground for the 
claim of an obligation on the part of the government to 
indorse the bonds of the company. 
Coming now to the second section, I see nothing whatever 
that looks to a rigllt in the company to go beyond the limits 
therein designated; on the contrary, I discover a plain indi-
cation of purpose that the company shall keep within those 
limits. It is authorized ''to take and use for all the purposes 
of a railway, and for no other purpose, a right of way one 
hundred feet in width," with an additional width for stations, 
etc., language which, to my mind, is quite at war with any 
co-existent right in the company to overstep the boundaries 
given in the law. 
Indeed, Congress, as if to prevent implications of any sort 
in a matter so delicate as that of giving a right of way 
through lands covered by a go\ernment patent or its full 
iquivalent, a treaty operating as a grant, has taken care to 
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be express in a particular where, if it had remained silent, an 
implication of a right in the company to cross the limits of 
the easement might possibly have been raised; for it has 
said that in cases where ''heavy cuts and fills" require more 
than the prescribed width, the company may use the addi-
tional land necessary "not exceeding one h~tndred feet in 1oidth 
on each side of said 'tight of way." This looks very much like 
a manifestation of purpose that nothing shall pass to the 
company that is not granted by express language. 
I am, therefore, unable to find any support for the com-
pany's claim in the second section. 
This brings me to the second question, namely, whether 
the disputes between the Cherokee Nation and the railway 
company, growing out of the latter's taking timber and other 
materials outside the limits of the easement, are not to be 
compared and settled by the courts under the eighth section 
of the act, "and, if so, what, if any, action shall be taken by 
the Department looking to permission or prohibition of con-
struction pending judicial decision on the point at issue." 
The eighth section, to which you refer, is as follows : 
"That the United States circuit and district courts for the 
western district of Arkansas and the district of Kansas, 
and such other courts as may be authorized by Congress, 
shall have, without reference to the amount in controversy, 
concurrent jurisdiction over all controversies arising between 
said Kansas and Arkansas Valley Railway and the nations 
and tribes through whose territory said railway shall be con-
structed. Said courts shall have the jurisdiction, without ref-
erence to the amount in controversy, over all controversies 
arising between the inhabitants of said nations or tribes and 
said railway company; and thecidl jurisdiction of said courts 
is hereby extended within the limits of said Indian Territory, 
without distinction as to citizenship of the parties, so far as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act." 
The language of this section is so broad that I can not 
doubt it was the purpose of Congress to give the courts 
therein named jurisdiction over such a controversy as the 
Cherokees have with the .railway company for trespassing 
on their domain; but I do not understand that the right of 
the Cherokees to go into court, thus conferred, diminishes in 
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any degree the duty of the Executive Department of the 
United States to use its authorit;y to protect them against 
what the Department may regard as violations of their rights. 
And to this end the Department has the remedies at hand 
that are provided by law for the protection of the Imliaus 
under its general control and supervision. 
If convinced the company is violating the rights of the 
Indians, you should notify it to desist, and to make repara-
tion for any damage it may have already done ; and failing 
to do this according to your notice, and the facts sent to this 
Department, proper steps will be taken in the premises. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
By the provisions of the act of February 4, 1887, chapter 104, creating 
the InteTstate Commerce Commission, the terms of the five Commie· 
sioners first appointed thereunder must be comp'uted from January 1, 
1887, although their appointments were made March 22, 1887. 
But they are entitled to draw pay only from the time they entered upon 
the discharge of their duties respectively. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 5, 1887. 
SIR : Your letter of the 28th ultimo submits for opinion 
two questions: (1) "When1 under the interstate-commerce 
law, the terms of the Commissioners begin," and (2) "from 
what date are they entitled to draw their salary~" 
The eleventh section of the act of Congress entitled ''A.n 
act to regulate commerce," approved 4th .February, 1887 (Acts 
Second SessionForty-ninth.Oongress, Pamphlet Edition, page 
379), provides "That a commission is hereby created and 
established, to be known as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, which shall be composed of five commissioners who 
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The Commissioners first ap· 
i>Ointed under this act shall continue in office for the term of 
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· two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the 
first day of January, anno Domini eighteen hundred and 
eighty-seven, the term of each to be designated by· the Presi-
dent ; but their successors shall be appoin,ted for terms of six 
years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall 
be appointed only for the unexpired term of the Commis-
sioner whom he shall succeed." 
On the22d March, 1887, the President, pursuant to this law, 
appointed five Commissioners to serve respectively for the 
periods of two, three, four, five, and six years from the 1st 
,January, 1887, who have all entered on the duties of their 
Qffice, but I am not informed when they did so respectively~ 
As the law provides that the Commissioners'' first ap-
pointed" shall continue in office for a ''term" to be computed 
from the 1st of January, 1887, and that ''the term of each 
shall be designated by the President," I have no doubt that 
reference must be bad to the 1st of January, 1887, as the point 
from which to reckon the official term of each of these first 
appointees, although his appointment did· not take place, in 
fact, until the 22d of 1.\-farch, 1887, for such is the clear inten-
tion of Congress, and effect must be giYen to it. It is true 
that it does not often occur that the term of a civil office 
covers a period during which the appointee could not have 
performed service, but such a thing is very common in the 
military and naval service, where increased rank is freque~tlY. 
conferred on an officer from a date sometimes years anterior 
to the appointment that conferred it. 
Having now disposed of the first question, I am brought 
to the second, as to the time from which the Commissioners 
are entitled to draw their salaries. 
It by no means follows that because their term of office 
begins on the 1st day of January, 1887, the Commissioners 
are entitled to be paid from that day. On the contrary, it 
, has been settled by a long and unshaken usage of the Gov-
ernment, supported by repeated opinions of my predecessors, 
that when Congress is silent on the subject, an officer's salary . 
begins only from the time when he commences to do some 
official act, or, in some cases, particularly in the Army and 
Navy, presents himself for assignment to duty. This is well 
illustrated by the case ()f Judge Brocchus, who was appointed 
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a Territorial judge, but having, for some reason, failed to 
qualify, was superseded. His claim for pay was denied on 
the ground that he had not taken the oath of office or en-
tered upon its duties, although he had formally accepted the 
appointment. (10 Opin., 308.) 
This practice has been steadily adhered to in cases arising 
in the Army and Navy where claims have been made for the 
pay of an increased rank during the interval between the 
date from which the rank took effect, by relation, to the date 
of the appointment, except in cases where the officer pro·moted 
has in fact pmformed the d'ltty proper to the increased rank 
d'ltring the interval and was legally assignable to that duty. 
So, also, when an officer improperly dismissed from the serv-
ice has been restored with the rank to which he would have 
been entitled had the injustice not been committed, it has 
been uniformly held that a claim for pay during the time be 
was out of the service was not maintainable, in the absence 
of some statute to that effect. 
Said lVIr. Attorney-General Clifford in Du, Barry's case (4 
Opin., 608) : "It would be absurd to hold that the pay of an 
officer might commence before he was appointed or commis-
sioned, and equally so to allow him to receive compensation 
under his commission when no service had been rendered to 
the Government for a period of time before it was in exist-
ence. The rule, if adopted, would authorize the Executive 
to bestow gratuities to an alarming extent without the con-
sent of the House of Representatives, and that, too, as it 
seems to me, in direct violation of law and of the Constitu-
tion." See also 2 Opin., 27, 638; 3 Opin., 105, 124,641; 4 Opin., 
123, 256, 318, 348; 5 Opin., 132; 7 Opin., 304; 10 Opin., 250, 
where the positions above taken are fully sustained. The 
opinion of Mr. Attorney-General Cushing in 7 Opinions 
(supra) would seem to meet the question directly. 
So that the statute creating the Commission, for certainty 
and uniformity, fixes the period at which the terms of the 
Commissioners shall commence; but being silent as to when 
their pay shall begin, we are left to the general principle upon 
which such question has heretofore been determined. 
It follows, then, that the Commissioners under the inter-
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state-commerce law can draw pay only from the time they 
entered upon their duties respectively. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
CHIRIQUI IMPROVEMENT COMPANY. 
The instrument (set out in the opinion) signed by Ambrose W. Thomp-
son, for himself and the Chiriqui Improvement Company, and Isaac 
Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, dated May 21, 1859, is in no sense a 
contract obligatory upon the United States. 
The appropriation of $200,000, made by the act of March 3, 1881, chap-
ter 133, "To enable the Secretary of the Navy to establish at the Isth-
mus of Panama naval stations and depots of coal for the supply of 
steam-ships of war," bas no application thereto. 
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 7, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 23d June last presents 
for opinion the following case : 
By an act approved 3d 1\iarch, 1881 (21 Stat., 448), being 
the sundry civil appropriation act, it was, amongst other 
things, provided as follows: 
"To enable the Secretary of the Navy to establish at the 
Isthmus of Panama naval stations and depots of coal for the 
supply of steamships of war, two hundred thousand dollars, 
to be available for expenditure as soon as suitable arrange-
ments can be made to the proposed end." 
The money thus appropriated has never been applied to the 
object mentioned in the law, although still available for that 
purpose. 
It IS claimed by the Isthmus Pacific Railway Compan~T' as 
the repre:sentative or successor of the Chiriqui Improvement 
Company, and the claim is pressed with much industry, that 
this appropriation of $200,000 was intended by Congress to 
be paid as the consideration for the benefits secured to the 
Government by an alleged contract made by the United 
States through Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, of the 
:first part, and the Chiriqui Improvement Company and 
Ambrose W. Thompson, of the second part, on the 21st 
May, 1859, which is in the following words : 
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''This indenture, made this twenty-first day of }_\,fay, A. D. 
1859, between the United States, acting by and through 
Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy of the United States, 
of the first part, and the Chiriqui Improvement Company and 
Ambrose W. Thompson, of the second part, witnesseth: 
"That, whereas, the said Chiriqui Improvement Compalty 
and the said Thompson have become possessed of certain 
grants, concessions, privileges, rights, and properties, at the 
isthmus of and in the province of Chiriqui, in the Republic 
of New Granada, as appears by the original title thereto, 
copies of which are hereto appended; and, whereas, it is 
desirable that the United States on the one part should have 
the right of transit over the roadway granted direct to said 
Ambrose W. Thompson through said pro\""ince and extending 
from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and the further 
right to use as harbors the waters, gulfs, bays, or lagoons, 
sheltered or partially surrounded by the lands of the said 
Thompson or the said improvement company, and the further 
right to use the coal contained in portions of said lands for 
naval purposes, as also the right to establish coal depots and 
naval stations. 
"Therefore, in consideration of the payments and cov-
enants hereinafter stipulated and set forth, it is mutually 
agreed between the parties aforesaid as fol1ows: 
"First. The United States for the consideration herein-
after named shall have and enjoy a right of way or transit 
over said right which is hereby granted to them by the party 
of the second part, free from all tolls or taxes upon officers, 
agents, seamen, landsmen, mails, munitions, stores, troops, 
or any direct property of the United States which the Gov-
ernment thereof may transport or cause to be transported 
over the said road during the continuance of the present 
grant made by the said Province of Chiriqui to the said Am-
brose W. Thompson. 
" Second. It is hereby agreed by and between the said par-
ties of the first and second part that there shall be selected 
and set apart such lands, not exceeding 5,000 acres, on each 
side of the Province or Isthmus of Chiriqui as may be neces-
sary for said United States for coal depots and naval sta-
tions at the Lagoon of Chiriqui and the Harbor of Golfito, 
I 
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the same to be located at such points as will secure good 
and sufficient depots and stations to the United States 
without impairing the general value of any site for city or 
cities which may be laid off by said party of the second part 
op any of said lands. The said lands to be selected and de-
signated either on the main land or island or both, as the 
United States may determine, and within twelve months 
from the date hereof; and the said party of the second part 
hereby conveys the said lands to be so selected to the United 
States, together with all the timber thereon, and covenants 
to execute such further conveyances as may be necessary to 
vest in them a good and sufficient title as derived from the 
said grants. 
"Third. The United States shall have the right, and the 
same is hereby conveyed, to use as harbors the waters of the 
lagoons, bays, or gulfs, sheltered or partially surrounded by 
the lands of the said Thompson or the said Chiriqui Improve-
ment Company on the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the afore-
said Isthmus, and in the bays and gulfs wherever the lands 
of the said Thompson or said company may extend. 
"Fourth. The United States shall have the right, and 
the same is hereby conveyed, to all coal for naval purposes, 
at or near the points selected for coal depots and naval 
stations, as aforesaid, but if coal shall be found of supe-
rior quality for steam purposes in other places than those 
so selected, then the United States shall have the right, and 
the same is hereby conveyed, to use the same, subject only 
to the tax of one dime per ton, as provided to be paid to the 
provincial authorities of Chiriqui, in the grant aforesaid, and 
the cost of mining and delivering the same. 
"Fifth. The United States hereby agree, in consideration 
of the grant of a right of way and free transit over the said 
road and for the harbors, lands, mines, concessions,- privi-
. leges, rights and enjoyments, hereby made and conveyed to 
them, to pay to the said Ambrose W. Thompson, for himself 
and said Chiriqui Improvement Company, the snm of three 
hundred thousand dollars; provided Congress shall approve 
this contract and make the necessary appropriations there-
for at its next session, otherwise this contract shall be void. 
''In witness wher.eof, the said Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the 
, 
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Navy, for and on the part of the United States Government, 
and the said Ambrose W. Thompson, for himself and as the 
duly authorized attorney in fact for the said Chiriqui Im-
provement Company, have signed, sealed, acknowledged, 
and delivered this agreement in duplicate the day, month, 
and year first herein written.. 
"AMBROSE W. THOMPSON, [L. s.] 
"For himself and the Chiriqui Improvement Company. 
"In presence of-
"ISAAC TOUCEY, rL. s.] 
"Secretary of the Navy. 
"0HAS. W. WELSH." 
, On the 22d June, 1860 ( 12 Stat. 83), Congress appropriated 
$10,000 "to enable the President to send some competent 
person or persons to the Isthmus of Chiriqui, whose duty it 
shall be to examine into and report upon the quality and 
probable quantity of coal to be found there, upon the lands 
of the Chiriqui Improvement Company; upon the character 
of the harbors of Chiriqui Lagoon and Golfito; upon the 
practicability of building a railroad across said isthmus, so 
as to connect said harbors; and generally upon the value of 
the privileges contracted for in a conditional contract made 
on the twenty-first day of May, eighteen hundred and fifty-
nine, between Isaac Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy of 
the United States, and Ambrose W. Thompson and the 
Chiriqui Improvement Company: P1·ovided, That nothing 
herein contained shall be construed as a ratification of the 
said contract." 
After the passage of this law, to wit, on 4th August, 1860, 
the following memorandum was made as supplemental to the 
alleged contract. 
"It having been agreed during the last session of Con-
gress that the time limited by this contract within which 
Congress should approve it and make the necessary appro-
priation therefor should b extended to the end of the next 
session, it is now in fulfillment ther~of agreed on both parts 
of the original contract that such extension shall take place 
and the time is hereby extended accordingly. And it is fur-
ther agreed that the United States shall have the full bene-
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flt. for the purposes of this contract which the said Ambrose 
W. Thompson or the said Chiriqui Improvement (Co.) has 
obtained or shall obtain from the Government of Costa Rica 
for a railroad between the Gulf of Golfito Dulce and the 
Chiriqui Lagoon or any part of the way between those places 
or between any other points on the Atlantic and Pacific. 
"August 4, 1860. 
~'AMBROSE W. THOMPSON, [L. s.] 
"For himself and the Ohriqui Improvement Co. 
''ISAAC TOUCEY, [L. s.] 
" In presence of -
" Sec'retary of the Navy. 
" CHAS. W. WELSH." 
Since the appropriation of the 22d June, 1860, there has 
been no legislation up to the 3d March, 1881, which has any 
relevancy to the question submitted, which is in these words: 
" Whether the contract entered into May 21, 1859, between 
the United States, represented by Isaac Toucey, Secretary of 
the Navy, of the one part, and the Chiriqui Improvement 
Company, represented by Ambrose W. Thompson, of the 
other part, for the acquisition by the United States of cer-
tain lands, rights, and privileges therein mentioned, which 
contract was made subject to the condition that the same 
should be approved and ratified by Congress at the then next 
ses~ion thereof, and which condition was, by a further agree-
ment, dated August 4, 1860, so extended as to include the 
second session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, is or is not a 
valid subsisting contract~" 
The paper writing bearing date 21st ~lay, 1859, was in no 
sense a contract. The Secretary of the Navy had no author. 
ity to pledge the United States in any such way, nor did he 
propose to do so, for it is expressly stated in the paper that. 
it is conditioned upon the approval of Congress and upon its 
making the necessary appropriation. 
I see nothing in the legislation on the subject that indi-
cates an intention on the part of Congress to make the United 
States a party to the scheme or proposition made to Congress 
by the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Toucey, and the Improve-
ment Company and 1\Ir. Thompson. 
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The language in which is made the appropriation of the 
act of the 3d of March, 1881, is perfectly clear and entirely 
free from ambiguity, and I can not possibly leave the plain 
words of the law, which contain no reference to the alleged 
contract, and resort to extraneous matter of any kind for the 
purpose of finding a pretext for making the law applicable 
to the alleged contract and giving it a sense which its lan-
guage taken by itself does not convey. In my opinion this 
would be legislation, and not interpretation. 
It is time enough to look outside of a law for aid in getting 
at its meaning when a doubt arises on its face; but where 
the language of the law is H plain and unambiguous," say 
the Supreme Court of the United States (6 Wall., 479, 480), 
there is no " room for construction." 
To yield to the argument of the counsel for the Isthmus Pa-
cific Railway Company would be to deprive the Secretary of 
the Navy of the wide discretion given him by the act in the 
matter of establishing naval stations and coal depots, by 
holding his function to be simply the ministerial one of pay-
ing the money appropriated for the fulfillment of a binding 
contract, and that, too, in the face of the language that the 
appropriation is to be available for expenditure" as soon as 
suitable arrangements can be made to the proposed end," which 
does not look much like Congress considered the Secretary's 
hands as tied by a con tract. 
It results, then, that the paper writing relied on as a con-
tract has never possessed that element in the least degree. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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KLAMATH INDIANS. 
The Attorney-General deems it inexpedient to express an opinion upon 
certain questions proposed, relating to a right of fishery in the Kla-
math River, California, claimed in behalf of the Klamath Indians; such 
questions being justiciable in the appropriate courts at the suit of the 
Indians themselves who are interested in them. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 11, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant, submits for 
opinion a series of questions. 
The first reiates to a claim to a right of fishery by prescrip-
tion in tbe Klamath River set up by the Indian Bureau in 
behalf of the Klamath Indians ; the second asks to know 
whether such right, if established, is not protected by the 
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; the third asks if the legisla-
tion and executive action resulting in fixing the limits of the 
reservation occupied by these Indians was not a recognition 
of their exclusive right to fishing privileges within the limits 
of the reservation; the fourth inquires whether, if such treaty 
and prescriptive rights exist, the State of California can 
divest them; and the fifth asks whether the Indians can not 
be protected by the Department of the Interior in these 
rights if they should appear to exist. 
The matters covered by these questions are clearly justi-
ciable in the appropriate courts at the suit of the Indians 
themselves who are interested in them. They are essentially 
judicial in their character, and as each is readily resolvable 
into a case at law or in equity, I do not see how it can be 
said to be a question arising in a course of executive admin-
istration. 
There is nothing in the nature of the protectorate or guar-
dianship exercised by the United States over the Indian 
tribes that warrants the Executive Department of the GO\T· 
ernment in assuming to determine a controversy properly 
cognizable by the Judicial Department of the Government, 
because the well-being of an Indian tribe requires that such 
controversy should be decided. The organic distinctions 
between the three great di~isions of Government established 
by the Constitution must be respected or collisions and dis-
cords inimical to good government will inevitably take place. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 57 
Suretie!l for the Performance of ('on tracts. 
When the questions arose between the State of Kansas and 
the Shawnee and ~fiami and Wea Indian tribes as to the 
power of the State to tax certain lands held in severalty by 
individuals of these tribes. the three tribes filed bills in equity 
against the State officials seeking to enforce the right to tax, 
and the suits thus brought were finally determined in favor 
of the Indians by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
(The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall, 737; see also the case of The 
New York Indians, lb. 761.) 
My predecessor, 1.\lr. Butler, declined to pass upon claims 
arising under a treaty with the Cherokee Indians, on the 
ground that a board of commissioners had been established 
by the treaty for the purpose of determining cases of that 
kind~ saying that the Attorney.General had ''no power to 
give an official opinion, on the request of a head of a depart· 
ment, except on matters that concern the official powers and 
duties of such depa'rtment," (.3 Opin. 369; see also section 356 
Rev. Stat., and 13 Opin. 160 and 11 Opin. 407.) 
It seems to me, therefore, that as the only way to settle 
the questions submitted is by judicial proceedings it would 
be hardly proper for me to express an opinion on them, while' 
my doing so might, at the same time, be regarded as an 
attempt of the Executive branch of the Government to fore-
stall such proceedings. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SURETIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS. 
Under section 7 of the act of August 3, 1886, chapter 849, authorizing 
proposals for certain work to be invited, which shall be subject to 
"such pro>isions as to bonds and security for the quality and due 
completion of the work as the Secretary of the Navy shall prescribe," 
the Secretary may, in his discretion, accept as surety (instead of an 
individual) a body corporate empowered to assume that relation. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J'ltly 15, 1887. 
SIR: Your communication of the 11th instant and the 
inclosures therein mentioned present the following case : 
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By an act of Congress approved 3d August, 1886, section 
7, the Secretary of the Navy is required, before making con-
tracts for the construction or completion of the vessels whose 
construction or completion is authorized by the act, to invite 
propo8als for the work, which shall be subject, amongst other 
regulations, to such ''provisions as to bonds and security for 
the quality and due completion of the work as the Secretary of 
the Navy shall prescribe." 
Invitations for proposals under the act have been made, and 
several contracts have been awarded to the Bethlehem Jron 
Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, which offers as its 
surety the Guarantee Company of North America, or the 
American Surety Company, corporations existing under State 
authority, and empowered to contract as sureties or guar-
antors. 
The question arising upon this state of facts is presented 
by you in the following words: 
"Can the Secretary of the Navy, under existing law, accept 
as security for the performance of a contract in which the 
United States are concerned, the obligation of a company 
'incorporated and acting under State law, in lieu of the obli-
gation of an individual surety or sureties, and, if so, what 
conditions are necessary to be observed with reference to a 
determination of the question whether such security, when 
tendered, is or is not to be deemed adequate and sufficient 
for the protection of the United States as a party to the con-
tract to which it relates 1" 
I prefer to answer this question with a view to the facts of 
the actual case before me, and not with reference to contracts 
of every kind in which the Government may be interested, 
which is understood to be the scope of the question. 
Looking at the wide discretion given you by the seventh 
section of the law,I have no doubt that the matter of security 
is entirely within your discretion, unconfined by previous law 
or practice, and, consequently, that under this section you can 
accept any body corporate as surety that may be empowered 
to assumP. that relation and is in your judgment sufficient, 
the sufficiency of such body corporate to be determined by 
you after proper inquiry, the nature and extent of which is 
lodged by the law in your sole discretion. 
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It occurs to me, however, to say that it may be worthy of 
consideration whether the possibility that the more onerous 
condition impliedly stated in your advertisements, that suc-
cessful bidders should furnish individual sureties, might not 
have deterred persons from bidding who might have bid had 
they known that security or guaranty companies would be 
accepted as sureties. 
I have the hon(lr to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES . 
.Advised, that the classification of roll paper heretofore adopted under 
paragraph 392, Tariff Index, new, should be adhered to. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 4, 1887. 
SIR: In reply to your letter of the 80th ultimo, submitting 
the inquiry" whether the decision of the court in the cases of 
the Scoville Manufacturing Company v. Robertson, and Gottlieb 
Gennert v. Robertson, should be acquiesced in and accepted 
by the Department as determining the classification of roll-
paper, without further litigation," in an opinion rendered 
on the 4th of April, ultimo, I certified that no appeal would 
be taken in the first case mentioned, and as the verdict and 
judgment were in favor of the collector in the latter case, 
that judgment, on the part of the Government, should not 
be questioned. So far as those cases are concerned, the 
judgment should be accepted as final. 
The substantial inquiry to be answered is: Should the 
Department accept the decision of those cases as a final de-
termination of the classification of roll paper~ 
In the case of Gennert v. Robertson, as reported by the 
United States attorney, the real question of classification 
submitted in yours was not passed upon. With reference to 
the case of the Scoville .Manufacturing Company v. Robertson, 
my opinion of the 4th of April, ultimo, concurred with that 
of the court as to sensitized and albumenized paper. The 
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court submitted to the jury, under the evidence, the question 
"as to whether or not the plaintiff had proven the roll paper 
to be a manufacture of paper." The jury found for the plain-
tiff on this question. The report of the United States attor-
ney in that case does not furnish the evidence~ if any was 
given, on the part of the plaintiff, nor show that any eYidence 
was offered on the part of the Government, with reference to 
the questions submitted and passed upon by the jury. The 
case, therefore, from the papers before me, affords no real 
guide as to the construction of the customs acts as to the 
classification of roll paper. The two paragraphs to be con-
strued in determining the classification are paragraph 388, 
Tariff Index, new, as follows: "Paper, manufactures of, or of 
which paper is a component material,notspeciallyenumerated 
or provided for in this act, fifteen per centum ad valorem," and 
paragraph No. 392, Tariff Index, new, "Paper hangings, and 
papers for screens or fire boards, paper antiquarian, demy, 
drawing, elephant, foolscap, imperial letter, note, and all 
other paper not specially enumerated or protided for in this 
act, twenty-five per centum ad valorem." 
The fact that the manufactured material is subject to but 15 
per centum ad valorem, while the unmanufactured is charged 
25 per centum, in the paragraphs quoted, is an exception to 
the general policy of the tariff laws. That such exception 
exists is the real cause of the complaint of the manufacturers 
to whom Y.ou refer. The policy of the exception has been 
passed upon by Congress; its reason or propriety we can not 
question. The report of the assistant appraiser of the port 
of New York, approved by the appraiser, finds that the roll 
paper submitted is "a fine quality of plain paper, which bas 
undergone no further process of manufacture than various 
other plain papers provided for under paragraph 392, Tariff 
Index, new." Under this statement of fact, the classifica-
tion of roll paper heretofore adopted under paragraph 392, 
Tariff Index, new, should be adhered to. 
I am, yours, respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS TO THE MILITIA. 
Provisions of section 1661 Revised Statutes, and of the act of February 
12, 1887, chapter 129, touching the distribution of arms to the militia 
of the several States and Territories, considered. 
Where a State or Territory had an unexpended balance to its credit, 
under the old law, on June 30, 1887, which still remains available, 
such balance can be drawn upon to supply ordnance stores to it. 
But where tbe quota belonging to any State or Territory, under the old 
law, has been overdrawn, the amount overdrawn is not to be charged 
to such State or Territory under the new law. 
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
.August 9, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 6th instant, referring to 8ection 
1661 of the Revised Statutes, and the act amending it of the 
12th of February, 1887 (24 Stat. 401), submits the following 
inquiries: 
(1) ''Whether the States and Territories which had bal-
ances to their credit on June 30,1887, under the old law, can 
draw that balance in ordnance stores. 
(2) "Whether the amounts which certain States, Territo-
ries, and the District of Columbia have overdrawn under the 
old law, shall be charged to them under the new law, and be· 
transferred from their respective quotas of the new appro-
priation to liquidate such indebtedness." 
The first question refers to balances unexpended under the 
act of the 23d of February, 1808, re-enacted as section 1661 
of the Revised Statutes. This section is a permanent annual 
appropriation made to procure arms and equipments to be 
distributed by the United States, through the medium of the 
several States and Territories, to the whole body of militia. 
By the act of 1808 and its amendment of 1855 the quota or 
proportion of arms to which each State shall be entitled is 
severally fixed. A proportionate part of the an~ual appro-
priation is provided to purchase the arms for each. The dis-
tribution is required to be made annually. This provision 
should have been observed, but its non-observance does not, 
of itself, cover the unexpended quota of the money provided 
to purchase the arms into the Treasury. The act of the 12th. 
of February, 1887, does not repeal the act of 1808, but sup-
plies its place as to appropriations after the time when the. 
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appropriation provided by the latter act becomes effective, 
which is the 1st of July, 1887. If there is available, under the 
old law, an unexpended balance which belongs to the quota of 
any particular State or Territory, which has not been or is 
not required to be covered into the Treasury, it may be drawn 
upon to supply ordnance to such State or Territory to the 
extent of such unexpended available balance, but no portion 
of the balance of one State or Territory can be applied to the 
use of another. I therefore answer your first inquiry in the 
affirmative. 
The act of 1808, with its amendments, contemplated a dis-
tribution of arms to the militia of the United States. By its 
provisions the States were only the mediums or agents, under 
their own laws and regulations, to effect this distribution. 
If these agents faithfully distributed the arms furnished to 
the militia for the purpose intended their duty was performed. 
There is no provision for accountability or return. Under 
the law no State could rightfully receive more than its own 
annual quota. If more arms were received by any State than 
the law authorized, it was done wrongfully or without law. 
If such arms, wrongfully received, are yet in the possession 
of any State, they should be reclaimed. If they have been 
wrongfully disposed of their value would be a debt owing 
to the United States. The act of 1887 does not appropriate 
any money to the several States which could be retained 
against money owing from a State. It only authorizes a loan 
of arms to the State, the right of property,, and absolute own-
ership of which, at all times, remains in the United States. 
The Department would not be justified under the law in re-
fusing this loan of arms to such State· or States as might be 
indebted to the Government for unliquidated amounts aris· 
ing from either torts or contracts. Your second inquiry is 
therefore answered in the negative. 
I am, yours, respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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COMPENSATION OF DISTRICT A1'TORNEYS. 
District attorneys are entitled to special compensation for their services 
in examining titles to lands purchased by the United States. 
The Attorney-General is invested with sole authority to employ and :fix 
their compensation where the performance of such services by them is 
called for. 
Expenses thus arising, including office fees for searches, copies of record, 
etc., being incidental to the purchase of the land, are ordinarily to be 
paid out of the appropriation made for the purchase. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 1, 1887. 
SIR: In your letter of the 16th ultimo, after mentioning' 
a number of bills of different district attorneys (which have 
been referred to your Department) tor services performed 
and expenses incurred by them in the investigation of titles 
to lands authorized to be acquired for sites for public build-
ings in their respective districts, you, in connection therewith, 
direct my attention to the provisions of sections 189, 355, 767, 
823, 835, 843, 1764, and 1765, Revised Statutes, and inquire 
"whether, in view of these provisions, the Secretary of the 
Treasury can l~wfully pay such bills out of any appropria-
tion which is under his control." 
I beg to state, in reply, that the question whether a district 
attorney is entitled to special compensation for his services 
in examining titles to lands proposed to be purchased by the 
United States has been passed upon by several of my pre-
decessors in office, and they have uniformly held that he is 
entitled thereto, upon the ground that such services are not 
covered by the statutory provisions prescribing his fees, etc. 
See opinion of Mr. Cushing, dated January 25, 1855 (7 Opin., 
46); of Mr. Speed, dated March 8, 1866 (11 Opin., 431); and 
of Mr. Browning, dated J nne 12, 1868 ( 12 Opin., 416). These 
opinions, it is true, all bear date prion to the enactment of the 
Revised Statutes, but at the time they were given the law 
regulating and .fixing the compensation of district attorneys 
was in the main substantially the same as at present. Statu-
tory provisions then existed corresponding to those contained 
in the above-mentioned sections (excepting section 189, as to 
which see below) so far as the latter are material to the con-
sideration of the subject now in hand. 
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After referring to the act of February 26, 1853, chapter 80, 
by which the fees of district attorneys, etc., were then de-
fined, Mr. Cushing, in his opinion above cited, observes: 
'~That act provides no fee for this duty, although it is required 
of district attorneys to make such examination of titles and 
abstracts thereof for the information of the Attorney-General 
to enable him to pass on titles according to the provisions of 
the joint resolution of September 11, 1841 (5 Stat., 468). The 
duty is a delicate and important one, requiring legal science 
and much care and personal attention. On the whole, it 
seems to me reasonable to consider the act of 1853 as provid-
ing the fees only of the duties enumerated, and that for duties 
not enumerated he is to have a fee either in the analogy of 
those fixed by the act, or at the sound discretion of the head 
of Department ordering the service." He adds .that the fee, 
when determined, should be "charged to the appropriation 
for the particular purchase of which there may be question." 
::1\-Ir. Browning, in the opinion above referred to, remarks : 
"These services not being among the enumerated duties of 
those officers for which compensation is prescribed in detail 
by the statute regulating their fees, they have been regarded 
as extra official services, to be paid for out of the appropriate 
funds of the Department at the request whereof, or in con-
nection with whose administration, they were rendered." 
By the act of February 26, 1853, already cited, it was pro-
vided that for the services of counsel, rendered at there-
quest of a head of a Department, the compensation should be 
such sum as might be stipulated or agreed on. This provis-
ion recognized the authority of heads of Departments to em-
ploy coum;el, and under it they employed district attorneys 
to examine ti ties and prepare abstracts thereof for submis-
sion to tlJe Attorney-General, and allowed them special com-
pensation therefor. But it was repealed by a clause in section 
17 of the act of June 22, 1870, chapter 150, which is embod-
ied in section 189, Revised Statutes. .According to the con-
struction given in practice, that repeal did not take away the 
right of a district attorney to compensation, where, acting 
under competent authority, he performs services of the char-
acter above mentioned, but it only altered the mode of his 
employment and payment; that is to say, it in effect invested 
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the Attorney-General with sole authority thereafter to em-
ploy and fix the compensation of district attorneys where 
the performance of such services by them is called for. 
Strongly confirmatory of the correctness of that view is the 
proviso in section 3 of the act of June 20, 187 4, chapter 328. 
This section reads : " That no civil officer of the Government 
shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, 
directly or indirectly, from the Treasury or property of the 
United States beyond his salary or compensation allowed by 
law : Provided, That this shall not be construed to prevent 
the employment and payment by the Department of Justice 
of district attorneys as now allowed by law for the perform-
ance of services not covered by their salaries or fees." The 
word ''payment," as here used, signifies to fix or determine 
the compensation for the services referred to ; and the pro-
viso is a virtual recbgnition of the practical construction 
given the act of 1870 (sec. 189, Rev. Stat.) above adverted 
to. 
Upon the whole, I see no reason to differ from the views 
of my predecessors as to the right of district attorneys to 
special compensation for their service in examining titles, or 
as to the appropriations properly chargeable therewith. Ex-
penses thus arising, including office fees for searches, copies 
of records, etc., being incidental to the purchase of the land, 
should ordinarily be paid out of the appropriation made for 
such purchase; and this, I understand, has been the general 
practice. 
I am, therefore, of the opinion that you can lawfully pay 
the bills in question, t() the extent that they have been ap-
proved by the Attorney-General, out of the appropriations 
for the acquisition of the property to which they respectively 
relate. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY OF NEW YORK. 
The American Surety Company of New York has power, nuder the laws 
of New York, to assume the relation of surety upon a bond to the 
United States conditioned for the faithful performance of a contract 
to furnish steel gun forgings to the latter. 
DEP-4-RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 7, 1887. 
SIR: In reply to your communication of the 31st October, 
ultimo, asking to know ".whether the American Surety 
Company of New York is empowered to assume the relation 
of surety upon a bond to be given to the United States by 
the Bethlehem Iron Company of Pennsylvania, conditioned 
for the performance of a contract to furnish steel gun forg· 
ings to the United States, I have the honor to saythati am 
of opinion, after an examination of the laws of New York 
submitted to me in connection with your communication, 
that the American Surety Company of New York has the 
power to become a surety in the bond to be given by the 
Bethlehem Iron Company, such power being expressly given 
by the first section of the act of the legislature of New York 
·of the 3d of June, 1885, entitled ''An act to amend chapter 
four hundred and eighty-six of the laws of eighteen hundred 
and eighty-one, entitled 'An act to facilitate the giving of 
bonds required by law.'" 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
NO MAN'S LAND. 
The strip of territory known as "No Man's Land" not being within any 
existing judicial district, punishment of crime committed therein will 
Ji'ot be within reach of the criminal law of the United Statf~s (see sixth 
article of amendments to the Constitution) until legislative action is 
had ascertaining the district which shall embrace such strip. · · 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 15, 1887. 
Sm : I received your note of the 4th instant, relating to 
the administration of the criminal law in that part of the 
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public domain commonly called ''No Man's Land." The land 
so designated is bounded on the north by the States of Kan-
sas aud Colorado, on the east by the Indian Territory, on 
the south by Texas, and on the west by New Mexico. Its 
length north and south is about 35 miles; its breadth east 
and west is about 165 miles. The title to it became Yested 
in the United States by cession from the State of Texas, in 
accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress of the 
9th day of September, 1850 (9 Stat., 446). By the same act 
a Territorial government is provided for the Territory of New 
l\fexico. By the act of the 30th of l\fay, 1854 (10 Stat., 277), 
the Territory of Kansas was organized. By an act of the 
28th of February, 1861 (12 Stat., 172), a Territorial govern-
ment was provided for Colorado. In the organization of 
these three Territories the land referred to was excluded 
from their several boundaries. In the establishment of the 
courts of the United States for the States of Texas, Kansas, 
and Colorado, and the Territory of New Mexico, the State 
and Territorial lines limit the judicial districts, except that 
the United States district court for Kansas and for the north-
ern district of Texas, by the second and third sections of the 
act of the 6th of January, 1883 (22 Stat., 400), are extended 
over portions of the Indian Territory. The land referred to, 
then, is not embraced in any district established by law of 
the United States. 
The sixth article of the amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States provides: ''In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused sha11 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law." * * * 
It therefore appears that, without legislative action ascer-
taining the district within which this public strip shall be 
embraced, the punishment of crime therein is beyond the 
.reach of the criminal law of the United States. 
I am, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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ADJUSTMENT OF RAILROAD LAND GRANTS. 
The terms "bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed land," as used in the 
third proviso of section 3 of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 376, 
mean those persons who, without knowledge of wrong or error, have 
purchased from the railroad company lands which had been previ-
ously entered by a pre-emption or homestead settler, where entry had 
been erroneously canceled as described in the :first clause of that sec-
tion, and which land the pre-emption or homestead settler did not elect 
to claim after the recovery by the proceedings prescribed by the sec-
ond section of the act. 
Patents, the issue whereof is provided for in the fourth section of the 
same act, are only intended to be issued after it shall have been le-
gally determined, in the mode prescribed in the second section, that 
. the certification or patent to the railroad company had been errone-
ously issued. 
The word "grant,'' in the :fifth section, should be construed to include 
(as it does in the preceding sections of the act) both the primary and 
the indemnity limits. 
DEPART:M:ENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 17, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter of October -, 1887, you submit three 
questions for my opinion. They arise upon the construction 
of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the act of the 3d of March, 1887, which, 
as shown by its title, as a whole, was passed " to provide for 
the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in 
the construction of railroads, and for the forfeiture of un-
earned lands, and for other purposes." (24 Stat., 556.) 
The first section of the act directs the adjustment of th~ 
grants. The second section provides for the restoration of 
title to the United States where lands have been errone· 
ously certified or patented to the railroads. The third sec-
tion is, "That if, in the adjustment of said grants, it shall 
appear that the homestead or pre-emption entry of any bona 
fide settler has been erroneously canceled on account of any 
railroad grant, orthewithdrawal ofpubliclands from market, 
such settler, upon application, shall be reinstated in all his 
rights and allowed to perfect his entry by complying with 
the public-land laws; provided, that he has not located an-
other claim or made an entry in lieu of the one so erroneously 
canceled; and provided also,· that he did not voluntarily 
abandon said original entry; and provided further, that if 
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any of said settlers do not renew their application to be re-
instated within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, then all such unclaimed lands shall be 
disposed of under the public-land laws, with priority of right 
given to bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed land, if any, 
and if there be no such purchasers, then to bona fide set-
tlers residing thereon." 
The question submitted under this section is: 
''What class of purchasers is referred to by the expression 
'bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed lands''" 
Three classes of persons are provided for under this sec-
tion: 
First. Bona fide settlers whose homestead or pre-emption 
entries have been erroneously canceled on account. of a rail-
road grant or withdrawal. 
Second. Bona fide purchasers of such unclaimed lands. 
Third. Bona fide settlers residing thereon. 
The rights of the several classes to the lands referred to 
in the section are successive, in the order stated in the sec-
tion. The first in right· is the homestead or pre-emption set-
tler whose entry has been wrongfully canceled. If he elects 
to assert his right, and has not been disqualified by locating 
another claim, or making another entry in lieu of the entry 
erroneously canceled, his right is absolute, and the success-
ive rights of the remaining two classes can not attach if he . 
lawfully asserts his claim. If he fails to clajm the land, or is 
disqualified. under the act, the rights of the second class of 
persons, who are the bona fiue purchasers of the land un-
claimed by him, attach and have precedence over those of the 
third class. The bona fide purchasers here referred to are those 
who, withoutknowledgeofwrongorerror, have purchased from 
the railroad company lands which had been previously en-
tered by a pre-emption or homestead settler, whose entry had 
been erroneously canceled, as described in the first clause of 
the third section, aud which land the pre-emption or home-
stead settler did not elect to claim atter the recovery by the 
proceedings prescribed by the second section of the act. 
The second question submitted by you i~:~ : 
''Can the Department, after adjustment of the grant by 
the Department, issue a patent to the purchaser of such land 
I 
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before the said land has been reconveyed by the road or title 
recovered by judicial proceedings¥" 
This question, as shown by your letter, refers to patents 
whose issue is provided for in the fourth section of the act. 
The fourth section is a part of a general scheme for the dis-
position of lands which h <tve been erroneously certified or 
patented to the railroads, which certification or patenting 
has been set aside and the title restored to the United States, 
as pr9vided for in the second section. The language of the 
section "That as to all lauds * * * which have been so 
erroneously certified or patented as aforesaid" in the fourth 
section refers to the same lands described in the second sec-
tion as follows: "That if it shall appear * * * that 
lands have been from any cause heretofore erroneously certi-
fied or patented," etc. 
The second section declares that the mode to finally deter-
mine whether tile lands shall have been so erroneously certi-
:f\ed or patented sllall be by the admission of the company 
and re-conveyance, or, in case of dispute, by judicial proceed-
ing. Until the land shall have been legally determined to 
belong to the United States the right to issue patents under 
the fourtll section does not arise. If patents should issue 
under the fourth section before re-conveyance or judicial re-
covery under the second, and proceedings should then be 
. instituted to cancel the patent issued to the railroad, in case 
cf a decision ad verse to the Government in the proceeding 
instituted two patents would be outstanding at tlw same 
time for the same land. The express words of the section 
with reference to the time when the patent shall issue are: 
"The person or persons so purchasing in good faith * • * 
shall be entitled to the land so purchased * * • after 
the grants, respectively, shall have been adjusted." As the 
adjustment, then, must be completed first, the patents under 
the fourth section are only intended to be issued after it shall 
have been legally determined in the mode prescribed in the 
second section that the certification or patent to the railroad 
had been erroneously issued. 
The third. question is as follow.s: 
"Third. The fiftll section of said act provides that where 
a railroad company has sold to citizens of the United States, 
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or persons who have declared their intention to become such, 
lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, the 
same being the numbered sections prescribed in its grant 
and coterminous with the constructed part of its road, and 
where such lands are for any reason excepted from the oper-
ations of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for 
the bona fide purchaser thereof from said company, to make 
payment to the United States for said land, at the ordinary 
Government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall 
issue therefor to the said bona fide purchaser, or his heirs or 
assigns. The question submitted under this section is 
whether the provision last above quoted is confined in its ap-
plication to lands within the primary granted limits, or 
whether it applies to lands within /the indemnity limits of 
which the company has made selection, but which has not 
been approved to it." 
The first section of the act, in the use of the WJrd "grant," 
must have necessarily included both the primary and in-
demnity limit::; in the adjustment, as it was doubtless intend~d 
that the adjustment should be a full and final one. The lands 
which, under the adjustment, were found not to be the prop-
erty of the railroad, were intended to be free from the cloud 
of claim by the railroad, and restored to the public domain 
for disposition according to law. The intent of the act shows 
that to c~rry out its purposes the word "grant" wherever 
used in the second, third, and fourth sections, must include 
the lands in both the primary and indemnity limits, as each 
directly, or by necessary implication, refers to the adjust-
ment provided for in the first· section. 
The protection afforded and redress granted the settler by 
each of the sections is fully as important in the indemnity 
as in the primary limits. The limitation on further certifi-
cation or patenting contained in the seventh section is fully 
as important as, and of more practical value, when applied 
to the indemnity limits, than to the primary limits of the 
grant. The fifth section is a pa.rt of the same scheme as the 
residue of the act. The wrong done the settler, who in good 
faith shall have purchased lands of the railroad company, to 
which the company by the adjustment is shown to have no 
legal right, is identical, whether the purchasers are in the 
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indemnity or primary limits. The hardship he may be sub-
jected to by loss of his land, improvements, and labor, 
is the same in either case. The whole scope of the law from 
the second to the sixth section inclusive is remedial. Its 
intent is to relieve from loss settlers and bona fiJe purchasers 
who, through the erroneous or wrongful disposition of the 
·lands in the grants by the officers of the Government, or by 
the railroad, have lost their rights or acquired equities which 
in justice should be recognized. That the selection sold by 
the railroatl company shall have been approved, is not re-
quired by the fifth section, nor that it shall have been pat-
ented. Tllat the land shall have been approved to the com-
pany, before the purchasers shall be entitled to the benefit 
of the sixth section, is not required. By the words of the 
act, the only requisite established to entitle those wronged 
to its benefit, is that they shall be citizens of the United 
States, or shall have declared their intention to become citi-
zens; that it shall have been sold to them by a railroad com-
pany as a part of its grant; that the land shall not have been 
conveyed to or for the use of the company; that the lands 
shall be of the numbered sections prescribed in the grant, 
and coterminous with constructed parts of the road, and that 
the purchasers shall have bought in good faith. It was not 
intended to limit the redress to cases in which the railroad 
could rightfully have sold the lands. The whole remedial 
part of the law was passed with a recognition of the fact that 
the railroad companies had sold lands to which they bad 
a just claim. The fifth section expressly refers to such lands 
as had been· sold, which bad not been conveyed ,, to or for 
the use of such companies." It is not required that the sale 
by the railroad companies shall have been made on its part 
in good faith, but only that the purchaser shall have bought 
in good faith. That it was sold under a claim of the grant 
to another in good faith is the ground of his equity. In 
order that the remedy may be adequate to redress the wrong, 
the word "grant" in the :fitth section must be construed to 
include, as it does in the preceding sections of the act, both 
primary and indemnity limits. 
Very respectfully, A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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SOUTH BOSTON IRON WORKS. 
Upon the statement of facts submitted : Advised that the right of the 
South Boston Iron Works to the possession and use of certain property 
(two lathes and a crane) belonging to the United States, derived under 
an agreement with the latter, dated January 21, 1885, has terminated, 
and that the right to the possession of the property is now in the 
United States exclusively. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 18, 1887. 
SIR: I have considAred the question presented in your 
letter to me of the 26th of JuJy last, as to whether ''there is 
any right of possession in the South Boston Iron Works" to 
two lathes and a crane (used in the manufacture of guns) 
therein mentioned. 
It appears by the papers submitted that on the 21st of 
January, 1885, the South Boston Iron Works entered into 
an agreementwith the United States on thefollowingterms: 
''Whereas the South Boston Iron Works, a corporation 
organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, doing business in the city of Boston and county of 
Suffolk, in said Commonwealth, being in possession of certain 
property belonging to the United of America, specified and 
described as follows:" (Here follows a description of the 
lathes and crane above referred to.) 
"And whereas permission bas been given by proper and 
competent authority that the said South Boston Iron Works 
shall continue in possession and have the use of the property 
hereinbefore described in the manufacture of certain guns 
for the U nitecl States under the terms and provisions of cer-
tain contracts between the said South Boston Iron Works 
and the United States, represented by Brig. Gen. S. V. Benet, 
Chief of Ordnance U.S . .Army, existing and in force at this 
present date. 
"It is agreed by the said South Boston Iron Works that it 
will relinquish possession of and deliver up to the United 
States, on demand made by such officer or agent as the Sec-
retary of War shall designate for that purpose, the property 
hereinbefore referred to and described after the terms of said 
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existing contracts shall have heen fulfilled by the said South 
Boston Iron \\T orks." 
You state that "on the date of the execution of this agree-
ment there were in existence between the United State::; and 
the South Boston Iron Works three contracts for the manu-
facture of materials and guns, which were e:1tered into under 
the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 3, 
1883 (22 Stat., 471), on the 24th of September, 1883, and the 
30th of June, 1884. One. of the contracts of the last named 
date, after having been extended to the extreme limit, was 
not completed until after the close of the fiscal year 1885-'86, 
when the appropriation therefor was no longer available; 
the other two, dated respectively September 24, 1883, and 
June 30, 18S4, involving the construction of one 12-inch cast 
iron breech-loading rifle with wire-wrapped steel tube, al-
though extended from time to time for a period of nearly 
two years, and until June 20, 1886, were never fulfilled, and 
the appropriation reverted to the Treasury on June 30, 1886, 
unc.ler the operation of section 3691, Revised Statutes." 
I understand that the two contracts last above mentioned 
have not been fulfilled through the fault of the contractor, 
and are now regarded as no longer subsisting. The other 
contract, having been fulfilled, as it seems, is also deter-
mined. 
Upon the foregoing state of facts I am of opinion that the 
right which ~as derived by the South Boston Iron Works, 
under the permission referred to in the aforesaid agreement 
of January 21,1885, to the possession and use of the property 
in question, ceased on the termination of the three contracts 
as above. 
The ownership of the property remaining in the United 
States, such right was simply that of a bailee, and the en-
joyment thereof depended solely upon the purpose of the 
bailment and the time limited for its accomplishment, the 
latter being, by necessary implication, restricted to the du-
ration of said contracts. On the failure of the bailee (the 
South Boston Iron Works) to accomplish that purpose within 
tlle time contemplated, the bailment terminated by its own 
limitation, and with it the bailee's l'ight to possess and use 
the property. Agreeably to this view, the right to the pos-
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session of the property now must be deemed to be in the 
United States alone. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. 
Coriander seed should be classified under paragraph No. 636, Tariff Index, 
as ''seeds, aromatic, which are not edible," etc. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 25, 1887. 
SIR: Your letter of the 19th instant submits for my opin-
ion whether coriander seed should be classed under Schedule 
N, 465, or in the free list under paragraph No. 636, Tariff 
Index. 
No. 465 is : '' Garden seeds, except seed of the sugar-beet, 
twenty per centum ad valorem." 
Paragraph No. 636, so far as applicable, is: "Seeds, aro-
matic, which are not edible, and are in a crude state, free." 
n Garden seeds," as used in the first paragraph cited, is a 
generic term, and as such might be construed to include 
almost all aromatic seeds; but this could not have been the 
construction intended by the legislature, for it would be sub-
stantially destructive of the second paragraph quoted. Even 
if coriander is a garden seed, if it is also aromatic and not 
edible it should be classed under paragraph No. 636. Your 
letter states it is aromatic, and that the seed itself is not 
edible, but is used on account of its aromatic qualities as a 
flavor for food products. The last fact stated is not of such 
a character as to have a preponderating weight over the fact 
that it is aromatic, and not edible. The almost sole value 
of the seed is derived from its aroma. The true construction 
of the two clauses, in my opinion, under the facts stated, 
requires that coriander seed should be classified under para-
graph No. 636. I therefore recommend a modification of the 
classification to conform with this opinion. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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UNION PACIFIC AND CENTRAL PACIFIC COMPANIES. 
The question considered whether, on the facts presented, an action could 
be maintained by the United States against the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and the '\Vestern 
Union Telegraph Company, to recover back certain moneys paid for 
the transmission of Government dispatches over the bonded lines of 
said railroad companies. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
.])rovember 30, 1887. 
SIR : By your letter of the 23cl instant you ask: 
" Whether on the facts presented in the brief submitted by 
the Comptroller, and other papers therewith, an action could 
be maintained against the Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany and the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad Com-
panies to recover back the mone.) s paid to theW estern Union 
Company for the services rendereu over the bonded lines of 
the said railroad companies." 
The Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Central 
Pacific Railroad Company, by accepting the benefits of the 
acts of 1~62 and 1864, which calleu them into life, each, for a 
_valuable consideration, obligated itself to construct and main-
tain a telegraph line along its route, and thereon at all times 
to transmit dispatches for the Government, and ''that all 
compensation for such services rendered for the Government 
should be applied to the payment of the bonds and interest 
until the whole amount is fully paid." 
The brief of the Comptroller states that $12,495.42 have 
been paid for the transmittal of Government dispatches over 
the bonded lines of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and 
$5,665.24 for like dispatches over the bonded lines of the Cen-
tral Pacific Railroad Company. This money has been paid 
by the Government, and has not been applied by the said 
companies as it was agreed it should be. The Government 
guarantied the payment of the interest on the bonds referred 
to in the acts and has paid it, and has not been re-imbursed 
by the companies. It has been damnified to the amount of 
the money not applied. The fact that the Government might 
have retained the money but did not exercise the right does 
not relieve the companies from the obligation of their con-
tracts that it should be applied. The money, therefore, if it 
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has not been paid into the Treasury, is owing from the com-
panies severally to the Government. The stateatent of the 
Comptroller alleges the money was paiu to the Vi;T estern Union 
Telegraph Company; but, in conuection with this statement, 
sets forth a summary of the coutracts between the railroad 
companies and the telegraph company, in pursuance of which 
the payments of the moneys is claimed to have been mad'e to 
the telegraph company. These contracts are unlike in their 
terms and require a separate consideration. 
By the contract between the Central Pacific Railroad Com-
pany and the Western Union Telegraph Company, "The 
Central Pacific Railroad Company agreed to transmit all the 
telegraphic business of the \\T estern Union Company at each 
railroad station where one agent shall be competent to per-
form all the duties of railroad agent and telegraph operator, 
and if an assistant operator should be required at any time 
it should be furnished by the Western Union Company." 
In consideration of this covenant, the Western Union Com-
pany agreed to furnish certain material, books, and em-
ployes, over which the railroad company was to furnish a 
superintendent. The vVestern Union Company agreed, as a 
part of the consideration, to pay the railroad company 
$80,000 for the first year ; $85,000 for the second year; 
$90,000 for the third year, and $100,000 for each year there-
after during the continuance of the agreement. Under this 
contract, dispatches delivered at the offices on the bonded 
lines of the railroad company would be delivered to the 
agents of the railroad company. The money received by 
these agents will be received by the railroad company. If 
the agents diverted it, and paid it to the Western Union 
Telegraph Company, if tbe Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany knew of such diversion, it might be made responsible, 
on the principle that a trust fund may be followed in the 
hands of any one who receives it with knowledge of the trust. 
(National Bank v. Insurance Company, 104 U.S. R., 54.) But 
no sufficient facts are stated in vours to warrant the conclu-• " . 
sion that the telegraph company received the money or knew 
of a wrongful diversion of the fund. If this fact can be 
established it might be liable. 
As to such moneys as were received by the Western Union 
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Telegraph Company at points of the bonded lines of the rail-
road com~any for the dispatches which were to be trans-
mitted in part over the railroad company's bonded lines, it 
was the duty of the agents of the railroad company to collect 
from the telegraph company the pro rata compensation for 
such dispatches; but the failure of the railroad company to 
do so would riot justify an action by the Government against 
the Western Union Company for the money thus received. 
It would be a matter of account between the railroad com-
pany and the telegraph company in which the Government 
should not be involved. 
As to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, the action 
may be sustained against it for the money stated in the brief 
of the Qomptroller to be owing by that company, if it has not 
been paid or applied ; but in the absence of evidence that 
the money was paid to any others than agents on the bonded 
lines of the railroad company, no sufficient facts are set forth 
to justify joint action against the railroad and telegraph com-
panies as to that money. 
The contract between the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
and the Western Union Telegraph Company is of a different 
character. It provides that the lines of the railroad company 
shall form a part of the general system of thA Western Union 
Telegraph Company; that the Government messages shall 
be transmitted 'at rates to be fixed by the railroad company 
on the railroad company's lines, with the proviso " that the 
local receipts · of the railway company on such dispatches 
should be divided between the parties in the same manner 
as are provided in the tenth clause of the agreement." The 
provisions of this contract for a division of the profits and 
expenses impress upon it the characteristics of a partnership. 
The contract further declares that it is made "for the pur-
pose of providing telegraphic facilities for the parties hereto, 
and for maintaining and operating the lines of telegraph 
along the railway company's railroads in the most economical 
manner, in the interest of both parties, and for the purpose 
of fulfilling the obligations of the railway cmnpany to the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and the public, in respect to the 
telegraphic service required by the act of Congress of July 1, 
1862, and the amendments thereto." 
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This shows that at the makin~ of the agreement the par-
ties to it had in view the act of 1862, and the obligation that 
the railroad company was bound to apply the compensation 
for Government dispatches as provided in that act. The 
obligation to apply is substantially an assignment in ad-
vance of such compensation for the uses provided in the act, 
and would impreRs upon the fund the character of a trust. 
That trust was, among other things, for the p~yment of the 
interest on the bonds. That interest has been paid by the 
Government. The Government has a right to follow that 
fund into the hands of any one who has received it with 
knowledge of the trust (104 U. S. R., supra). For this fund, 
then, the United States can sustain an action against the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, if it has not been paid to or 
retained by the Government. It may also be followed into 
the hands of the Western Union Telegraph Company and 
the railroad company, who, by their joint agents, received it. 
It must be remembered that the views expressed in this 
opinion are based upon the facts stated by the Comptroller, 
between whom and the other parties in interest there is a 
disagreement of fact, which is not in my province to decide. 
The papers with yours transmitted are herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PURCHASE OF LAND. 
The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 362, "for 
the erection of monuments or memorial tablets for the purpose of mark-
ing the position of each of the commands of the regular army engaged 
at Gettysburg," is not applicable to the purchase of land for the sites 
of such•monuments or tablets. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 2, 1887. 
Sm: With your letter of the 21st of November, 1887, you 
transmitted a letter received by you from Col. John M. Wil-
son "relative to the erection of monuments or tablets to mark 
the position of commands of the regular army engaged at 
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Gettysburg, for which purpose $15,000 was appropriated by 
the sundry civil bill of March 3, 1887," and asking my opin-
ion "as to whether land for the sites of such monuments or 
tablets can legally be purchased out of said appropriation." 
Section 3736 of the Revised Statutes declares: ''No land 
shall be purchased on account of the United States except 
under a law authorizing such purchase." 
When the_.actual dominion and ownership of the land is 
the direct purpose of the expenditure of the money of the 
Government, no such expenditure can be made, according to 
the language of the section quoted, unless under a law au-
thorizing the purchase. The appropriation referred to in 
your letter is as follows : 
''Monuments or tablets at Gettysburg: For the erection of 
monuments or memorial tablets for the purpose of marking 
the position of each of the commands of the regular army 
engaged at Gettysburg, fifteen thousand dollars, to be ex-
pended under the direction of the Secretary of War." (24 
Stat., 535.) 
The appropriation is specifically for the erection of monu-
ments or memorial tablets. There is no express authority in 
the law to purchase land. The specific language, that the 
money is for tlw erection of monuments or tablets, applies it 
to that use, and rebuts tbe implication that it may be applied 
to any other purpose. The appropriation under considera-
tion is found in the sundry civil bill. In the same act, ten 
different appropriations are made for the erection of struct-
ures, and a much larger number for the continuance or com-
pletion of buildings already commenced. In the former, 
where the site is to be purchased before the erection can be 
commenced, the appropriatjon specifically provides for the 
purchase of the site. When the legislature thus, in the same 
act, makes the distinction by recognizing that the appropria-
tion for an erection does not, by implication, embrace the 
purchase of the site, it would be an unwarranted construc-
tion of a later clause in the same act to imply that which so 
much care had been taken to express in like cases in previous 
clauses of the same enactment. In an opinion rendered by 
Attorney-General Mason on the 18th of September, 1846 (4 
Opin., 533), on a strictly analogous question, the conclusion 
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was reached that an appropriation could not be extended for 
the purchase of land for the improvements provided for in 
the appropriation, although the fact appeared from the esti-
mates that the purchase of the land entered into and f0rmed 
a part of the estimate on which the appropriation was made, 
and the appropriation was for the full amount of the esti-
mate. I therefore answer the question submitted by you in 
the negative. 
Very respe~tfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
OTARY PUBLIC. 
A notary public appointed for the District of Columbia has no power to 
take acknowledgments of deeds in foreign countries (where he may 
at the time be) for property situated in said District. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 3, 1887. 
SIR: By your letter of November 26, 1887, you ask my 
opinion "As to whether a notary public appointed by the 
1 President of the United States for the District of Columbia 
bas power, under the acts of Congress relative to his office, 
to take, in foreign countries where he may at the time be, 
acknowledgments of deeds for property in the District of 
Columbia." 
By the act of Congress of the 7th of June, 1878 (Supp. 
Rev. Stat. 337), the President is authorized to appoint for 
the District of Columbia such notaries public, residents of 
the District, as the business of the District may require. The 
taking of acknowledgments of deeds is a judicial act. The 
office is local. When the officer goes to a foreign country, 
being outside of the limits for which he is appointed, he is not 
there a notary public, but a private citizen. His powers are 
confined to the locality for which he is commissioned, unlPss, 
by exceptional legislation, his official functions are extended 
beyond the locality for which be is appointed. Section 442 
of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia 
prescribes a form for certificates of acknowledgment of deeds 
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for lands in the district. 'rhat certificate requires the officer 
to certify that he is an officer in and for the district where 
the venue of the acknowledgment is laid, and that the person 
by whom the deed is acknowledged appeared before him in 
that district and acknowledged the deed. The law conclu· 
sively intends that the officer who signs the certificate shall 
only certify to the truth. If a notary public for the District 
of Oolumbia, at any place outside the District, should certify 
that he is an officer in and for that place his certificate would 
be false. The notarJ·, therefore, as he can not in a foreign 
country truthfully certify according to the statutory form, 
can not there take an acknowledgment. The notaries public 
referred to in section 444 of the Revised Statutes for the 
District of Columbia, before whom eeds made in foreign 
countries may be acknowledge~!, are foreign notaries for the 
country in which the acknowledgment i& taken. This is 
shown by the fact that1he official character is required to 
be certified to, in conformity to section 443, which requires 
the attestation of the official character of the officer who 
takes the acknowledgment, and applies only to such officers 
as may be foreign to the District. I find no authority given 
by the law to notaries public for the District of Columbia to 
take acknowledgments in foreign countries for deeds to lands 
in the District. I therefore answer the question asked by 
you in the negative. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
·FORT BROWN MILITARY RESERVATION. 
The deed of conveyance to the United States fron.' James Stillman and 
Thomas Carson, administrator, etc., dated October 14, 1887, which is 
offered for the acceptance of the Government (together with the quit-
claim deed of S. Josephine Allen, dated October 24, 1887, the quitclaim 
deed of Francis J. Hale et al., dated November 15, 1887, the quitclaim 
deed of William H. Hale, dated December 3, 1887, and the quitclaim 
deed of Thomas Cq,rson, dated December 12, 1887, mentioned in the 
opinion), are sufficient to pass a valid title to the tract of land known 
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as the Fort Brown military reservation in Texas, and to extinguish 
all claims for the use and occupancy of said reservation by the United 
States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Decentber 22, 1887. 
SIR: I herewith return all the papers which were trans-
mitted to me by your Department under cover of letters 
dated the 1st and 4th of October, 1887, relating to the pro-
posed transfer to the United States of title to the tract of 
land (said to contain about 358 acres) known as the Fort 
Brown military reservation, situated in Cameron County, 
Tex. Accompanying them are also some additional papers, 
since filed in this Department, which relate to the same 
matter. 
Among the papers first above referred to is a deed dated 
September 17, 1887, executed by James Stillman, of New 
York, and Thomas Carson, of Brownsville, Tex., administra-
tor with the will annexed of ~faria Josefa Cavazos, deceased, 
granting to the United States the whole of said tract; and 
in one of the aforesaid letters request is made for an opinion 
as to whether such deed is sufficient to vest the title to the 
premises in the United States. 
I bad occasion to consider the title to this property in two 
opinions heretofore addressed to you dated respectively, Jan-
uary 16, 1886, and May 20, 1886. The result there arrived at 
was, that a part of the premises (which i~ used for a national 
cemetery), containing about 25 acres, already belonged to the 
United States, the same having been acquired by condemna-
tion proceedings instituted in 1872 under the act of Con-
gress of February 22, 1867, chapter 61, and that to acquire 
a valid title to the remainder of the premises by voluntary 
transfer, deeds from a number of persons mentioned, includ-
ing both the grantors in the aforesaid deed, would be neces-
sary, in view of the existence of adverse claims of ownership 
by them involving disputed questions of fact which could not 
be satisfactorily determined without a judicial investiga-
tion. 
Susequently all these persons became parties to a suit in 
trespass to try title, etc., which was originally instituted in 
the district court for Cameron County, Tex., in June, 1886, 
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by the heirs of Miguel Salinas against.William L. Kellogg, 
an officer of the army then on duty at Fort Brown as p()st 
commander, and which was afterwards, on application of the 
United States attorney for the western district of Texas 
(who appeared for said Kellogg, under instructions from this 
Department) removed into the United States circuit court 
for said District, where such of the persons above referred to 
as were not plaintiffs were brought into the suit as defend-
ants; and a trial was had in the latter court in July, 1887. 
The record of the proceedings therein shows that the cause 
was heard upon pleas in reconvention filed by the different 
defendants; that the jury found in favor of two of the latter, 
namely, the said James Stillman and the said Thomas Carson, 
administrator, etc., of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased, for the 
property claimed by their pleas in reconvention, in the pro-
portion of one undivided half of the premises to each, and 
that the court thereupon adjudged that they recover the 
premises in equal moieties, together with the rents and dues 
for the past use and occupation thereof. 
It is understood that all the part:es to the suit acquiesce in 
this judgment; so that the controversy over the ownership 
of the premises and the right to the is~ues and profits there-
of, previously existing between them, may now be regarded 
as judicially determined in favor of the grantors in the deed 
in question, and their title fully established as against the 
other litigants~ 
But a cloud upon this title recently appeared, which was 
not cleared away by that judgment, it being a claim in behalf 
of persons who were not parties to said suit. In the latter 
part of June, 1886, a certified copy of a deed from Rafael 
Garcia Cavazos and MariaJosefa Cavazos, his wife, to Eben-
ezer Allen and William G. Hale, dated December 12, 1849, 
but not recorded until April 7, 1886, was transmitted to the 
Secretary of War, who subsequently sent it to this Depart-
ment. By this deed an undivided one-tenth interest in cer-
tain land, including the premises (to all of which the said 
:Maria Josefa Cavazos, under whom the said Stillman and 
Carson afterwards derived their title, then claimed the ex-
clusive ownership) is granted to the said Allen and Hale. 
It appears that both the grantees are dead, and that the 
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entire interest of Allen in the premises has devolved, by test-
amentary disposition, upon his widow, Mrs. S. Josephine 
Allen, while the entire interest of Hale therein has passed, 
by inheritance, to his six surviving children, viz, William H., 
Francis tT., Susan B., Louisa H., A.lice S., and Richard K. 
Hale. To remove the cloud above adverted to, deeds from 
Mrs. Allen and the Hale heirs have been obtained as follows: 
(1) A deed from S. Josephine Allen by her attorney in fact, 
Thomas Oarson, to the United States, dated October 24, 1887, 
g -·nting the premises, and releasing and discharging the 
United States from all claims and demands whatsoever for or 
in respect of the use and occupancy thereof. (See deed ac-
companied by power of attorney 'herewith marked A and B.) 
(2) A similar deed from Francis J., Susan B., Louisa H., 
Alice S., and Ricbar<l. K. Hale, to the United States, dated 
Novem,ber15,18R7. (SeedeedherewithmarkedC.) (3) A simi-
lar deed from William H. Hale to Thomas Carson and James 
Stillman, dated December 3, 1887. (See deed herewith marked 
D.) This instrument was recorded in Cameron County, Texas, 
December 6, 1887. In addition to these deeds, a similar one 
has been executed 'by Thomas Carson in favor of the United 
States, dated December 12, 1887 (see deed marked E), the 
object of which is to convey to the Government such interest 
in the premises as he may have acquired in his own right 
under the said deed of William H. Hale. The interest which 
James Stillman may have acquired under tue same deed will 
pass on delivery of the deed made by him jointly with said 
Carson as administrator, etc. In my judgment, the deeds 
()f '-l}e Hale heirs, together with that of Mrs. Allen, and also 
the deed of Carson, mentioned above, are sufficient to remove 
the cloud herein before referred to. 
As the deed of James Stillman and Thomas Carson, ad-
ministrator, etc., dated September 17, 1887, which accom-
panied your request for an opinion, only purports to convey 
the property described therein, and contains no release of 
daims for ~se and occupation, it does not fully meet the re-
quirements of the act of March 3, 1885, chap. 360, in regard 
to such claims. 
The attention of the grantors being called to this, they 
have executed anew deed, dated October14, 1887, conveying 
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the same property to the United States and also ''releasing 
and discharging the latter from all claims and demand~ 
whatsoever for the use and occupancy thereof.'' (See deed 
herewith marked A A.) This deed is offered by them in lieu 
of the other. I may her'e add, that by an order of the county 
court of Cameron County, made at its .August term, 1885, 
Thomas Carson as administrator, etc., was authorized for and 
in behalf of the estate of said Maria J osefa Cavazos, deceased, 
to unite with the other claimants to said Fort Brown reser-
vation in a sale of the land, em braced in said Fort Brown res-
ervation, to the United States, and to make, execute, and 
deliver to the said United States full and complete acquit-
tances, releases, and con vesances of all and singular, the rightt 
title, and estate which he, the said Thomas Carson, now has 
and holds as administrator of the estate of Maria J osefa 
Cavazos, deceased, in and to the land embraced within said 
Fort Brown reservation, and in and to all sums of money due 
by the United States as rents for the use and occupancy 
of the same." . 
' Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the aforesaid 
deed of James Stillman and Thomas Carson, administrator, 
etc., dated October 14, 1887, together with the said deeds of 
:Mr~ . .Allen, the Hale heirs, and Thomas Carson, dated re-
spectively October 24, November 15, and December 12,1887,. 
is sufficient to vest in the United States a good and valid 
title to the tract of laud known as the Fort Brown reserva-
tion, in Texas (excluding, of course, that part of the premises 
which already belongs to the Government, whereof mention 
is hereinbefore made), and also to extinguish all claims for 
the use and occupancy of said reservation by the UI.tited 
States. 
This opinion assumes that the premises are now free from 
tax or other liens. Should the proposed transfer take place, 
it is ad vised that proper searches therefor be made before 
the purchase money is paid over; the abo,·e-mentioned deeds 
and power of attoruey (marked A, B, C, E, and A A) being 
in the mean time put on record. 
In connection witll the above matter several communica-
tions were received from you, dated October 15, 1887, and 
November 3, 4, 5, and 7,1887, inclosing and calling my atten-
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tion to a number of letters addressed to you by }fr. Pedro G. 
Cavazos, also a copy of a letter addressed to you by the }Iex-
ican minister, and a letter addressed to you by William 
Brady, esq., of New York. Upon examination of these letters, 
however, I do not find that they in any manner affect the 
validity of the title to the property proposed to be conveyed. 
:Mr. Cavazos was a party defendant in said suit, and put 
in a plea in reconventron, claiming title to an undivided one-
half of the pre wises, etc., as executor and trustee under the 
will of his mother :\Iaria Josefa Cavazos, deceased. This 
claim was antagonized by the claim of Thomas Carson as 
administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of the said 
.i\Iaria Josefa Cavazos, which was also pleaded in reconven-
tion. The verdict and judgment went against the former, 
and in favor of the latter claimant. The only interest which 
Mr. Cavazos has is that of a distributee, in common with the 
other heirs of said 1\laria J osefa Cavazos, of the proceeds 
arising from the ~ale of the land and of the receipts for use 
and occupanQy thereof; and it is not to be doubted that both 
his and their rights will be adequately protected by the local 
court having jurisdiction of the administration and distribu-
tion of the said estate. This remark is applicable to th~ let-
ter of tlle -:\Ie.s:ican minister, which is in relation to the inter-
ests of the same heirs. The letter of Mr. Brady relates to a 
claim for his services as attorney for James Stillman and 
others, owners of the property aforesaid, and does not con-
cern the title thereto. A notice of such claim was also 
received here (which I transmit herewith), wherein the claim-
ant asserts a lien upon the fund appropriated for the pur-
chase. There is no foundation for the lien asserted, nor has 
the claimant, as I conceive, any equitable interest in the 
fund which,your Department is bound to protect in the dis-
bursement thereof. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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NORTHERN PACIFIC LAND GRANT. 
The joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 378), added a second in-
demnity belt to the land grant made to the Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company by the act of July 2, 1864, chapter 217, such grant thus having 
two indemnity belts. 
Indemnity seiections within the first belt (i. e., that originally created by 
~be act of 1864) are not restricted to the lirnjts of the particular State 
or Territory in which the granted lands were lost, bnt may be made 
outside of those limits. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
J a.nuary 17, 1888. 
SIR: Your predecessor, by his letter of the 7th of Decem-
ber, 1887, asked my opinion on the following points: 
(1) "Did the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, create a sec-
ond indemnity belt beyond and in addition to the indemnity 
belt created hy the granting act of 1864 ~ 
(2) "If you answer the first proposition in the affirmative, 
and find that there are two indemnity belts, can selections be 
made within the first belt for losses outside the particular # 
State or Territory in which the same occurred?" 
The grantiug act referred to in your first inquiry was passed 
on the 2d day of July, 1864 (13 Stats., 365). Its third section 
granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company "every 
alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by 
odd numbers, to the arnount of twenty alternate sections per 
mile, on each side of said railroad lin~, as said company may 
adopt, through the Territories of the United States, and ten 
alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said rail-
road whenever it passes through any State, and whenever 
on the line thereof the United States have full title, not re· 
served, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free 
from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the 
line of said road is definitely fixed and a plat thereof filed 
jn the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office; 
ancl whenever, prior to said time, any of said sections or parts 
of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied 
hy homestead settlers, or pre-empted, or otherwise disposed 
of, other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu 
thereof, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, 
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in alternate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not 
more than ten miles beyond the limits of said alternate sec· 
tions." 
This section thus provided for a limit or boundary on each 
side of the road, to run parallel to the course of its line, along 
the outside lines of the alternate sections granted, and another 
lirr_it or boundary 10 miles beyond that, to which last limit 
the company was granted the right to select for lands lost in 
the first in consequence of prior rights having attached 
thereto. These limits have been known as the'' primary" 
and ''secondary," or the" granted" and'' indemnity" limits. 
Both are clearly the boundaries of rights or privileges granted 
by the section. On the 6th of March, 1865, the president of 
the company presented a map of the general route of the 
line to the proper officers of the Interior Department, and 
asked a withdrawal from sale of the public lands along its 
course. This map was adjudged insufficient and withdrawal 
refused. The map thus filed accomplished no good pur-
pose for the company, but afforded the public a general 
knowledge of the probable location of the prospective road. 
The knowledge thus furnished inspired activity in the settle-
ment, pre-emption, and purchase of lands along the probable 
line indicated by it. The nineteenth section of the act de· 
clared the act should be null and void unless $2,000,000 of 
the stock of the company should be taken and 10 per cent. 
thereof paid in within two years. Other provisions of the act 
showed the intent of Congress to impose on the company a 
speedy completion of the line. Before the 31st of May, 1870, 
the date of the resolution referred to in your inquiry, little 
had been done by the company to complJT with that intent. 
The necessity for relief from tbe effect of the supineness of 
tbe company, and its inability to proceed successfully without 
additional powers, gave rise to the resolution under consid· 
eration, which declares (16 StatR., 378): 
'' That the Northern Pacific Railroad Company be, and 
hereby is, authorize<': * * * to locate and construct., under 
the provisions, and with the privileges, grants, and duties 
provided for in its act of incorporation, its main road to some 
point on Puget Sound, via the valley of the Columbia 
River, * * • and in the event of there not being in any 
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State or Territory, in which said main line or branch may 
be located at the time of the final location 1 hereof, the amount 
of land per mile granted by Congress to said company wit,bin 
the limits prescribed by its charter, th('n said company shall be 
entitled, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, 
to receive so many sections of land belonging to the United 
States, and designated by odd numbers, in such State or Terri-
tory, within ten miles on each side of said road beyond the 
limits prescribed in said charter, as will make up such defi-
ciency on said main line or branch, except mineral or other 
lands, as excepted in the charter of said company of eighteen 
hundred and sixty-four, to the amount of the lands that have 
been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, 
preempted, or otherwise disposed of subsequent to the 
passage of the act of July 2, eighteen hundred and sixty-
four." 
The first clause in the resolution quoted expressly declares 
the company is authorized to construct "under the provisions 
and with the privileges, grants, and duties provided for in its 
act of incorporation. " This language clearly indicates an 
intent to confirm all the benefits, privileges, and grants em-
.. braced in the original act, and rebuts any interpretation of 
the resolution which would diminish or curtail them. Among 
those privileges was the right of the company to select lieu 
lands for those that bad been disposed of by the United 
States at any time prior to the date of the definite location of 
the road. 'If this indemnity grant be construed to cover the 
same ground embraced in the original indemnity limit, and not 
exteml beyond it, it would deprive the company oft be lieu lands 
for any lands that had been taken up by settlers or purchasers 
before the passage of the act of 1864. Congress could not 
have intended to provide for indemnity of lands lost to the 
company after the passage of the act of 1864, and take from 
it all indemnity for those which bad been lost before that 
date, in an enactment whose clear purpose was to increase 
the inducements to build the road by strengthening the credit 
of the company. The probability that many of the most val-
uable lands which the company would have received had the 
lands been withdrawn on the 6th of March, 1865, within U1~ 
original primary and secondary limits, bad been appropriated 
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by settlers and purchasers between the passage of the original 
act and the resolution of the 31st of March, 1870, suggested 
the necessity that an additional indemnity limit should be 
established for lands which had been lost between those dates. 
This probable necessity was provided for by the provision in 
the resolution that-
"In the eYent of there not being in any State or Territory 
in which said main line or branch may be located at the time 
of the final location thereof the amount of lands per mile 
granted by Congress to said company within the limits pre-
scribetl by its charter, then the said company shall be enti-
tled, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, to 
receive so many sections of land belonging to the United 
States, and designated by odd numbers, in such State or Ter-
ritory, 'vitbin ten miles on each side of said road, beyond the 
limits prescribed in saiil charter, as will make up such defi-
c~ency ." 
This clause seems to be sufficiently clear to be its own in-
terpreter. "Beyond the limits prescribed in said charter" 
certainly means outside of the limits. It does not declare it 
is to be outside of the granted or primary limits only, but 
beyond the limits, without restriction to either primary or 
secondary. Interpretation does not authorize the interpola-
tion of the words "primary" or "gtanted" into the statute. 
To add the words "granted" or "primary" after the word 
"limits" would diminish the right of indemnity by exclud-
ing the company from indemnity for . such lands as prior to 
the passage of the original act had been disposed of by the 
Government, and would restrict the right of selection for 
lands lost to the particular State or Territory in which the 
lands lost were located. The company woultl thus be deprived 
of a part of the ~' pri 'Tileges and grants provided for in its 
act of incorporation." That the resolution should not be thus 
restricted is corroborated by the uniform interpretation of 
both the Land Bureau and the Department of the Interior 
in their administration of it. Commissioner Drummond, on 
• the 26th of December, 1871, issued orders to the registers and 
receivers along the line of the road as follows : 
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" DEP A.RTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
r, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, 
" Washington, D. 0., December 26, 1871. 
" GENTLEMEN: Referring to my letter to you of the 15th 
of September, 1870, and map of designated line and 20-mile 
limit of the land grant to tbe Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany and directing a withdrawal of lands therefor, I now 
inclose you a map showing the line of the road as constructed, 
together with the definite 20-mile limits of the grant and the 
additional 10-mile indemnity limits as granted under the 
original act of July 2, 1864:, and also the additional 10-mile 
indemnity limit granted by the joint resolution May 31, 1870. 
These limits are respectively designated as the 20, 30, and 40 
mile limits. I have also designated the limits fixed in my 
letter of the 15th of September, 1870; and you are now di-
rected to withhold from sale or location, pre-emption or 
homestead entry, all the odd-numbered sections within the 
limits designated on the map herewith and not heretofore 




REGISTER AND RECEIVER, 
Alexandria, JJ.finn: 
On the 31st of July, 1885, Commissioner Sparks, in the 
case of the United States v. Guilford Miller (3 Brainerd's 
Precedents, 214) referring to this resolution, together with 
the indemnity provisions of the original act, uses the follow-
ing language: 
"The indemnity provision is as follows : 
"And whenever prior to said time any of said sections or 
parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, 
occupied by homestead sett,lers, or pre-empted, or otherwise 
disposed of, other lands shall be selected by such company 
in lieu thereof, under the directions of the Secretary of the 
Interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd num-
bers, not more than ten miles beyond the limits of said alter-
nate sections. 
"The, act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 276), extended these 
limits fartlter, in the event that deficiencies could not be sup-
plied within the first 10 miles within the granted limits." 
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The interpretation thus illustrated has been the rule of 
administration both in the Land Bureau and in the Interior 
Department without exception ever since the passage of the 
resolution of 1870. Many property rights must doubtless 
have vested upon the construction adopted. Contemporane-
ous and uniform interpretation is entitled to weight in the 
construction of the law, and in case of doubt ought to turn 
the scale. (Brou·n v. United States, 113 U. S., 570). As, 
therefore, the circumstances surrounding the passage of the 
resolution of 1870, the lauguage of the resolution itselt~ 
and the contemporaneous and uniform interpretation adopted 
by the Land Bureau and Interior Department all concur in 
the conclusion that the resolution of 1870 ''creates a second 
indemnity belt beyond and in addition to the indemnity belt 
created by the granting act of 1864," your first inquiry is 
answered in the affirmative. 
In reply to your second inquiry, the first section of the act 
of the 2d of July, 1864 (13 Stat.; 366), declares: 
"And said corporation is hereby authorized and empow-
ered to lay out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain, and en-
joy a continuous railt·oad and telegraph line, with the appur-
tenances, namely, beginning at a point on Lake Superior, in 
the State of Minnesota or Wisconsin, thence westerly by 
the most eligible railroad route, as shall be determined by 
said company, within the territory of the United States on 
a line north of the forty-fifth degree of latitude, to some point 
on Puget's Souncl." 
By this a eontinuous line is provided for. No State or 
Territory is even named in it, except as the starting point 
and terminus of that line. State and Territorial lines are not 
mentioned nor in any way recognized as constituting divis-
ions which break the continuity. On this unbroken line 
alternate sections are granted to the amount of ten per mile 
on each side within the States and twenty within the Terri-
tories. Whenever lands shall have been lost to the company 
from the amount granted within the primary limits by pre-
vious settlement or purchase the act declares : 
''Other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu 
thereof, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, 
in alternate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not 
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more than ten miles beyond the limits of said alternate sec-
tions." (13 Stats., 368.) 
This clause as a whole provides for an indemnity for lands 
lost out of the amount granted. The conditions of this in-
demnity, set forth in detail, under which the right or privi-
lege of selection vests in the company, are: lands shall have 
been lost out of the amount granted ; selections must be 
made by the company of other lands in lieu of them ; those 
selections must be made under the directions of the Secretary 
of the Interior; selections shall only be of alternate odd-num-
bered sections, and they must not be more than 10 miles be-
yond the limits of the granted sections. These are all the 
limitations or conditions provided for by the act of 1864, sub-
ject to which the right to select is granted. Interpretation 
will not warrant the adding of another limitation that the lieu 
lands must be selected in the same State or Territory in which 
the lands were lost. To annex such an additional limitation 
to the words of the grant would be legislation and not con-
struction. In the resolution of the 31st of 1\fay, 1870 (16 
Stat., 379), in which Congress intended to limit the selection 
of the lieu lands to the same State or Territory in which the 
lands were lost, the languag·e used to so limit the grant is: 
"Then said company shall be entitled, under the direc-
tions of the Secretary of the Interior, to receive so many sec-
tions of land belonging to the United States, and designated 
by odd numbers, in such State or Territo'ry, within ten miles 
on each side of said road, beyond the limits prescribed in 
said charter." 
The language," in such State or Territory," or some equiv-
alent language, would doubtless have been found in the 
original act of 1864, had it been the intent of Congress to 
limit the selection to the State or Territory in which the 
Jands were lost. In the absence of any such words, I do not 
feel authorized to interpolate them as an additional limita-
tion to the law as enacted. 
I therefore answer your second inquiry also in the affirma-
tive. 
I am, yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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PURCHASE OF INDIAN SUPPLIES. 
The third section of the act of March 2, 1887, chap. 320, permits purchases 
not exceeding $3,000 in amount to be made in open market without 
advertisement, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, as 
often as a "case of exigency" exists, so that the gross purchases 
keep within the sum appropriated. · 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 27, 1888. 
SIR : Your inquiry of the 19th instant is whether the 
aggregate expenditure from the appropriation for Indian 
supplies (sec. 3, 24 Stat., 46fi) is limited to a sum not ex-
ceeding $3,000 for the annual total expenditures, or for a 
single expenditure at any one time, in cases of exigency. 
Section three authorizes purchases out of the appropria-
tion for Indian supplies in an aggregate of $500 in value at 
any one time; and when cases of exigency exist purchases 
may be made in the discretion of the Secretary of the In-
terior in open market in amount not exceeding $3,000; 
the latter purchases, in sums not exceeding $3,000, are re-
stricted by official record of facts constituting the exigen-
cies and by a report thereof to Congress. 
The prevailing words of the section are : " That no pur-
chase of supplies for which appropriations are herein made, 
exceeding in the aggregate five hundred dollars in value at 
any one time, shall be made without first giving at least 
three weeks' public notice by advertisement, except in cases 
of exigency, when, in the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Interior, who shall make official record of the facts consti-
tuting the exigency and shall report the same to Congress 
at its next session, he may direct that purchases may be 
made in open market in amount not exceeding three thou-
sand dollars. * * * 
The above interpretation assumes that section 3 does not 
appropriate money, but is a proviso explaining how the 
appropriation may be used. Under this rule of interpreta-
tion the whole section must be read together, and the parts 
mnst interpret each other, so that ,the intention of the legis-
lature may be ascertained. 
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In the first part there is a prohibition, in the second part 
au exception. Both deal with one subject-matter; the pro-
hibition, with sums over $500; the exception, with sums. 
under $3,000. The phrase " at any one time " in the former 
has a continuing and pertinent force in the latter clause;. 
a conclusion that is strengthened by the words ''except in 
cases of exigency/' which imply a plurality of exigencies, 
when purchases under $3,000 · may be made. Construed 
together, then, the exception permits as many purchases of 
$3,000 as the prohibition permits of $500, so that the gross 
purchases ·keep within the sum appropriated. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CQNGRESSIONAL LIBRARY BUILDING. 
The words" proper advertisements," as used in the act of Aprill5, 18861 
chap. 50, mean advertisements for proposals in such cases as the gen-
eral provisions of law concerning public contracts require. 
The Commission created by that act may, in the construction of the Con-
gressional Library Building, contract for personal services without 
previous advertisement; and within that description of services come 
those rendered by mechanics and laborers who may be employed to 
place the stone properly in the wall directly under the control and 
supervision of the Commission, its architect, or superintendent. of con-
struction. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 21, 1888. 
SIR: In your letter to me of the 17th inst., at the request 
of the Commission created by the act of April 15, 1886, en-
titled "An act authorizing the construction of a building for 
the accommodation of the Congressional Library," you in-
quire: 
"Whether, under said act or other existing statutes, the 
Commission is authorized to contract, after proper advertise-
ment and the reception of bids, for the necessary stone, ce-
ment, lime, sand, and other materials required for the con-
struction of the foundation walls of the Library Building, and 
then to employ the necess'ary mechanics, by the day, to place 
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the stone properly in the wall, directly under the control and 
supervision of the Commission, its architect, or superintend-
ent of construction, or whether it is obligatory upon the 
Commission to contract for such labor only after advertise-
ment and reception of bid~, either in connection with the 
furnishing of materials or separately." 
Having carefully considered this inquiry, I have now the 
honor to submit the following in reply: 
The act of 1886, mentioned above, authorizes the said 
Commission to make contracts for the construction of the 
Library Building" after proper advertisements and the recep-
tion of bids." The words "proper advertisements," as there 
used, I think, mean nothing more than advertisements for 
proposals in such cases as the gene~·al provisions of law con-
cerning public contracts require. To ascertain, then, wherein 
it is or is not incumbent upon the Commission to a(h-ertise 
for proposals previous to making contracts, recourse must be 
had to these provisions, which are contained in section 
3709,. Revised Statutes. See also in connection therewith 
section 238 of the Revision relating to the District of Co-
lumbia. 
By the former section all" contracts for supplies or services 
in any of the departments of the Gm·ernment, except for per-
sonal services, shall be made by advertising a sufficient time 
previously for proposals respecting the same," etc.~ while by 
the latter section "all contracts for buildings and other pub-
lic works of the United States in the District of Columbia 
shall be advertised at least sixty days before letting." 
It will be observed that section 3709 expressly excepts 
contracts for "personal services" from the requirement of 
previous advertisement for proposals. Section 2J8 prescribes 
the duration of the ad\Tertisement, where the proposed con-
tract relates to public buildings or works in the District of 
Columbia, but does not otherwise modify section 3709. 
The conclusion reached is that the Commission may, in 
the construction of the Library Building, contract for" per-
sonal services" without previous advertisement. And within 
that description of services would obviously come those ren-
dered by mechanics and laborers who may be employed by 
the Commission '"to place the stone properly in the wall 
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directly under the control and supervision of the Commis-
sion, its architect, or superintendent of construction." 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
Hon. WM. F. VILAs, 
Secretary of the Interior, and Chairman of the 
Commission for the Construction of the Con-
gressional Library Building. 
TAX ON NOTES USED FOR CIRCULATION. 
The tickets issued by certain ice companies (copies of which are given in 
the opinion) are not "notes" within the meaning of that term as used 
in section HI of the act of February 8, 1875, chapter 36, and therefore 
are not subject to the 10 per centum tax imposed by that section. 
Where a company or corporation made and paid out its own notet~ in the 
ordinary course of its business, not intending them to be used for cir-
culation as money or cnrnmcy, their use as such by other persons after 
they were paid out, without approval by the maker of such use, would 
not subject the maker to the tax. 
No tax, as such, is imposed ou those notes which are prohibited by sec· 
tion 3583, Revised Statutes. The violation of this section is vindi-
cated by fine or imprisonment, or both. 
DEPARTMEN'l.' OF JUSTICE, 
February 23, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 28th of January, 1S88, after re-
ferring to ice tickets is~med by a number of ice companies 
upoti the Hudson River, and submitting three specimen 
copies, you inquire, 
First, ''Are these so-called ice-tickets, or any of them, and 
if only some of them which, notes within the meaning, pur-
pose, and intent of that word as emplo:red in section 19 of the 
act of February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 311) ~" 
Second, "Is a company or corporation relieved from tax 
on the amount of its own notes used for circulation by othero, 
and paid out by it, pro·dded it itself did not intend them for 
circulation and does not use them for circulation, except in so 
far as it is done by paying them out~" 
Third, "Is the Government precluded from collecting from 
a corporation a tax on the corporation's own notes used for 
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circulation and paid out by it by the fact that the notes fall 
within the prohibition of section 3583 of the Revised Statutes 
of the United States~ " 
Fourth, ''Are these issues, or any of them, and if so what 
ones, taxable under said section 19 of the act of February 8 ~" 
The three copies of ice tickets submitted are as follows: 
J oily Island. 
Good f'?r 12t cents. 
Knickerbocker Ice Company. 
Robert Maclay, Prest. 
Consumers' Ice Company. 
$1.50. 
R. French, Prest. 
New Jersey Ice Company. 
West Camp. 
Good for $1. 75. 
No. 474. Henry L. Newkirk, 'l'reas. 
(Indorsed on back) : "E. A. Stevens." 
The law imposing the tax is the nineteenth section of the 
act of the 8th of February, 1875 (18 Stat., 311 ), which pro· 
vides: 
''That every person, firm, association, other than national 
bank associations, and ~very corporation, State bank, or 
State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum 
on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and 
paid out by them." 
This section imposes a tax on notes. It is, therefore, indis-
pensable that the instrument taxed should be a note. The 
statute does not include every note given by a debtor to his 
creditor. In the case of Hollister v. Mercantile Association 
(111 U. ~S. R., 65) the notes taxable under the statutes are 
limited to negotiable promissory notes, in the following lan-
guage: 
" From this review of the legislation on the general sub-
ject, and tbe apparently studied use by Congress of words of 
appropriate signification whenever it was intended to cover 
anything else than promissory notes in the commercial sense 
of that 'Ferm, we are led to the conclusion that only such 
notes as are in law negotiable, so as to carry title in their 
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circulation from hand to 'hand, are the subjects of taxation 
under the statute." 
Neither are all negotitble promissory notes taxable under 
tbe statute. One of the chief purposes of the tax is tore-
strain or repress the issuing of such notes as are intended to 
be subjected io the tax. Congress did not intend to clog the 
business of the country by repressing the giving of negotiable 
promissory notes, nor impose an additional indebtedness of 
10 per cent. upon a debtor who, in the ordinary course of 
business, gives his creditor a promissory note for the amount 
he owes. The additionaf limitation of the taxable notes is 
found by considering the words of the enactment in connec-
tion with other existing legislation on the same subject, 
which may be found in sections 3583, 5182, 3'408, 3412, and 
3413 of the Revised Statutes. The W(trds used, '~for circul;t-
tion and paid out by them,'' as found in the enactment, when 
construed in connection with like language and intent shown 
in other parts of the same system, establishes another limi-
tation upon the taxable notes. The making and paying out 
of the note are the acts of the maker. The character of the 
note must be impressed upon it by bim in those acts. If the 
maker, in the ordinary conduct of a lawful business (other 
than that of banking), for the purpose of that business gives 
his negotiable promissory note without intent that it shall be 
used as currency in competition with the national currency, 
such a note would not be taxable. If the maker did not 
intend the note to be used as a substitute for money, the 
fact that others, without consulting him, so used it, should 
not subject hilll to the tax; nor will the fact that those into 
whose hands the paper may come may assign or transfer it 
render him liable to a tax for which he would not have been 
liable when it left his hands in the ordinary course of a legiti-
mate business. The subject-m~tter of taxation, therefore, 
intended by the act is negotiable promissory notes paid out 
with the intent at the time of their issue that they shall be 
used as a currency or circulating medium. 
In your }(lifter you state yoq inclose " a sample of the 
tickets issued by each of five companies." I find but the 
three samples above set forth among the inclosures. 
In reply to your first and fourth inquiries : None of those 
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tickets are notes within the meaning, purport, and intent of 
that word as employed in section nineteen of the act of Feb-
ruary 8, 187 5. 
In reply to your second inquiry: If the company or cor-
poration made and paid out its own notes in the ordinary 
course of its business, and did not intend them to be used 
for circulation as money or currency, their use as such by 
other persons after thej' were paid out, without the 'approval 
by the corporation of such use, would not subject the maker 
to the tax, and the mere fact that the maker paid the tickets 
when presented would not be such an approval as would im-
pose the liability. 
In reply to your third inquiry: Section 3583 of the Revised 
Statutes absolutely prohibits the issuing of notes, intended 
for circulation as currency, of less denomination than $1. 
The violation of this section is vindicated by fine or imprison-
ment, or both. It is not to be presumed Congress contem-
plated a general disregard of its own ('nactment, and imposed 
a tax, as. such, for acts prohibited by it. This principle is 
recognized in the case ot'1llcLain v. The United States(6Peters, 
427). An examination of the existing statutes does not show 
that Congress intended to impose a tax on that which by law 
was forbidden, and as to such notes as are prohibited by 
section 3583 no tax as such is imposed. 
I herewith return the inclosures, as requested. 
Very respecrifully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTACHMENT OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. 
Imported merchandise, while in the custody of the customs officers, is 
not subject to attachment at the suit of private parties; and those 
officers should pay no attention to process of that kind against such 
merchandise when served on them. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 2 i, 18H8. 
SIR: I received your letter of the 9th of ~,ebruary, 1888, 
inclosing copies of three monitions issued from the district 
court of the United States for the southern district of New 
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York, and served by the ma~shal on the collector of cus-
toms of the port of New York. You ask, ''Whether or not 
customs officers should pay any attention to these pretended 
attachments of imported merchandise in the custody of the 
United States." 
The monitions command the marshal " to attach the said 
merchandise, and detain the same in his custody until the 
further order of the court respecting the same." The cus-
toms laws command the officers of the customs to take pos-
session of merchandise imported by virtue of the laws of the 
United States, and retain the goods in accordance with law 
until the duties (if subject to duty) shall be paid. The lien 
of the United States, and the right to tha possession of the 
goods for its enforcement, have precedence over every other 
lien and right. When the collector of customs, in the dis-
'charge of his official duty in obedience to law, takes posses-
sion of merchandise, his possession is the possession of the 
United States. Until the right of the United States to the 
posses~ion shall have terminated, the marshal can not law-
fully seize the goods, or interfere with the possession of the 
officers of the customs. The collector can not recognize or 
hold a concurrent possession with the marsbal. The law is 
declared as follows in the case of Harris v. Dennie (3 Peters, 
304): 
"From the moment of their arrival in port the goods are, 
in legal contemplation, in the custody of the United States; 
and every proceeding which interferes with or restricts or 
controls that custody is a virtual violation of the provisions 
of the act. Now, an attachment of such goods by a State 
officer presupposes a right to take possession and custody 
of those goods and to make such possession and custody ex-
clusive. If the officer attaches upon mesne process, he has 
a right to hold possession to answer the exigency of that 
process; if he attaches on execution, he is bound to sell, or 
may sell, within a limited period, and thus virtually displace 
the custody of the United States. The act of Congress re-
cognizes no such authority and admits of no such exercise 
of right." 
This statement of the principle is quoted with approval 
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and enlarged upon in the case of Taylor v. Oarryl (20 How., 
596). 
The law does not contemplate that the officers of the cus-
toms shall be involved in the litigation of private persons 
with reference to their debts against, or thejr rights in, mer-
chandise imported; nor can they be required to hold the 
goods after the right of the United States shall have been 
discharged. In a single instance, section 2981 of the Re-
vised Statutes permits the chief officer of customs to retain 
the goods for a purpose other than the enforcement of the 
public right. This exception in favor of private parties 
goes far br imp~ication to forbid him to ret<lin the import 
for any other purpose, not public, beyond the one excepted, 
Your inquiry is therefore answered in the negative. 
I am yours, z:espectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
IRON-BAR ENDS . 
.Advised that iron-bar enus, consisting of the crop ends, from 1 to 4 inches 
loug, cut off from Swedish bar-iron in the proces8 of manufacturing the 
bars, have not been" in actual use" so as to justify their classification 
as scrap-iron under Sche(lule '' C" of the act of March 3, 18133, chapter 
121. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1888. 
SIR: Ym;rr letter of the 31st of January, 1888, submits for 
my opinion whether certain charcoal iron-bar ends, consist-
ing of the crop ends from 1 to 4 inches long, cut off from 
Swedish bar-iron in the process of manufacturing the bars, 
"have been in actual use" so as to justify their classification 
as scrap-iron under Schedule 0 of the tariff act of 1883. 
That which is a part of the process in the manufacture of 
an article is not an actual 'use of the article. The cutting off 
of the bar ends under the facts stated in your letter is a part 
of the process of manufacturing the bar-iron. They have not, 
therefore, been in actual usr, as contemplated, to entitle them 
to be classified as scrap-iron under the definition of scrap-iron 
• 
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contained in the statute, which is that "nothing shall be 
deemed scrap-iron or scrap-steel except waste or refuse iron 
or steel that has been in actual use and is fit only to be re-man· 
ufactured." 
This view is not inconsistent with the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Schles·inger v. Beard (120 U.S. R., 267). 
. In that case the cuttings and clippings were waste, cut off 
rods and plates which were used for the making of boilers 
and the erecti0n of bridges. The clippings were cut so as to 
fit the rods and plates for that particular use. The court 
ruled that "The plates, rods, and beams were made to be 
used in a particular way. They have been so used, and these 
cuttiugs and clippings are the waste of that use. Conse-
quently they are, in our opinion, wrought scrap-iron, and duti-
able as such." 
The bar-iron referred to in yours is not of any particular 
use, but for the general market. No parts of the process of 
manufacture of it can be properly called " an actual use;" 
therefore the ends des~ribed in yours, cut off in tlle process 
of manufacture, should not be classified as scrap-iron. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CLASSIFICATION OF CARRIAGE-ROBES . 
.Advised that if certain lap-robes or carriage-robes, sometimes called 
railway or traveling rugs, were commercially known at the time of 
the passago of the act of March 3, 188:3, chapter 121, as mat8 or rugs, 
they should be classified under a certain clause of Schedule K of that 
act, providing for ''Carpets and carpetings of wool, etc., and mats, 
rugs," ( tc.; but that if not so known, nor by any other designation 
1novided for, they should be classified according to the component 
material. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 25, 18S8. 
SIR : I received your letter of the 17th of February, 1888, 
"relative to the classification under the tariff laws of certain 
lap-robes and carriage robes, which are sometimes called rail-
way or traveling rugs," also a '~copy of a decision rendered 
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by the Secretary of the Treasury on the 18th of January, 
1870 (S., 543), on certain railway rugs, which are believed to 
be the same class of articles." 
You state the importers claim the merchandise should be 
classified under the clause of Schedule K of the act of 1883 
(22 Stat., 510), which provides: 
" Carpets and carpetings of wool, flax, or cotton, or parts 
of either or other material, not otherwise herein specified, 
forty per centum ad valorem; and mats, rugs, screens, 
covers, hassocks, bedsides, and other portions of carpets 
or carpetings shall be subjected to the same rate of duty 
herein imposed on carpets or carpeting of like description; 
and the duty on all other mats, not exclusively of vegetable 
material, screens, hassocks, and rugs, shall be forty per· 
centum ad valorem." 
You ask for " an expression of my opinion under section 2 
of the act of March 3, 1875, as to whether the decision (S., 
543) referred to should be modified to accord with the claim 
of the importers." To answer the question unqualifiedly 
would involve the decision of a question of fact which is not 
within my province; but if it be assumed the goods were 
known commercially at the time of the passage of the act of 
1883 as mats or rugs, they should be classified under the 
clause quoted in accordance with the views of the importer, 
because in that event they are ~pecially provided for. If 
they were not known at the time of the passage of the act 
referred to in trade and commerce as mats or rugs, nor by 
any other commercial designation provided for~ they should 
be classified according to the component material. The de-
cision (Synopsis, No. 543) referred to should be modified to 
correspond with these views. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
.A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF '!'HE TREASURY. , 
106 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Court Martial-Pardon. 
COURT MARTIAL-PARDON. 
An officer who is authorized to order a general court-martial has no' 
power under the 112th article of war to pardon or mitigate the punish-
ment adjudged by it after confirmation by him of the sentence. 
DEP .A.R1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 27, 1888. 
SIR: The papers transmitted with your letter of the 24th 
of February, 1888, call for an interpretation of the one-hun-
dredth and twelfth article of war (Rev. Stat., sec. 1342), which 
provides: 
"Every officer who is authorized to orcler a general court-
martial shall have power to pardon or mitigate any punish-
- ment adjudged by it, except the punishment of death or of 
dismissal of an officer. Every officer commanding a regiment 
or garrison in which a regimental or g·arrison court-martial 
shall be held shall have power to pardon or mitigate any 
punishment which such court may adjudge." 
The question presented is whether an officer authorized to 
order a general court-martial, after the final approval by him 
of the punishment adjudged by the court, has power to par-
don the offender. 
The second section of Article II of the Constitution of the 
United States provides: 
"The President • • • shall have power to grant re-
prieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, 
except in cases of impeachment." 
This grant of power to pardon offenses against the United 
States to the President alone forbids the exercise of it by 
any one else. The crimes or misdemeanors forbidden by the 
Articles of "\Var are offenses against the United States. The 
Constitution, therefore, forbids any one but the President 10 
pardon those who commit such offenses. If the power to 
pardon provided for in article 112 is an aosolute grant of 
power to pardon an offense against the United States, vested 
in an officer authorized to order a general court-martial, the 
enactment as to such power is void. But it is to be pre-
sumed Congress passed the law in subservience to a,nd not 
in violation of the Constitution. If, then, the enactment is 
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fairly capable of a construction that will render it consistent 
with the Constitution, that construction should be adopted 
as expressing the intent of the legislative power. To dis-
cover that intent, the context and subject-matter may be 
resorted to. 
Article 109 provides: "All sentences of a court-martial 
may be confirmed and carried into execution by the officer 
ordering the court." 
This establishes that the action is not final until the officer 
ordering the court shall confirm it. His confirmation is the 
judgment of the law. That confirmation is an act distinct 
from the action or judgment of the court, and is the action 
of the officer ordering the court after it shall have exhausted 
its jurisdiction over the alleged offense. Article 112 clearly 
recognizes the distinction between the final judgment of the 
law as pronounced by the officer who ordered the court and 
that of the court-martial submitted to him for judgment. 
The verdict of a jury bears a close analogy to the judg-
ment of a court-martial. The sentence pronounced on that 
verdict by the court bears a like analogy to the confirmation 
of the officer who ordered the court. 
The language of article 112 is : 
''Every officer who is authorized to order a general court-
martial shall have power to pardon or mitigate any punish-
ment adjudged by it." , 
The pronoun ''it" refers to ''general court-martial" as its 
antecedent. lt is only the judgment of a court-martial that 
the officer may pardon or mitigate. The enactment does not 
gh·e him power to pardon or mitigate the punishment of an 
offense finally adjudged and confirmed by himself. Had 
Congress so intended, it bad the free use .of the whole 
English language to so say. To express such au intent, it 
would have added after the word "it" the words "or him," 
so that the enactment would have read "any punishment 
adjudged by it or him." A fair interpretation of the act does 
not require the addition of these words. For a construction 
of the article which shall give the officer any other power 
over the punishment, except the power to pardon or mitigate 
the punishment adjudged and reported to him by the court, 
adds to the power granted by the statute. Before he shall 
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have confirmed the action of the court article 112 permits 
him to mitigate the punishment or remit it; but after the 
final judgment of confirmation-which is the judgment of 
the law-shall have conclusively established the offense aud 
the guilt of the ofi'ender, the law gives him power neither to 
mitigate nor remit. It i~ only the punishment, by the 
language of the article, and not the offense, that he may · 
mitigate or remit. Until the final judgment the charge 
against the alleged offender is not conclusively or legally es-
tablished as an offense, and until so established Congress 
intended to authorize the officer to suspend further prosecution 
of the alleged crime. But when the law has finally pro-
nounced its judgment, it could not and did not intend to 
grant the power to pardon the offense against the United 
States. 
Any other interpretation of the article would be a dis-
regard of the constitutional limitation of the pardoning 
power, which is vested in the· President alone. After the 
final sentence of the law is pronounced by the superior officer, 
the charge has passed conclusively into an offense beyond 
dispute, for, as i~ ruled in the case of Ex parte Reed (100 U. 
S. R., 13), Keyes v. United States ( 109 U. S. R., 336), and 
11 Opin., 19, the judgment of a court-martial is conclusive in 
its effect as to the truth of the charge, and as a judicial de-
cree is a bar to further proceeding. 
It is declared in Bronson v. Schulten (104 U.S. R., 415): "It 
is a rule equally well established that after the term has ended 
all final judgments and decrees of the court pass beyond its 
control, unless steps be taken during that term, by motion or 
otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct them; and if errors 
exist, they ca.n only be corrected by such proceeding by a 
writ of error or appeal as may be allowed in a court which, by 
law, can review the decision. So strongly bas this principle 
been upheld by this court, that while realizing that there is no 
court which can review its decisions, it has invariably refused 
all applications for rehearing made after the adjournment of 
the court for the term at which the judgment was rendered; 
and this is placed upon the ground that the case has passed 
beyond the control of the court." 
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The consequences that might follow any other interpreta-
tion would be obnoxious to the constitutional principle that 
forbids any person to be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense; for the power of the officer to pardon is limited by 
the statute to the pardon of the punishment. After such 
a pardon the offense would still remain unpardoned against 
the offender. If the power of the officer to pardon existed 
at any time after the final judgment, and should be exercised 
after the offender had paid a large part of the penalty of t!Je 
law, he might be agai.n prosecuted, convicted, and twice pun-
ished for the same o.ffense. Such a consequence was not in-
tended. 
The latter part ofthe opinion of Attorney-General Brews-
ter, rendered February 11, 1884, which seems to be incon-
sistent herewith, does not appear to have been essential to 
the determination of the question submitted to him, and there-
fore may not have been maturely considered, nor intended 
as an authoritative answer to the question now under consid-
eration. 
In reply to your inquiry, therefore, after the final approval 
by the officer ordering the court-martial, he bas no power to 
pardon the offense or mitigate the punishment under article 
112. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
LAWS OF THE CHOCTAW NATION. 
The seventh section of the Choctaw intermarriage act of November 9, 
lo75, is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States. 
That section is valid and binding on all citizens of the Choctaw Nation, 
but affects on1y their rights acquired under said act. 
The fact that a white man was divorced from his Indian wife, upon her 
petition, is evidence that he parted from her without just provocation, 
and brings the case within the provision of the Choctaw act of October, 
1840, declaring that any white man parting from his wife without just 
provocation shall be deprived of citizenship. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 1, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 27th of January, 1888, submits for 
my consideration the following questions: 
(1) "Does the seventh section of the Choctaw intermarriage 
act, approved November u, 1875, conflict with the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United Statea' and, if not, 
(2) ''Is said section valid and bindingastopersonswho be-
came citizens by intermarriage contracted before the 9th of 
November, 1875, and who married aliens subsequent to said 
date' 
(3) "Does the fact that the claimant was divorced from his 
wife, upon her petition, bring him within the provision of 
the act of October, 184:0 (Choctaw), that any white man part-
ing from his wife without just provocation shall be deprived 
of citizenship'" 
The seventh section of the Choctaw intermarriage act 
referred to provides: 
" Be it further enacted, That should any man or woman, a 
citizen of the United States or of any foreign country, become 
a citizen of the Choctaw Nation by interm}uriag(', and he or 
she be left a widow or widower, he or she shall continue to 
enjoy the rights of citizenship, unless he or she shall marry 
a white man or woman, or person, as the case may be, having 
no rights of ChQctaw citizenship by blood; in that case all 
his or her rights acquired under the proviRions of this act 
shall cease." 
The Choctaw Indians, having kept up their tribal organiza. 
tion 1 are a dependent domestic nation within the boundaries 
of the United States. Without naturalization, they are not 
citizens of the United States within the meaning of the four. 
teenth amendment to the Constitution (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 
U.S. R., 103.) By the fourth article of the treaty between 
the Choctaws and the United States of the 27th of Septem-
ber, 1830 (7 Stat., 333), it is stipulated: 
"The Government and people of the United States are 
hereby obliged to secure to the said Choctaw Nation of red 
people the jurisdiction and government of all the persons 
and property that may be within their limits, west * * "" ; 
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but the United States shall forever secure said Ohoctaw 
Nation from and against all laws, except such as from time 
to time shall be enacted in their own national councils, not 
inconsistent with the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the 
United States." 
The seventh section of the treaty of the 22d of June, 1855 
(11 Stat., 612), stipulates : 
"So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the 
United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regu· 
lating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the Choc-
taws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted 
right of self-government and full jurisdiction over persons 
and property within their respective limits; • • • and 
all persons, not being citizens or members of either tribe, 
found within their limits shall be considered intruders, and 
be removed from and kept out of the same by the United 
States agent." 
These treaty stipulations reserved to the Choctaws full 
legislative powers, only limited by the Constitution, the 
laws, and treaties of the United States. Sectwn 1839 of the 
Revised States excludes regularly organized tribes of Indians 
from the efl'ect of legislation by Uongress with reference to 
the Territories. I am not aware of any statute of the United 
States inconsistent with the section referred to in ~·our letter, 
nor has any been brought to my notice by those denying the 
validity of it. Article 26 of the treaty of the 28th of April, 
1866 (14 Stat., 777), is claimed to deprive the Choctaw Nation 
of the power to make the enactment referred to. That article 
stipulates : 
"The right here given to Choctaws and Chickasaws re-
spectively shall extend to all persons who have become citi· 
zens by adoption or marriage with said nations or who may 
hereafter become such." 
The right referred to in this article is the right to make 
selections of land in severalty, as set forth in detail in the 
treaty from article 11 to article 25 inclusive. Article 10 of 
the same treaty expressly reaffirms the treaties previously 
existing, except as modified by the treaty of 1866. Article 
26, above quoted, establishes no rule as to who are or who in 
the future shall become Choctaw citizens, nor does it define 
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or prescribe what shall constitute the rights of Choctaw 
citizens beyond the one referred to in it. .Article 38 of the 
same treaty is relied upon as restrictive of the powers of the 
Choctaws to legislate with reference to the granting or with-
holding of citizenship to whites. This article stipulates: 
'~Every white person who, having married a Choctaw or 
Chickasaw, resides in the said Choctaw or Chickasaw Nat.ion, 
or who has been adopted by the legislative authorities, is to 
be deemed a member of said nation, and shall be subject to 
the laws of the Choctaw and Chickasa"' Nations according to 
his domicile, and to prosecution and trial before their tri-
bunals, aml to punishment according to their laws, in all 
respects as though he was a native Choctaw or Chickasaw.'" 
The language of the treaty is in the past. It is not restrict-
ive of future action by the nations, but rather enlarges or con-
firms the previous legislative power. It applies to and pro. 
vides for those who at the time of the making of the treat;/ 
were citizens by adoption or intermarriage. It does not en-
large the rights of such eitizens, nor relieve them from any 
conditions subjt>ct to which they held and enjoyed the right 
of citizenship. It declares they shall be subject to the laws 
of the Choctaws accorrling to their domicile. If they held 
citizenship subject to any condition or limitation at the time 
the treaty was made, the condition or limitation was a part 
of the law subject to which they held their citizenship, and 
such law was obligatory after the treaty as it was before. 
Therefore, so far as these treaty provisions are concerned, 
the Choctaw Nation is left free in tht~ future to enact laws 
with reference to what shall be the qualifications of citizen-
ship and what shall be the privileges accorded to citizens by 
adoption or intermarriage. 
The section of the Constitution of the United States with 
which the seventh section of the law under consideration is 
claimed to be inconsistent is the first section of the four-
teenth article of amendments, which declares: 
"'.All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges. 
or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any 
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State depriYe any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due proce.ss of law, nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." 
The case of Elk v. Wilkins, above cited, rules that Indians 
during the continuance of their tribal organization, without 
naturalization, are not citizens of the United States. The 
last clause of this section of the Constitution, even if incon-
sistent with the law under consideration (which is not con-
ceded), is a limitation on the powers of the States; and, how-
ever just in the abstract, does not by its terms apply to the 
Ohoctaw Indians, '' ho are not organized as a State, but exist 
as a dependent domestic nation. The section referred to in 
your first inquiry is prospective, and is answered in the 
negative. 
In reply to your second inquiry: The seventh section re-
ferred to applies only to rights acquired under the act of 
the 9th of November, 1875. It docs not di\Test any rights 
unless the act of 1875 conferred additional rights on wid-
ows or widowers which they bad not possessed before the 
passage of the act. If any additional right is conferred by 
the act, the person who acquired it, under the prodsions of 
the law, would not be entitled to the additional right, un-
less be or she conformed to the condition thereof, subject 
to which it was granted. The act or law therefore is valid 
and bindi11g on all the citizens of the Choctaw Nation, hut 
only affects the rights which were acquired under the act 
of 1875. 
Your third question refers to the Cb')ctaw act of October, 
1840. That act provides for marriages brtween white men 
at1d Choctaw women, and declares that a white man who 
was married according to the provisions of the act should 
"be entitled and admitted to the privilege of citizenship," 
and concludes : 
''Any white man parting from his wife without just 
provocation shall forfeit and pay over to his wife such sum 
or sums as may be adjudged by the district court for said 
breach of the marriage contract and be deprived of citi· 
zenship." 
The fact of a husband parting from his wife without just 
provocation, when legally determined, is followed by the 
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deprival of citizeuship; but that fact must be judicially 
established in accordance with the laws of the nation. 
The proceeding in which the question propounded arises, 
as shown by the papers transmitted, was originated by a 
claimant who presented his petition to the Choctaw na-
tional council to establish his right to citizenship by intermar-
riage. The jurisdiction of the council to pass upon the 
facts necessary to determiue the question is granted by 
an act of the Choctaw council approved October 21, 1882. 
The judgment of that council is in this case brought before 
you on appeal. The question you ask is one of evidence. 
The fact set forth is, that the claimant was divorced 
from his wife upon her petitiou. The question of fact to 
be determiued is, does the record in that case establish the 
fact t!Jat tile white man, from whom the divorce was ob-
tained by his wife, parted from his wife without just provo-
cation~ The general rule of evidence (though subject to 
numerous exceptious) h;, that a record is only evidence be-
tween the parties to that record. In this case the wife is 
not a party ; yet, as an exception to the general rule, the 
judgment or decree is eYiUence as to the status of the par-
ties as husband aud wift·, that they are separated, and 
that the prO\'Ocatiou which justified the separation was 
g·h?en by the husbaud ( 1 Greenleaf on E'dde11ce, sec. 525; 
Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray, 387). The record in the divorce 
case is not before me. Whether it shall be conclusive as 
evidence or not must be determined from the record. If 
the proceediugs in the di,·orce are regular, the allegations 
sufficient~ and the decree final, the granting of the divorce 
to the wife establishes that she had just cause for separa-
tion from her husband. It also establishes that he bad no 
just or sufficient defense to the cause she alleged. The 
separation on his part, therefore, is established by the de· 
cree to have been without just cause, and that he parted 
from her without just provocation. 
Subject to these conditions, your third question, as a ques-
tion of evidence, is answered in the affirmative. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE INTERIOR. 
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MEMBERSHIP OF INDIAN TRIBE. 
Case of two brothers, \V. C. Lykins and E. W. \V, Lykins, claiming to 
be members of the confederated tribes of the Kaskaskias, Peorias, 
\Veas, and Piankeshaws, considered. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 2, 1888. 
SIR: In replying to your communication of February 17, 
1888, containing certain questions upon which an opinion is 
asked, I beg to say that I have made the basis of the follow-
ing opinion the statement of. facts contained in the communi-
cation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of February 15, 
1888,-to which you refer me; but the other papers trans-
mitted it has not been necessary to examine, as I have no 
power to find facts in any case in which my opinion is re-
quested, but must confine myself to the facts appearing in 
connection with the request. 
Two brothers, W. C. Lykins and E. W. W. Lykins, claim to 
be members of the confederated tribes of the Kaskaskias, 
Peorias, \Veas, and Piankeshaws. That their father, David 
Lyki11s, who also went under the Indian name of Ma-cha-ko-
me-ah, ''as a member of the tribe is established. by the 
unquestioned facts that he was one of the commissioners 
who negotiated and executed the treaty of .l\lay 30, 1854 
(10 Stat., 1082), by whjch the confederation of tribes was 
affected, and is named in the schedule accompanying tlJe 
treaty, and containing the names of " per~ons or families 
composing the uuite<l tribe of Weas, Piankeshaws, Peorias, 
au<l Kaskaskias." 
David Lykin~ is dead, and his two sons claim through him 
the right of membership iu the confederated tribe. 
Further than the recital of a puhlic act by the chiefs of 
the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Wea, and Piankeshaw Indians, being 
a formal assent of these chiefs to a sale of 80 acres of land 
by the Lykins brothers as sole surviving heirs of David 
Lykins, which land, as is recited in the act of assent, was 
"originally granted to J\Ia-cha-ko-me-ah, or David Lykins, 
late a member and reserve of our tribe, by the United States," 
there does not seem to have been auy official acknowledg-
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ment of those persons as members of the tribe until June 15, 
1878, when the chiefs and councillors of the tribe issued a 
certificate of membership to them, declaring them "entitled 
to membership as sons of David Lykins, who was a member 
in his life-time," and this certificate was approved on July 
15, 1878, by Agent Jones. 
Questions are raised as to the validity of the act of placing 
the names of the Lykins brothers on the rolls of the confed-
erated tribes, but these questions need not be noticed~ because 
the twenty-third article of the treaty with the Peorias, Kas-
kaskias, etc., of February 23, 1867 ( 16 Stat., 519), makes them, 
relatively to the United States, entirely unimportant. 
That article provides, amongst other things, that "the said 
chiefs shall have the exclusive right to determine who are rnem- , 
bers of the tribe, and entitled to be placed ~tpon the pay-rolls." 
In my opini0n, it was the object of this pro\ision to relieve 
the United States of all responsibility or rluty of inquiry 
touching the names on the "pay-rolls'~ of the tribe, and for 
an obvious reason. It was the Indians, and not the United 
States, that were interested in the distribution of what was 
periodically coming to them from the United States. It was 
proper then they should determine _for themselves: and 
finally, who were entitled to membership in tbe confederated 
tribe and to participate in the emoluments belonging to that 
relation. 
The certificate of the chiefs and councillors referred to is 
possibly as high a grade of evidence as can be procured of 
the fact of the determination by the chiefs of the right of 
membership under the treaty of February 23, 1867, and 
seems to be such as is warranted by the usage and custom of 
the Government in its general dealings with these people 
and other similar tribes. 
It follows, then, that while these names are on the rolls of 
the tribe the individuals represented by them must be treated 
by the United States as members of the tribe. 
This satisfactorily answers all the questions submitted and 
renders an answer to each unnecessary. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE INTERIOR. 
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SALES O:Ji, INDIAN LA.NDS IN KANSAS. 
The State of Kansas is not entitled, under the third section of the act of 
January 29, 1861, chapter 20, to 5 per centum of the proceeds of the 
sales of the Indian lands in that State, which proceeds the United 
States, as a conside~ation for the extinguishment of the Indian title, 
agreed to receive, hold in trust, and pay over to the Indians. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
"Jf arch 5, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the lOth of January, 1888, submits the 
following statement and question: 
''At the time of the admission of Kansas there were large 
bodies of Indian lands within the jurisdiction of the State, 
although not within its political jurisdiction, that belonged 
to the Indians by original title and treaty stipulations, that 
after the admission of the State were ceded by the Indians 
to the United States for the purpose of being sold, the pro-
ceeds to constitute a fund to belong to the Indians, and the 
question presented is whether the State of Kansas is enti-
tled to 5 per cent. of the sales of said lauds." 
The State of Kansas claims that 5 per cent. of the proceeds 
of the sales of the· Indian lands shall be paid to the State. 
The claim is founded on an acceptance by Kansas of propo-
sition five, made by the United States to the State at the 
time of its admission, whereby the United States became 
obligated according to the terms of the proposition. That 
proposition is contained in the third section of the act of the 
29th of January, 1861 (12 Stat., 127), and is: 
'~Fifth. That five per centum of the net proceerls of sales 
of all public lands lying within said State which shall be sold 
by Congress after the admission of said State into the Union, 
after deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be 
paid to said State, for the purpose of making public roads 
and internal improvements, or for other purposes, as the leg-
islature shall direct." 
The proposition, when accepted, assumed the form of a 
legislative contract, and is to be so interpreted, subject to 
the rule stated in The Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Gorn-
pany v. Litchfield (23 How., 88), that "All grants of this de-
scription are strictly construed against the grantees, and 
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nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit 
language. As the rights here claimed are derived entirely 
from the act of Congress, the donation stands on the same 
footing of a grant by the public to a private company, the 
terms of whicb must be plainly e.xpressed in the statute, an<l 
if not thus expressed can not be implied." This principle is 
applied to a grant to a State in the case of Leavenworth, etc., 
Railroad Company'· The United States (92 U. S. R., 740). 
In the determination of the rights of the State of Kansas 
under the grant the first question that arises is, of what is 
Kansas entitled to receive 5 per cent. f The reply, in the 
language of the act, is, " of the net proceeds of sales of 
all public za,as, after ded'lwting all the expenses -incident to 
the same." To ascertain what the net proceeds are the gross 
amount of the sales must be first determined; then all the 
expenses incident to the land liquidated, and the latter de-
ducted from the former. From your letter and the accompany-
ing papers I understand that all the lands of which Kansas 
claims a part of the proceeds of sale were Indian lands, as 
to wlJich the Indian title had not been extinguished at the 
time of the admission of the State, and which were then in 
rPservation from the public lands au<.l occupied by seYeral 
Indian tribes. 'fhe Indians had a right of occupancy of the 
lands for an indefinite time. Until that right of occupancy 
should be extinguished by pur~hase or otherwise the lands. 
could not be sold by the United States. To retP.O\e the In-
dians and relie\e the title from their right of possession was 
indispensable to qualify -the lands for sale. Whatever it 
ruight cost to do this was an expense incident to the lands-, 
and to such a sale as was contemplated by the act of admis-
sion; for it was and is a well-known usage of the Govern· 
ment not to sell lands until the Indian title of occupancy 
should be extinguished, and neither party to this compact 
contemplated the adoption of any other course with reference 
to this transaction. The parties to the contract knew of the 
Indian right of possession, and that its removal was an in-
cident that must precede the sale. The removal of this In-
dian title was an expense which should be charged up against 
the gross proceeds of the sale and subtracted from them be-
fore the net proceeds of the land would be obtained. After 
this and all other expenses had been deducted the balance, 
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if any, would be the net proceeds. If there is no balance 
there is no fund subject to distribution hetween the United 
States anc.l Kansas. The intent of the compact was that the 
United States should pay to the State 5 per cent. of the net · 
.moneys which the Government, in its own right, received 
from the sales of public lands, and which might be rightfully 
applied out of the money received to the payment of the 
State. As to the 5 per cent., Kansas stood on no higher plane 
than the Government did as to the 95 per cent. If the Gov-
ernment could not rightfully apply the 95 per cent. to public 
uses, it could not be called upon to apply 5 per cent. to the 
use of Kansas. The Supreme Court of the United States, con-
struing substantially similar compacts made with the States 
of Illinois and Iowa, respectively, in the Five Per Gent. 
Oases (110 U.S. R., 48~), declares: ''When each of these 
acts speaks of lands sold by Congress, '5 per cent. of the net 
proceeds' of which shall be reserved, and be' disbursed' or 
'appropriated' for the benefit of the State in which the land 
lies, it evidently has in view sales in the ordinary sense, from 
which the United States receive proceeds, in the shape of 
money payable into the Treasury, out of which the 5 per cent. 
may be reserved ancl paid to the State." 
You state that the lands sold were ceded by the Indians for 
the purpose of being sold, the proceeds to constitute a fund 
to l1elong to the Indians. Among the lands thus acquired, 
as an illustration, I find the greater part of the fund out of 
whkh the State claims 5 per cent. accrued from lands sold 
by the United States which were acquired from the Osage 
Indians by treaty of the 29th of December, 1865 (14 Stat., 
687) By that treaty the whole amount of the proceeds of the 
sales of the land to be made by the United States is agreed 
to be paid to the Indians, or held in trust for them as a con-
sideration for the cession of the Indian title to the land to the 
Government. No part of the net proceeds of the sales be-
longed to -the United States. No part of them can be re-
servec.l from the ludians or applied to public use. The whole 
of the net proceeds constitute. tlw consid.eration paid by the 
United States to the Indians to secure an extinguishment 
of their title. There are no net proceeds in the sales of these 
lands; for the United States, in their own right, receive noth-
ing whatever. Out of the fund received for the Indians· the 
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United States can not rightfully deduct 5 per cent. for the 
benefit of Kansas, nor rightfully apply any portion of the 
fund to public use. 
That the United States, in order to open up the Indian 
lands in the State of Kansas to settlement, made such a bar-
gain with the Indians in the purchase of their title as that 
no compensation whatever was receiYed for the title in 
remainder which was vested in the Government, does not 
impose on the Government an obligation to pay a percentage 
to Kansas for money which the Government might have 
obtained in its own right at some 'distant time, but did not. 
The compact was not intended to confer upon the State any 
power to restrain tlle United States in its treaty-making pow-
ers, nor to confer upon the State any right to control the action 
of the Ge11eral Go,'ernment with reference to the price or 
amount which should be realized out oftheGovernmeutt;tle for 
public use. That the expense incident to throwing the lands 
open to the public consumed the whole fund, if such expense 
was just and necessary to the best jn terests of the nation at 
large, and especially to the people of Kansas, does not sul>-
ject the United States to an indebtedness for any part of the 
expense paid, or contracted to be paid, by the Govern-
ment. The right of Kansas is only what she acquired by the 
compact at the tiwe of her admission. The law of admission 
is the legal and official determination of its policy. What 
the policy of the Governm('llt was with reference to other 
States, as to wllich other circumstanres existed and other 
and different legislation declared the policy, should not con-
trol the intent of the law which is applicable to this subject. 
It would be alike unprofitable and irre1evant to pass upon 
the rights of other States, which are not before me, in deter-
mining thi8 question. 
It is therefore concluded the State of Kansas is not enti-
tled to 5 per cent. of the proceeds of the sales of the Indian 
Janus referred to in yours, w bich the United States, in order 
to and as a consideration for the extinguishment of their 
title, contracted to receive, hold in trust, and pay to the In-
<liaus. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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EXTRA COMPENSATION. 
The elements necessary to justify the payment of compensation to an offi-
cer for additional services are, that they shall be performed by virtue 
of a separate and distinct appointment authorized by law; that such 
services shall not be services added to or connected with the regular 
duties of the place he holds; and that a compensation whose amount 
is fixed by law or regulation shall be provided for their payment. 
A United States marshal, appointed an agent in pursuance of section 
5276 Revised Statutes to briug back a fugitive criminal from a foreign 
country, is entitled to receive compensation for this service out of tho 
fund appropriated "for bringing home fugitive criminals," where the 
amount of the compensation is fixed by regulation beiore his appoint-
ment; otherwise he 1s entitled to be paid his expenses only. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Ma,rch 13, 1888. 
SIR : I received your letter of the 1st of March, 1888. The 
question therein asked is, substantially, whether a United 
States marshal, who brings home a fugitive criminal from a 
foreign country, is entitled for such services" to compensa-
tion in excess of expenses" out of the fund appropriated 
"for bringing home fugitive criminals~" 
Section 1764 of the Revised Statutes provides : 
"No allowance or compensation shall be made to any of-
ficer or clerk by reason of the discharge of duties which be-
long to any other officer or clerk in the same or any other 
Department; and no allowance or compensation shall be 
made for any extra services whatever which any officer dr 
clerk may be required to perform unless expressly authorized 
by law." 
Section 1765 declares : 
"No officer in any branch of the public service, or any 
other person whose salary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by 
law or regulations, shall receive an'y additional pay, extra 
allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the dis-
bursement of public money, or for any other service or duty 
whatever, unless the same is authorized by law, and the ap-
propriation therefor explicitly states that it is for such addi-
tiona,l pay, extra allowance, or compensation." · 
These sections are in substance re-enactments of the third 
section of the act of the 3d of March, 1839 (5 Stat., 349), the 
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second ·Jection of the act of the 23d of August, 1842 (5 Stat., 
510), 3-lld the twelfth section of the act of the 26th of August, 
1842 ~5 Stat., 525). 
The construction of these statutes bas been repeatedly 
pa~sed upon by my predecessors, and their opinions are not 
~ntirely reconcilable. They were rendered on tlifferent facts, 
itud the salaries and compensations of the officers and persons 
referred to were pro·dded for by different statutes. A re-
hearsal of the facts and analysis of the law and views ex-
pressed in each would not be profitable and would unduly 
extend the limits of this opinion. The general results may 
be ranged in two separate classes by a representative of each 
class. 
Attorney-General Black, in an opinion rendered on the 17th 
of October, 1859 (9 Opin. 127), thus states the one view: 
"My conclusion is that no officer of the Government hav-
ing a salary fixed by Jaw, nor no other person whose compen-
sation amounts to $2,500 per annum, can receive extra pay 
for any service whatever, whether it be withiu the line of his 
duty or outside of it. Nor is it possible for any such officer 
to receive the salaries of more than one office, no matter 
under what circumstances he may have performed the duties 
of more than one." 
The general result, as thus announced in this opinion, is 
in substance corroborated by the opinions of Attorneys-~en­
eral Grundy (3 Opin., 422; ib., 473); Gilpin (3 Opin., 621); 
Legare (4 Opin., 126; ib., 139); :Mason (4 Opin., 464); Nelson 
(4 Opin., 342); Toucey (5 Opin., 74:); Bates (10 Opin., 436). 
The other view is thus stated by Attorney-General Crit-
tenden in an opinion rendered on the 7th of June, 1851 (5 
Opin. 765). 
"At the passage of these acts there was no law forbidding 
any person from holding under the Government of the United 
8tates two compatible offices or employments at one and the 
same time, and receiving the salary and emoluments belong-
ing to each of the offices, whether fixed directly hy law or 
by a regulation made by a person lawfully authorized to 
make it. These sections do not forbid it. They are intended 
to fence against arbitrary extra allowances in each partic-
ular case; but do not apply to distinct employments with 
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salaries or compensation affixed to each by law or by regu- · 
lation. 
* * * * * 
"The plain meaning of this seems to be, that an individual 
holding one office and receiving its salary shall in no case 
be allowed to receive also the salary of another office which 
he does not hold, simply on account of his having performed 
the duties thereof. 
"The prohibition is against his receiving the salary of an 
office that he does not hold, and not against his receiving the 
salaries of two offices which he does legitimately hold." 
This construction is partially supported by the opinions of 
Attorneys-General Black (9 Opin., 508); Cushing (6 Opin., 
81; 8 ib., 325); Evarts (12 Opin., 459); Devens (15 Opin., 
306.) 
I am relieved from the embarrassment of choosing sides 
in the apparent disagreement between authorities of such 
high respectability by the conclusive interpretation given 
the sections . under consideration by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. In the case of Converse v. The United 
States (~1 How., 463), that court held that the collector of 
customs of Boston, whose salary as collector exceeded $2,500 
per annum, was entitled to receive in addition lawful com-
missions for his services as purchasing agent for such sup-
plies necessary for the light-house service as were to be used 
by the United States outside of his own district. 
The case of the United States Y. Shoemaker (7 Wall., 338), 
rules that the collector of customs who, between the 1st of 
April, 1857, and the 12th of June, 1858, had disbursed, under 
the instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury, the money 
appropriated for the erection of the new marine hospital and 
custom-house within his own ,district was not entitled to re-
ceh·e any commission therefor. The ground on which the 
decision is placed is : 
"It is admitted that there is no act of Congress author-
izing it. The claim must rest, therefore, in a quantum meruit. 
This might, under some circumstances, present a strong case 
against the Government for the allowance of reasonable 
compensation. But the difficulty here is that there is not 
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only no law providing for compensation, but the collector'is 
forbidden to receive it." 
In the case of Hall v. Tlte United States (93 U. S. R., 
563), which was a suit on the bond of an internal-revenue 
collector, the collector sought to set off claims for extra 
allowance for services rendered by him. It did not appear 
that the Secretary of the Treasury, who at his discretion 
was authorized, under the act of the 30th of April, 1864, to 
make such allowance, had ever authorized the allowance. 
The court ruled the defendant was not eutitled to the set-off, 
declaring-
" Nor can any compensation for extra services be allowed 
by the court or jury as a set-off in a suit brought by the 
United States against any officer for public money in his 
hands, unless it appears that the head of the Department 
was authorized by the act of Congress to appoint an agent 
to perform the extra service, that the compensation to be 
paid for the services was fixed by law, that the service to be 
performed had respect to matters wholly outside of the 
duties appertaining to the office held by the agent, and that 
the money to pay for the extra services had been appro-
priated by Congress." 
In the case of the United States v. Brindle (110 U. S. R., 
688), the United 8tates sued the defendant to recover a bal-
ance claimed to be in his hands as receiver of a land office. 
The defendant claimed to set off commissions for the amount 
received by him for the sales of Indian lands which he had 
been employed to receive, but which were not within the 
line of his duty as receiver of public lands. The amount of 
his compensation was not fixed by law for the additional 
service. The set-off was allowed by the court below. The 
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the ground 
that it was a special sen·ice, not within the line of the de-
fendant's official duty, and that "in legal effect the appoint-
ment was to an agency for the sale of lands for the Indians, 
with an implied understanding that a reasonable compensa-
tion would be paid for the services rendered," aud that the 
duties were of a different character, and at a different place, 
from those of the land office. This case differs from the case 
of The United States Y. Converse, in which the fact existed 
that the amount of compensation to be paid was fixed by 
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law, and in this respect might seem to enlarge the right of 
compensation to the officers, so a£ to include services in 
which the amount of compensation is implied from the serv-
ice in pursuance of the additional appointment, without the 
amount being fixed by law or in accordance with the regu-
lation made by the head of a Department. But the cause of 
difference appears to ha\e arisen from the fact that the ad-
ditional duty was one to be performed for the Indians, and 
payable out of a trust fund received by the United States 
for them. This is to be inferred from the language of the 
Chief-Justice aboYe quoted. 
The last case in which the subject is considered by the 
Supreme Court is that of The United States '· Saunders ( 120 
U. S. R., 126), which was decided on the 24th of January, 
1887. The opinion in this case adopts the interpretation 
placed upon the section by Attorney-General Crittenden 
above cited, that the sections "do not apply to distinct em-
ployments with salaries or compensation affixed to each by 
law or by regulation." The court declares, Justice Miller 
delivering the opinion: 
"We are of opinion that, taking these sections all together, 
the purpose of this legislation was to prevent a person hold--
ing an office or appointment for which the law provides a 
definite compensation by way of salary or otherwise, which 
is intended to cover all the services which as such officer he 
may be called upon to render, from receiving extra compen-
sation, additional allowances, or pay for other services which 
may be required of him either by act of Congress or by order 
of the bead of his Department, or in any other mode, added to 
or connected with the regular duties of the place which he 
holds; but that they have no application to the case of two 
distinct offices, places, or employments, each of which bas 
its own duties and its own compensation, which offices ruay 
both be held by one person at the same time. In the latter 
case be is, in the eye of the law, two officers, or holds two 
places or appointments, the functions of which are separate 
and distinct, and, according to all the decisions, he is, in such 
case, entitled to recover the two compensations." 
From these authorities it may be derived that the elements 
necessary to justify the payment of compensation to an offi-
cer for additional services are, that they shall be performed 
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by virtue of a separate and distinct appointment authorized 
by law; that such services shall not be services added to or 
connected with the regular duties of the place he holds; and 
that a compensation, whose amount is fixed by law or regu-
lation, shall be provided for their payment. (See Stanbury 
v. United States, 8 Wall., 34.) 
In reply to your inquiry, therefore, with reference to the 
marshal of whom you write, section 5~76 of the .Revised 
Satutes authorizes the payment of an agent in i)ehalf of the 
United States to receive the delivery of criminals from a for-
eign government. If a United States marshal was appointed 
an agent, in pursuance of this section, to go to a foreign 
country to take the delivery of a criminal, his services per-
armed in . pursuance of such appointment would not be a 
duty added to or connected with tlw reguHtr duties of his 
office as marshal. The appropriation l.ills provide for the 
payment of compensation for these services, but they do not 
specify the amount to be paid to such agent. But if the 
amount of compensation to be paid the agent was fixed by 
regulation of the Department before his &.ppointment, he is 
entitletl to receh·e the amount so established ; if the amount 
was not fixed by regulation, he is not entitled to compensa-
tion beyond his expenses. 
I am, respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECR:fuTARY oF STATE. 
RESURVEY OF PATENTED LANDS. 
Where a substantial allegation of fraud or mistake is made, the sustain-
ing of which will restore to the public domain land wrongfully patented, 
or subserve the public interest or protect the public right, the Com-
missioner of the G ... neral Land Office may, in his discretion, direct a 
resurvey of patented land. 
Such survey would not be conclusive, but, in connection with other testi-
mony, might be admissible as evidence to maintain the allegation. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Ma1·ch 16, 1888. 
SIR: Yonr letter of the 7th of March, 1888, with a request 
for an expression of my opinion on the questions contained 
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in a communication of the Acting Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office, was received. 
The questions asked by the Acting Commissioner are: 
(1) ''Has this office any legal authority to order a survey 
of lands which have been patented by the Government, and 
which prima facie belong to private citizens? 
(2) "Would said survey, when made (necessarily ex parte 
in its nature), and offered as evidence, be conclusive in the 
face of the patented. survey, which is strictly official, and 
executed under express authority of law, and which has not 
been successfully impeached~ 
(3) " Would an ex pa1·te survey made by the Go\ernment on 
lands which are not for the present under its control be com-
petent evidenc~ such as would be received by the court, in 
view of the d'ecision of the circuit court of California, 
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Company ( 8 Saw· 
yer, p. 81)¥" 
These questjons are answered in their order: 
1. The ·public lands, or tlle public interest therein alone, 
are under the general law committed. to the care of the Com-
missioner of the General Laud Office, subject to your super-
vision. After the Government has taken all the prelim-
inary legal steps leading to a patent and issued the patent 
for the land to tlle purchaser or rightful claimant, w·ith-
out fraud or mistake, tlle land becomes private property. 
If a contest as to boundary arises after the delivery of 
tlle patents to two such patentees, the Government has 
no legal interest therein, except to furnish the proper 
judicial tribunals and process by which the private con-
tention can be justly settled. In such a contest between 
private parties for their private interest, the Government, as 
between two of her citizens, each of wllom has an equal 
right to her protection, should not cast the weight of her 
influence in either scale of the balance of .i ustice. In the 
courts the parties should be left on terms of equality to seek 
an unbiased. judgment. So, after the delivery of the patents, 
where fraud or mistake is alleged, which affects only private 
rights, and where the public has no interest in the lands, and 
no public right is to be su bserved or protected, there is no 
legal authority vested in the Commissioner of the General 
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Land Office to expend public money to make surveys to su~­
tain allegations of fraud on one side or the other. In such a 
case his power ends with the issue of the patent, and the 
wrong, if any exists, must be redressed through the courts. 
But where sub::;tantial allegations of fraud or mistake are 
made, the sustainiug of which win restore to the public 
domain lands wrongfully patented, or subserve the public 
interest, or protect the public right, the Commissioner ma.y, 
in his discretion, direct a survey as a part of the in vestiga-
tion to sustain the alleged fraud or mistake, and to furnish 
evidence in the proper court to establish it. 
Subject to the conditions last stated, your first inquiry is 
answered in the affirmative. 
2. A. survey made under the circumstances stated would 
not be conclusive, but on allegation of fraud in the original 
running of the lines might, with other facts, be evidential. 
3. In connection with other testimony to establish fraud 
or mistake in the original running of the lin est the testimony 
of the surveyor who reran the lines as to the facts found by 
him on the ground, together with the plats made by him, 
might be admissible as evidence to sustain an allegation of 
fraud or mistake. 
I am, very respectfully, yours, 
A.. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRET.A.R Y OF THE INTERICR. 
SUSPENSION OF 'l'ONNAGE DUTY. 
Under the proclamation of the President, made on the 26th of Jan-
uary, 1888, in pursuance of the first proviso in section 11 of the act of 
June 19, 1886, chap. 421, a vessel emered in a port of the United States 
from Bremen, via Southamptou, is exempted from payment of the ton-
nage-tax imposed by said section, although the vessel may have taken 
on boa.rd cargo, passengers, and mails at the last-mentioned port. 
But if the vessel had entered at aud cleared from Southampton it is 
liable to the duty. 
DEJ? ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
, March 19, 1888. 
SIR: I received your letter of the 12th of March, 1888, 
with the inclosed papers. You ask" Whether \essels entered 
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in the United States from Bremen, via Southampton, and 
which ha\~ taken on board cargo, passengers, or mails at 
the port last mentioned, may be exempted from tonnage-tax 
in the United Sates?" 
The answer must be derived from a construction of the 
ele,~enth section of the act of the 19th of t.T une, 1886 (24 Stat., 
81 ), .and the proclamation of the President, made on the 26th 
day of January, 1888, in pursuance of the first proviso of 
that section. The part of the section which is to be consid-
ered provides : 
"A duty of six cents per ton, not to exceed thirty cents per 
ton per annum, is hereby imposed at each entry upon all ves-
sels which shall be entered in the United Statesfrom any other 
foreign ports, not, however, to include vessels in distress or 
not engaged in trade: Provided. That the President of the 
United States shall suspend tile collection of' so much of the 
duty herein imposed, on vessels entered from any fot·eign port, 
as may be in excess of the tonnage an<l light-house dues, or 
other equivalent tax or taxes, imposed in said port on 
American vessels by the Government of the foreign country 
in which such port is situated." 
The proclamation, so far as relevant to this inquiry, de-
'clares: 
"Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the 
United States of America, by virtue of the authority \ested 
in me by section 11 of the act of Congress entitled 'An 
act to abolish certain fees for official services to American 
vessels, and to amend the laws relating to shipping commis-
~ioners, seamen, and owners of vessels, and for other pur-
poses,' approved June nineteenth, one thousand eight hun-
dred and eighty-six, do hereby declareandproelaim, that from 
and after the date of this my proclamation shall be sus-
pended the collection of the whole of the duty of six cents 
per ton, not to exceed thirty cents per ton per annum 
(which is imposed by said section of said act), upon vessels 
entered in the ports of the United States from any of the 
ports of the Empire of Germany." 
The proclamation strictly conforms to the law, and sus-
pends the collection of the tonnage duty imposed by the 
eleventh section of the act "upon vessels entered in the 
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ports of the United States from any of the ports of the 
Empire of Germany." The duty is suspended upon vessels 
entered from the Empire of Germany. It is not suspended 
on vessels entered from England. If the entry of the Elba, 
concerning which the question arose, was from Bremen, 
the tonnage duty should not IJe charged. If the entry was 
from Southampton, the duty was rightfully collected. The 
oath of entry for the Elba declares the vessel sailed "from 
the port of Bremen, Germany, Yia Southampton, England." 
The copy of instructions issued by the 'rreasury Department 
on the 1st of February, 1888, No. 19, announees-
'' Information has been received showing that vessels 
belonging to * * * Germany, · * * * arriving in the 
United States directly from the ports of the German Em-
pire, may be admitted, under the proclamation, without the 
payment of the dues therein mentioned." 
Southampton is not in the direct route from Bremen to the 
United States. But the word'' directly" is VJ.Ot found in the 
hw. There being nothing in the statute to limit the words 
used, they must have their full effect in construing them. 
Indeed, if exceptions so important were intended, they 
should have been placed in the statute. The lan-
guage ·of the act is "entered from any foreign port." 
The departmental instructions cannot lawfully annex lim-
itations to the right to the relief granted which the law does 
not warrant. The language, "from any foreign port," 
describes one terminus of a voyage, and the entry at the 
port of the United States the other. The voyage, in con-
templation of law, from one to the other, is to be a unity. 
The intent and faithful performance of that does not require 
that the voyage shall be direct. The doctrine of deviation 
in marine insurance, by which the insurer is released from 
the obligations of the policy in consequence of the greater 
risk incurre«l by the \essel pursuing an unusual route, or 
touching at points unauthorized by the policy, does not ap-
ply in the construction of this statute. A mere deviation in 
t.he voyage, or a touching at intermediate ports, as incidents 
only, without entry at or clearance from any such port, does 
not break the continuity of the voyage, so as to make the 
• 
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intermediate port the port of departure contemplated by the 
statute. The fact that the ship took in caJ go, passengers, 
and mails at Southampton is of little import on the question, 
as the tonnage-tax is on the ship, regardless of where she 
may have obtained her cargo; while the customs laws, by 
separate provisions, regulate the tax upon the cargo, equally 
regardles::; of the tmmage-tax on the ship. If the voyage as a 
unit was from Bremen to a port of the United States, and 
the vessel touched at Southampton, without entering or 
clearing there, the duty should be suspended; but if the 
vessel entered at and cleared from Southampton, the duty 
should be exacted. 
The papers transmitted with yours are herewith returned. 
I am, respectfully yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PURCHASE OF SITE FOR PUBLIC BUILDING. 
The act of March 5, 1888, chap. 23, entitled "An act for the purchase of 
a site, including the building thereon, etc., for the use of the office of 
the Chief Sign:tl OfficPr of the Army," etc., does not carry with it an 
appropriation of money for the objects designated therein. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 22, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant calls my attention to 
the act of March 5, 1888, entitled "An act for the purchase 
of a site, including the building thereon, etc., for the use of 
the office of the Chief Signal Offi~er of the Army," etc., and 
also to a provision in the act of August 7, 1882, chapter 433, 
declaring ''that no act passed authorizing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to purchase a site and erect a public building 
thereon shall be held or construed to appropriate money, 
unless the act in express language makes such appropria-
tion," and you inquire whether the Secretary of the Treasury 
is authorized to pay the sum specified in the former act, and 
if so, out of what moneys. 
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The act of March 5, 1888, authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury "to purchase or otherwise provide" a site (em-
bracing a certain piece of ground in Washington, D. C., with 
the building now standing thereon), and on such portion 
thereof as is not already occupied by buildings to ''cause to 
be erected" a substantial and commodious building, with 
fire-proof vaults; the cost of the whole not to exceed $150,000, 
of ·which not more than $112,000 is to be paid for the site. 
The same act further provides that no part of said sum shall 
be expended until a valid title to the site is vested in the 
United States. 
This act makes no appropriation of money for the acq uisi-
tion of the site mentioned or for the erection of the proposed 
building, unless the authority "to purchase or otherwise 
provide" a site and "cause to be erected" a building thereon 
may be t1.ken to contain, by implication, an appropriation 
therefor. But such a con~truction is plainly forbidden by 
the provision in the act of August 7, 1882, quoted above. 
That provision, though ern bodied in an annual appropriation 
act, is permanent in its character, and should be allowed due 
effect in the construction of statutes like the one under con-
sideration. It has the same operation it would have if in-
serted therein as an interpretation clause. According to it, 
authority given to the Secretary of the Treasury, as above, 
does not carry therewith an appropriation. Besides the 
omission of express words of appropriation, the failure to 
state out of what fund or moneys this payment should be 
made would render such payment by you impossible. 
I am therefore of the opinion that no appropriation is 
made by the act of March 5, 1888, for the objects designated 
th~rein, and that you are not authorized to pay the sum 
specified in that act until such appropriation is made. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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APPEALS FROM GENERAL LAND OFFICE. 
The consideration and determination of appeals to the Secretary of the 
Interior from the Commissioner of the General Land Office may be 
made by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, under a regulation 
prescribed by the Secretary, pursuant to section 439, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 31,1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 16th of March, 1888, you ask 
"Whether the consideration and determination of appeals to 
the Secretary of the Interior from the action of the Oommis-
~ioner of the General Land Office, jurisdiction of which was 
judicially affirmed in the case of Snyde~· v. Sickles (98 U. S. 
' R., 203), may be made by the First Assistant Elecretary of the 
Interior, or by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, by 
and under his proper designation of office in either case, if 
the Secretary of the Interior shall by regulation prescribe 
the performance of such duty to either under and by virtue 
of section 439 of the Revised Statutes, or under any other 
enactment." 
In an opinion render~d by me to your predecessor on the 
23d day of July, 1886, I gave a construction to section 439, 
Revised Statutes, with reference to your power to prescribe 
the duties of the Assistant Secretaries. I then stated, as I 
now repeat, that the section ''empowers the Secretary to make 
the Assistant, as it were, his deputy in all things. * * * 
So long as the powers delegated to the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Interior by his superior remain unrevoked, the 
authority of the former is co-ordinat~ and concurrent with 
that of the latter." When the Assistant acts at a time the 
Secretary is not absent or sick, under a regulation made by 
the Secretary prescribing his powers, he should sign with 
his own proper official designation. When the Secretary is 
absent or sick, if the Assistant is in charge of the Depart-
ment, in pursuance of sections 177 or 179, Revised Statutes, 
be should sign as Acting SPcretary. 
I am, respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
184 BON. A. H. GARLAND 
Pottawatomle Indians. 
POTTAWATOMIE INDIANS. 
Under the act of April4, 1888, chapter 59, the Secretary of the Interior 
is authorized to find that certain services rendered the Pottawatomie 
Indians were contracted for in good faith by persons empowered to 
represent said lndiane. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE, 
April 16, 1888. 
SIR: Your communication of the 14th instant, with inclos, 
ures, received. You ask the following question: Whether, 
if you shall determine that the services were rendered 
to the ·Pottowatomie Indians by B. John Ellis, esq., as 
claimed, you are authorized, upon the facts referred to, to 
find that these services were contracted for in good faith by 
persons authorized to represent said Indians within the 
meaning of the act, etc. My opinion is, that the act re-
ferred to, approved April 4, 1888, entitled "An act to en-
able the Secretary of the Interior to pay certain creditors of 
the Pottawatomie Indians out of the funds of said Indians," 
in view of all the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case mentioned, was intended to be curative-that is, to 
remove the difficulties that existed heretofore as to the pay-
ment of the money claimed by Mr. Ellis, as indicated in the 
three opinions of the Attorney-General referred to in your 
communication; and therefore I have no doubt you are au-
thorized under that act to find that these services were con-
tracted for in good faith by persons authorized to represent 
said Indians. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SEORET .A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD LAND GRANT. 
The proviso in section 23 of the act of March 3, 1A71, chapter 122, exceptR 
from the operation of the grant made by that section to the Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company of California all lands within the primary 
limit~ of the road of said company which also fall within the primary 
or indemnity limits of the grant to the Atlantic and Pacifie Railroad 
Company now forfeited, and such lands can be restored to settlement 
and en try under the general land 1a "·s. 
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DEP ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
.April 16, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 2d of March, 1888, you ask my 
opinion," Whether the proviso to the twenty-third section of 
the act of the 3d of March, 1871 (16 Stat., 573), excepted from 
the operation of said grant lands within the primary limits 
of said road, where said lands fall also within the primary or 
indemnity limits of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany now forfeited, and whether said lands can be restored 
to settlement and entry under thA general land laws." 
The twenty-third section of the act o( the 3d of March, 
1871, is found in the act incorporating the Texas Pacific 
Railroad Company, and provides: 
"That for the purpose of connecting the Texas Pacific 
Railroad with the city of San Francisco the Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company of California is hereby authorized (sub· 
ject to the laws of California) to construct a line of railroad 
from a point at or near Tebacbapa Pass, by way of Los 
Angeles, to the Texas Pacific Railroad at or near the Colo-
rado River, with the same rights, grants, and privileges, and 
subject to the same limitations, restrictions, and conditions 
as were granted to the said Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany by the act of July 27, 1866: Provided, however, That 
this section shall in no way affect or impair the rights, present 
or prospectivf', of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, or any other railroad company." · 
This section constitutes the grant of all the rights the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company bas to public lands for 
the branch line described in it. No subsequent legislation 
bas either added to or diminished the rights of that com-
pany. Whatever rights the company had along the main 
line of its roarl under the act of July 27, 1866, are extended 
to this branch line, subject to the same limitations, re-
strictions, and conditions that are attached to it in the orig-
inal grant, with the additional exception stated in the pro-
viso. By that proviso all rights and privileges that would 
in "any way affect or impair the rights, present or prospective," 
of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company are excepted 
I by the enactment from the grant to the Southern Pacific 
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Company, and as to any such right or privilege thus excepted 
no claim of any kind was ever vested in the Southern Pacific 
Company. The rights that were granted to the Atlantic 
and Pacific Railroad Company in their full breadth, as set 
forth in the act of July 27, 1866, are excepted by the pro-
viso. The exception includes all the rights, both present 
and prospective, of the Atlantic and Pacific Company. The 
rights excepted are those which on the 3d of :l\Iarch, 1871, 
existed, and those which the legislation as it then stood 
promised, to the Atlantic and Pacific Company. It is to be 
observed tlJat it is not titles, but rights~ that are excepted. 
Whether those rights ever ripened into titles or not can 
neither enlarge nor diminish the scope of the exception. If, 
by subsequent legislation, additional rights bad been granted 
to the Atlantie and Pacifie Railroad Company, such addi-
tional rights would not extend the length of the exception; 
nor, if by like legislation that company's rights haLl been 
diminished, would it contract its breadth. The exception 
was a fixed boundary, whose limits were to be determined as 
the rights, present and prospective, existed at the time of 
its enactment. By the third section of the act of the 27th 
of July, 1~66 (14 Stat., 294), the rights of the Atlantic and 
Pacific Railroad Company, material to be considered in 
answer to your inquiry, are found. That section contains a 
present grant of every alternate section of public land, not 
mineral, designateM by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty 
alternate sections per mile on each side of said railroad. 
The right to the lands thus granted was a preS('nt right at 
the time of the acceptance by the company of the provisions 
of the act of 1871, and therefore came within the proviso. 
(Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. R.,360.) In addition thereto, 
the section granted an indemnity limit of 10 miles on each 
side of the granted limits. This was a p'rospective right, to 
take effect on condition that tlw amount of twenty alternate 
odd sections of unreserved public land could not be found 
on each side of the road within the primary limits. If 
another railroad in 1871, and continuously thereafter, should 
have the right to take the odd-numbered sections of land 
within the secondary limit, it would Yery seriously affect and 
implX!ir this prospeetive right. This secondary limit also was 
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intended to be protected by, and was included within, the 
exception contained in the proviso. 
The inquiries contained in yours, as above stated, are 
therefore answered in the affirmati~e. 
I am J·ours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
NEW SITE FOR FORT BRADY. 
Upon the facts submitted, which are set forth in the opinion: Advised 
that, under the deed of Thomas Ryan and wife, dated December 18, 
1866, granting to the United States certain land at Sault Ste. Marie, 
Mich., selected fora new site for Fort Brady, the title to the premises 
has become vested in the United. States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 16, 1888. 
SIR: In compliance with the request contained in your 
letter to me of the 6th of February last, I have considered 
the petition of Mr. Thomas Ryan, of Sault Ste. Marie, 1\Hch., 
for the cancellation of a deed executed by himself and wife, 
December 18, 1886, granting to the United ~tates certain 
land in that place. From that letter, the papers submitted 
therewith, and other sources I gather the ~ollowing facts: 
The act of July 8, 1886, chapter 7 4 7, authorized the Secre-
tary of War to purchase a new site for Fort Brady, in or near 
the village of Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., provided the title 
thereto should be approved by the Attorney-General. Sub· 
sequently a Board of A.rmy Officers was appointed to select 
such site, and among other proposals received by it was the 
following: 
"SAULT STE. MARIE, September 8, 1886. 
" To the honorable the Board of Survey : 
" SIRS: I am instructed by Mr. Ryan to offer the south-
west! of southwest! of section 6, and the southeast! of the 
southeast! of section 1 (both in towns. 47 N., ofranges 1 E. 
and W.), containing 80 acres, more or less, if sold together, 
gether, for the sum of $12,000. 
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''Although not authorized yet, I assume that :Mr. Ryan 
would sell any portion of said lands at a price in ratio to the 
above (i.e., $150 per acre). 
•'THOMAS RYAN, 
"By W. B. CADY. 
"P. S.-The above offer is subject to the opening of Easter-
day avenue along the south line." 
The Board having recommended the purchase of the prop-
erty described in thi8 proposal, the Actif!,g S('cretary of War, 
on the 11th of September, 1886. telegraphed his approval 
thereof, and Mr. Ryap. was thereupon notified by the presi-
dent of the Board of the acceptance of his offer, the notice 
being in writing, as follows : 
''FoRT BRADY, MICH., September 11, 1886. 
''THOMAS RYAN, 
"Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.: 
" SIR: You are hereby notified that the Acting Secretary 
of War has approved the recommendation of the Board of 
Officers now in session at this post, that your proposal, dated 
September 8, 1886, be accepted, viz, for the sale of certain 
tracts of land described in your proposal, as follows: The 
southwest! of the southwest-! of section 6, and the south-
east! of the southeast-! of section 1, subject to the opening of 
Easterday avenue along the south line, for $12,000. 
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"HENRY L. ABBOT, 
''Lieut. Col. of Engineers, President of the Board." 
Afterwards Mr. Ryan received a letter requesting the 
speedy preparation of his title papers, of which the following 
is a copy:. 
''UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE, 
"THOMAS RYAN, Esq., 
'' 34 CONGRESS STREET, WEST, 
"Detroit, Mich., October 6, 1886. 
" Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.: 
" SIR: I have received from the War Department the fol-
lowing letter of instructions, viz: 
" 'The recommendation of the Board, approved by the De-
partment, selects a tract of about 75 acres of land at Sault 
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Ste. Marie, owned by Thomas Ryan, as the new site for Fort 
Brady, at the proposed price of $12,000. Papers on file show 
.Mr. Ryan's address to be Michigan Exchange Hotel, Detroit. 
Please take the proper steps, without delay, to collect and 
forward to this Department the necessary deeds and other 
title papers for the conveyance of this land to the United 
States for examination by the Attorney-General, as required 
by law. General Orders, 47, Headquarters of the Army, Ad-
jutant-General's Office, of 1881, published regulations of the 
Department of Justice concerning such title papers, a copy 
of which will be forwarded to you by mail. 
"R. C. DRUM, 
"Acting Secretary of War.' 
'' I have therefore to request that JOU will proceed as rap-
idly as possible with the preparation of the requisite papers, 
and to aid you in this I inclose herewith a copy of General 
Orders, No. 47, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-Gen-
eral's Office, May 13, 1881, above referred to. 
"Please acknowledge receipt of this communication, and 
inform me as to how soon you can begin the preparation of 
the papers in question. 
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
" 0. J\1. POE, 
"Lieut. Col. of Engineers, Bvt. Brig. Gen., U. S. A." 
To the foregoing letter the following response was made: 
" 0C'l'OBER 13, 1886. 
"General 0. M. PoE: 
"SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging your favor of 
the 6th instant to Thomas Ryan. I am acting for Mr. R,van 
in preparing his title for the inspection of the Attorney-
General. I expect to be able to send on the necessary papers 
in from six to eight weeks. 
''Yours, very respectfully, 
"W. B. CADY. 
''To 0. M. PoE, 
" Lieut. Engineers, Bvt. Brig. Gen., U. S. A.., 
" Detroit, Mich." 
In the latter part of December, 1886, an abstract of title and 
other papers, including a deed of the above-described prem-
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ises to the United States executed by Ryan and wife, dated 
Dtw.ember 18, 1886, were sent by W. B. Cady to General 
Poe, who thereupon transmitted all the papers to the United 
States attorney for the western district of .Michigan, with 
a request that he examine the title to the property. 
On the 28th of March, 1887, the Secretary of War trans- . 
mitted these title papers, accompanied by an opinion of the 
United States attorney thereon, dated the 17th of same 
month, to the Attorney-General, with a request for his advice 
"as to the validity of the title to the lands in question, and 
whether the inclosed deed is sufficient to vest the title in the 
United States." Before the question had been passed upon 
by the Attorney-General a letter was received by him from 
the Secretary of War, dated April 5, 1887, inclosing a copy 
of a. letter from Messrs. Brennan & Donnelly of Detroit, 
Mich., which reads as follows : 
"DETROIT, Aprill, 1887. 
''Ron. WM. 0. ENDICOTT, 
"Secretary of War, Washington, D. 0.: 
''SIR: Mr. Thomas Ryan, of Sault Ste Marie, in this State, 
with whom your Department had some negotiations some 
months ago for the purchase of the SW.:! of the SW. -! 
of section 6, and the SE. :! of the SE. :! section 1, in said 
town, as a site for Fort Brady, has instructed us to say that 
he has arranged for a different disposition of the property, 
and further negotiations are unnecessary. Will you please 
return to him all papers submitted to the Government con-
cerning said property ~ · 
" Very truly, yours, 
''BRENNAN & DONNELLY." 
On receipt of the last-mentioned letter or the Secretary 
the papers were returned to him by the Attorney-General 
without other action; but by another letter, dated the 16th of 
~arne month, the Secretary resubmitted the title papers to 
the Attorney-General, with request for his opinion as to the 
validity of the title, etc. In response to this request an 
opinion was rendered by the Attorney-General on the 18th 
of May~ 1887, as follows : 
" Upon examination of these papers I find that a valid 
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title to said land (i. e., the premises hereinbefore described) 
is thereby deduced to Thomas Ryan, of that place (Sault 
Ste :Marie), and I am of the opinion that the accompanying 
deed of cunveyance from him and his wife to the United 
States, dated December 18, 1886, which is offered for the 
acceptance of the Government, is sufficient to pass a valid 
title to the premises, assuming, of course, that nothing 
affecting the title to the property has transpired since the 
date of the deed. Information on this point should be ob-
tained before completing the purchase by having the searches 
for liens, incumbrances, etc., continued down to the present 
time." 
On the following day, at the desire of the War Depart-
ment, the Attorney-General transmitted the deed of Ryan 
and wife hereinbefore mentioned to the United States attor-
ney for the western district of Michigan, for the purpose of 
having the same put on record. Accompanying the deed • 
were the fvllowing instructions to the United States at-
torney: 
"You are hereby instructed to continue the search for 
liens, incumbrances, etc., against the property from the date 
of the deed down to the present time, and should the .title 
be found to be unaffected thereby and to remain unchanged, 
you are further instructed to have the deed recorded, after 
which payment of tLe purchase-money will be made in the 
usual way through the War Department." 
The said deed of Ryan and wife was recorded on the 25th 
of 1\'Iay~ 1887. In a letter to the Attorney-General touching 
this subject, dated the 28th of same month, the United 
States attorney states: 
"I found upon investigation * * * that on the 4th of 
April, 1887, Thomas !{yan and wife deeded to the village of 
Sault Ste. Marie a strip of land 40 feet wide off the east side 
of the SW.! of the SW.-! of section 6, and 40 feet off the 
west side of the SE. ! of the SE. -! of section 1, making 
together a strip 80 feet wide. for street purposes. I hereto 
attach a slip, with the land marked out, showing you what 
has been done to affect the title to the land; notwithstand-
ing all this, I recorded the deed running to the United States. 
" Perhaps I should explain further. Since ·this land was 
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contracted to the Government a very remarkable business 
boom has struck Sault Ste. Marie, and Mr. Ryan claims that 
the land deeded to the Government is worth $50,000 or 
$60,000. He· has made a claim that the Government was deal-
ing with the expectation of purchasing it, and assuming 
that it had not been accepted as yet, but was under consid-
eration by tlie Government; while I supposed you had 
accepted his offer to sell land for $1:?,000. This being the 
situation, I took the responsibility of recording the deed, 
notwithstanding that RO feet had been deeded away, think-
ing it would be the safest way to secure the Government. as 
the property is unquestionably worth more than $12,000, 
although the conveyance of the street should be valid.'' 
June 9, 1887, the Attorney-General addressed a communi-
cation to the Secretar~- of War, transmitting a copy of the 
• afore~aid letter of the United States attorney, together with 
the slip therein mentioned. In that communication the fol-
lowing remarks were made: 
" It appears that since the date of the deed, and before the 
same was recorded, namely, on the 4th of April, 1887, the 
said Ryan and wife deeded a small part of the premises to 
the village of Sault Ste. Marie for the purpose of a street. 
Notwithstanding this, the United States attorney thought 
it advisable to put the deed to the United States on record. 
"By the law of Michigan an unrecorded deed is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion 
thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded. If 
the con\eyance to the village bas been first duly recorded, 
and is otherwise within the provision of law just adverted 
to, its title to so much t>f the premises as is granted thereby 
would doubtless be superior to a title derived under the deed 
to the United States. Howew'r, should the use of that part 
of the premises for the purpose of a street be unobjectiona-
ble, the failure to derive title thereto under such deed may 
be unimportant." 
The following statement, containing addition3.l facts, is 
taken from the letter of the Secretary of War, of February 
6, 1888, herein before referred to : 
''The Lieutenant-General recommended, June 24, that the 
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ground be not purchased, unless the roadway referred to be 
given up to the United States by the village authorities. 
" The papers were referreu to Colonel Poe, to ascertain if 
the village autlwrities woulu relinquish the roadway. 
"July 27, l887, Oolonel Poe reported that he had written 
to the president of the village of Sault Ste. Marie, and is in-
formed that it is hopeless to expect favorable action by the 
present village council on the request for reconveyance of 
the strip of land mentioned. * * * 
"The Secretary of War and General Sheridan held a con-
ference November 25, 1887, and decided to await further ac-
tion of the village council of Sault Ste. Marie; that the 
rights of the United States should be maintained, and that 
payment must be withheld until the roadway is relinquished 
to the Government, thus making the title of the United States 
good to the whole tract conveyed by the deed of Thomas 
Ryan to the United States. 
"It is proper to add that it is the desire of the [War] De-
partment to secure the tract of land in accordance with the 
terms offered by Mr. Ryan September 8, 1886." 
The deed of Ryan and wife to the village, referred to above, 
was recorded Aprill~, 1887. With the exception of so mnch 
thereof as is granted by that deed, the entire tract has re-
mained in his possession. 
The petitioner, Thomas Ryan, claims that prior to the date 
of his letter to the Secretary of War requesting the return of 
the title papers (April'l, 1886) no contract existed between 
him and the Government by which either was bound; that 
the sale and purchase of the property were still in negotia-
tion; that those papers, including the deed of himself and 
wife of December 18, l886, were sub nitted for examination, 
merely; that until approval of the title by the Attorney-
General and acceptance of the deed by the Government he 
was at liberty to withdraw from the matter. and that before 
the title was approved or the deed accepted he withdrew 
therefrom. He further claims to be still the rightful owner 
of the premises, states that the recording of said deed has 
created a cloud upon his title, and asks that the deed be cau-
celed. 
The inquiry presents itself, at the very outset, whether any 
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valid and binding agreement for nbe sale of the land was 
concluded betw~n the United States and Mr. Ryan prior to 
the execution and delivery of his deed into the hands of the 
Government agent. By the statement of facts herein before 
set forth it appears that the premises were offered for sale 
to the United States by an agent of Ryan for a cPrtain sum, 
and that the offer was accepted on the part of the Govern-
ment, the acceptance being subject, of course, to the conai-
tion required by the statute, that the title should be approved 
by the Attorney-General. (See the corre'1pondence of Sep-
tember 8, 18~6, and September 11, 1;--.'86, supra.) Thereupon, 
in order to meet the statutory requirement jnst adverted to, 
Ryan was req nested by the Government agent to proceed as 
rapidly as possible with the preparation of the requisite 
papers, which request his agent acknowledged, signif.ving 
an intention to comply therewith. (Correspondence of Octo-
ber 6, 18~6, and October 13, 1886.) This is substantially the 
evidence appearing in the case which has· any bearing hpon 
the inquiry under consideration. 
Mr. Ryan claims unuer these facts that because Mr. Cad~,. , 
his agent, was not "lawfully authorized" by him to make 
the contract in pursuance of which he made the deed to the 
United State8, that the whole transaction is void, as being 
within the provisions of section 6181 of Michigan statutes, 
which ·is substantially a re-enactment of a part of the En-
glish statute of frauds. The facts do not seem to justify the 
application of the principle he contends for. The deed, 
signed, sealed, acknowledged, and delivered by Mr. Ryan to 
his agent to deliver to the United States, which the agent 
did actually deliver, raised a sufficient presumption of rati-
fication, if the original contract were material. The delivery 
of the deed to the agent, in pursuance of the contract which 
he made in the name of the principal, would certainly re-
lieve the agent from the consequences of his alleged unau-
thorized acts, and make the acts of the agent those of the 
principal. (,Story on Agency, sec. 244, and note~.) The 
delivery of the deed by the agent to the Government is prima 
facie a full execution of the contract, and passed a complete 
title. The possession of a deed by a vendee is presumptive 
evidence of delivery. The recording of the deed also gives 
• 
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rise to the same presumption. To overcome tpe effect of the 
possession of the deed by the vendee, and the recording of 
it, lt would be incumbent on the grantor to establish affirma-
tiV"ely that the delivery was not made. When a deed is 
passed from the grantor to the grantee, whether the change 
of possession of the instrument shall be regarded as a deliv-
ery is to be determined from the intent of the parties. In 
Devlin on Deeds, section 289, it is state~ that "the true 
rule would seem to be that when the grantor bas parted with 
all control of the deed its acceptance by the grantee may be 
presumed if it be beneficial to him." 
In the case of Hatch v. Hatch (9 Mass., 309), Justice Sew-
all declares: 
"The delivery is an essential requisite to a deed, and the 
effect of it is to be from the time when it is delivered as a 
deed, but it i~ not essential to the valid delivery of a, deed 
that the grantee be present, and that it be made to or ac-
cepted by him personally at the time. A writing delivered 
to a ~tranger for the use and benefit of the grantee, to have 
effect after a certain event, or the performance of some con-
dition, may be delivered either as a deed or as escrow. The 
distinction, however, seems almost entirely nominal, when we 
consider the rules of decision which have been resorted to 
for the purpose of effectuating the intentions of the grantor 
or the obligor, or in some cases·of necessity. If deliverPd as 
an escrow, and not in name as a deed, it will, nevertheless,. 
be regarded. and construed as a deed from the first delivery 
as soon as the event happens or the condition is performed 
upon which the effect bad been suspended, if this construc-
tion should be then necessary in furtherance of the lawful 
intention of the parties." 
The preponderance of the fact~ in this case seems to show 
the grantor bad parted with all control of the deed. It was 
Ile\er to be returned to him except on the condition pre-
scribed by law, that if the Attorney-General sl.J.ould declare 
the title defective, then the w bole transaction, whether exist-
ing in parole or established by legal written evidence, should 
be void. This condition, being public law, entered into and 
constituted a condition subject to which evc'ry step in the 
proceeding was taken. The condition was not made by the 
274-VOL XIX--10 
146 HON. A. H. GARLAND 
Mall Tran !Jporta tlon-D lscont tn u an c e of c·o n tract. 
partie8, nor for the benefit of the grantor, but for the protec-
tion of the Government. The grantor could not take advan-
tage of it, and rescind a sale otherwise lawfully made when-
e\'er his whim or intPrest might suggest such a course. 
When the .Attorney-General passed upon the title as good, 
this condition, fixed by law, was performed, and the delivery 
became absolute and unconditional. Under the facts sub-
mitted, the title to the land seems to be vested in the United 
States. The deed having been recorded, the title can not be 
revested in the vendor without a decree of court or Congres-
sional authorization. 
The proper course to be pursued, it is suggested, would be 
to determine what was the value of the street conveyed by 
the vendor to the village of Sault Ste. Marie before the re-
cording of the deed to the United States, and, after subtract-
ing that amount from the whole consi1lerration in the deed, 
pay or tender the balance of the purchase money to the ven-
dor, and take possessjon of the lands. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
NoTE. -An action of ejectment was subsequently brought by the United 
.States against Thomas Ryan, in the United StateM circuit court for the 
western district of Michigan, to recover the premises conve_yed by the 
ileed of said Ryan and wife referred to in the foregoing opinion, and 
'Verdict and judgment went in favor of the Government. The case was 
~tfterwards carried by writ of error to the Supreme Court, which affirmed 
the judgment of the court below. (See Ryan v. United States, 136 
u.s., 68.) 
MAIL TRANSPORTATION-DISCONTINUANCE OF CONTRACT. 
The Postmaster-General may discontinue a contract for carrying the mail 
before expiration of the term thereof, allowing the contractor one 
month's e~tra pay, when i~ his judgment the public interests require 
such discontinuance, for the purpose of re-advertising and reletting 
the service on an increased schedule, in preference to permitting the 
contractor to perform the increased service at the pro rata to which he 
would be entitled under his contract. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 20, 1888. 
SIR: I received your letter of the 14th of April, 1888. 
You refer to certain statutes, regulations, and clauses in the 
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proposals and contracts relating to the carrying of the United 
States mail, and submit for my opinion the question-
'' Whether the Postmaster-General can lawfully discontinue 
-a contract before the expiration of its term, allowing one 
month's extra pay, when in his judgment the public interests 
require such discontinuance, for the purpose of re-advertis-
ing and reletting the service on such increased schedule, in 
preference to permitting the contractor to perform the in-
creased service at the pro rata increase to which he would be 
-entitled if the service were required under his contract." 
The question submitted is one of power, not one duty. 
The power may exist, and yet the circumstances surround-
ing a particular case may not in justice and good policy war-
rant the exercise of it. The duty to exercise a power is irr 
many instances left to your just discretion. In the postal 
system the general rule i~ the mails are to be carried by con-
tracts. Those contracts are to be let after and in pursuance 
~f public advertisement to the lowest qualified competent 
bidder. The general intent is that the work shall be done 
at the lowest rate it can be done for, on contracts let by 
public, equal, fair, competitive bidding. All preferences or 
prejudices on private or personal grounds are intended to be 
.avoided. Section 3956, Revised Statutes, declares: "No con-
tract for carrying the mail shall be made for a longer time 
than four years." There is no law forbidding contracts for 
.a shorter term. Section 3960 provides that compensation 
for additional service in carrying the mails shall not be in ex-
cess of the exact proportion which the original compensation 
bears to the original senTice. This clause is a restriction 
that the compensation shall not be greater than in exact pro-
portion paid for the original se_rvice, but it does not say it 
may not be less. Under the general intent of the law, if the 
additional service may justly be procured for less, it may 
rightfully be done. The changing interests of the public, 
and the good of the service, may require that the number of 
mails in a given time should be increased after a contract 
shall have been made. If but a single mail a week is called 
for in the a.d vertisement for the letting of a contract, bidders 
would be likely to ask a higher price for the carrying of that 
single mail than they would for each of a larger number of 
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mails on the same route within the same time. To provide' 
for such a change, when just and expedient, section 817 of 
the Postal Regulations provides: 
"The Postmaster General may discontinue or curtail the 
service on any route, in whole or in part, in order to place 
on the route superior service, or whenever the public in-
terests in his judgment shall require such discontinuance 
or curtailment for any other cause, he allowing, as full in-
demnity to the contractor, one month's extra pay on the 
ainount of services dispensed with, and a pro rata compensa-
tion for the amount of services retained and continued." 
This regulation is, in substance, incorporated in the in-
structions given by the Department to bidders for contracts, 
and consLitutes a part of the contract when made. The reg-
ulations and instructions give full notice to the bidders and 
contractors that the Postmaster-General reserves to himself 
the power to discontinue a given service whenever the public 
interests in his judgment shall require it. The contracts made 
in pursuance of the regulation in the following clause sub-
stitutes the word "contract" for '"service," as follows: 
" It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the said contractor 
and his sureties that the Postmaster-General may discontinue 
or extend this contract, change the schedule and termini of 
the route, and alter, increase, decrease, or extend the service, 
in accordance with law, he allowing not to exceed a pro rata 
increase of compensation for an~~ additional service thereby 
required; and iu case of decrease, curtailment, or discontinu-
ance of service, as full indemnity to said contractor, one 
month's extra pay on the amount of service dispensed wit!J, 
and not to exceed a pro rata compensation for the service 
retained; but no increase of compensation shall be allowed 
for a change of service not amounting to an increase, nor in 
demnity of month's extra pay for any change of service not 
involving a decrease of service." 
This interpretatiou given by the parties to the word'' serv-
ice" as found in the regulation, in connection with the regu-
lation, gives to the Postmaster-General the power to discon-
tinue a contract when in his judgment the public interests 
require it. In the case of Garftelde v. United States (93 U.S. 
R., 246), the Supreme Court of the United States, in con-
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struing a similar regulation of earlier date, Rpeaking of the 
contractor, ruled: 
"He no doubt knew that this regulation provided that the 
Postmaster-General could discontinue entirely the service for 
which he pro1wsed, wheneYer in his judgment the public 
interests required it, an<l that for such discontinuance one 
month's pay was to be deemed a full indemnity to the con-
tractor. There was reserved to the Postmaster-General the 
power to annul the contract when his judgment advised that 
it should be done, and the compensation to the contractor 
was specified." 
Your inquiry is therefore, subject to the limitations con-
tained in it, answered in the affirmative. 
I am yours, respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
BATTERY ISLAND, MARYLAND. 
Upon the facts presented touching the title to certain property at Bat-
tery Island, in the Susquehanna River, Maryland, occupied and used 
by the U. S. ~,ish Commission: Advised (1) that the legal title to such 
of the made land as is contiguous to the il:lland is in the riparian pro-
prietor; (2) that the legal title to such of th0 ruade land as is not con-
tiguous to the island, but lies separate therefrom, is in the State of 
Maryland, also the title to the soil on which tlH· pnldic works (cribs, 
breakwaters, etc.) are constructed; (3) that tl!o rnited States have 
no title to any land within the lines of said works or upon the island 
excepting the light-house site. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 5,1888. 
SIR: I have had under consideration the communication 
of the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries and other papers 
which were referred to me with :rour letter of the 18th ultimo, 
touching certain property on Battery Island, in the Susque-
hanna River, within the State of Maryland, situated about 
3,Z miles below Havre de Grace, Md., and in compliance with 
your request now beg to submit my opinion as to whether 
the United States have a valid title to the whole or any part 
of the premises. 
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Part of said island, comprising 2,025 square feet of ground,. 
was purchased by the United States in 1852 for a light-house 
site, and is still used for that purpose. On examining the 
title papers relating thereto, I find that a patent covering the 
whole i3land (formerly called Edmonson Island or Shad Bat-
tery, and containing 1 or 2 acres only) was issued by the 
State of Maryland to Robert Gale and John Donohoe some 
time previous to the year 1835. In 1842 it was purchased by 
Otto Scott at a sheriff's sale, under an execution on a judg-
ment against said Gale and Donohoe. The title of the United 
States to the light-house site is derived by deed from said 
Scott .. The remainder of the island was leased by the Gov-
ernment from T .. B. Ferguson in 1883 for a nominal rent 
($1 per annum), and has since been held under his lease, re-
newed from time to time; but for several years prior to 1883 
it had been occnpied for the purposes of the U. S. Fish Com-
mission, with the permission of the owner, and it has since 
been occupied for the same purposes under the said lease. 
During such occupancy a number of cribs, breakwaters, 
basins, and other works have been constructed by the Gov-
ernment, at great expense, in the waters immediately ad-
jacent to the island and outside of its original boundaries .. 
Within the lines of these works are several pieces of "made 
land," formed by deposits of earth obtained in dredging the 
channel leading to the island and otherwise, some of which 
are contignons to and other's separate and distinct from the 
island. And the question proposed I understand to relate to 
the soil on which the said works are constructed, including 
the pieces of made land referred to, and not to any soil lying 
within the original limits of the island. 
In regard to the made land which is contiguous to the island, 
and which constitutes really a part of the latter as it now ex-
ists, the ownership thereof would seem to be in the proprietor 
of the land in front of which the same was formed. By an act 
of the Maryland legislature, passed in 1862, chapter 129 (see 
also Revised Code of Maryland, 1878, pp. 183, 184), the owner 
of land bounding on navigable waters is declared to be. en-
titled to all accretions to said land by the recession of the 
water, whether formed or made by natural causes or other-
wise, in like manner and to like extent as such right may be 
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claimed by the owner of land bounding on water not naviga-
able; and he is also declared to be entitled to the exclusive 
right of making improvements into the water in front of his 
land (saving only that no improvement shall be so constructed 
as to interfere with the navigation of the stream); and it is 
further declared that such improvements and accretions shall 
pass to the successive owners of the land to which they are 
attached as incident to their respective estates. The United 
States own no land on the island, excepting· the light-house 
site hereinbefore mentioned, which, when purchased by the 
Government, was bounded on all side3 by other land belong-
ing to the vendor thereof, and its boundaries have since re-
mained unchanged. }[an~festly, then, tlle proprietorsllip of 
such site does not carry with it any rights under the said act. 
With respect to the other made land, namely, that which 
is not attached to the island, and also the soil whereon the 
said works are constructed, I am of thA opinion that the 
title thereto is in the State of :Maryland. It is well settled 
that each State owns the land of all tide waters withi~l its 
jurisdiction, unless they haYe been granted away. (McCready 
, .. Virginia, 94 U.S. R., 391.) In the absence, therefore, of any 
grant by the State of .Maryland imparting a right to the 
premises (and I am not advised that any such grant exists) 
the ownership tberPof must be deemed to be in that State. 
It will be observed that the law of l\Iaryland cited abovA 
gives the riparian proprietor the exclusive right to make im-
pro,-ements in the water in front of his land. The construc-
tiou of the public works already referred to in the immediate 
front of the island abridges somewhat the exercise of such 
right by its owner; hut they we"te constructed there with 
the consent of such owner. There is believed to be no ground, 
legal or equitable, upon which he could maintain any claim 
to or respecting the same a~ against the Government. 
The result reached by me may be summed up thus: (1) 
The legal tttle to such of the made land as is contiguous to 
the island is in the riparian proprietor. (2) The legal title 
to such of the made land as is not contiguous to the island, 
but lies separate therefrom, is in the State of :Maryland; also 
the title to the soil on which the public works aforesaid are 
constructed. (3) The United States have no title to any land 
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within the lines of said works or upon the island, excepting 
the light-house site. 
The condition of the title to the property at Battery Island, 
occupied and used by the Fish Commission, here pointed out, 
may suggest the advisability, in order to avoid complications 
in the future and to adequately protect the public interests 
there, of acquiring for the United States the part of the 
island not already owned by them (containing about 1 acre) 
which is at present occupied by the Commission under the 
lease from Ferguson, and also of obtaining from the State a 
grant to the United States of the land belonging to the former 
within the lines of said works, together with a cession of juris-
diction over the whole of the propt·rty. 
The papers received with your letter are herewith re-
turned. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
COMPENSATION 0~"' DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 
Where a district attorueJ· instituted proceedings for the forfeiture under 
section 5239, Revised Statutes, of" all the rights, privileges, and fran-
chises" of a national banking association, by direction of the Solicitor 
of the Treasury, agreeably to section 31'30, Revi!:ied Statutes: Advised 
that the account of the district attorney for his services, upon ap-
proval thereof by the Attorney-General, may properly be paid out of 
the appropriation for the payment of miscellaneous expenses author-
ized by the Attorney-General. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J1me 14, 1888. 
Sm: I have given careful attention to the question of au-
thority to pay the claim of W. B. Burnet for services as dis-
trict attorney in the judicial proceedings instituted by the 
Comptroller of the Currency under section 523!J, Revised 
Statute.'3, for the forfeiture of'' all the rights, privileges, and 
franchises" of the Fidelity National Bank, of Cincinnati. Ohio. 
Section 380, Revised Statutes, pro,·ides as follows: 
''All suits and proceedings arising out of the provisions of 
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law governing national banking associations, in which the 
United States or any of its officers or agents shall be parties, 
shall be cond1.wted by the district attorneys of the several dis-
tricts, 1.tnder the direction and s1.tpervision of the Solicitor of the 
Treas1.try ., 
The proceedings in question were institute<l under that sec-
tion, by direction of the Solicitor of the Treasluy, and were 
such as it was the duty of Mr. Burnet to conduct. 
District attorneys are compensated by fees and fixed sal-
aries. Congress has in several sections of the Revised Stat-
utes prescribed what fees shall be charged by them, and for 
what services, and by section 770 has declared that district 
attorneys are entitle<l to receive a salary at the rate of $~00 
a year ''for extra sm·vices." 
It is unnecessary to examine the several provisions of law 
relating to the fees of district attorneys, because Mr. Burnet 
admits that his claim does not come within any of them, nor 
do the services on which the claim is founded bear analogy 
to those named in the provisions of law mentioned, as the 
litigation in which they were rendered was not set on foot 
for tlle benefit of the Government of the United States, but 
for the benefit of the Fidelity National Bank, and possibly 
of the public in general. 1 
Is the claim covered by the provision allowing him a sal-
ary of $200 "for extra se,rvices?" 
Undoubtedly the services rendered by Mr. Burnet were 
"extra" in the sense that they were not enumerated in any 
of the provisions of law relating to fees; but the words" extra 
seYvices" have not been given so extended a sense by those 
charged with the duty of applying these laws. They have 
uniformly held that the ''extra services" contemplated are 
certain duties of a minor character wllich the district attor-
neys are required to perform, but for which Congress has not 
seen fit to legislate severally as to compensation; but that 
services out of the ordinary run of official duties do not fall 
within the meaning of" extra services" as used in section 770. 
That there are services in the view of Congress required 
by law of district attorneys, and not covered by any legisla-
tion as to the compensation of such officers, is shown clearly 
by the third section of the act 20th June, 187 4 (18 Stat., 109), 
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which, after declaring" that no civil officer of the Govern-
ment shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, 
directly or indirectly, from the Treasury or property of the 
United States beymul his salary or compensation allowed 
by law," says, ''Provided, That this shall not be construed to 
prevent the employment and payment by the Department of 
Justice of district attorneys as now allowed by law for the 
performance of services not covered by theit· salaries m· fees.'" 
. I am entirely free from doubt that ~1r. Rurnet's services 
are not covered by the salary for " extra services " allowed by 
law, according to the settlP.d interpretation of section 770, 
Revised Statutes. 
I am of opinion, furthermore, that Congress intended that 
such services as Rurnet's should be paid out of the appro-
priation to defray the expenses of the United States courts. 
In the appropriation for that purpose for the :fiscal year end-
ing the 30th J nne, 1888 (24 Stat., 542), is the following pro-
vision: 
"For payment of such miscellaneous expenses as may be 
authorized by the Attorney-General, including the employ-
ment of janitors and watchmen in rooms or buildings rented 
for the use of courts, interpreters, experts, and stenographers; 
of furnishing and collecting evidence where the United 
States is or may be a party in interest, and moving of rec-
ords, two hundred and fourteen thousand four hundred 
dollars." 
In my opinion the Attorney-General's approval of Mr. 
Burnet's account would authorize its payment out of the 
appropriation for the payment of miscellaneous IJXpenses 
authorized by the Attorney-General. 
I do not think it necessary that the authority of the 
Attorney-General contemplated by the act should have been 
given before the se;rvice was rendered, but that it is enough 
if his approval or sanction is given after the service bas been 
rendered. Any other view would produce great embarrass-
ment aud in some instances seriously obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice, as all expenses cannot possibly be foreseen 
by the Attorney-General, and it would be a public inconven-
ience to stop judicial proceedings, for example, to afford 
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time to make application to the Attorney-General. It seems 
to me, therefore, that it can hardly be supposed that Congress 
intended, by the use of the words "authorized by the Attor-
ney-General," any more than that his appro\al of an expense 
should be necessary before it could be paid under the pro-
vision in question. In the case in hand, Mr. Burnet was re-
quired by law to perform the services in question when di-
rected to do so by the Solicitor of th,e Treasury without the 
knowledge of the Attorney-General, and it must have been 
intended that services so required and rendered should be 
paid for, and my opinion is that Congress had in view that 
proper compensation in all such cases should be made out of 
the above-mentioned appropriation "for the payment of such 
miscellaneous expenses as may be authorized by the Attor-
ney-General." 
I do not see that your action is necessary in the present 
state of this business; but as the case stands without pre-
cedent in this Department, its extraordinary character might 
be a reason for sending it to the Treasury with your approval 
should you concur in my views. 
I have the honor to be, very respecfully, yonr obedient 
servant, 
WM. A. MAURY, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The PRESIDENT. 
COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION, NEW YORK. 
Under the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, and the contract made by 
the Secretary of the Treasury agreeably thereto with the commis-
sioners of emigration of the State of New York, the latter are not 
bound to account for and pay over to the Treasury Department moneys 
received by them for privileges granted to individuals to transact in 
Castle Garden certP,in business "';ith tbe immigrants there. 
DEPARTMENT OF JT.TSTICE, 
Jtttne 30, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th ultimo states that, pursuant 
to the provisions of the act of August 3, 1882, entitled ''An 
act to regulate immigration," the Secretary of the Treasury, 
on the 27th of September, 1883, entered into a contract with 
the commissioners of emigration of the State of New York, 
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under which the Treasury Department has allowed and paid 
from the immigration fund created by that act certain ~x­
penses incurred by the commissioners, including the sum of 
$8,000 a year rent paid by them for Castle Garden, used as 
a landing place for immigrants. 
During the continuance of such contract it appears that 
the commissioners have received considerable amounts of 
money for privileges granted by them to individuals to tran-
sact in Castle Garden certain business with the immigrants 
there-such as selling them food, railroad tickets, etc., 
changing their money, transporting their baggage, and the 
like-and that the money so received has not been accounted 
for at the Treasury Department. 
You inquire whether, under the act and contract referred 
to, such money should be accounted for and paid over by the 
commissioners to that Department. . 
Upon examination of said act I find no provision therein 
which contemplates the collection of or accounting to the 
Treasury for any money other than the '' duty of 50 cents 
for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United 
States who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign 
port," etc., and with the collection of that duty the commis-
sioners have nothing to do; nor do I find any provision in 
the said contract under which money is authorized to be col-
lected by or paid to the commissioners, excepting such as 
shall be found due for necessary expenses incurred by them 
in the performance of the contract. 
It seems that, in adjusting the accounts of the commis-
sioners for expenses so incurred, the Treasury Department 
has heretofore allowed as part of these expenses the amount 
of the rent annually paid by them for Castle Garden. But 
this does not make the United States a lessee of the prem-
ises, or entitle it to the income derived from the use thereof 
for private business purposes under licenses given by the 
commissioners. The latter are officers of the State, and in 
their capacity as s1.wh are authorized to lease, and have 
leased, from the city of New York, for the purpose of a land-
ing place for immigrants, what is known as Castle Garden. 
Their accountability is, I concf'ive, to the State for whatever 
money they may receive for grants by them of privileges to 
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transact private business upon the premises so leased. Such 
funds cannot well be regarded as belonging to the United 
States. 
I am accordingly of the opinion that the commissioners 
are under uo duty, by the provisions of either the act or the 
contract referred to, to account for and pay over to the 
Treasury Department the money received by them for the 
purposes aforesaid. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
The phrase "forgings of iron and steel,'' as used in clauses Nos. 163 and 
167 (T. I., new), of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, includes 
forgings made of iron and forgings made of steel, and is not limited 
to articles composed of both iron and steel combined in the same 
forging. 
DEP ARTME~'l' OF JUSTIOE, 
July 2, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of June 1, 1888, you ask for an ex-
pression of my opinion as to the true interpretation of clauses 
(T. I., new), Nos. 163 and 167 of the tariff act of the 3d of 
March, 1883, with reference to the phrase '~forgings of iron 
and steel,'' which is used in both. 
No 163 is: "Anvils [2~ cents per pound], anchors or parts 
thereof [2-! cents per pound], mill-irons and mill-cranks of 
wrought-iron and wrought-iron for ships [2 cents per pound], 
and forgings of iron anil steel for \essels, steam-engines, and 
locomotives, or parts thereof, weighing each twenty five 
pounds or more, two 0ents per pound." 
Clause No. 167 is: "Forgings of iron and steel, or forged 
iron, of whatever shape, or in whatever stage of manufacture, 
not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, two and 
one-half cents per pound." 
The question is, does the phrase "forgings of iron and 
steel" limit the articles therein named to such as are com-
posed of both iron and steel combined in the same forging, 
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or does it em brace forgings made of iron and also forgings 
made of steel~ 
Very few, if any, of the articles named in clause No. 163 
are ever made by a combination of the two metals. To in-
terpret the phrase so as to limit it to such articles would 
render it almost if not quite nugatory, and leave nearly all 
the forgings used for the purposes set forth in the clause un-
provided for by any specific provision as to the rate of duty. 
The law could hardly have been intended to provide for a 
possible few of the articles named, and leave almost the whole 
bulk of such products unprovided for. The same reason ap-
plies in a large degree to clause No. 167. The context of the 
phrase in this clause, ''or forged iron, of whatever shape or 
in whatever stage of manufacture not specially enumerated 
or provided for," does not necessarily rebut the view that 
forgings of iron had been provided for by the previous phrase 
in the same clause. "Forged iron" is a much more compre-
hensive phrase than "forgings." It includes all iron that has 
been subjected to the process of forging. The last part of 
the sentence, "not specially enumerated or provided for," 
clearly contemplates th,at some forged iron had been specially 
enumerated orprovided for. It is entirely consistent with the 
cpntext to the phrase "forged iron," etc., that a sp cific p::ut 
of the manufacture embraced in it had been provided in other 
clauses or phrases of the act. The phrase in clause No. 167 
is identical with that in No. 163. They both deal with the 
same general subject. Consistency requires that they shall 
receive the same interpretation, if such interpretation can 
reasonably be given. There is no sufficient reason to the 
contrary. I am of the opinion that the phrase "forgings of 
iron and steel" should be interpreted in both clauses to in-
clude forgings of iron and also forgings of steel, and not 
alone to those in which thR two metals are combined in the 
same forging. 
Very respe.ctfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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GOVERNMENT ADVERTISEMENTS. 
Section 853, Revised Statutes, is superseded by the act of June ·2o, 1878, 
chapter 359, as regards tlle payment for advertisements by the several 
Departments of the Government. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 3, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 15th ultimo has been received. It 
asked for the construction of the laws in force respPcting ad-
vertisements in newspapers, referring to sections 853, 3823, 
and 3824, Revised Statutes. 
Section 853 (act February 26, 1853) fixed printers' fees 
"for pnb1ishing- any notice or order, required by law, or the 
lawfnl order of any court, Department, Bureau, or other per-
son," except for ten States mentioned in sections 3823, 3824, 
and for other States, as in 3825, Revised Statutes. Section 
853 included all possible legal notices or orders. 
Section 3823 (act March 2, 1867) directed the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives to select certain newspapers in 
certain States, ten in number, to publish (1) the treaties and 
(2) the laws of the United States, in one or more of which 
papers the orders of a judg~ or court, or officers of the court 
or executive officer, "shall be published." It likewise in-
cluded all possible legal notices or orders. 
Section 3825 regulated the publishing of treaties and laws 
in all other States, without mention of publication of notices 
or orders ~'required by law" or the order of a court, so that 
section 853 hau no force in the ten States and was of force in 
t1ie others. 
Section 3824 (act March 2, 1867) directed the Clerk to no-
tify each head of a Department and each judge of the United 
States courts "of the papers selected by him ; " directed the 
executive officers to publish in the papers ·selected; prohib-
ited payment of publications or advertisements in other pa-
pers in said districts, and forbade every public officer to 
publish "otherwise than" thus provided. 
'rhe act of July 31, 1876, directed the publication of all 
treaties in only one newspaper in the District of Columbia, 
designated by the Secretary of State. 
160 HON. G. A. JENKS 
Goyernment Advertisements. 
The act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 313), amended sec-
tion 79, Revised Statutes, so as to read "after the 4th day of 
:March, 1875, the publication of laws in newspapers shall 
cease." · 
The action of the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
under section 3823 was to provide for the publication of 
treaties and laws in newspapers, section 79 forbade the pub-
lication of laws in newspapers, and section 204 provided for 
their promulgation. 
The act of July 31, 1876, provided for the publication of 
treaties in another manner. 
The duties of the Clerk to publish the laws and treaties 
therefore ceased, and he was no longer required to act ; 
therefore the injunction laid upon a court or a judge, an 
officer of court or an executh·e officer of the United States, 
by section 3823 (contingent upon the action of the Clerk) also 
ceased. Thus the sections 3823, 3824, and 3825 were re-
pealed. 
The act of June 20, 1878 (20 Stat., 216), fixes the rates of 
all advertisements by the several Departments of the Govern-
ment. It affected section 853, as it (lirected "That hereafter 
all advertisements, notices, proposals for contracts, and all 
forms of a<lverthing required by law for the several De-
partments of the Government may be paid for at a price not 
to exceed the coq:unercial rates charged to private indi-
viduals, with the usual discounts; such rates to be ascer-
tained from sworn statements to be furnished by the pro-
prietors or publishers of the newspapers proposing so to ad-
vertise: Provided, That all advertising in newspapers since 
the lOth day of April, 1877, should be audited and paid at 
like rates; but the heads of the several Departments may 
secure lower terms at special rates whenever the public inter-
est requires it." 
The section covers advertisements that are executed by 
the marshals, who are executive officers, under the charge of 
and subject to the general supervision of the Department of 
Justice. 
It is thus an expense in contemplation of law for the De-
partment in that the costs of the advertising are paid out of 
funds distributed for the use of the United States Courts 
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under the general supervision of the Department of Justice. 
There seems to be, therefore, no printers' fees contemplated 
by section 853, that are not incurred for and paid by an Ex-
ecutive Department. 
The facts that the courts direct the advertisements makes 
them none the less "an advertising required by law for the 
Department." 
Section 853 is therefore superseded by the act of June 20, 
1878, so far as the advertisements referred to in your letter 
are concerned. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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Lands entered and patented to Indians under the provisions of the act 
of March 3, 1875, chapter 131, before the act of July 4, 1884, chapter 
180, became a law, are exempt from taxation for a period of :five years 
from the date of the patent issued therefor. 
The said act of July 4, 1884, is supplementary to the said act o+" March 
3, 1875, and its provisions apply to all entrie1:1 under the latter. act for 
whiuh patents had not issued when the former act took effect. Under 
the act of 11:!84 the lands entered are exempt from taxation for a. 
period of twenty-five years from the date of the patent. 
Under the act of January 18, 1881, chapter 2:~, for the benefit of the Win-
nebago Indians, the land entered is expressly exempt from taxation 
for twenty years. 
Lands allotted to Indians under the provisions of the act of February 8, 
1887, chapter 119, are exempt from taxation for tweuty-.five years. ,. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 27, 1888. 
SIR: An opinion is asked by you on the question," Whether 
lands entered by or allotted to Indians under the provisions 
of section 15 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 420), of 
~ection 5 of the act of January 18, 1881 (21 Stat., 315), of 
section 1 of the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat .• 96), and of sec-
tion 4 of the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), are sub-
ject to taxation during the period in which said Jandsare held 
in trust by the United States for the sole use and benefit of 
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the Indians · by whom such entries or to whom such allot-
ments shall have been made." 
The act of 3d March, 1875, chapter 131 (18 Stat., 4~0), 
enacts (section 15) that any Indian born in the United Slates 
and tlle head of a family or who has arrived at the · age of 
twenty-one, and has abandoned or may hereafter abandou 
his tribal relations, shall, on making satisfactory proof of 
such abandonment, under rules to be prescribed by the Sec-
retary of the Interior, be entitled to make a homestead entry 
of public land under the general law, subject, however, to 
the following proviso: 
"Provided, however, That the title to lands acquired by 
any Indian by virtue hereof shall not be subject to alienation 
or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or the judg-
ment, decree, or order of any court, and shall be and remain 
inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the 
pat~nt issued tllerefor." , 
The act of 1Stb January, 18'H (21 Stat., 315), after reciting 
that a large number of the Winnebago Indians, of Wisconsin., 
have selected and settled in good faith upon homestead 
claims nuder section 15 of the act of 3d March, 1875 (s~tpra), 
and have abandoned their tribal relations, and after provid-
ing among other things for cases in which certain of the 
s~id Indians are prevented hy po,erty from obtaining the 
benefit of the said act of 3d ."March, 1875 (supra). enacts (sec-
tion 5) : · 
"That the titles acquired by said Winnebagoes of Wiscon-
sin, in and to the lands heretofore or hereafter entered by 
them under the provisions of said act of March third. eight-
een hundred and seventy-five, shall not be subject to aliena-
tion or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance or by 
the judgment, decree: or ortler of any court, or subject to 
taxation of any character, but shall be and remain inalien-
able and not subject to taxation for the period of twent~­
years from the d<tte of the patent issued therefor. And 
this section shall be inserted in Aach and every patent 
issued under the provisions of said act or of this act." 
By the act 4th July, 1884 (23 Stat., 96), it is provided (sec-
tion 1) : 
" That such Indians as may now be located on public lands, 
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or as· may, under the direction of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, or otilerwise, hereafter so locate, may avail themselves 
of the provisions of the homestead laws as fully and to the 
same extent as may now be done b;v citizens of the United 
States; and to aid such Indians iu making selections of home-
steads and the necessary proofs at the proper land offices, 
one thousand dollarR, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 
is hereby appropriated; but no fees or commi~sions shall be 
charged on account of said entries or proofs. All patents 
therefor shall be of the legal effect, and declare that• the 
United States does and will hold the land thus entered for 
the period of twenty-fiye years, in trust for tile sole use and 
benefit of the Indian by whom such entry shall have been 
made, or, in case of his decease, of his widow and heirs ac-
cording to the laws of the State or Territory where such land 
is located, and that at the expiration of said period the United 
States will convey tile same b~ patent to said Indian, or his 
widow and heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust 
and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever." 
The act of 8th February, 1887 (~4 Stat., 383), authorizes the 
President to ~Hot to Indians in severalty lands in any reserva-
tion on which their tribe or baud may be settled, and in certain 
other cases to make allotments to Indians out of lands of the 
United States, and proYides (section 5) : 
''That, upon the approval of the allotments provided for 
in this act by tile Secretary of the Interior, he shalt cause 
patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, whiCh 
patents shall be of the legal effect, atJd declare that the 
United States does and will hold the laud thus allotted, for 
tile period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and 
benefit of the Indian to whom such allottment shall have 
been made, or, in ca~e of his decease, of his heirs according 
to the hnrs of tile State or Territory where such land. is 
located, and that at the expiration of said period the U ni.ted 
States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his 
heirs as aforesaid, in fee~ discharged of said trust and free of 
all charge or incumbrance whatsoever: Provided, That the 
President of the United States may in any case in his discre-
tion extend the period. And if any conveyance shall be 
made of the lands set apart and allotted as herein provided, 
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or any contract made touching the same, before the expira-
tion of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or con-
tract shall be absolutely null and void: Provided, That the 
law of descent and partition in force in the State or Terri-
tory where such lands are situate shall apply thereto after 
patents therefor have been executed and delivered, except 
as herein otherwise provided; and the laws of the State of 
Kansas regulating the descent and partition of real estate 
shall, so far a8 practicable, apply to all lands in the Indian 
Territory which may be allotted in severalty under the pro-
visions of this act." 
Tlie interesting feature 0f this legislation is that it marks 
a new epoch in the history of the Indians, namelY., that in 
which Congress has begun to deal with them as individuals, 
and not only as nations, tribes, or bands, as heretofore. It 
is dismemberment of the tribes and bands, and absorption, 
as citizens, of the individualR composing them by the States 
and Territories containing the lands on which such individ-
uals settle or may be settled, that is the policy of this new 
legislation. 
But Congress has not deemed it safe, in making the Indian 
a freeholder, to give him at once the same coHtrol over the 
land as other freeholders enjoy. The legislation abo\e men-
tioned deprives the Indian settler of the right of conveying 
or encumbering the land, in any way, for a period stated, or 
provides that it shall be held by the United States for a gi,en 
time in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian, and, 
at the expiration of such time, be conveyed to him by 
patent. 
That Congress has power to say that the Indian settler on 
the public lands in a State or Territory shall not be taxed as 
to his land, or that it shall not be aliened or encumbered in 
any way, is, I think, clear; for if the Indians, as communities, 
are under "the paternal superintendence of the Govern-
ment" (6 Wheat., 588), or "in a state of pupilage," looking to 
our Government for protection, relying upon its kindness and 
its power, appealing to it for relief to their wants, and ad-
dressing the President as their great father (5 Peters, 17; 112 
U.S. R., 99; 118 U.S. R., 384), and if the national legislation 
has tended more and more towards the education and civili-
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zation of the Indians and fitting them to be citizens (112 U.S. 
R., 106), it is not easy to comprehend why the guiding and pro-
tecting hand of the Government should be powerless to fol-
low the Indian who bas abandoned his tribe and resolved to 
live in a civilized community. It is true that the Indian who 
gives up his wild life has taken a great step in the direction 
of becoming a citizen, but his situation as a member of a civ-
ilized community exposes him to dangers which call for the 
fostering care and protection of the Government, without 
which the attempt to make him a useful citizen must fail 
necessarily. It is only after a considerable period of proba-
tion that'he can be educated to understand the dignity and 
responsibilities that belollg to citizenship and the ownership 
of property, and it is to protect him, while receiving this 
education, that Cougress has placed the above-mentioned re-
straints upon his property rights. Say the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Elk v. TVilkins (112 U.S. H., 106): "But 
the question whether any Indian tribes, or members thereof, 
have become so far advanced in civilization that they should 
be let out of the state of pupilage and admitted to the privileges 
and responsibilities of citizenship is a question to be decided 
by the nation w bose wanl~ tbey are and whose citizens they 
.seek to become, and not by each Indian for himself." 
It is plain, then, that the Governmust must continue its 
"paternal superintendence" over the individual Indian who 
has become a freeholder in a State or Territory under the 
legislation above mentioned, or it should not be the means of 
introducing into such State or Territory so dangerous an ele-
ment as the Indian must be who is put in the uncontrolled 
possession of property before he has got tbe mastery of the 
improvidence anll instability that charjj.cterize him in his 
wild state. 
Has Uungress signified a purpose to withhold from State or 
Territorial taxation lands held under the above-named stat-
utes~ That is the question submitted for opinion. 
The act of 1875 (supra) declares (section 15) that the In-
dian's title to land entered by him under tbat act ';shall not 
be ::-ubject to alienation or incumbrance, either by voluntary 
conn~yance, or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, 
and shall be and remain inalienable for a period of five years 
from the date of the patent issued therefor." 
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The act •of 188-1 (supra) extends the benefits of the home-
stead laws "to such Indians as may now be located on public 
lands, or as mar, under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior, or otherwise, hereafter so locate." This law re-
quires that t>ach patent issued under it shall rleclare that the 
United States will hold the lands entered for the period of 
twenty-five years in trust for the sole use and benefit of the 
Indian by whom the land was entered, or his widow and heirs 
in case of his decease, and that at the expiration of said pe-
riod the United State will issue a patent to such Indian, or 
his widow and heirs, in fee, "discharged of said trust and free 
of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever." 
I am of opinion that this act of 1884 was intended to be 
supplemental to and somewhat in modification of the act of 
1875, and that its provisions apply to all entries made under 
the act of 1875 for which patents had not issued at the time 
the act of 1884 went into effect. But all lands entered and 
patented under the act of 1875, before the act of 188! became 
a law, are, I think, governed by the former act alone, and 
therefore alienable by the settler and subject to his liabilities 
after a period of five years from the date of the patent, there 
being no provision in the act of 1884 for recalling patents 
already issued under the act of 1875 and replacing them by 
others drawn in conformity to the act of 1884. 
That tlle act of 1884 was intended to be supplemental to 
the act of 1875, and cover the same cases as that act, is 
further shown by its general reference merel;)' to the power 
of the Secretary of the Interior under the act of 1875 to lay 
down the rules and regulations under which Indians desiring 
to enter public lands shall make proof of abandonment of 
tlleir tribal relations. 
It would be a great mistake to hold that tlle United States 
is an ordinary trustee of the lands entered uy Indians nuder 
the act of 1875 and 188-i, for it is in its sovereign character 
as the guardian and protector of the Indians, and in t be per-
formance of a high and sacred duty to them, the due execu· 
tion of which is of great importance to the United States, 
that it assumes the relation of trustee; and the trust created 
by the act is nothing less than the means or instrumentality 
employed by the United States for the performance of that 
duty. Now nothing is better settled under the Constitution 
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than that no State or T("rritory has power to lay a tax on a: 
means or instrumentality used by the United States in the 
performance of a duty appertaining to that Government. 
Said Chief-Justice :Marshall in lVeston v. The City of Charles-
ton (2 Peters, 466): "The States have no power lly taxation, or 
otherwiRe, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con-
trol the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by Co ... -
gress to carry into execution the powers vested in the Gen-
eral Government." (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316; 
Osbm·n v. The Ba.nk of the United States, D Wheat, 738. See 
also Railroad v. Peniston, 18 Wall., 38, for a very full discus-
sion of the subject.) 
The case of the United States v. The Nashville, Chattanooga 
and St. Louis Railway Company (118 U.S. R., 120) has a direct 
bearing on the point now in hand. In that case it wa~ held 
that the statute of limitations of Tennessee did not run 
against certain coupons cut from bonds of the defendant 
company during the time such bonds were held by the 
United States as trustee for certain Indians. The court say: 
"The money with which they (the bonds) were bought was 
money received by the United States from the sale of lands 
ceded to them by the Chickasaw Nation of Indians. Those 
lands, the money recei"Ved from their sale, and the securities 
in which that money was invested, were held by the United 
States in trust, to be applied for the benefit of those Indians, 
in the performance of the obligation assumed by the United 
States by treaties with them. The securities were thus held 
by the United States for a public use in the highest sense, 
the performance of~ quasi international obligation, and they 
continued to be so held until that obligation had been per-
formed and discharged, after which they '"ere held by the 
United States, like all other property of the Government, for 
the ordinary public uses." (Page 126.) 
It is impossible to distinguish that case, in principle, from 
the one in hand, or to escape the conclusion that the course 
of reasoning that shows tha.t the coupons were not affected 
by the State statute of limitations must necessarily lead to 
the exemption of the lands in question from State or Terri-
torial taxation. 
But, aside from this view, the words of the act of 1875 are 
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sufficient to exempt the lancls in question from taxation. It 
is true the term taxation is not used, but it would seem to 
be embraced necessarily by the declaration that the lands 
"shall not he subject to alienation or incumbrance," follow-
ing which, to be sure, are the words, ''either by 'loluntary 
conveyance, or the judgment, decree, or order of any court, 
and shall be and remain inalit•nable for a period of fise years 
from the date of the patent issued therefor;" which words, it 
is easy t() see, were used by way of illustration or example 
merely, and not to narrow tbe sense of the preceding general 
terms "alienation" and "incumbrance;" just as the old 
English statute declaring that a ship should not be deemed 
a wreck if "a man, a dog, or a cat" escaped alive, as to 
which words Lord Coke says, "for, besides these two kinds 
of beasts, fowls, birds, hawks, and other living things are 
understood, whereby the ownership or property of the goods 
may be known." 
The intention of the act of 1875 being to provide a way for 
starting the Indian to live in a civilized way and educate 
him to be a good citizen, it would be a Ntrange thing, indeed, 
to find that Congress had made its plan for that purpose 
dependent on the Indian's ability and disposition to pay the 
taxes assessecl on his land. It is unnecessary to argue that 
such an interpretation would defeat the manifest intention 
of Congress, and involve the inconsistency of treating the 
Indian as helpless and dependent, and at the same time as 
able to take care of himself. 
We pass now to tbe act of l881 (supra), for the benefit of 
the Winnebago Indians. This statute contains, in addition 
to the provision of the act of 187 5 against alienating and en-
cumbering, the express declaration that the lands entered 
''shall not be subject to taxation of any character" for 
twenty years, thereby removing the question of immunity 
from taxation beyond the domain of argument. Congress 
l1as seen fit in this act not to leave to construction the ex-
emption of the lands from taxation, but its explicit declara-
tion in that respect in this subsequent law does not, it may 
be observed, impair, in my opinion, the argument above 
urged in favor of exemption from taxation under the act of 
1875. 
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I am also of opinion that the allotment lands provided for 
in the act of 1887 are exempt from State or Territorial taxa-
tion upon the ground above stated with reference to the 
act of 1884, namely, that the lands covered by the act are 
held by .the United States for the period of twenty-five years 
in trust for the Indians, such trust being an agency for the 
exercise of a Federal power, and therefore outside the prov-
ince of State or Territorial authority. 
This dispm;es of the questions presented for my consid-
eration. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney General. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
PASSED ASSISTANT SURGEONS IN THE NAVY. 
In the organization of the Medical Corps of the Navy a passer1 assistant 
surgeon and an assistant surgeon are officers of one and the same 
grade, but belong to different classes in such grade. 
A passed assistant surgeon is simply an assistant surgeon who has been 
officially notifiell that he has passed successfully the examination nec-
essary to be undergone before he can be appointed a full surgeon 
when a vacancy occurs. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 31, 1888. 
SIR: I have considered the questions presented by your 
communication of the 26th June ultimo, namely, wht.Jther 
passed assistant surgeons represent "a separate and dis-
tinct grade," whether the incumbent of the office of passed 
assistant surgeon must be appointed and comrpissioned by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and whether there must be a further examination of passed 
assistant surgeons before promotion to the grade of sur-
geon." As the last two are necessarily involved in the first, 
it is only necessary to determine whether there exists in the 
naval organization the grade of passed assistant surgeon. 
Section 1368, Revised Statutes, provides that "The active 
list of the Medical Corps of the Navy shall consist of fifteen 
Passed !sshtan t Surgeoustu the Navy. 
medical directors, fifteen medical inspectors, fifty surgeons,. 
and one hundred assistant surgeons." 
Thi~. section was supplanted by a provision in the act of 
5th August, 1882 (22 Stat., 285), which is in these words~ 
"That the active list of the Medical Corps of the Navy shall 
hereafter consist of fifteen medical directors, fifty surgeons, 
and ninety assistant and passed assistant surgeons." 
We will first consider the law with regard to passed as-
sistant surgeons as it stood before the act of 5th August, 
1882 (supra), was passed, and then consider the effect of 
that law. 
In tht~ chapter of the Revised Statutes which provides for 
the organization of the Navy no mention is made of passed 
assistant surgeons except to declare (section 1375) that a 
surgeon, assistant surgeon, or passed assistant surgeon maY, 
be detailed as assistant to the Bureau of Medicine anll Sur-
gery, which. although not by any means conclusive, goes far 
to show, in tue absence of a clear manifestation of a contrary 
purpose in SOllie other chapter, that Congress did not intend 
to establish any such grade, but that, as under the law in 
force at the time of the revision, there should be under the 
grade of assistant surgeon two class€s, namely, assistant sur-
geons and passed assistant surgeons; and accordingly we 
find, passing from the chapter on organization to that on rank 
and precedence, that in dealing with the subject of relative 
rank passed assistant surgeons are declared entitled to the 
relative rank of lieutenant or master, while assistant sur-
geons are entitled to the relative rank of master or ensign 
(sec. 1474, Rev. Stat.); and passing to the chapter on pay, 
emoluments, anc.l allowances, we see that a higher rate of 
compensation is given passHl assistant surgeons than assist-
ant surgeons (sec. 1556, Rev. Stat.), thus recognizing, it 
would seem, two classes under the simple grade of assistant 
surgeon. 
Looking now for guidance in analogous legislation, we find 
that in the chapter on the organization of the Navy special 
provision is made for the grade of passed assistant paymas-
ter {sec. 1376), for it is expressly dedared (sec. 1377} that 
"until the number of passed assistant-paymasters shall have 
been reduced below thirty there shall be no promotion to 
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that grade, nor any appointment to the grade of assistant-
paymaster," and section 1380 provides that passed assistant-
paymasters shall be regularly promoted and commissioned from 
assistant paymasters and paymasters from passed a~sistant­
payrnasters, subject to such examinations as may be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Navy." Again, section 1383 
provides that every paymaster shall give a bond in the sum 
of $25,000, every passed assistant paymaster in the sum of 
$15,000, and every assistant paymaster in the sum of 
$10,000. 
In the Corps of Engineers likewise we find (sees. 1390, 
1392, chapter on organization) that Congress bas established 
the grade of assistant engineer and the grade of passed 
assistant engineer in terms equally clear. 
Now, it is natural to look for the same particularity of enact-
ment in the case of passed assistant surgeons, if it had been 
the purpose of Congress in adopting the Revised Statutes 
to make them a distinct grade instead of a mere classifi· 
cation under a grade. But no such legislation is to be found. 
There is uothing in section 1480, Revised Statutes, mili-
tating against the conclusion I have ;eached. The reference 
in that section to "the grades established" in the six preceding 
sections for the staff corps of tlle Navy is the iuentical lan-
guage of the ninth section of the act of .l'.Iarch 3, 1871 (16 
Stat., 536), which refers to the previous sections of that act, 
in which grade and relative rank in the sta1f' department of 
the Na\y are created together ~tno flatu; whereas in the Re-
vised Statutes the two subjects are treated in distinct chapters. 
This effectually disposes of the argument that there was any 
establishing of grades in the sections assigning relative rank; 
the mistake of the reYisers in using the expression "grades 
established'' being too evident to admit of doubt. Besides, 
it would be taking an unwarrantable liberty with the lan-
guage of the law to deduce from the use of the expression 
" grades established," in the regulation of a matter merely 
ceremonious, an intention to make a change in the organiza-
tion of the Medical Corps ot the navy. 
Indeed, the case of passed assistant surgeons, under the 
Revised Statutes, was precisely similar to that of passed 
midshipmen under the old law. That law recognized no such 
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grade as passed midshipman. Midshipman was the grade, 
and passed midshipmen merely a " class." Hence, the act of 
1\iarch 3, 1845, section 4 (5 Stat., 794), declares that" no more 
than one hundred and eighty passed midshipmen, and those 
senior in rank, ~hall at the same time receive tl!e pay fixed by 
law for that class of officer8." But the act of 1806, which was 
still in force when the act of 1845 took effect (2 Stat., 390), 
organizing tl!e Na,Ty, declared "that the officers shall not 
exceed. the following numbers and grades; that is to say, thir-
teen captains, nine masters-commandant, seventy-two lieuten-
ants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen." • • • 
It may be added, that passed midshipmen received more 
pay than midshipmen, just as passed assistant surgeons are 
entitled to more pay than assistant surgeons. 
It seems very clear, then, that as the law stood at the time 
the act of August 5, 1882 (supra), was passed, there was no 
such grade in the Navy as that of passed assistant surgeon. 
It remains to consider what effect the act of 1882 had on 
the legislation preceding it. 
As we have seen, that act provides, "That the active list 
of the Medical Corps of the Navy shall hereafter coTlsist of fif-
teen medical directorA, fifteen medical inspectors, fifty sur-
geons, and ninety as~dstant and passed assistant surgeons." 
In this provision-that is, to the extent of its relevancy to 
the subject in hand-I see nothing more than an intention to 
cut down the number of assistant and passed assistant sur-
geons. And to deduce any thing more, especially any thing 
so radical as a change in the organization of the Medical 
Corps, by establishing a new grade, would be, in my opinion, 
to take an unwarrantable liberty with the language of the 
statute. 
The view we have taken derives no little support from the 
fact that in the analogous legislation with reference to assist-
ant paymasters and engineers the number of each is defined 
by law (sees. 1376, 1390, Rev. Stat.), whereas there is no such 
regulation touching assistant and passed assh;tant surgeons, 
further than the declaration that the two together shall not 
make a greater number than ninety. And it may be added, 
as a fact authentically made known to me, that under the 
practice of the Navy Department the death, resignation, or 
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promotion of a passed assistant surgeon ILakes no . vacancy 
of itself alone calling for the promotion of an assistant sur-
geon. A passed assistant surgeon is simply an assistant sur: 
geon who has been officially notified that be bas passed suc-
cessfully the examination necessary to be undergone before 
he can be appointed a full surgeon when a vacancy occurs. 
This reasoning is strongly confirmed by the Supreme Court 
in United States'· Jfoore (95 U. t:\. R., 760), where it was held 
that a nomination by the President and confirmation by the 
Senate were not necessary to make a passed assistant sur-
geon out of an assistant surgeon, a position that could not have 
been taken if there had been such a grade as passed assist-
ant surgeon. 
I am happy to know that the conclusion I ba, .. e reached is 
in harmony with the interpretation and practice of the Navy 
Department. 
I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
G. A. JENKS, 
.Acting .Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
SEIZURE OF CATTLE IN INDIAN 'fERRITORY. 
In the case of a seizure of cattle in Indian Territory, alleged to be in viola-
tion otthe treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United States: 
Advised that the complainant should seek redress not by application 
to the executive, bnt to the jndicial department of the Government, 
the courts of the United States for the western district of Arkansas 
having full jurisdiction of the subject-matter. 
DEP AR'fMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.August l, 1888. 
SIR: I have considered your communication of the 5th 
July, 1888, asking my opinion as to the vali,lity of certain 
legislation of the Cherokee national council in connection 
with the complaint of 0. M. McClennan, who claims that 
the legislation in question is null anrl \Oid, and that the 
seizure of his cattle by virtue thereof is in violation of the 
treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United States, 
and oft~e Constitution of the United States, and asks the 
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action of the executive department for the purpose of se-
curing redress from the Cherokee Nation. 
The question propounded is esRentially judical, in view of 
the fact that the courts of the United States for the west-
ern district of Arkansas have full jurisdiction of the sub-
iect-matter by virtue of the thirteenth article of the treaty 
of the 19th July, 1866, between the United States and Che· 
rokee Nation of Indians (Rev. Ind. Tr., 91) empowering t.he 
United States to establish a court or courts in the territory 
of the said nation; and of article 12 (paragraph 3) of the 
same treaty (ib., 91), providing that the council of said nation 
shall enact no law inconsistent with the Coustitn tion of the 
United States or Jaws "of Congress authorizing treaty stipu-
lations with the United States;" and of section 533 Hevised 
Statutes, which includes within the western judicial district 
of the United States for the State of Arkansas "the coun-
try lying west of :Missouri and Arkansas known as the Indian 
Territory;" and of section 563 Revised Statutes, paragraph 12, 
which gives the United States district courts jurisdiction of 
"all suits at law or equity authorized by law to be brought by 
any person to redress the deprivation * * * of any right, 
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the 
United States, or of any right secured l>y any law of the 
United States to persons within the jurisdiction thereof;" 
aud of section 629 Revised Statutes, paragraph 16, investing 
the circuit courts of the United States with a jurisdiction 
similar to that conferred on the district courts l>y section 
563 Revised Statutes; and of sectiou1977, Revised Statutes, 
securiug to persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States the same benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, etc. 
If Mr. McClennan has been deprived of any right secured 
to him by the Constitution, by the laws, or by the treaties of 
the United States, he should in\oke the judicial power of the 
Government, which is aruple for his purpose. 
The mistake of Mr. McClennan in applying to the execu-
tive branch of the Government is in supposing that the 
United States stand towards the Oherokee Nation as 
towards an independent power; but such is not the case. 
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The Cherokee Nation has by its own agreement, as we have 
seen, come under the jurisdiction of the United States 
courts, and to the extent in which it bas done so redress 
must be sought through those courts against members of the 
nation who have violated the rights of others. 
I have tbe honor to return the papers that accompanied 
your communication of the 5th July, as requested. 
I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
G . .A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
BOND OF DISBURSING OFFICER IN THE NAVY. 
The Secretary of the Navy has power, under section 1383, Revised Stat-
utes, to approve a pay-officer's bond in which the sureties are corpora-
tions, or a corporation joined with a natural person, if he deems such 
sureties sufficient. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 2, 1888. 
SIR: Your communication of the 26th July submits for 
opinion whether the Secretary of the Navy has power to ap-
prove a pa,y.officer's bond in which the sureties are corpora-
tions created by State authority, or in which one or more such 
corporations may be joined as surety or sureties with a nat-
ural person. 
Section 1383, Revised Statutes, requires that a pay-officer 
''shall, before entering- on the duties of his office, give bond, 
with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the 
Secretary of the Navy, for the faithful performance thereof." 
I see no reason why you should not appro,-e a pay.officer's 
oond having corporations solely, or in com oination with nat-
ural persons, as sureties. 
The question of the surety's sufficiency is, ullder the law, 
for you alone to determine, and where a corporation is tend· 
ereu as surety, that question involves the further question 
for your determination whether such corporation has the 
power under its charter to enter into the obligation. 
It is the sufficiency of the sureties that the law looks to, 
and it does not conoern itself any further. To say that it re-
quires also that the surety shall be a ~tural person is to re-
fuse the aDgoage of Congress its ordinary meaning, ther& 
being nothing to justify the conclusion that Congress intended 
tbe word " sureties " to be taken in a narrower sense. 
I do not see that the question presented is affected by the 
.fact that a bill has been introduced in Congress authorizing 
the Secretary of War to accept f' the bond of an incorporated 
guaranty company for the fa,ithfol discharge of the duties of 
any disbursing officer of the Army." 
·I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acti'ltg Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OP THE NAVY. 
EFFECTS OF A. DECEDEN'l' ON NAVAL RESE:aVATION. 
Where a resident on the navai reservation at Pensacola, Fla., 4.ied intes-
tate,~ of certain property, which is in the hands of ~he com-
mandant of the yard : .ddmaed that the local pre bate coort of \)le State 
may properly exerejJe juriscJiction ove~: the case, and that on the ap-
pointment 1;)1.4)~ of an admiD1strator or the estate of tbe deceased 
the property in the banda of the commandant belonging to such elftate 
· shoUld be turned over to the administrator. 
DEP A..RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 4, 1888. 
Sm: Your letter of the 1st instant presents the following 
case: One John L. Ahearn, late a resident en the naval res-
ervation at Pensacola, Fla., died. intestate, in the year 1885, 
po888ssed of certain pro_verty, consisting of two trc~~me houses 
on the rt.servation, a t5o6 Government bond, now in the cus-
tody of Mr. 0. McK. Oertnng, a. resident of Pensacola, and 
also some interest coupons and 11 small amount of cash, now . 
in the official safe at tho yard.· The deceased was not at the 
time of his death an employe of the Government. Hereupon 
a qoestion has arisen as to the proper disposition of his 
effects, and you ask advice on this subject, in order that the 
commandant of the yard, who has control of the reservation, 
may be instructed con~rning his duty in the premises. 
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Upon consideration I think the case is one over which the 
local probate court of the State may properly exercise juris-
diction, and that such jurisdiction should be invoked for the 
appointment of a curator or administrator of the estate of the 
deceased under the State law. On such appointment being · 
rnaue, the curator or administrator would be entitled to the 
custody of the property in the hands of Oertung belonging 
to the estate, and that in the hands of the commandant of 
the yard could lawfully be placed in the same custody. It is 
not to be doubted that the rights of all who may be inter-
ested in the estate will be fully protected by the local court. 
I r~turn herewith the papers which accompanied your 
letter. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
SETTLE:\IENT OF ACCOUN7'S. 
The Secretary of the Treasury can not legally, by departmental order, 
change a practice or course of office prescribed by statute for the set-
tlement of accounts. 
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
A ug'u,st 4, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 12th ultimo has been received, iu 
which you ask whether or not under existing practice the 
accounts of the officers of courts, United States attorneys, 
etc., can be settled through one bureau of the Treasury De-
partment or not, and ''whether the Secretary of the TreasuQ? 
has authority under the statutes, by departmental order or 
regulations, to change the existing practice in this Depart-
ment with regard to the settlement of certain accounts." 
The First Auditor of the Treasury details the existing prac-
tice and recommends a change. 
The Commissioner of Customs finds that there is a serious 
difficulty in the course suggested by the First Auditor, and is 
of the opinion that such a course can not be adopted with-
out further legislation. 
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The accounts of the ·officers m~ntioned, it is suggested by 
the Commissioner of Customs, must, under sections 269,3 7, 
and 377, Revised Statutes, be settled by the First Auditor, 
the First Comptroller, and the Commissioner of Customs. To 
· these statates may be added the act of February 22, 1875, 
section 1 of which directs that the original accounts and 
vouchers of the officers m ·ntioned, when approved by the 
court, shall be forwarded by the clerk of the court "to the 
proper accounting officers of the Treasury." This section, 
with those cited by the Comrnisl.'\ioner of Customs, points out 
the legal way of auditing and adjusting the accounts. 
The First Auditor says that the change proposed "can 
mostly be reached by departmental action." 
A change of statute can not be made by any departmental 
regulation. 
However "illogical" the practice under the laws may be, 
the laws authorize and enjoin such practice, and a deviation 
from a practice thus established can not be justified under 
the decisions of theo Supreme Court of the United States 
(12Wheat.,206,210; 15 Peters 141, 145; 8 Wall.,335; 23 Wall., 
374, 382; 95 U.S. R., 76P, 763; 99 U.S. R., ~65, 269; 107 U.S. 
R., 402, 406; 111 U. S. R., 471, 465; 113 U. · S. R., 568), which 
sustain the doctrine that a contemporaneous and uniform in-
terpretation by executive officers, charged with the duty of 
acting under a statute, is entitled to great weight, and ought 
1wt to be overturned-particularly applicable in cases tbat 
have been settled by construction, by precedent, by continu-
ous pfactice, and tbP. decisions of the court .. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that so far as the contem-
plated changes are inconsistent with existing law, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury can not legally by departmental order 
change a practice or a course prescribed by statute. 
7 ery respectfully, ' 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SEOR11TARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CHOCTAW CITIZENSHIP. 
Claim of James Bragg to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation of Indians 
reconsidered; and advised that upon the record of the case as now made 
up he is entitled to such citi7:enship. Opinion of March 1, 1888 (ante, 
p. 110) cited. 
DEPARTIYIEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
August 31, 1888. 
SIR: Yours of the lOth instant, with inclosures, received. 
You again submit the papers in the clai:rp of James Bragg to 
citizenship in the Choctaw Nation of Indians, "with the ~rig­
inal petitions of di,Torce of both Bragg and his wife," with 
the indorsements thereon, and request an opinion upon the 
question, ''ls James Bragg entitled to Ohoctaw citizenship 
on the record as now made up~" 
The Attorney-General, in an opinion dated March 1, 1888, 
says upon the question now resubmitted: 
"The record in the divorce case is not before me. Whether 
it shall be conclush·e as evidence or not must be deter-
mined from the record. If the proceedings in the divorce 
are regular, the allegations are sufficient and the decree final; 
the granting of the divorce to the wife establishes that she 
had just cause for separation from her husband." * * * 
The petitions in the divorce case now transmitted mate-
rially change the status of James Bragg and Ellen Bragg as 
to the facts. 
There is now placed before the Attorney-General what pur-
ports to be the record in the divorce case for the purpose of 
supplying the omission adverted to in the former opinion. 
The additional transmittals consist of (1) the petition of 
Ellen Bragg, filed with the circuit clerk of Tobucksy County, 
in the first judicial district of the Choctaw Nation, on the 
7th clay of December, 1876, in which she asks a divorce from 
James Bragg for alleged non-support. An indorsement on 
back of petition shows that the case was dismissed with the 
consent of plaintiff's attorney on the 5th day of December, 
1877, without notice having been given to the defendant of 
the pendency of the suit. (2) A petition of James Bragg, 
filed in the same court on the 5th day of December, 1877, 
in which he prays for a divorce from Ellen Bragg for the 
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alleged reason that she had m-arried one Dick Nail and had 
lived with him as his wife. The record does not disclose that 
the defendant was ever served with a summons to appear and 
an8-wer the allegations of the petition, and so far as the rec-
ord shows no appearance or answer was ever made by the 
defendant. There is an indorsement on the back of the peti-
tion as follows: "Granted this 5th day of December, 1877." 
The petitions and indorsements are certified by the clerk 
of the court as true copies. This is a statement, in substance, 
of all there is of the record in the divorce case as now sub-
mitted. This record does not, in my opinion, furnish suffi-
cient evidence under the rule announced by the Attorney-· 
General in his former opinion in this case to establish the 
fact that James and Ellen Bragg have been divorced at a 
proper hearing and by a final decree of a court having juris-
diction of the parties. 
The law of the Choctaw Nation requires something more 
than an unsigned endorsement on the back of a petition to 
divorce man and wife. 
In the laws of the Choctaw Nlttion, printed at Doaksville, 
in 1882 (page 28), will be found an act approved October, 1840, 
which provides the manner in which the records of trials in 
the district courts shall be kept. No such record has been 
furnished as evidence among the papers submitted. The law 
reads as follows: 
AN AcT.-Clerks and judges to keep record of the courts. 
"SEc. 5. Be it enacted, etc. That from and after the passage 
of this act each clerk of the several districts shall be furnished 
with a large blank book out of the district funds, to keep a 
correct record of all the proceedings of the several courts i u 
his own district. 
''And be it further enacted, That the judges in the several 
districts of each court shall furnish the district clerk in .their 
respective districts with a full copy of all trials under his 
jurisdiction, with his name signed to it, which bill shall be 
filed and put on record. 
"Approved October, 1840." 
There may be deduced from the record as now submitted 
the following conclusions: 
First. If there is a legal record of the proceedings upon the 
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petition of James Bragg, and there is included therein a final 
decree of divorce, and the finding of the court was based upon 
the allegations of the petition, in which just provocation is 
sufficientl.r averred, then James Bragg is entitled to Choctaw 
citizenship. 
Second. If James Bragg has not been legally divorced from 
his Indian wife, Ellen Bragg, and in my opinion the record 
a.dduced is not sufficient to establish such final and legal de-
cree, then he remains the husband of Ellen, and by reason 
thereof he is entitled to Choctaw citizenship. 
Upon the record as now made up I am of the opinion that 
vour question must be answered in the a.ffirmatiV"e. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY UF THE INTERIOR. 
CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY OF BONDSMEN. 
There is no law requiring a United States judge or a United Stat~s 
attorney to certify as to the sufficiency of guarantors or bond~men 
offered in connection with proposals and contracts with the Navy 
Departme.nt, and no fees are chargeable against the Government for 
such service. 
fhe expense of obtaining a certificate from the office must be borne by 
the bidder or contractor as other expenses are incurred by him in "the 
proper execution of the papers. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Septernber 7, 1888. 
SIR: Yours of the 3d instant has been received. You 
request information concerning a custom in your Department 
requiring the sufficiency of guarantors and bondsmen, offered 
in connection with proposals and contracts to and with the 
United States, to be certified by the United States judge or 
United States attorney of the district in which the parties 
reside; and whether under existing law a fee may be required 
for performing the service described, and if so, what amount · 
may be demanded by the officer rendering the services. 
In reply, I have to say that I fail to find any law that 
imposes the duty upon either the United States judge or 
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United 8tates attorney to perform the service, and this being 
so there is no fee prescribed by law. If a United States 
judge or United States attorney performs the service the 
same is an unofficial act and carries with it no official obli-
gation or responsibility. No doubt this is the view taken by 
the United States attorney when he charged for his services. 
If, therefore, these certificates are required by your Depart-
ment for its protection in relation to proposals and contracts~ · 
t.he compensation for making the same is a matter to be 
settled between the contractor and the officer, and the expense 
must fall upon the bidder or contractor in the same way that; 
other expenses are incurred by him in the proper execution 
of the papers. 
The amount of the fee must be determined by contract made 
between the United States attorney and the co,utractor, or, in 
the absence of a contract, by the extent and value of the 
services rendered in the necessary searches and examination. 
Very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRET~.RY OF THE NAVY. 
VESSELS OF COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY. 
The ·shipping commissioners act of June 7, 1872, chapter 322 (Title 53) 
Merchant Seamen, Revised Statutes), has no application to seamen em-
ployed on vessels engaged in the Hervice of the Coast a,nd Geodetic 
Survey. 
DEP.A.RT:i.\-1EN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
September 13, 1888 . 
• SIR: I may answer all the questions submitted for opinion 
in your communication of 15th .August, 1888, by saying that I 
am satisfied that the shipping commissioners act of 7th June, 
187~ (17 Stat., ~6~), now embraced by Title 53, :;\fercbant Sea-
men, Revised Statutes, has no application whatever to sea-
men employed on vessels engageu in the service of the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey. The act in question is expressly lim-
ited ~o the Merchant Marine of the United States. 
It would seem to have been the intention of Congress that 
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the seamen employed on vessels in the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey should be taken from the regularly enlisted seamen 
of the :Navs, and section 4685, Revised Statutes, which au-
thorized the President in executing the provisions of law, 
under the title Coast Survey, ''to employ all persons in the 
land or naval service of the United States." S~aruen employed 
under this section would, of course, be governed by the ar-
ticles for the government of the Navy of the United States 
(Rev. Stat., 1624) just as if serving on a vessel of war. 
It was in entire harmony with the plan requiring officers 
of the Army and Navy and vessels of the United States to be 
employed in prosecuting the work of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey (Rev. Stat., 4684) for Congress to direct that sea-
men of the Navy should also be employed in that service. 
This, I apprehend, disposes of all the questions submitted. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
TIMBER DEPREDATIONS ON INDIAN LANDS. 
The cutting or destroying of timber on lands which have been patented 
to individual Indians is not an offense punishable under the act of 
June 4, 1888, chapter 340, amendatory of section 5:~88, Revised Statutes. 
DEp ARTI\-IENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 21, 1888. 
SIR: Your communication of the 2d August, 1888, asking 
an opinion as to whether the act of Cougress en titled ''Au act 
to amend section fifty-three hundred and eighty-eight of the 
Revised Statutes of the Unite<1 States in relation to timber 
depredations," approved 4th June, 1888, applies to lands for 
which individual Indians have received patents under treaties 
between the tribes to which they belonged, when the treaties 
were respectively made, and the United States. 
As the questions bmitted has reference to lands in Wash-
ington Territory held by Indians under patents from the 
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United States, I shall confine myself to those lands and the 
law regulating the tenure thereof. 
The act of Congress upon which the question submitter 
arises provides: 
"That section fifty-three hundred and eighty-eight of the 
Revised Statute~ of the United States be amended so as to 
read as follows: 'Every person who unlawfully cuts, or aids 
or is employed in unlawfully cutting, or wantonly destroys or 
procures to be wantonly destroyed, any timber standing upon 
the land of the United States which, in pursuance of law, 
may be reserved or purchased for military or other purposes, 
or upon any Indian reservation, or lands belonging to or 
occupied by' any tribe of Indians under authority of the 
United States, shall pay a fine of not more than five hundred 
dollars or be imprisoned not more than twelve months, or 
both, in the discretion of the court."' 
The lettff of the Acting Commissioner of. Indian Affairs, 
which accompanied your communication, states that the 
timber lands in -que~tion are held in severalty by Indiane 
under patents from the United States. 
These patents were issued under the treaties referred to 
and quoted in presenting the question submitted for my con-
sideration. 
The effect of this action under these treaties and of the act 
of Congress of the 8th February, 1887 (24: Stat., 3DO), entitled 
"An act to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty on 
the various reservations, and to extend the protection of the 
laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, 
and for other purposes," was no doubt to sunder the tribal 
relations of the Indian allottees and place them under the pro-
tection of State or Territorial law, as the case might be, 
ancl, where the allottee was born within the territorial limits 
of the United States, make him a citizen of the United States. 
Of this there can be no room tor controversy. under the act 
of 8th February, 1887, to say nothing of the treaties already 
mentioned, with which the statute hdargely concurrent. The 
sixth section of the act provides as follows: 
"That upon the completion of said allotments and the pat-
enting of the lands to said allottees, each and every member 
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of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom allot· 
ments have been made shall have the benefit of and be sub-
ject to the laws, both ci\il and criminal, of the State or Ter-
ritory in which they may reside, and no Territory shall pass 
or enforce any law denying any such Indian within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the law. And every Indian 
born within the territorial limits of the United States to 
whom a1lotments shall have been made under the provisions 
of this act, or under any law or treaty, and every Indian born 
within the terrHoriallimits of the United States who has vol-
untarily taken up within said limits his residence separate 
and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and bas adopted 
the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen 
of the United Statet:, and is entitled to all the rights, privi-
leges, and immunities of such citizen, whether said Indian bas 
been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of 
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States, 
without in any manner impairing or otherwise afl'ecting the 
rights of any such Indian to tribal or other property." 
Inasmuch, then, as lands held as above, by Indian allottees, 
ean not be called, properly, Indian reservations, a term which 
Congress has clearly used to indicate those tracts or bodies 
of land set apart from the public domain for the occupation 
of Indian communities at the pleasure of the United States, 
but witlwut any purpose to invest the occupants with more 
than a right of possession, and inasmuch as the lands cov-
-ered by the statute are not " lands belonging to or occupied 
byanytribe of Indians under authority of the United States," 
the cutting or destroying of timber on land which is thus held 
in severalty by one who is clothed with the right of citizen-
ship and protected by and subjected to all the laws, civil and 
criminal, of the Territory in which the land lies, is not an 
offense punishable under the act of Congress of the 4th of 
Juue, 1888. 
I am, yours, respectfully, 
G. A. JENKR, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRE'£.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR • . 
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TRANSFER OF CO~TRACT. 
A manufacturing company, after having entered into a contract with the 
Navy Department to deliver a large quantity of steel castings to be 
used in the construction of an armored cruiser, proposed to transfer 
the contract to another manufacturing company, which contemplated 
fulfilling the covenants of the former company with tbe Government, 
aud asked the approval of such transfer by the Secretary of tbe Navy: 
..4.dvised that, in view of the prohibition in section 3737, Revised Stat-
utes, the proposed transfer can not lawfully be approved and recog-
nized by the Navy Depart.rnent. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 20, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 17th of October, 1888, you state 
that the Pittsburgh Steel Casting Company, by its contract 
of the 20th of June, 1888, secured by bonds for its perform-
ance, agreed to deliver to the United States about 140 tons 
of steel castings, to be used in the construction of the armored 
cruiser .Maine; that that company asks your approval of a 
proposed assignment or transfer of the contract to the Stand-
ard Steel Casting Company; which last company joins in the 
request, and contemplates fulfilling the covenants of the 
former company with the .Government. You inquire: 
"First. Whether the transfer requested as above stated 
can or can not lawfully be approved and recognized by the 
Department. 
"Secondly. If such transfer ca,n 'lawfully be approved and 
recognized by the Department, may it accept a bond. with 
sufficient sureties, to be furnished by the Standard Steel 
Casting Company, in lieu of the bond heretofore given by the 
Pittsbnrgh StePl Casting Company and which accompanies 
its said contract of June 20, 1888~" 
Section 3737 of the Revised Statutes provides: 
"No contract, Ol' order, or any interest therein, shall be 
transferred by the party to whom such contract or order is 
given to any other party, and any such transfer shall cause 
the annulment of the contract or order transferred so far as 
the United States are concerned. All rights of action, how-
ever, for any breach of such contract by the contracting par-
ties are reserved to the United States." 
• 
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The first clause of this section forbids the transfer of this 
contract. The second clause declares that the effect of the 
transfer, when made in violation of the first clause, shall be 
an annulment of the contract as to all rights and covenants 
''hich are beneficial to the assignor. The third clause re-
serves the rights of action to the United States for any 
breach by the contractor. The general intent of the law is 
to forbid such assignments. In order to make it the interest 
of those who contract with the Government to obey the pro-
hibition, and also to protect the United States against loss 
when assignments are made, it declares that assignors shall 
still remain subject to all obligations entered into and liabili-
ties incurred under the contract, but shall be deprived of all 
legal rights thereunder as against the United States. Thus 
the parties to an assignment may suffer damage, but can de-
rive no benefit from an assignment of a Government contract. 
There is no authority given by the statute, nor to be inferred 
from it, that any officer of the United States can, in advance, 
either approve or recognize any proposed assignment thus 
forbidden. It is true, as stated by Attorney-General Devens, 
the statute ''is intended only for the benefit of the United 
States," but to secure integrity of administration and equal 
justice, rights, and privileges to all is a benefit contemplated 
by it. One of the purposes of tbe law was to secure integrity 
in bidding for contracts, by preventing a bidder or contractor 
from making several bids, one by himself and others by his 
friends and employes, to be afterwards consummated by 
assignme11ts of the contract by them to the real bidder, for 
whom they all acted. Another was to prevent those who 
bid for and obtain contracts for mere speculation, aud who 
have neither the intention nor the ability to perform them, 
from selling the contracts at a profit to bona fide bidders or 
contractors. 
Without further illustration as to the purposes of the law, 
it is sufficient that Congress regarded it as necessary and 
expedient. .And as stated by Justice Matthews in the case 
of St. Pwu,Z Railroad v. United States (112 U.S. R., 737): "The 
transfer, by the same proceeding, of the contract itself, so as 
to entitle the assignee to perform the service and claim the 
compensation stipulated for, is forbidden by Revised Statutes, 
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3737, which provides that 'no contract or order, or any in-
terest therein, shall be transferred by the party to whom 
such contract or order is given to any other party, and ·any 
such transfer shall cause the annulment of the contract ot· 
order transferred so far as the United States are concerned.''' 
The explicit provisions of this statute do not require any 
comment. No explanation could make it plainer. 
Both your inquiries are therefore answered in the negative. 
I am, respectfully, yours, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
ISSUE OF NEW JJAND PATENTS. 
In the case of a voidable entry of public land upon which a patent has 
already issued, where the actiou of the board of equitable adjudication 
is applied for with a view to obtaining the issue of aanew patent by 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office under section 2456, Revised 
Statutes, a surrender of the outstanding patent should accompany the 
application or be made before the entry is acted .upon by the board. 
The outstanding patent, when surrendered, need not be canceled until 
after confirmation of the entry; it is sufficient if the cancellation take 
place previously to the issue of a new patent. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 22, 1888. 
Sm : I have the honor to return herewith a list of fifteen 
private cash entries of public lands made at the Marquette 
land office, in the State of Michigan, which was reterred to 
me by the Secretary ofthe Interior, in a letter dated the 9th 
of November last, for consideration and concurrent action. 
It appears that these entries are voidable, and, having been 
for that reason submitted to the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office for the action of the board of equitable ao-
jndication thereon under the law r-elating to suspended land 
entries, are by him approved and recommended to that board 
for cancellation. It also appears that the same entries had 
all been patented previously to their submission to the Com-
missioner, and that the outstanding patents have not as yet 
been surrendered. And the Secretary in his letter expresses 
the opinion that the entries should not be confirmed by the 
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board, and furthermore that the Commissioner had no author-
ity to lay tllem before it. 
The case here presented is governed by section 2456, Re-
vised Statutes, wllich reads as follows: "Where patents haYe 
already been issued on entries which are confirmed by the 
officers who are constituted the board of adjudication, the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office, upon the cancel-
ling of the outstanding#patent, is authorized to issue a new 
patent on such confirmation to the person who made the 
entry, his heirs, and assigns." 
This provision, which is taken from the second section of 
the act of March 3, 1853, chapter 152, does not in terms re-
quire either the cancellation or the surrender of the outstand-
ing patent before confirmation of the entry by the board, 
though it plainly contemplates not only such confirmation, 
but th~ ~urrender and also the cancellation of such patent 
before the Commissioner is authorized to issue a new patent. 
Under the act of 1853 the outstanding patent was required 
to be surrendered previously to confirmation of the entry by 
the board. This is shown by the provision thereof giving 
authority to confirm, which confers it only upon those officers 
who constitute the board of adjudication "at the time of such 
surrender." But that act did not call for cancellation of 
the patent prior to confirmation of the entry by the board. 
Such cancellation was, indeed, thereby required before the 
Commissioner could issue a new patent on the confirmation 
of the entry by the board, but the confirmation of the entry 
might lawfully take place prior to the cancellation of the 
patent. 
Although the surrender of the outstanding patent in ad-
vance of the action of the board upon the entry is not in 
terms required by section 2456 of the revision, as was the 
case in the act of 1853, yet such a requirement is entirely 
compatible with the language of that section; in view of 
which it may fairly be presumed that the practice established 
by the act of 1853 touching such surrender was not meant 
to be disturbed by the revision. 
It is my opinion that in the case of an entry of the above 
character upon which a patent bas already issued, where the 
action of the board of equitable adjudication is applied for 
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with a Yiew to obtaining the issue of a new one by the Com-
missioner under section 2456, Revised Statutes, a surrender 
of the outstanding patent should accompany the application, 
or -at least occur before the entry is acted upon by the board; 
that such patent, when surrendered, need not be canceled 
until after confirmation of the entry; and that it is sufficient 
if the cancellation thereof be done previously to the issue of 
a new patent by the Commissioner. 
I accordingly concur in he view expressed by the Secre-
tary in so far as it affirms the requirement of the outstanding 
patent before action on the entry by the board, and difl"er 
therefrom only as regards the cancellation of the patent, 
holding that this may take place after such action is had. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ARREARS OF PENSION. 
Where an application for a pension was made by letter, sufficient to iden-
tify the claimant and the claim, and was placed on file as a part 
of the record of the case before July 1, l~t:!O, and the claim was not 
abandoned, but delay in its prosecution satisfactorily accounted for by 
sickness: ..d.d11ised that (the claim beiug subsequently established and 
allowed) such app1ication by letter is sufficient to warrant the grant-
ing of arrears of pension provided for by section 2 of the act of March 
3, 1879, chapter 187. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 23, 1888. 
SIR: I received your letter of the 27th of Septemb_er, 1888, 
in which :you ask-
" Whether an application of a pension claimant made by a 
writtl'n cnmmunication or letter stating his claim, acknowl-
edged and filed as an application by the Pension Office duly 
numbered in its order, should be treated as an application for 
pension under the proviso of the second section of the act 
ofMarch 3,1879, in a case where the declaration, subsequently 
required by the Office according to usual practice, was not 
filed, owing to sickness of the claimant; until after the 1st 
day of July, 1880, but the pension was subsequently duly 
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proved and allowed. Should the apP,licant be accorded the 
arrears of pension provided by law when the application was 
made prior to July 1, 1880 ~" 
The proviso to which you refer (20 Stat., 470) is: "Provided, 
The application for such pension has been or is hereafter filed 
with the Commissioner of Pensions prior to the first day of 
July, eighteen hundred and eighty, otherwise the pension 
shall commence from the date of filing the application ; but 
the limitation herein prescribed shall not apply to claims by 
or in behalf of insane persons and children under sixteen 
years of age." 
An application is the first regular substantial step taken 
by a claimant to obtain a pension. In the administration of 
the pension laws literal adherence to form or the strict plead-
ing of t!Je courts of law is not required. If the claimant is 
identified, the time and place of his service and the injury or 
disease which constitute the ground of his claim are substan- · 
tially set forth, the form is immaterial. Substance and merit 
in the application are controlling. The original application 
may be only sufficient to identif~' the claim and claimant~ and 
will yet be a valid application, for it is subject to amenament 
for defective statements. Section 4718, ReYised S'"atutes, 
which is a re-enactment of the twenty-second secti&o of the 
act of the 3d of March, 1873, clearly contemplates. the pros-
ecution of claims by the claimants themselves, wtthout the 
intervention of attorneys or agents. That section expressly 
refers to ''applications being made by letter." The proviso 
to the act of 1879 doubtless bad in view such applications as 
well as the more formal ones. The same section of the Re-
vised Statutes contemplates that after the ap:tJiications are 
made the necPssary forms and instructions as to proof of the 
claims shall be furnished to the claimants by the Commis-
sioner of Pensions. It makes the distinction between the 
, applications and the necessary evidence or proof to establish 
and obtain the claims. If, then, the letter or written appli-
cation made personally by the claimant is sufficient to iden-
tify the claimant and the claim he makes, and was placed 
upon file as a part of the record in his case before the 1st 
day of July, 1880, and was not abandoned, or if delay in its 
prosecution has been satisfactorily accounted for by sicknesi, 
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as in the case you state, and the case by the subsequent pro-
ceedings was shown to be meritorious and was granted, the 
application by letter is sufficient to warrant the granting of 
arrears provided for by the second section of the act of the 
3d of March, 1879. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT TUNNEL. 
The Secretary of War may extend the time for t be completion of thE! 
work on the ·washington Aqueduct tunnel, under the contract with 
Beckwith & Quackenbush, in case the work is not completed by the 
1st of November, 1888. 
The clause in the act of March 30, 1888, chapter 47, namely, "all of said 
work to be completed by November first, eighteen hundred and eighty. 
eight," is to be understood as directory merely. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
October 25, 1888. 
SIR: Your letter of the 18th instant requ~sts my opinion 
upon the following question : " Whether the Secretary oi 
War can extend the time for the completion of the work on 
the Washington Aqueduct tunnel, under the contract with 
Beckwith & Quackenbush herewith, in view of the clause in 
the urgent deficiency act, approved March 30, 1888, limiting 
the time for the completion of the work to November 1, 1888." 
The clause referred to is in these words: "all of said work 
to be completed by November first, eighteen hundred and 
eighty-eight," and is contained in the following provision of 
said act: 
"To enable the Secretary of War to complete the work of 
increasing the water supply of the city of Washington, under 
the act entitled 'An act to increase the water supply of the 
city of vVashington, and for other purposes,' approved July 
fifteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, namely: For 
completion of lining of tunnel, two hundred and ninety-seven 
thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars; for completing 
shafts, west connection, and for superintendence and engi-
neering, thirty-seven thousand two hundred and fifty dollars; 
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and for general contingencies of the work, twenty thousand 
dollars; in all, three hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars; 
all of said work to be completed by November first, eighteen 
hundred and eighty-eight; said sum to be subject to all the 
provisions and restrictions of the said act of July fifteenth, 
eighteen hundred and eighty-two, and of the act approved 
July fifth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, making appro-
priations for the expenses of the government of the District 
of Columbia, as to its apportionment and settlement between 
the United States and the District of Columbia, and there-
funding thereof. The work above provided for to b~ done 
under the contract heretofore made, or by a reletting, as in 
the discretion of the Secretary of War shall be most promo-
tive of the interest of the Government: Provided, '!'hat no 
contract shall be made at prices greater than the prices al-
lowed under contract under which work has been heretofore 
done on said tunnel." 
It appears that, under the act of July 15, 1882, mentioned 
in the above provision, a contract for the construction of the 
said tunnel was entered into with Messrs. Beckwith & Quack-
enbush on the 29th of October, 1883, to which supplementary 
articles were afterwards made by agreement on the 18th of 
October, 1886, the 5th of December, 1887, and the 8th of May, 
1888, those of the latter date being made under the provision 
aforesaid, which authorizes the work provided for therein to 
be done under the said contract, or by a reletting, as in the 
discretion of the Secretary of War shall be most promotive 
[}f the interest of the Government. 
Upon consideration, I am of the opinion that the clause in 
question was not intended to be a limitation upon the au-
thority of the Secretary of War to contract for the completion 
the W<?rk, or a requirement with which strict compliance is 
mandatory and indispensable in the prosecution of the work 
provided for, but is ritther to be considered as merely direct-
ory to him-" as giving directions which ought to be followed, 
but not so limiting the power in respect tow hich the directions 
are given that it can not effectually be exercised without ob-
serving them." In French v. Edwards (13 Wall., 506), the Su-
preme Court remarks: "There are undoubtedly many statu-
tory requisitions intended for the guide of officers in the conduct 
of business devolved upon them which do not limit their power, 
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or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. 
Such generally are regulations designed to secure order, sys-
tem, and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which 
the rights of parties interested can no~ be injuriously affected. 
Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as man-
datory unless accompanied by negative words importing that 
the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or 
time than that designated." 
In the absence of any negative words in the provision 
above quoted, restraining the Secretary of War from going 
on with the work after the 1st of November, or any expres-
sion therein indicating that it is the intention of Congress 
that the work shall be stopped, if not completed by that 
time, t~ clause referred to may, I think, be properly con-
strued as directory; and viewing it in that light, and having 
regard to the general object intended to be secured by the 
act of July ! 5, 1882, and the statutory provisions supple-
mentary thereto, including those of the act of :March 30, 
1888, it seems to me that the Secretary of War not only has 
power under this legislation to extend the time for the com. 
pletion of the work under the contract referred to, but that 
it is his duty so to do, if in his judgment the public intereste 
will thereby be promoted. 
The papers which accompanied your Jetter are herewith 
returned. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
TIMBER ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS. 
Indians occupying reservations, the title to which is in the United States 
subject to their occupancy, have no right to cut and remove the dead 
and fallen timber thereon for the purpose of sale alone; such timber, 
where not used by the Indians for fuel or for agricultural or other pur-
poses connected with the occupation of the land, being the property 
of the United States. 
DEPARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
Novembm· 20, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 27th of October, 1888, you ask-
" (1) Whether the Indians occupying reservations, the 
title to which is in the United States, have the right, in view 
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of the opipion of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the case of the United States'· George Cook (19 'Vall., 591), 
to cut and sell for their use and benefit the dead and down 
timber which is found to a greater or less extent on many of 
the reservations and which will go to waste if not used f 
"(2) If they have such right, whether it is a common right 
to common property belonging to the tribe or band as a whole 
occupying the respective reservations, or whether it is such 
a right as may be exercised by individual Indians belonging 
on the reservations for their individual benefit~ 
'' (3) If they have the right, and it is a common right only, 
whether the cutting and sale of such dead and down timber 
b.r the Indians can be regulated by the Indian Bureau under 
the directions of this Department so as to secure to the pro-
ceeds arising therefrom the greatest possible benefit for im-
proving their condition and promoting their civilization and 
self-support by the methods pursued in the work." 
In the case of the United States v. Cook (19 Wall., 593), it is 
ruled that the right of the Indians on an Indian reservation is 
one of occupancy only; that that right) of occupancy carries 
with it the right to improve the land by clearing it; that the 
right to clear includes the right to sell or dispose of timber 
on the land cleared, and to use the timber on the reservation 
for purposes necessary for improvement or residence; that 
when cut or severed for sale alone, and not as an incident to 
the occupancy, the right and title to the timber is absolute 
in the United States; that ''what a tenant for life may do 
upon lands of a remainderman, the Indians may do upon 
their reservations, but no more." Dead and wind-fallen tim-
ber, as a part of the realty, belongs to the remainderman, 
and not to the tenant for life to the same extent as growing 
timber does. 
In the case of Bewick v. Whitfield (3 P. Williams' Chancery 
Rep., 268), in discussing this question it is ruled, first, that 
"the timber while standing is part of the inheritance; but 
whenever it is severed, either by the act of God, as by a tem-
pest, or by a trespasser, and by wrong, it belongs to him who 
has the first estate of inheritance, whether in fee or in tail, 
who may bring trover for it, and this was so decreed upon 
occasion of the great wind-fall of timber on the Cavendish 
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estate." Secondly, "As to the tenant for life, he ought not 
to have any share of the money arising by the sale of this 
timber." ' 
The principle thus announced is recognized in Lewis Bowles's 
Case (11 Coke, 81), and in the case of Shult v. Barker (12 Ser-
geant & Raw1e, 272). 
Therefore, the dead and fallen timber that is not needed or 
used for improvements, agricultural purposes, or fuel by the 
Indians is the property of the United States. It is to be 
preserved and protected as such, and disposed of only as 
Congress by law may provide. This rule will doubtless best 
preserve the timber on Indian reservations and avoid mucb 
destruction by fires, which would occur as the timber became 
scarce and valuable, whenever its dearth might become a 
source of gain. Your first question is, therefore, answered in 
the negative, which renders a reply to the remaining inquiries 
unnecessary. 
Very r~spectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
OFFICIAL CONSULAR SERVICES. 
Under the laws and usages governii~g the American consular service, the 
authentication, noting, etc., of marine protests are to be regarded as 
official consular services. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 22, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 25th of October, 1888, you in, 
quire, as I understand your communication, whether'' the 
natural and essential character of the consular services ot 
authenticating, noting, etc., marine protests, apart from the 
factitious status given them by inclusion in the tariff of offi-
cia1 fees," are or are not official consular services~ 
The office of consul is of very ancien:t origin. In its early 
history its incumbent was a municipal officer, intrusted with 
the power and charged with the general duty of the enforce-
ment of the laws of the sovereignty which he represented over 
its citizens resident in a special locality or municipality, out-
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side of the general territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign. 
Within the governments of Christendom, the exterritorial 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereignty over its citizens has gen-
erally ceased to exist, and t,he local law governs the residents 
as well as the citizens of a nation. But outside of the pale of 
Christendom, in some instances the exterritorial jurisdiction 
of the sovereignty still exists, and the corresponding powers 
and duties of the consul still survive. Under international 
law there have been and are, therefore, different official duties 
incident to the office of consul, varying with time, place, and 
circumstances. No invariable test can be derived fr,om inter-
national law, or from the general character of the consular 
office,, by which to determine what services performed by the 
consul are official consular services, and what are not. The 
American consul has no authority except what may be ex-
pressly granted by a law of Congress, and acknowledged by 
the government in whose jurisdiction he resides. His duties 
are described in different acts of Congress, and in the consu-
lar instructions of the Department of State. (Warden's Con-
sular Establishment, page 140.) 
"In process of time, by traditional usage, by positive pro-
visions of local law, and by treaty stipulations, the existing 
legal character with its limited rights was fixed on the for-
eign consuls mutually accredited in the countries of Chris-
tian Europe and America." (7 Opin., 348.) 
Whether the taking of marine protests is an official consu-
lar service, or a non-consular service, must be determined by 
tradition, usage, treaties, and laws. The second section of 
the act of the 14th of April, 1792 (1 Stat., 255), provides: 
" And for the direction of the consuls and vice-consuls of 
the United States in certain cases. 
" SEC. 2. Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That they 
shall have the right, in the ports or places to which they are 
or may be severally appointed, of receiving the protests or dec-
larations which such captains, masters, crews, passengers, 
and merchants, as are citizens of the United States, may re-
spectively choose to make there." 
By the twenty-second section of the act of the 1st of March, 
1855 (10 Stat., 626), it is provided : 
" That the following record books shall be provided for and 
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key;t in each consulate and commercial agency, * • * a 
book for the entry of protests, and in which all other official 
consular acts likewise shall be recorded." 
In an opinion rendered on the 2d of June, 1855 (7 Opin., 
259), Attorney-General Cushing, in classifying and distinguish-
ing between consular and non-consular services, applying the 
act last referred to, concludes: 
"(4) Drawing out a power of attorney, bottomry bond, 
will, or any such similar service, is a notarial, not a consular 
act; and therefore only the certificate upon it would go to 
account of the Government. 
'' (5) I should have said the same of extending a protest, but 
for the phrase in another part of the act, 'a book for the 
entry of protests, and in which all other official consular acts 
likewise shall be recorded,' which seems to cover the fact of 
extending a protest, and so to give the fee to the Govern-
ment." 
In determining what are the usage and law on this subject 
section 17 45 of the Revised Statutes can not well be omitted. 
It provides: "The President is authorized to prescribe from 
time to time the rates or tariffs of fees to be charged for 
official services, and to designate what shall be regarded 
as official services besides such as are expressly declared by 
law in the business of the several legations, consulates, and 
commercial agencies." 
This section authorizes the President to prescribe a tariff 
of fees for official services only, and does not authorize him 
to fix the rate for non-official. It also empowers him to des-
ignate or name what shall be regarded as official services 
beside such as are expressly declared by law. When thus 
empowered, if he shall name or designate in the tarifl' of fees 
as official that which before had not been so regarded, from 
the time of such naming or designation the services thus 
designated should be regarded as official. Your communica-
tion shows that the President has prescribed a rate of fees 
under the section, and that he has therein named such ma-
rine protests as are referred to in yours. I therefore con-
elude from the usage, as shown from the laws of the past 
(some of which have been repealed) and those of the presentt 
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that the "authenticating, noting," etc., of'' marine protests," 
concerning which you inquire, are official consular services. 
Very respectfully, 
A. B. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
WASHINGTON AND IDAHO RAILROAD CO~IPANY. 
Under the act of May 30, 1888, chapter 336, granting to the Washington 
and Idaho Railroad Company a right of way through the Cceur 
d'Alene Indian Reservation, the Secretary of the Interior has no au-
thority to permit the construction of a railroad across the reservation 
prior to the ascertainment, fixing, and payment of the compensation 
as provided for in section 3 of that act. 
By that section three conditions precedent are annexed to the grant, 
namely: (1) The plats made upon actual survey for the definite loca-
tion of the road must be filed; (2) those plats must be approved in 
writing by the Secretary of the Interior; (3) the compensation must 
be fixed and paid. Until all of these conditions are performed no 
right of any kind respecting the right of way becomes vested in the 
company. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 3, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 1st of December, 1888, you ask : 
''First. Whether since the passage of the act entitled 'An act 
· granting to the Washington and Idaho Railroad Company 
the right of way through the Creur d' Aiene Indian Reserva-
tion,' passed May 30, 1888, chapter 336, the Secretary of 
the Interior possesses any authority rightfully to permit the 
construction of a rai1road across the reservation in advance 
of the ascertainment, fixing, and payment of the compensa-
tion provided to be ascertained by him in section 3 of the 
act, and therein required to be fixed and paid before a right 
of any kind shall vest in the company 'in or to any part of 
the right of way.' In other words, whether the Secretary of 
the Interior has any rightful authority to permit a railroad 
to be constructed across an Indian reservation until a right 
to construct it has vested by virtue of an act of Congress Y 
'' Second. If you should be of the opinion that there is au-
thority and power in the Secretary of the Interior' to permit 
by rightful administration the construction of this railroad 
across this reservation before the compensation is fixed and 
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paid, whether he has then any lawful power to make any 
agreement with the parties by which a deposit of money can 
be required by him to be made in the United States Treasury, 
or elsewhere, as security for the payment of the compensa-
tion, when ultimat~ly fixed, so that he could .retain and con-
trol the expenditure of the money in liquidating the compen-
sation which be should subsequently fix under the third sec-
tion. 
''Third. Whether it be legally possible for him to require 
and accept a bond, with sufficient sureties, which should be 
safely obligatory to provide for the benefit of individual In-
dians and of the tribe the payment of compensation and 
damages~ And if so, what the terms and conditions of such 
a bond should be '" 
The taking of property without compensation is a violation 
of an absolute property right. When taken with compensa· 
tion, by authority of law, the law must be strictly construed 
in favor of the property-owner and against the grantee. The 
property over which the right of way is granted by the act 
under consideration is subject, in whole or in part, to three 
different rights which were to be provided for. The fee, · 
subject to the rights of the Indians, is vested in the United 
States. Th'e Indians as a tribe have or had a right of in-
definite occupancy in common over all the land. As to cer-
tain portions of it, the act contemplates that individual In-
dians have or may have a special right of occupancy of a 
part in severalty. With reference to the rights of the Jn. 
dians as a tribe and as individuals, the Government hold8. 
and exermses a power closely analogous to that of a guardian 
over the property of his ward. That this power may not be 
abused, nor the rights of the Indians be lost or jeopardized, 
is clearly intended to be carefully guarded by the granting 
act. Its first section provides ''that the right of way is 
hereby granted as hereinafter set forth." This is not an abso-
lute grant, to take effect at the date of acceptance by the 
corporation, but is subject to the conditions imposed by the 
later provisions of the law." The third section of the act, 
among other things, provides : 
"No right of any kind shall vest in said railway company 
in or to any part of the right of way herein provided for 
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until plats thereof, made upon actual survey for the definite 
location of such railroad, and including the points for station 
buildings, depots, . machine-shops, side-tracks, turn-outs, and 
water-stations, shall be filed with and approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior, which approval shall be made in 
writing, and be open for the inspection of any party inter-
ested therein and until the compensation aforesaid has been 
fixed and paid." 
By this, three different conditions precedent are annexecl 
to the grant: 
(1) The plats made upon actual survey for the definite lo-
cation must be filed. 
( 2) Those plats must be approved in writing by the Secre-
tary of the Interior; and 
(3) The compensation must be fixed and paid. 
Until all three of these conditions shall have been per-
formed the act. declares ''No right of any kind shall vest in 
said railway company as to any" part of the right of way." 
"When compensation is to be a condition to or simultaneous 
with the taking, equity will enjoin the use of the land until 
the compensation be made (Shute v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 26 
Ills., 426; People v. Law, 34 Barber, 49.6; Western, etc., R. R 
v-. Owings, 15 :Mel, 199; Ourranv. 8hattuck, 24 Cal., 427; Pe1l-
rice v. Wallis, 37 Miss.,-172; Johnson v. Alameda County, 14 
Cal., 106; Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory and Con-
stitutional Law, 465, note). When the Constitution requires 
the compensation to be paid prior to the taking, and the 
statute authorizing the taking does not specify whether the 
compensation is to be made before or after the property is 
taken, it will be construed to intend the former (Sharpless 
v. West Chester, 1 Grant's Cases, 257)." If the railroad 
company, for the purposes of construction, before the com-
pensation has been paid, shall enter upon the reservation 
and eject the Indians as a tribe from their common right of 
occupancy and the individual Indians from such several rights 
of occupancy as each may possess on the line of the right 
of way, such ouster must either be wrong or be done under 
a right granted by the act. It can not be· done under a right 
granted by the act, for the language, " no right of any kind 
shall vest," is broad enough to cover the right of possession 
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and occupancy which might be taken for construction. So 
far as the Indians are concerned such taking would embrace 
their whole estate, for, as is befOI'e stated, their whole rights 
are those of occupancy. These rights are the very kind of 
rights that were intended to be protected. The entry, there-
fore, for const,ruction before the payment of the compensa-
tion would be wrongful, and it is not within your power to 
grant it nor within your discretion to permit it. The pro: 
visions of the same section, empowering you to fix the com-
pensation to be paid and the time and manner of payment, 
impose upon you the duty to :fix the compensation and time 
and manner of payment within such time as will leave enough 
of the period limited in the act before the-expiration of the 
grant to allow the construction to be accomplished within 
two years from the passage of the act. If the limitation of 
time in the first instance was insufficient to allow the con-
ditions precedent to be performed and the road to be 
constructed before its expiration, the company could have 
declined to accept under the terms of the act, and all em-
barrassment would have been avoided. The first inquiry is 
therefore answered in the negative, which renders the second 
and third immaterial 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
RETIRED LIST OF THE AR:\IY. 
L., a major in the Seventh Infantry, was, by direction of the President, 
dropped from the rolls of the Army November 25, 1861, and W., a 
captam in the Fourth Infantry, was with the advice and consent of 
the Senate appointed major in the Seventh Infantry, vice L., dropped. 
Afterwards, on November 27, 1866, the President revoked the order 
dropping L., and directed that he be restored to his former commission 
to :fill a vacancy of major in the Eighteenth Infantry, to date from 
July 28, 1866, and at the same time, by direction of the President, L. 
was placed on the retired list as major: ddt•ised that the action of 
the President on the 27th of November, 1866, was ineffectual to restore 
L. to the Army and place him on the retireCJ. list, and that he is not 
entitled to be borne thereon. 
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8., a captain in the Seventh Infantry, was summarily dismissed the 
service by direction of the President July 15, 1863, and notified. thereof. 
Afterwards, on August 11, 18631 the order of dismissal was revoked; 
whereupon S. (the vacancy not having been filled in the mean time) 
returned to the position from which he was dismissed and continued 
to serve therein until December 30, 1864, when, upon the finding of a 
retiring board, he was retired under the provisions of the act of August 
3, 1861: Advised that the dismissal of July 15, 1863, created a vacancy 
which could not otherwise be filled than by an appointment with the 
advice and consent of the Senate; that the subsequent revocation of 
that order on the 11th of August, 1863, was ineffectual to restoreS. to 
his former position in the Army; that when, afterwards, he was pnt 
on the retired list he was not a commissioned officer of the Army, and 
therefore ineligible to a plac~ thereon; and that, accordingly, be is not 
entitled to be borne on such list. 
L., a first lieutenant in the Seventh Infantry, having been found by a 
retiring board "incapacitated for active service from insanity, which 
insanity is not incident to the service," was, by direction of the Presi-
dent, retired July 31, 1868, on pay proper alone under the act of 
August 3, 1861. At L.'s request the order of retirement was, by direc-
tion of the President, on June 23, Hl69, so amended as to wholly retire 
him from service with one year's pay and allowances. On April2, 1878, 
by direction of the President, the order of June 23, 1869, was declared 
void, on the ground that L. was insane when he requested it; and he 
was restored to the retireci list in accordance with the original order: 
Advised that after the President had once acted. upon the finding of 
the retiring board, by placing L. on the retired list with pay proper 
alone, his power over the case was exhausted, and the subsequent 
order wholly retiring L. was void for want of authority thus to retire 
him; and that therefore L. is entitled to be borne on the retired list 
conformably to the order retiring him on pay proper alone. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 3, 1888. 
SIR: In response to your request, made some time ago, 
for an opinion as to the right of certain persons to be borne 
'on the retired list of the Army-namely, Daniel E. SickleR, 
as major-general, retired; Adam Badeau, as captain, re-
tired; Isaac Lynde, as major, retired; Charles B. Stivers, as 
captain, retired; and James T. Leavy, as first lieutenant, 
retired-! now have the honor to submit the following: 
The cases of General Sickles and Captain Badeau are alike 
in all material respects. It appears that each of these offi-
cers, after being placed on the retired list, accepted in 1869 
an appointment in 1 he diplomatic service. General Sickles 
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remained in that service until April, 1874. Captain Badeau 
remained therein only a few months, but subsequently, in 
1870, entered the consular service, wherein he held an ap-
pointment for several years. In the mean time they were 
each actually borne on the retired list and have since been 
continued thereon. 
By section 2 of the act of March 30, 1868 (the provisions 
of which section are embodied in sections 1223 and 1440, Re-
vised Statutes), officers of the Army or Navy accepting- or 
holding- any appointment in the diplomatic or consular serv-
ice are to be considered as having- resigned, and their places 
in the military or naval service are to be deemed vacant, etc. 
The act of March 3, 1875, chapter 178, however, contains a 
clause providing that a certain class of retired officers who 
are "now ( i. e., at the date of the act) borne on the retired 
list shall be continued thereon notwithstanding the provis-
ions" of section 2 of said act of 1868. 
Both General Sickles and Captain Badeau are within the 
class of retired officers described in the clause of the act of 
1875 above referred to, and they were each actually borne 
. on the retired list when that act was passed. Their right now 
to be borne thereon depends upon the operation and effect of 
the provisions of the said acts of 1868 and 1875 upon their 
respective cases, and necessaril;y involves a construction of 
those provisions. 
There is a suit pending in the Supreme Court (Badea'lt v. 
The United States) which presents the same question precisely 
that arises in those cases, involves a construction of the same 
statutory provisions, and which will doubtless be determined 
during the present term of that court. In view of this, I 
think it unadvisable to express any opinion upon the two 
cases just referred to, and suggest that it would be proper 
to await the decision of the court in that suit, which will 
finally settle the question arising in them. 
The case of Maj. Isaac Lynde is this: By direction of the 
President, announced in paragraph 1 of General Orders, No. 
102, dated Washington, November 25, 1861, Major Lynde, 
Seventh Infantry, was from that date dropped from the rolls 
of the Army. Capt. Henry D. Wallen, Fourth Infantry, was 
subsequently promoted and appointed by the President, by 
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and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to be major 
of the Seventh Infantry, November 25, 1861, vice Lynde 
dropped (see General Orders, No. 63, dated Washington, 
June 10, 1862), which appointment was accepted by Wallen, 
and he was commissioned accordingly. Afterwards, by Gen-· 
eral Orders, No. 94, dated Washington, November 27, 1866, 
the President directed that paragraph of General Orders, No. 
102, of November 25, 1861, be revoked, and that Major Lynde 
be restored to his commission to fill a vacancy of major in 
the Eighteenth Infantry, to date July 28, 1866; and, at the 
same time, by direction of the President, Major Lynde, 
Eighteenth Infantry, was placed on the retired list to date 
from July 28, 1866 (see paragraph 2 of General Orders, No. 
94, aforesaid). 
In this case, irrespective of the effect of the order of No-
vember 25, 1861, dropping Major Lynde from the rolls of the 
Army, the fact that Wallen was appointed by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to be ma-
jor of the Seventh Infantry, in the place of Lynde, and was 
commissioned as such, operated to supersede the latter, and 
to completely sever his relations with the Army, if they were 
not already severed by the effect of said order (see Blake v. 
United Stutes, 103 U.S. R., 227; Keyes v. United States, 109 U. 
S. R., 336). Having thus ceased to bean officer in the Army, 
he could not again become one otherwise than by a new ap-
pointment, made in conformity to the law of the military 
service, and to which the advice and consent of the Senate 
were necessary (97 U. S. R, 426). The order of the President 
of November 27, 1866, revoking the previous order by which 
Major I1ynde was dropped, and restoring him to his commis· 
sion, was ineffectual to place the latter in the active list of 
officers of the Army ; and it follows that the order of the 
President of the same date, putting him on the retired list 
of the Army, was inefficient for this purpose-none but com-
missioned officers in active service being then eligihle thereto. 
I am therefore of the opinion, upon the fa.cts above stated, 
that l\iajor Lynde is not entitled to be borne on the retired 
list of the Army. 
The case of Capt. Charles B Stivers is as follows: While 
holding a commission as captain in the Seventh Infantry he 
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was summarily dismissed the service by direction of the 
President, to date July 14, 1863, per Special Orders, No. 313, 
issued from the \\.,.. ar Department, dated \Vashington, July 
15, 1863. Of this order he was notified, as appears by a 
letter from him to the Adjntan~-General, dated at Rouse's 
Point, N.Y., July 28,1863, wherein he writes: "I have been 
dismissed the service for Hot joining my regiment. My health 
· has been so feeble that I could not do so. I respectfully ask 
that my case may be reconsidered, atHl tllat~ if consistent 
with the interests of the service, l may be reinstated to 
my former rank." Afterwards, on reconsideration of his case, 
the order of dismissal was revoked by Special Orders, No. 
356, issued from the War Department, dated Washington, 
August 11, 1863. Thereupon Oaptain Stivers returned to 
the position from which he was dismissed (the vacancy not 
having been filled in the mean time), and continued to serve 
in that position until December 30, 1864, wh•3n, upon the 
finding of a retiring board, he was retired from active serv-
ice under the provisions of the act of August 3, 1861. 
At the time of the dismissal of Captain Stivers, as above, 
the President was invested with power to summarily dismiss 
from service a commissioned officer of the Army. This 
power (if not already possessed by him) was given by sec-
tion 17 of the act of July 17, 1862, chapter 200. 
In the case of the The United States v. Corson (114 U. S. 
R., 619) the e:fl'ect of an order of dismissal by the President, 
issued while clothed with that power, and also the effect of 
its subsequent revocation by him, were considered by the 
Supreme Court. 
There an officer holding a commission as captain and assist-
ant quartermaster of volunteers was, by order of the Presi-
dent, dated March 27, 1865, summarily dismissed the service. 
On June 9, 1865, an order was issued by the President re-
voking the order of dismissal and. restoring him to his former 
position in the service. Between the date of dismissal, March 
27, 1865, and the date of revocation, June 9, 1865, it does not 
appear that the vacancy was filled by another appointment. 
By an order issued from the War Department, under date of 
June 19, 1865, he was assigned to duty as division quarter-
master of the First Division, First Army Corps, with the 
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temporary rank of major in the Quartermaster's Department, 
under the act of July 4, 1864, and sen ... eel in that position 
until October 7, 1865, when he was honorably mustered out 
of the service of the United States. 
The court held that the effect of the order of 1\Iarch 27, 
1865, dismissing the officer from the service was to sever his 
relations with the Army; that thenceforward and until in 
some lawful way again appointed he was disconnected from 
that branch of the public service as completely as if he had 
ne\er been an officer of the Army; and that he could not 
regain his position and become entitled to its emoluments by 
means of a subsequent order reToking the order of dismissal 
and restoring him to the position. 
This decision of the Supreme Court is clearly applicable 
to the case of Captain Stivers, and must be regarded as con-
clusive of it. According to the doctrine there laid down, the 
order of July 15, 1863, dismissing that officer from service 
created a vacancy, which could not otherwise be filled than 
by an appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate 
(97 U.S. R., supra); and consequently the subsequent order of 
August 11,1863, revoking that order, was ineffectual to restore 
him to his former position in the Army, although it had in 
the mean time remained vacant. 
It follows that when, afterwards, Captain Stivers was put 
on the retired-list he was not a commissioned offi~er of the 
Army, and for that reason was not eligible to a place on that 
list. The finding of the retiring board (upon which he was 
placed there) that he was incapacitated for active service was 
not conclusive of the question of his eligibility, the jurisdic-
tion of the board being limited to the determination of "the 
facts as to the nature and occasion of the disability" of tile 
officer, and not including within its scope the validity or in-
validity of his commission. 
I am therefore of the opinion that Captain Stivers is not 
entitled to be borne on the retired list of the Army. 
The remaining case is that of First Lieut. James T. Lea,y, 
formerly of the Seventh Infantry. It appears that this 
officer, having been found by a retiring board "incapacitated 
for active service from insanity, which insanity is not incident 
to the service," was, by direction of the President, re~ired 
• 
r 
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from aotive service" on pay proper alone," July 31,1868, under 
section 17 of the act of August 3, 1861 (see Special Orders, 
No.182, dated Washington, July 31, 1868.) On June 23,1889, 
by direction of the President, the order retiring him from 
active service as above was so amended as to wholly retire 
him from the service with one year's pay and allowances, to 
date from July 1, 1869, and his name was directed to he 
thenceforward omitted from the Army Register (see Special 
Orders, No. 151, dated Washington, June 23, 1869). This 
amendment, it is stated, was made at Lieutenant Leavy's 
request. On April 2, 1878, by direction of the President, 
the order of June 23, 1869, wholly retiring that officer, was 
declared void, on the ground that he was insane when he 
made such request, and he was restored to the retired list in 
accordance with the original order (see Special Orders, No. 69, 
dated ·washington, April 2, 1878). And by a joint resolution 
passed by Congress June 18, 1878, the Paymaster-General 
was "authorized and directed to adjust the pay accounts of 
the said Leavy, and pay out of any moneys appropriated for 
the pay of the .Army the balance, if any, found to be due 
him on account of salary during the time his name was 
omitted from the Army Register on account of his request 
to be wholly retired, which request was made by him while 
insane." (20 Stat., 588). 
Section 17 of the act of August 3, 1861, under which Lieu-
tenant Leavy was retired from active service, provided for 
the assembling of a board of Army officers "to determine the 
facts as to the nature and occasion of the disability of such 
officers as appear disabled to perform military servi~e," and 
invested such board with the power of a court of inquiry and 
court-martial, their decision to be subject to like revision as 
that of such courts by the President of the United States. 
It further provided that whenever the board finds an officer 
incapacitated for active service it should report whether, in 
its judgment, the incapacity resulted from long and faithful 
service, from wounds or injury received in the line of duty, 
etc., or from any other incident of service, adding, ''If so, 
and the President approve such judgment, the disabled 
officer shall thereupon be placed upon the list of retired offi-
cers according to the provisions of this act. If otherwise, 
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and if the President concur in opinion with the board, the 
officer shall lJe retired as above, either with his pay proper 
alone or with his service rations alone, at tlle discretion of 
the President, or he shall be wholly retired from the service 
with one year's pay and a1lowances; and in this last case his 
name shall be thenceforward omitted from the Army Reg-
ister." 
In the case under consideration the board found that the 
incapacity of the officer for active service resulted from a 
cause not incident to the service. Upon this finding, if the 
President concurred in opinion with the board, he had power 
(1) to place the officer on the retired list either with his pay 
proper alone or with his service rations alone, or (2) to wholly 
retire him from the service with one year's pay and allow-
ances. And having once acted under that power upon the 
report of the board, by retiring the officer on his pay proper 
alone, the inquiry arises, whether such power as to this par-
ticular case was not thereby exhausted. I am inclined to 
think that this inquiry should be answered in the affirmative. 
In general, where power is given by statute to enable an offi-
cer to do a particular act which would otherwise be beyond 
the scope of his authority, after such power bas been once 
exercised it is deemed exhausted and can not be exercised 
again. 
The Court of Claims, in the case of McBlair v. Un·ited States 
(19 C. Cls. R., 528), referring to the power of the President 
above adverted to, remarks: "He had a power to exercise in 
the disposition of the report (i. e., of the retiring board in 
that case), and his action thereon made, in law, the complete 
exercise of the full measure of authority provided by the 
statute. It is not a continuing power, but is performed to 
the extent of its existence by the one act of the President." 
In this connection the court cites People v. Waynesville (88 
Ill., 470-475), where it is observed: "As a general rule, 
where the General Assembly confers a power, and the per-
sons upon whom it is conferred act under it, the power is ex-
hausted, unless power is given to act again under the same 
authority;" and also Ex parte Randolph (2 Brock., 473, 474), 
where the court say: "I take it to be a sound principle, 
that when a special tribunal is created, with limited power 
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and a particular jurisdiction, whene-ver the power is once 
executed the jurisdiction is exhausted and at an end-that 
the person thus invested with power is, in the language of 
the law, functus officio." 
Regarding the power of the President from this point of 
view, the order of June 23, 1869, wholly retiring l.1ieutenant 
Leavy from service, was void for want of authority in the 
former thus to retire him. The circumstance that such order 
was issued in compliance with a request made by Lieutenant 
Leavy when he was insane may afford additional ground for 
holding it void, as it was subsequently declared to be by the 
order of April 2, 1878, by which he was reinstated on the re-
tired list. Moreover, the last-mentioned order is impliedly 
sanctioned by Congress, and his right to have been borne 
ou that list during the time his name was dropped therefrom 
is clearly recognized by that body in the enactment of t.he 
joint resolution of June 18, 1878, providing for the payment 
of any balance due him "on account of salary during the 
time his name was omitted from the Army Register," etc. 
In my opinign Lieutenant Leavy is legally entitled to be 
borne on the retired list of the Army conformably to the 
.order of J u1y 31, 1868, retiring him on pay proper alone. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
'The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS. 
Duty of the Commissioner of Pensions considered in connection with a 
statement of. facts submitted by him, relating to the recovery of money 
paid on a pension certificate alleged to have been fraudulently obtained. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 10, 1888. 
SIR: By your indorsement <1f the 30th of November ]llst 
on the letter of the Commissioner of Pensions of the 27th of 
the same month, you request my views as to the rights and 
duties of the Commissioner of Pensions on the statement of 
facts and inquiries submitte<l in his communication. 
It appears from the statement of facts contained in his 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 211 
Commisstonel' of Pensions. 
letter, that in 1887 a pension certificate was granted and 
issued to Francis Patterson ; 
That he received the first payment after the granting of the 
certificate by the proper pension agent, which, with the 
arrears, amounted to $13,312; 
That after the first payment had been made a special 
examination of the claim, as adjudicated, was had, in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 4 7 44 Revised Statutes, 
as amended by the act of 25th of July, 1882 (Digest of Pen 
sion Laws, p. 591); 
That on such examination, proof, which was satisfactory 
to the Secretary of the Interior, was taken, which establisllecl 
that the name of the pensioner was put on the rolls by or 
through false and fraudulent representations, whereupon the 
Secretary of the Interior caused the name of Francis Patter-
son, the pensioner, to be stricken from the rolls; 
That the War Department also restored to its record, on 
evidence which was sufficiently satisfactory, the charge of 
deHertion against the pensioner, which had been removed; 
That the pensioner. with certain alleged accomplicesl was 
prosecuted in the proper United States court for perjury, for 
the making of false affidavits to obtain the pension, and the 
defendants were acquitted; 
That recaption of the money which was paid in pursuance 
of the certificate, so far as it could be traced and identified, 
was made by officers of the United States. Of the money 
rec~ptured, $4,725 was taken from Mrs. Dr. Mills, the wife 
of one of the alleged ~ccomplices of Patterson, and $62.53 
from the wife of Patterson. 
It also appears that proof in the possession of the Com-
missioner of Pensions established that a certificate of deposit 
of the Lock Haven Bank, of Pennsylvania, is now in the 
possession of the Second National Bank, of Elmira, N.Y., 
fGr a part of the funds alleged to have been fraudulently 
received by Patterson; also that a bond and mortgage of 
John B. Fishier and wife for $3,000 was purchased for the 
use of Patterson with a part of the same money. 
It alAo appears that suit~ have been brought in the circuit 
court of the United States for the western district of Vir-
ginia by direction of the Solicitor of the Treasury, to recover 
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·certain other moneys and property which are claimed to have 
been traced into the hands of Mills and others. 
It is to be inferred from the tenor of the whole transaction 
that Patterson is insolvent. 
The inquiry is, What are the "rights and duties" of the 
Commissioner of Pensions in the premises ~ 
The Commisione'r of Pensions is generally charged with 
the administration of the pension laws, subject to the super- . 
vision of the Secretary of the Interior. By section 4744 of 
the Revised Statutes, as amended, he is specifically charged 
with the duty of making special examinati~ns into the merits 
of pension claims, whether pending or adjudicated, and to 
· aid in the prosecution of any parties who may appear on 
such examination to be guilty of fraud in the prosecution or 
procuring of such claims. The duty of examining the fraud 
alleged to have been perpetrated in this case has already 
been performed by the Commissioner of Pensions. That ex-
amination resulted in the obtaining of evidence which is 
claimed to show that money has been wrongfully obtained by 
Patterson from the United States Treasury. In aid of the 
prosecution of legal actions in court to recover this money 
wrongfully obtained back, it is the duty of the Commissioner 
of Pensions to furnish the several officers charged with the 
conduct of such actions with all material facts and evidence 
at his command, or whiclf he can obtain, to sustain the claim 
of the Government. With reference to the suits that have 
been already brought, by direction of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, in the western district of Virginia, be appears to 
ha\e already done so. He should further report to the 
Solicitor of the Treasury all the facts and evidence with ref. 
erence to the certificate of deposit of the Lock Haven Bank, 
and also with reference to the bond and mortgage of Fishier; 
and if, on examination, the Solicitor of the Treasury shall 
determine the evidence is sufficient to warrant legal action 
for their recovery, it will be his duty to furnish all aid in his 
power for the successful prosecution of such suits as may be 
brought. The money that is in the hands of Chief Clerk 
Brock, from the statement of facts submitted, seems to have 
come into his hands by the common-law remedy of recaption. 
A "party may peaceably retake his goods wherever he 
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happens to find them, unless a new property be fairly 
acquired therein." (3 Blackstoue's Commentaries, 5; 4 id., 
363.) 
The United States has the same remedies for the protection 
and recovery of its property that an individual under like 
circumstances has. Doubtless, at the time of the recaption 
of the money by the examiner who obtained it from Mrs. 
Mills and Mrs. Patterson, he had reason to think there was 
no doubt that the money belonged to the United States; but 
in the exercise of the remedy of recaption on the part of the 
Government the officer acts at his peril. This remedy by 
the act of the party should not be resorted to in doubtful 
cases. In cases where there is a substantial dispute as to 
the facts, the regular orderly proceedings · of the courts of 
law should oe resorted to, and the prima facie presumption 
of right of property arising from possession should be re-
spected until overthrown by a judicial determination. No 
provision of law exists by w~ich the Government can give 
bond of indemnity to the officer in case he should be found, 
on a judicial trial, to have made a wrongful recaption. In 
this case none of the money was fouud in the possession of 
Patterson. ' The greater part of it was found with Mrs. 
Mills; the balance with 1.\-frs. Patterson. Their possession is 
prima facie e\idence of ownership. The pension certifi~ate 
under which it was claimed to have been recovered for the 
Government would be prima facie evidence of the right of 
property. That prima facie right of property would have to 
be overthrown by evidence of fraud in the obtaining of the 
certificate. That fraud is not to be presumed, but must be 
clearly proven to sustain a retention of the money. The 
dropping of the name of the alleged pensioner from the rolls 
by the Secretary of the Interior, while conclusive as to future 
payments on the certificate, would have no retrospective 
effect in a judicial trial as to the right of the alleged pen· 
sioner to such money as had been paid before his name was 
dropped. The verdict of acquittal in the prosecution of the 
alleged pensioner for perjury does not establish the right of 
the pensioner to the money, nor could the proceedings in that 
case be legally received in evidence in a civil suit. (1 Green-
leaf on EYidence, sec. 537). Yet the perjury with which the 
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defendant was charged in the prosecution was the chief 
element of fraud relied on to show the right to the money in 
the United States. The verdict in that case establishes that 
twelve men, legally qualified to try that issue, believed there 
was no reasonable doubt as to whether or not the perjury 
had been committed. As the recaption of the money was at 
the officer's peril, its retention by the present or any future 
officer continues subject to the same condition. Future 
officers may decline to receive the money and assume the 
peril, and even if they did accept it, such acceptance would 
not effect a legal release of responsibility of prior officers 
who made the recaption. The case is therefore such a one 
that the officer would be justified in returning the money to 
the persons from whom it was obtained. If this course be 
adopted, the duty would devolve upon the Commissioner of 
Pensions to report all the facts, with the evidence, imme-
diately to the Solicitor of the Treasury, so that he might 
bring suit to recover the money, if the evidence, in his judg-
ment, should warrant such action. But if, to avoid suit by 
the Government to recover the money, the persons from 
whom it was obtained, and those having claim to it, will ex-
ecute a release to the United States of all right or rights, it 
should then be returned to the Treasury in due course of law. 
Very respectfully, 
A. II. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
DOUBLE PENSIONS. 
A person to whom a pension certificate was granted as the widow of a 
soldier in the war of the rebellion was also granted a pension certifi-
cate as the widow of a soldier in the war of 1812, and drew pensions 
upon both certificates from March 9, 1878, to December 3, 1883. The 
Commissioner of Pensions, on discovering this, required her to make 
an election, and she having elected to hold the first-mentioned certifi-
cate, he ordered the amount which had been ·paid to her upon the 
other certificate to be withheld in installments of $6 per month from 
payments thereafter, and issued an order to the pension agent accord-
ingly: Advised that the order made in this case, being within the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the Commissioner, is obligatory on the pension 
agent, and that the accounting officers of the Treasury have no power 
to disallow payments made by the agent pursuant thereto. 
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It is not within the province of the accounting officers of the Treasury, 
upon learning of any order made by the Commissioner of Pensions t~ 
a pension agent for the payment of pensions, to notify such agent of 
what their decision will be upon his account when rendered. 
In the case stated, the whole of the monthly pension under the certifi-
cate which the pensioner elected to hold should be withheld until the 
amounts so withheld shall equal the sum paid the pensioner under the 
other certificate. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 12, 1888. 
SIR: By your letter of the 7th instant you request my 
opinion upon the following questions: 
"(1) Is the order of the Commissioner of Pensions to a 
pension agent obligatory upon him; and, if so, have the ac-
counting officers ofthe Treasury any jurisdiction to disallow 
the payments made in pursuance of such order~ 
'' (2) Is it within the jurisdiction or province of the ac-
counting officers of the Treasury, upon learning of any order 
made to a pension agent for the payment of pensions, to issue 
any notice of what their decision will be upon his account 
when rendered, without request therefor~ 
" (3) Ought the whole amount of the monthly pension 
under the existing certificate to be withheld until the sum 
of the pension Rhall equal the amount paid the pensioner 
under the certificate of the war of 1812 ~ '' 
The facts on which the questions arise, as stated by you, 
are: "Sarah Ranner is a pensioner as the widow of a soldier 
during the war of the rebellion. She was also granted a 
certificate as the widow of a soldier of the war of 1812, and 
drew pension from 1\larch 9, 1878, to December 3, 1883, inclu-
sive, under both certificates. On discovery of the fact, the 
Commissioner of Pensions required her election, and she 
having determined to hold the certificate under the later 
pension laws, the Commissioner ordered the amount which 
she had been paid under the other certificate, being $550.67, 
to be withheld from payments made upon the later certificate 
in installments of $6 per month, and directed the pension 
agent at Indianapolis to pay all that was due under such 
certificate, less said monthly deduction. The accounting 
officers gi\e notice to the pension agent that they will dis-
allow his account for any such payment, holding that there 
,I 
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should be no payment made until, by lapse of time, the pen-
sion would. discharge the indebtedness. The action of the 
Commissioner of Pensions has not yet been reviewed by the 
Department." . 
The pension agent is a disbursing officer, and is the subor-
dinate of the Commissioner of Pensions. The Commissioner 
is an officf'r of thf' Department of the Interior, and subject to 
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.. The account-
ing officers of the Treasury are officers of the Treasury De-
partment, and subject to the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. To avoid conflict of jurisdiction and maintain the 
autonomy of the departmental distribution of dutie8 and la-
bors established by law, the subordinates of a Department, 
upon matters within their cognizance, should communicate to 
their own superior officer any alleged error in the adminis-
tration of any other Department, by whom it should be com-
municated to the head of the Department in which the al· 
leged error occurred, who, if he regards the charge of error 
as substantial9 will rectify it. and through the proper chan-
nels of his own Department communicate the result to his 
subordinate. In the case submitted, the communication of 
the Third Auditor, which was sent directly to the pension 
agent, should have gone in the regular course through the 
Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Interior, 
who had the power, if the action of the pension agent was er-
roneous, to make the necessary order to correct it. The pen-
sion agent can not obey the order of the Commissioner of 
Pensions and at the same time conform to the notice of the 
Third Auditor, for the order and notice are inconsistent. 
The general duty of the administration of the pension laws is 
committed to the Commissioner of Pensions, subject to the 
·direction of the Secretary of tile lllterior. 
Section 4715, Revised Statates, under which the account-
jug officers of the Treasury assume to disallow in the accounts 
of the pension agents credits for money paid by them in pur-
suance of the orders of the Commissioner of Pensions, is a 
part of the system of pension laws, the administration of 
which comes within the duties .of the Commissioner of Pen-
sions. THat section provides : 
"Nothing in this title shall be so construed as to allow 
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more than one pension at the same time to the same person, 
or to persons entitled jointly; but an;v pensioner who shall so 
elect may surrender his certificate, and receive, in lieu thereof, 
a certificate for any other pension to which be would have been 
entitled had not the surrendered certificate been issued. But 
all payments previously made for any period covered by the 
new certificate shall be deducted from the amount allowed 
by such certificate." 
Every duty imposed by this section is within the adminis-
trative powers of the Commissioner. The pensioner is to 
make an election. This election is to be communicated to 
the Commissioner of Pensions. The pensioner is to receive 
a new certificate. This new certificate h; to be issued by the 
Commissioner of Pensions. The payments made on the old 
certificate for any period covered by the new, are to be de-
ducted from the amount allowed by the new certificate. This 
· deduction is to be made by the Commissioner of Pensions. 
The whole section is a rule to guide the Commissioner when 
he, by the certificate, sets forth the amount to be paid by the 
pension agent to the pensioner. When the Commissioner 
of Pensions has transmitted to the pension agent the new 
certificate, showing the amount to be paid to the pensioner, 
.such action is conclusive on the agent. He has no power to 
review the action of his superior officer, and to say: "This 
certificate is issued for too much, or too little, and will pay 
more or less, as seems to me to be lawful." The pension 
agent has no discretion in the matter, but must pay in 
accordance with the certificate. It follows that, if the law 
compels him to pay it, it is not within the power of the ac-
counting officers of the Treasury to disallow a credit for that 
which he shall have paid according to law. In this case an 
order of the Commissioner was made and was certified to the 
pension agent instead of a new certificate. That order was 
but a modification of the certificate alreafly in the possession 
of the pensioner directing the amount to be deducted. The 
Commissioner of Pensions has g·eneral jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter, as has been shown. The form he adopts in 
the mode of administration does not change the principle. If 
his certificate or order duly certified in lieu thereof was is-
.sued for an amount too great, it is only an error and does not 
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render the certificate or order \Oid. If the oruer issued was 
erroneous, the error, if brought to the attention of the Com-
missioner of Pensions by the accounting officers of the Treas-
ury, or any one else, through the proper channel, would be 
corrected either by himself, or his superior, the Secretary of 
the Interior, or, in case of disagreement between the Secre-
tary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Treasury, by the 
President. But until reviewed, or modified in due course, 
the order can not be treated as vmd, nor disregarded by 
either the pension· agent or the accounting officers of the 
Treasury. 
I therefore answer your first inquiry, that the order made 
in this case being within the general jurisdiction of the Com-
missiouer of Pensions is obligatory on the pensjon agent, and 
the accounting officers of the Treasury have no power to dis-
allow the payments made by the agent in pursuance of it. 
I answer your second in the negative. 
If by your third question you mean to inquire whether the 
whole amount ought to be withheld while the certificate and 
order of the Commissioner, as they now exist, stand unre-
voked and unmodified, I would answer it in the negative; 
but if your inquiry means, should the order be modified so 
as to withhold the whole amount until the sum of the pen-
sion withheld shall equal the amount overpaid, it raises a 
different. question. 
The statute says: ''But all payments previously made 
for any period covered by the new certificate shall be deducted 
from the amount allowed by such certificate." The payments 
made between 187~ and 1883, during which the pensioner 
drew both pensions, are covered by toe new certificate. If 
it had been issued in 1883 jnstead of1878, the whole amount 
ov~rpaid would under the law have been required to be de-
ducted fr·om the amount allowed by him. The order of the 
Commissioner is but a modification of the certificate issued 
before, and is to be regarded as though it had been originally 
incorporated into the second certificate, from which, by mis-
take, it had been omitted. The order should therefore be 
modified to conform to what it should originally have been. 
Your third inquiry, thus interpreted, I therefore answer in 
the affirmative. 
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The conclusions lila Ye reached are substantially sustained 
by an opinion, on analogous questions, rendered by Attorney-
General Brewster on the 28th day of April, 1882. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SALARY OF MINISTER. 
By act of July 11, 1888, chapter 614, the office of charge d'affaires to Para-
guay and Uruguay, the salary of which was $5,000 per annum, was 
abolished, and provision made for representing the United States there 
by a minister at $7,500 a year. B., who at that time held the former 
office, was on the 11th of August, 1888, appointed minister. Here-
ceived his commission at his place of duty on the 3d of October, 18~8, 
and on the latter date took the official oath and entered upon the du-
ties of his office as minister: Advised that B. is entitled to draw his 
salary as minister ft·om the 3d of October, 1888, the date on which he 
qualified for the office and entered upon its duties, and not from the 
date of his appointment (Aug. 11, 1888). 
DEPART::\-IENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 12, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 14th of December, 1888, it ap-
pears the United 8tates was represented at Paraguay and 
Uruguay by a charge d'affaires. By the appropriation act 
of the 11th of July, 1888, the office of charge d'affaires to 
those countries was abolished and provision made for repre-
sentation by a minister. The salary of the charge d'affaires, 
while the office existed, was $5,000 a year. The salary of the 
minister is $7,500 a year. John E. Bacon, who was charge 
d'affaires, was appointed minister on the 11th of August, 
1888. He did not return to the United States. His commis-
sion as minister was delivered to him at his place of duty on 
the 3d of October, 1888, and the same day he took the official 
oath and entered upon the duties of his office as minister. 
Until he assumed tile office of minister he continued to dis-
charge his duties as charge d'affaires. On this statement of 
facts you inquire " Wilether 1\Ir. Bacon is entitled to draw for 
his salary at the rate of $7,500 a year from (a) July 1, 1888, 
the beginning of the fiscal year; (b) from August 11, 1888, 
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the date of his commission; or (c) from October :1, 1888, the 
date of his taking the oath of office as minister resident." 
The office of minister and charge d'affaires are separate and 
distinct offices, of different grades in the diplomatic service. 
Section 1740 of the Revised Statutes provides: 
"No * * * minister * * * shall be entitled to 
compensation for his services, except from the time when he 
reaches his post a.nd enters upon his official duties." * * * 
It also provides : 
"No * * * charge d'affaires shall be entitled to com-
pensation for his services, except * * • to the time when 
be ceases to hold such office, and for such time as is actually 
and necessarily occupied * • * * * * in making the 
direct transit between the place of his residence, when ap-
pointed, and his post of duty, at the commencement and ter-
. ruination of the period of his official service, for which he 
shall in all cases be allowed and paid, except as hereinafter 
mentioned. And no person shall be deemed to hold any 
such office after his successor is appointed and actually enters 
upon the duties of his office at his post.of duty." 
These extracts from the statute establish that the minis-
ter's salary begins when he enters upon his official duty; 
that the charge d'affaires shall be allowed his pay while he 
legally performs the ''official service" of' his office, and that 
his legal discharge of those services terminated when his 
successor "actually enters upon the duties of his office at his 
post of duty." The miniAter in this case was the successor of 
the charge d'affaires. The salary of the charge d'affaires 
stops when the minister .enters upon his duties. The minis-
ters salary then begins. 
Section 1756 of the Revised Statutes provides: 
"Every person elected or appointed to any office of honor 
or profit either in the civil, military, or naval service, except-
ing the President and the persons embraced by the section 
following, shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, 
and before being entitled to any part of the salary or other 
emoluments thereof, take and subscribe to the following 
oath." 
(~fter which the form of the official oath follo~s.) 
Section 1757 provides a different form of oath in a certain 
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contingency in lieu of that provided for in section 1756; but 
whatever form of oath is taken, the taking of the oath is a 
prerequisite to the entering upon the official duties or draw-
ing salary therefor. That the minister prior to his appoint-
ment had taken the oath and entered upon the duty of a dif-
ferent office does not relieve him from the requirements of 
section 1756. By its terms that section provides that the 
appointee shall take the oath before he enters upon the duties 
of such office as he may be appointed to. That Mr. Bacon 
was his own successor does not relieve him from the provis-
ions of the section, for it contemplates that the oath shall 
be taken at every new appointment before entering upon 
the duty. 
It is therefore concluded that :1_\Jfr. Bacon is entitled to draw 
his salary at the rate of $7,500 annually from the 3d of Octo-
ber, 1888, the date at which he took his oath of office; and 
this is in ae<~ord with the general principle so well recognized 
in the matter of the payment of salaries of officials. (2 Opin., 
27' 638; 3 ib., 105, 124, 641; 4 ib., 123, 250, 318, 348; 5 ib., 
132 ; 7 ib., 304; 10 ib., 250, 308.) 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
ENLISTED MEN OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. 
The phrase, "by reason of absence from his command at the time he be-
came entitled to his discharge," as used in the first section of the act 
of August 14, 1888, chapter 890, is to be regarded as equally applicable 
to the date when the term of enlistment of the applicant expired, and 
to the date when he would have received his di~charge along with 
other enlisted men with whom he served, had he been present. 
The p1·oviso in the third section of that act is applicable to the latter sec-
tion alone. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 15, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 20th of December, 1888, you 
ask-
(1) Whether or not the words, "'by reason of absence from 
his command at the time he became entitled to his discharge," 
as used in the first section of the act entitled "An act tore-
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lieve certai11 appointed · or enlisted men of the Navy and 
.Marine Corps from the charge of desertion," approved Au-
gust 14, 1888, are to be regarded as applicable only to the 
expiration of the period of enlistment, or as equally applica-
ble to the date when, had the applicant for relief under said 
ac~ been present at the time an<l place wben and where dis-
charges were issued to other enlisted men with whom he had 
served, he would have recei'"ed his discharge T 
(2) Whether the proviso contained in section 3 of said 
act of August 14, 1888, is to be regarded as applicable to any 
case or cases arising under the first section of the same act, 
or only to such cases as are provided for in said third section. 
The statute to be construed is a remedial one. Its purpose 
is to authorize the granting of discharges to a class of sailors 
and marines who, at the close of the last war, had done sub-
stantially their duty to their country, and chiefly failed, in 
not reporting for a discharge, to do their duty to themselves. 
Under the act a wide discretion is vested in the Secretary of 
the Navy, in order that full justice may be done, by granting 
or refusing discharges as the real merits of each case pre-
sented may demand. A liberal interpretation will conform 
to the intent of the law-makers. ff the clause in the first 
section "by reason of absence from his command at the time 
he became entitled to his discharge," should be interpreted 
to apply only to those who bad served out their term of en-
listment, it would cut off a large majority of those for whose 
relief the act was passed. The language "at the time he 
became entitled to his discharge," if interpreted Ro as to limit 
the operation of the section to those entitled to discharge 
under the former laws, would render the section an absolute 
nullity, and would not include even those who bad served 
out their term of enlistment; for even they would not become 
entitled to discharge, unless at the proper time and place, 
and in the proper manner, they were present to receive it. 
We are not authorized. to insert after the words " became 
entitled to his discharge,'~ the words " on account of expira-
tion of term of enlistment." The language of the act is gen-
eral and unlimited, and if from any cause the sailor or marine, 
if he bad been present, could and would have been legally 
granted a discharge, he is entitled to the benefit of the act. 
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The reason for discharge at the expiration of the term of en-
listment stands upon no higher ground than the reason to 
di1'.charge in order to reduce the force, or any other cause for 
which the sailor or marine could and would have been dis-
charged if present to apply for it. 
The act under. consideration clearly intended to grant the 
same relief to the sailors and marines of the late war that 
had been granted to the soldiers under like circumstances by 
the acts of J u1y 5, 1884 (25 Stat., 119), and the 17th of 1\Ia.r, 
188r. (24 Stat., 51). The report of the Committee on NaYal 
Affairs of the House on the bill (House Report No. 220, first 
session, Fiftieth Congress), declares : 
''The justice and expediency of applying the same general 
rules to the Army and Navy, in the matter of amending or 
correcting the military record of individuals, are so obvious 
that your committee deem no argument necessary' to sustain 
the proposition." 
The first and second sections substantially embrace the 
same classes of the Navy as those of the Army that were 
relieved by the act of the 5th of July, 188!. The IH'OYiso to 
the first section of the present act is identical with that in 
the first Rection of the act of 1884. The class of sailors and 
marines in the third section of this act corresponds with the 
class of soldiers provided for in the act of 1886. The pro-
viso to the third section of this act and to the act of 1886 are 
literally identical. The committee, by which this bill was 
reported, clearly used the acts of 1884 and 1886 as the model, 
in conformity to which the bill was drawn, so as to embrace 
the proYisions of both acts in one. In carr.ying the proviso 
from the act of 1886, the word "act," as it occurred therein, 
was copied with the rest of the proviso, doubtles~ through 
the inadvertence of not observing that the act of 1886 related 
only to the class em braced in the third section of this act, 
while the classes em braced in the first and second sections 
were provided for, as to the Army, by the act of 1884. To 
extend the proviso of the third section to the whole act would 
cut off a very large portion of those intended to be relieved 
by the first and second sections; it would make the whole 
proviso, as to the first section, useless tau to logy; it would 
leave many of the sailors and marines, who had returned to 
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the service and been honorably discharged, provided for in 
the second section, standing upon the rolls charged with de-
sertion; it would leave many who died from wounds received 
in battle stigmatized on the record as deserters. These, with 
many similar considerations, clearly establi8h that it was the 
intent of the law-maker (which is the law) that the word 
''act," in the third section, from an interpretation by the 
subject-matter, the spirit and reason, and the effect and con-
sequence of the law, means "section." 
I therefore answer your :first inquiry, that the words "by 
reason of absence from his command at the time be became 
entitled to his discharge," are to be regarded as equally ap-
plicable to both classes referred to in your :first question. 
I answer your second inquiry, that the proviso contained 
in the third section is applicable to that section alone. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NA. VY. 
RESCISSION OF CONTRACT. 
Upon the facts stated: Advised that a contract entered into on the 15th 
of December, 1887, between Charles Rohr and the Bureau of Animal 
Industry of the Department of Agriculture, may be considered re-
scinded and no longer binding upon said Bureau after. June 30, 1888. 
DEP .AR'l.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 19, 1889. 
SIR: I have considered the communication of the Com-
missioner of Agriculture, dated the 15th instant, transmitted 
to me by you, requesting my opinion whether a certain con-
tract, dated December 15, 1887, between Charles Rohr, of 
Baltimore County, in the State of Maryland, of the :first part, 
and the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of ' 
Agriculture, of the second part, has expired by limitation of 
law or bas been rescinded by such Department and is no 
longer binding. I have a copy of the contract, and, also a 
copy of a communication dated J nne 7, 1888, from D. E. 
Salmon, Chief of the Bureau of Animf.l,l Industry, to the said 
Charles Rohr, notifying him that the contract would expire 
by limitation of law on June 30, 1888. 
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No definite period of time is fixed in the contract during 
which either party is to be bound by its terms or entitled to 
its benefits; this being so, either party to the contract was 
at liberty to put an end to it on reaspnable notice to the 
other. (PaJmer v. Vandenbergh, 3 Wend., 193; .. McLees v. 
Hale, 10 Wend., 426.) 
Although the notice herein before mentioned from D. E. 
Salmon, Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, to the 
said Charles Rohr did not in terms contain a rescission of 
the contract, it informed him that the Bureau would con-
sider the contract at an end on June 30, 188~. 
The notice so given would seem to have been a reasonable 
one as to time, and the contract may therefore be considered 
rescinded and no longer binding upon the Bureau of Animal 
Industry of the Department of Agriculture. 
Very respactfuly, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The PRESIDENT. 
CONSULAR FEES. 
A certified consular invoice is required by law for the admission to entry 
of imported merchandise not subject to duty, excepting where Con-
gress has expressly dispensed with that requirement. · 
The new edition of the Consular Regulations of 1888 contains provisions 
making the fee for a consular certificate to an invoice of merchandise 
not subject to duty official and returnable to the Treasury. 
The fee for such certificate may be rendered official by ExecutiYe order. 
and specially included in the tariff of official fees under the Revised 
Statutes. • 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 22, 1889. 
SIR: Yours of the 21st ultimo and of the 3d instant, with 
inclosure, have been received, and in them you request an 
official opinion upon three propositions touching the subject 
of consular fees, which have arisen by reason of a recent de-
cision of the United States Court of Claims in the claim of 
JohnS. Mosby, the former consul at Hong-Kong, China. 
Attorney-General Cushing had occasion, in 1855, to write 
an excellent opinion upon this and other subjects relating to 
the consular service, in which he construed the act of March 
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1, 1855, (10 Stat., 623; 7 Opin., 24:3). This act was, howeYer, 
wholly repealed by the act of August 18, 1856. (11 Stat., 65.) 
The important and material sections of the latter act were 
transferred to and are now embraced in the severft.l chapters 
of Title XVIII of the Revised Statutes. 
The questions presented for consideration bear directly 
upon the commercial relations of the Unite<l States with for-
eign governments or their subjects, and the provisions of law 
above referred to must necessa ·1ly, therefore, be considere~ 
in connection with the laws regulating the importation of 
goods, whether free or dutiable, into the United States. 
With this preliminary and casual reference to the law by 
which your propositions will be governed, I shall now answer 
your questions in their order: 
"The court hold that the certificate to an invoice of mer-
chandise not subject to duty is a non-official paper; that 
the Consular Regulations of 187 4 and 1881 contain no pro-
visions making the cons,ular charge for such a certificate an 
official fee; but they intimate that the President may, in his 
discretion, prescribe fees for non-official acts, and thereby 
render such fees official. This leads to the inquiry whether 
the new edition of the Consular Regulations, formulated by 
the President in February, 1888, to go into effect April 1, 
1888, contain any provision by virtue of which the fee for a 
consular certificate to an invoice of merchandise not subject 
to duty is made official and returnable to the Treasury. The 
paragraphs touching official fees and invoices are 491-508, 
and 636-682." 
Merchandise shipped to the United States in transit t~ a 
foreign country, as indicated by manifests, bills of lading, or 
other documents, are not importations into the United Statee 
under the law, and consular invoices are not required. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, importations under the stat-
utes consist of goods that are dutiable and goods that are 
admitted free. There is no controversy as to the require-
ment of an in voice and the character of the consular fee in 
regard to dutiable importations. It will be observed that 
the law upon the subject of consular invoices is found in the 
statutes regulating the customs duties. 
The answer, therefore, to the material part of the above 
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question depends upon tlle construction or application of the 
provisions of section 1 of the act of l\farch 3, 1863 (12 
Stat., 737) and of section 1 of the act of June 22, 1874, 
(18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 187.) The provisions of section 1 of the 
act of March 3, 1863, have been re-enacted in sections 2853, 
2855, and 2860, of the Revised Statutes; but no part of the 
act of June 22, 1874, has been embraced in the Revised 
Statutes. It may be found, however, in \Olume 1 of the 
Supplement to the Revised Statutes, page 79. 
These statRtes are now in full force, and in effect they are 
prohibitory. No distinction is made in them between dutia-
ble and free goods. Whether the goods belong to the one or 
the other class, they are alike importations. Nor are free 
importations included in the exceptions under which mer-
chandise may be admitted to entry without the invoices 
required by these statutes, although some exceptions are 
expressly made.. The law·makers ha,Te not included free 
goods within the exceptions, and they can not be admitted 
to entry without the consular in\oice required, unless the 
strict and familiar rule of construction of statutes is relaxed 
for the purpose. This can not be done. 
The first section of the act of l\Iarch 3, 1863, expressly pro-
hibits the admiEsion to entry of goods unless the consular 
invoice accompanies them. Section 9 of the act of June 22, 
1874, provides, "that except in the case of personal effects 
accompanying the passenger, no importation exceeding one 
hundred dollars, in dutiable value, shall be admitted to entry 
without the production of a duly certified inv4)ice thereof as 
required by law." * * * 
The State and Treasury Departments, which have cogni-
zance of these matters, ha,e, according to the information 
transmitted by you, construed the above statutes to mean 
that" the fact that imported goods are entitled to free entry 
does not excuse the production of a certified invoice." And 
in 1872 the question arose, and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury on the 8th of November in that year so decided, antl 
notified the collector of customs at San Francisco, Cal., by 
letter of such decision. 
"The construction given to a statute by those charged 
with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most 
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respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled with-
out cogent reasons (Edwards vs. Darby, 12 Wheat., 210; 
United States vs. The State Bank of North Cm·olina, 6 Pet., 
29; United States vs. ~JlcDaniel, 7 ib., 1). The officers con-
cerned are usually able men and masters of the subject. 
Not unfrequently they are the draughtsmen of the laws they 
are afterwards called upon to interpret." (United States vs. 
JJloor, 95 U. S. R., 763.) 
And the above rule of contemporaneous construction of 
statutes, by those charged with their execution, applies in all 
cases of ambiguity and doubt. (Swift Go. vs. United States, 
105 U. S. R., 695, and the cases therein cited; United States 
vs. Philbrick, 120 U.S. R., 52; l!nited States vs. Hill, ib., 169.) 
It is not necessary to discuss the reasons why certified 
consular invoices should or should not be required for free 
importations, inasmuch as the conclusion has been reached, 
as will be perceived from the above remarks, that such in-
voices are required by law. 
The President may, therefore, in his discretion, prescribe 
the fee for a consular certificate to au invoice of merchan-
dise not subject to duty as official and require it to be re-
turned to the Treasury. And even if those certified invoices 
were not required by law, the President is a'tthorized in his 
discretion, under section 1745 of the Revised Statutes, to 
designate the service of the consul in certifying such in-
voices as official, and also to declare the fee prescribed there-
for to be official, and require it to be accounted for to the 
Treasury. 
Upon my first examination of the paragraphs of the Con-
sular Regulations of 1888, referred to in your communication, 
I was under the impression that item 36 of paragraph 508 
included a special reference to the section of the Revised 
Statutes in which invoices for dutiable goods are required 
and the fee prescribed. But, upon further investigation and 
reflection, I find this impression to be erroneous. Item 36 
gf paragraph 508 is broad enough in its provisions to include 
the fee for a consular certificate to an invoice of merchandise 
not subject to duty, and to make such fee official and return-
able to the Treasury. 
In answer to your second inquiry, I beg to say, that I see 
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. 229 
Cherokee Citizenship. 
no reason why the fee for certifying an invoice may not be 
rendered official by Executive order and specially included 
in the tariff of fees in accordance with section 17 45 of the Re-
vised Statutes. 
The answers to your first and second inquiries render it 
unnecessary for me to express an opinion upon the third 
proposition submitted. 
I am of the opinion therefore-
( a) That a certified consular invoice is required by law for 
the admission to entry into the United States of goods and 
merchandise not subject to duty, except in the instances in 
which Congress has expressly dispensed with the require-
ment of the same. 
(b) That the new edition of the Consular Regulations of 
1888 contains provisions which make the fee for consular 
certificate to an invoice of merchandise not subject to duty 
official and returnable to the Treasury. 
I am also of the opinion that the fee for certificates to 
consular invoices may be rendered official by Executive 
order, and specially included in the tariff of official fees under 
the Revised Statutes. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
CHEROKEE CITIZENSHIP. 
Where a North Carolina Cherokee Indian removed into the Cherokee 
Nation and permanently located there subsequent to the date of the 
act of the Cherokee legislature of l(j70, relating to the admission to 
citizenship in that nation of North Carolina Cherokees, and made 
proof as in said act is required, and was thereupon admitted to citi-
zenship by the chief-justice under its provisions, he thereby became 
fully invested with the rights, privileges, and immunities of Cherokee 
citizenship. 
The action of the chief-justice, under the act, is final, and leaves noth-
ing for review. 
The Interior Dapartment is under no obli~ation to respect a later decis-
ion of the Cherokee authorities made pursuant to the order of a com-
mission subsequently established. 
/ 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 23, 1889. 
SIR: I have received your communication of the 7th in-
stant, which is in the following language. 
"I have the honor to band you herewith a copy of an act 
of the legislature of the Cherokee Nation in 1870~ in relation 
to the admission to Cherokee citizenship of North Carolina 
Cherokees, in which it is provided: that all such Cherokees 
as may hereafter remove into the Cherokee Nation, and per-
manently locate therein as citizens thereof, shall be deemed 
as Cherokee citizens, provided such Cherokees shall enroll 
themselves before the chief-justice of the supreme court 
within two months after their removal in the Cherokee Na-
tion and make such showing to him of their being Chero-
kees, and the said chief-justice is hereby required to report 
the number, names, ages, and sex of all persons admitted 
by him to be entitled to Cherokee citizenship, and also the 
number, names, ages, and sex of the persons denied the 
rights of Cherokee citizenship, to the annual session of the 
national council in each year; and thereupon to solicit your 
opinion upon the following questions: 
'' (1) If a North Carolina Cherokee removed into the Cher-
okee Nation and permanently located there subsequent to 
the date of the act, and within two months of his remo·val 
made satisfactory proof of his char::tcter as a Cherokee to the 
chief-justice, and was by him admitted, was be thereby 
fully invested with the rights, privileges, and immunities of 
Cherokee citizenship~ or did there .remain in the council 
or legislature or other authorities of the Cherokee Nation a 
right of supervision over the act of the chief-Justicr., so that 
the question remained dependent on future determination by 
superior authority 1 
"(2) If a North Carolina Cherokee admitted within the 
time and according to the terms of the foregoing act, after 
permanent location according to its requirements, should 
be some years subsequently declared bJ· a commission, es-
tablished by the Cherokee legislature to inquire into the claim 
of residents in the nation to citizenship, to be not properly 
entitled to such citizenship, is the Department under obliga-
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tion to respect the later decision by the Cherokee authori-
ties, and, upon the demand of the principal chief, to remove 
such person aR an intruder under the existing treaties be-
tween the United States and the Cherokee ~ation ~" 
In answer to the fir~t question pr~)pounded, I beg leave to 
say, that a North Carolina Cherokee removed into the Chero-
kee Nation as stated in such question, and who made proof 
as therein named, was thereby fully invested with the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of Cherokee citizenship. 'fhis 
was a species of naturalization resorted to by the legislature 
of the Cherokee Nation in 1870, and would stand to that ex-
tent precisely as a judgment of a court under an act of 
Uongress conferring citizenship in the United. States upon a 
foreigner or an alien, and closes all inquiry, and, like every 
other judgment, is complete evidence of its own validity. 
(Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters, 406.) Or, to state it a little more 
broadly, a judgment in this proceeding by the chief-justice 
of the supreme court of the Cherokee Nation was in the ex-
ercise of a special jurisdiction conferred upon him, and comes 
within the familiar rule that when a special tribunal is 
authorized to hear and determine certain matters its ueci-
sions within the scope of its authority are conclusive. 
I find from the papers submitted no authority to super-
vise this act of the chief-justice, and I certainly think there 
is none. The right of citizenship is determined in this pro-
ceeding and becomes an adjudicated matter, and to leave it 
an open question for review by the legislature or the council 
or other authority would be to unsettle every right of citizen-
ship based upon that act. In this, as in all other things, 
there must be a termination-an ending-somewhere, aucl 
the proper construction of this act is that the judgment of 
the chief-justice, rendered according to the terms of such 
act, is the final determination, and leaves nothing for review. 
These principles of law would apply, if possible, with more 
force here than in ordinary cases, because it appears from 
the papers submitted that the Cherokee council invited the 
.North Carolina Cherokees to come to the Cherokee Nation 
and to become identified therein as citizens, and this pla}l 
of making them citizens was adopted to carry out the pur-
pose of that invitation. 
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And it therefore follows, as a consequence, in reply to 
your second inquiry. that the Department of the Interior is 
under no obligation to respect the decision of the Cherokee 
authorities in pursuance of the order of a commission estab-
lished by the Cherokee legislature to inquire into the claims 
to citizenship o'f these persons adjudged to be citizens, a 
designated in the :first-named inquiry. The right of citizen-
ship can not be forfeited by legislative act directly or indi-
rectly no more than can be the right of property. 
As requested by you, I herewith return the copy of the 
law of the Cherokee Nation. 
Very respectfully, A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
TIMBER ON INDIAN LANDS. 
An Indian allottee of land under the act of February o, 1887, chapter 119, 
does not possess the right to cut and sell merchantable timber standing 
upon the land, excepting such as it may be necessary to cut in clear-
ing the premises for agricultural or grazing purposes, or to erect suit-
able buildings thereon. 
Until the second patent provided for by the fifth section of said act is 
granted, it is the duty of the Interior Department, by virtue of the 
legal title remaining in the Government and the trust relation assumed 
by it, to prevent the cutting of timber except for the above-men-
tioned purposes, whether the land is or is not within an Indian 
reservation. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 26. 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 21st of January, 1889, you 
ask: 
"(1) Whether an allottee under the act of February 8, 
1887 (24 Stat., 388), possesses the right to cut and sell 
merchantable timber, whether pine or hard wood, standing 
upon the lands allotted to him and held under the trust 
patent by which the title is reserved for twenty-five years or 
longer to the United States . 
. "(2) If such allottees possess the right of sale to any ex-
tent, is the Department authorized to exert any control over 
the disposition of the property, except when the land still re-
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mains within an Indian reservation within its jurisdiction 
under the statute~" 
The Indians when organized as tribes, under the former 
policy of the Government, have been treated as domestic 
dependent nations under the guardianship of the United 
States. That their condition would L>e made better if, in-
stead of their separate national organization, with the 
nomadic and improvident habits incident to it, they were 
severally qualified as speedily as possible for self-reliant 
-citizenship in the several States and Territories and endowed 
with political rights, is ,3hown to be the conclusion reached 
by Congress, which inspired the passage of the act to which 
you refer. The act is intended to change the wandering, 
improvident, and semi-civilized hunter to the domestic, in-
dustrious, and enlightened citizen. The first step adopted 
to promote this end is to give to each Indian a home, with a 
sense of ownership. The act contemplates that these homes 
shall, in the first instance, be agricultural. The first indus-
tries are to· be farming and grazing, as shown by the first 
section of the act,, for the land to be allotted is to be such 
as is'' advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes.' 
In this contemplated new mode of life the guardianship 
which heretofore has been exercised over the tribe is to be 
transferred to the individual allottees provided for in this 
act. The separate manhood of each Indian is to be recog-
nized, but still subject for a time to the care and supervis1ou 
<>f the Government as trustee or guardian. ThP. real estate 
falling to each allottee is not intended to be used during the 
period of the guardianship for speculative purposes, but is 
so conditioned that in their period of wardship and tutelage 
the Indians shall not be subject to the danger of entering 
into an unequal competition with the whites in the field of 
traffic and general busine8S outside of agriculture and graz-
ing. The fifth section of the act provides for two different 
patents to be given to each allottee for the same land; the 
first to be ''of the legal effect, and declare that the United 
States does and will hold the. land thus allotted, for the 
period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and 
benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have 
been made, or, in case of his decease, of his heirs according 
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to the laws of the State or Territory where such land is 
located. The second is, "that at the expiration of said 
period the United States will convey the same by p~ent to 
said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged · of 
said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever." 
Prior to the issuing of the second patent the United States 
is to act as trustee of the lands. This relation as to the 
lands is substituted for the guardianship heretofore exercised 
over the tribe. For twenty-five years or longer the obliga-
tion exists to see that the intent of the law shall be faith-
fully carried out, and no unlawful waste committed either by 
the cestui qui trust or any one else. During that period the 
land is intended to be used for agricultural and grazing pur-
poses. Whatever timber may be 'necessaril,y· cut or used for 
the promotion of these· purposes the trustee should permit. 
To sell the timber growing on the land, or to cut it for sale 
for commercial purposes, except such as may be cut in clear-
ing the land or for improvements to be erected thereon, would 
be inconsistent with the obligation of the trustee to preserYe 
and protect the trust. And the ruling in United States v. Cook 
(19 Wall., 591) woulu seem to meet this question. The opinion 
rendered by me July 21, 1885. to the Secretary of the Interior 
on the question of leasing Indian lands fm· grazing purposes 
in its logic reaches this proposition. 
Your first inquiry is therefore answered, that the allottee 
does not possess the right to cut and sell merchantable 
timber, except such as it may be necessary to cut in clearing 
the land for agricultural or grazing purposes or to erect 
suitable buildings thereon. 
To your second inquiry I reply, that by virtue of the legal 
title remaining in the Go\ernment and the trust relation as-
sumed by it until the second patent is granted, it is the duty 
of the Department to prevent the cutting of timber except 
for the purposes above indicated, whether the land is or is 
not within an Indian reservation. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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NAVAL VESSELS-ARMAMENT. 
The words" exclusive of armament," as used in the first section of the 
act of August 3, 1886, chap. !:!49, are not to be understood as excluding 
the offensive armament, such as guns, torpedoes, eto., only; the term 
''armament" comprehending, besides those articles, such shields and 
protections as are directly and necessarily connected with the efficient 
and safe working thereof. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Jawuary 31, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 14th of January, 1889, you ask: 
"(1) Whether the words' exclusive of armament,' as used 
in the first section of said act of August 3, 1886, with refer-
ence to the' armored vessels,' the construction of which is 
therein authorized, are to be un_derstood as excluding only 
the offensive armament, consisting of such articles as guns, 
torpedoes, etc., with the apparatus for serving them; or 
"(2) Whether the word 'armament,' as applied to said ar-
mored vessels, viz, the armored battle-ship Texas and the ar-
mored cruiser ~faine, is to be understood as including, besides 
guns, torpedoes, etc., and the apparatus for serving them, 
armor-plates for turrets, sighting-towers on turrets, turret 
aud breastwork tops, and breastworks below turrets to pro-
tect the turning and loading gear; in other words, such por-
tions of armored protection as are directly and necessarily 
connected with the efficient and safe working of the offensive 
arm~ment, and consti.tute, practically, an indispensaBle por-
tion of the defensive armament." 
The first clause of the first section of the act of August 3, 
188~ (24 Stat., 215), is: 
"First. Two sea-going, double-bottomed, armored vessels 
of about six thousand tons displacement, designed for a speed 
of at least sixteen knots an hour, with engines having all 
necessary appliances for working under forced draught, aud 
costing, including engi_fies and machinery and excluding ar-
mament, not more than two million five hundred thousand dol~ 
lars each. Said Yessels shall have each a complete torpedo 
outfit and be armed in the most effective manner." 
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The following provisions relating to the same subject are 
found in the fourth section of the act of the 3d of l\1arch, 
1887 (24 Stat., 594): 
"For expenditure towards the construction and comple 
tion (exclusive of armament) of * * * the vessels author-
ized by the act of August third, eighteen hundred and eighty-
six, two million four hundred and twenty thousand dollars. 
"Towards the armament * * * of the vessels author-
ized by sections one and two of the act of August third, 
eighteen hundred and eighty-six * * * two million one 
hundred and twenty-eight thousand three hundred and sixty-
two dollars. 
" Towards procuring, testing, and delivering the armor 
and gun steel for the vessels authorized by section one of the 
act of August third, eighteen hundred and eighty-six * • * 
four million dollars." 
The statute first cited refers to the construction of the 
vessels alone, exclusive of armament. The above quotations 
from the act of 1887 contemplate thre~ different stages of pro-
gression towards the final qualification of the vessels for act-
ual use. First, " the construction of the vessels;" second, 
''towards the armament of the vessels;" and, third, "to-
wards the procuring, testing, and delivering of the armor and 
gun steel." The exclusion of the armament from the con-
struction of the vessels in the first act shows the armament 
is not to be regarded as part of the construction of the ves-
sels. The separate appropriations for the armament and for 
the procuring, testing, and delivering of the armor and gun 
steel in the last act, together with the last clause in the first 
act, show that the offensive arms and torpedo outfit are not 
understood as including all that is contained in the word 
"armament." That word, tLerefore, is intended to embrace 
an element in the completely fitted and armed vessel which 
is not included in the construction of the vessel nor in the 
offensive weapons known as guns, arms, and torpedoes. The 
armament contemplated in the appropriation acts is intended 
to be broader than the mere word "arms," and includes cer-
tain elements which are intermediate between the finished 
vessel and the final equipment with guns, arms, and torpe-
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does. The construction of the \essel includes all that is nec-
essary to finish and qualify it for use for all purpos.es as a 
\essel, which embraces the armor for protection of the ship 
itself but does not include the shields or protections which in 
battle only are necessary for the safety of the crew or for the 
~afety of tbe offensive implements of war, nor such additional 
constructions as are intended for such emergencies only . 
.After the vessel is thus finished with the material, strength, 
endurance, and power of resistance contemplated by the act 
it may be compared to a well-developed man, with vigor to 
march, strength to bear fatigue, and fortitude to endure pain, 
who is about to be mustered into the military service, but, 
except these qualifications, with no preparation to specifically 
fit him for offensive wal:'-like service. A merchant vessel con-
structed of the material, with the speed, strength, endurance, 
protection, and the capability to passively bear the amount of 
violence anticipated, would be the cGnstructed vessel p:·o-
vided for in the act. But the acts intend the vessel should 
be used for offense; that there are shields and protections to 
be specially provided for the safety of those engaged in battle 
and for the protection of the arms and illlplements which are 
only useful for such emergencies; also that there may be ad-
ditional attachments needed to be made to the constructed 
vessel to enable those engaged in naval warfare to intelli-
gently and effectively use the implements of war, and that 
there may be additional protections necessary specially for 
these additional constructions. None of these latter would 
constitute a part of the construction of the vessel, neither 
would they be arms, guns, or torpedoes, nor the apparatus 
for serving them; and yet they would come under the sig-
nification of the term "armament." 
I therefore answer your first inquiry in the negative, and 
your second in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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ILLEGAL :FEES PAID CUSTOMS OFFICERS. 
When a. person at different times between April, 1882, and October, 1887, 
paid to customs officers, by deductions from drawbacks allowed him, 
alleged illegal fees, but gave no notice of dissatisfaction and took no 
appeal from the decisions of such officers to the Treasury Departm'3nt : 
Advised that he can not recover back such fees bv suit. 
DEPARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
Febru,ary 2, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 28th of January, 1889, yon sub-
mit for my opinion substantially the inquiry whether a person 
who, at different times between April, 1882~ and October, 1887, 
has paid, by deductions from drawbacks allowed him, alleged 
illegal official fees and extra expenses~ but who did not gi\"e 
notice of dissatisfaction, nor appeal from the decision of the 
collector, can recov·er by snit such alleged illegal fees and 
expenses. 
The laws authorizing drawbacks are a part of the general 
system of customs-revenue laws. The duty of administer-
ing them is committed to the customs revenue officers as a 
part of their general duties. The fees and expenses incident 
to the discharge of those duties are customs· revenue fees and 
expenses. The extra expenses, if any were charged, are ex-
pressly pro\"ided for bl'.the last clause of the Treasury Reg-
ulations of 1884, No. 970. Section 3057 of the Revised Stat-
utes authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make such 
regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to 
carry into effect the laws relating to drawback. 
Section 2932 of the Revised Statutes provides : 
"The decisions of the respective collectors of cu~toms as 
to all fees, charges, and exactions, of whateYer character, 
• • • claimed by them, or by any of the officers under 
them, in the performance of their official duty, shall be final 
and conclusive against all persons interested in such fees, 
cllarges, or exactions, unless the like notice (as pro\"ided in 
the preceding section) that an ap11eal will be taken from such 
decision to the Treasury, shall be given within ten days 
from the making of such decisions." 
This section embraces all fees, charges, and exactions 
claimed by the collectors~ and the officers under them, in the 
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discharge of their general duties as re\·enue officers. If a 
special duty, not relating to the reYenue, sl.wulu be by law 
required of such an officer, such sen·ice might not come 
within its provisions; but it clearly intends to subject the 
right to collect back alleged illegal official fees and charges 
paid to customs reYenue officers to the same restrictions that 
are imposed by section 2931 as to alleged errors in the classi-
fication of goods and rates of duty on importe(l merchandise. 
The reason of the law is as applicable to oue as to the other. 
If the exporter claiming the drawback expresses no dissat-
isfaction with the fees and expenses charged at the time 
they are paid, nor for years after, a subsequent claim would 
be defeated, as a voluntary payment, and be reg&rded as an 
acquiescence or ratification of the action of the officer, and 
there could be no recovery. The law prescribes the only 
mode by which he can avoid the consequences of a T"oluntary 
payment, which is, that he shall give notice of dissatisfaction 
and appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. In the case 
submitted this has not been done. The law certainly does 
not contemplate that after the proper officers have liquidated 
the amount of the drawback, and the complainant, witLont 
dissent, has accepted the liquidation and received his money, 
after the transaction has been closed, it can, at an indefinite 
period thereafter, be re-opened on account of alleged excess-
ive fees and expenses, in the face of a statute so plain in its 
provisions as section 2932. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS. 
In September, 1887, H. entered into a contract with the Quartermaster's 
Department to perform certain work, but afterwards, being in default, 
it was arranged that his bondsmen, C. and R., should take charge of 
and complete the work ; and in pursuance of this arrangement H. exe-
. cuteu and delivered a power of attorney to them, by which the~' were 
authorized to receive and receipt for the money due on the contract. 
C. and R. signed receipted vouchers for the balance due: Adt•ised that 
the Department may recognize the power of attorney of H., and that 
payment to C. and R. upon the receipted vouchers thereunder will dis-
charge the Government. 
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DEPAR'lMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Febr'ttary 19, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 16th of February, 1889, you ask 
''whether payment should be made to James S. Culver, as 
proposed by the Quartermaster-General in his indorsement 
of the 13th instant." 
The inquiry arises upon the following facts: On the 7th of 
September, 1887, a contract was made between the United 
States and George D. Hullinger & Son for the erection of cer· 
tain buildings at Fort Riley. On the 9th of January, 1888, it 
appears from a letter of the Quartermaster-General, in charge 
at that post, that the contractors were in default, and were 
unable to perform the contract; that J. S. Culver and Hen-
son Robinson were their bondsmen; that it had been agreed 
between the principals and the contractors that the bonds-
men should take charge of and compl~te the work. In pur-
suance of that agreement George D. Hullinger & Son exe-
cuted and delivered a power of attorney to J. S. Culver and 
Henson Robinson, authorizing them to receive and receipt for 
the money on the contract. On the 9th day of September, 
1888, Culver and Robinson made an assignment of the balance 
due on the final estimates to HenryS. Davis, jr., and, as attor-
neys of George D. Hullinger & Son, signed receipted vouch-
ers for the balance. J. S. Culver had been the managing 
partner of the firm of Culver & Robinson in the completion 
of the. work, and by the contract between him and Robinson 
he alone was authorized to sign the firm name and take en· 
tire charge of the business of the firm. The power of attor· 
ney of Hullinger & Son to Culver & Robinson does not au-
thorize the latter to assign the money to be paid on the con-
tract, nor to empower any one else to receive it. It does fully 
authorize Culver & Robinson to receive the money, and 
stands unrevoked. 
Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes declares all powers of 
attorney for receiving payment of claims against the GovP-rn-
ment void unless made and executed after the allowance of 
the claim. 
In the case of Goodman v. Niblack (102 U.S. R., 560) it is 
ruled that th~ "sole purpose" of thA ~bove section "was to 
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protect the Government, and not the parties to the assign-
ment." 
In the case of Bailey v. United States (109 U. S. R., 439), 
in construing the same section, it is ruled : 
"A mere power of attorney gi"\"en before the warrant is 
issued-so long at least as it is unexecuted-may undou bt-
edly be treated. by the claimant as absolutely null and void 
in any contest between him and his attorney in fact. And 
it may be so regarded by the officers of the Government, 
whose duty it is to adjust the claim and issue a warrant for 
its amount. But if those officers chose to make payment to 
the person whom the claimant, by formal power of attorney, 
has accredited to them as authorized to receive payment, 
the claimant can not be permitted to make his own disregarcl 
of the statute the basis for impeaching the settlement had 
with his agent. To bold otherwise would be inconsistent 
with the ruling heretofore made, and with which, upon con-
sideration, we are entirely satisfied-that the purpose of 
Congress, by the enactments in question, was to protect the 
Government against frauds upon the part of claimants and 
those who might become interested with them in the prose-
cation of claims, whether before Congress or the several 
Departments." 
You may therefore, as the interests of justice in your own 
judgment dictate, recognize the power of attorney of Hulliuger 
& Son to Culver & Robinson; and if you deem it right to do 
so, the receipted vouchers signed by Culver & Robinson as. 
attorneys of Hullinger & Son, as submitted with your letter, 
if properly filled, will discharge the Government. As the 
power of attorney is a joint one, it requires that tlle payments 
shal1 be joint to Culver & Robinson. The warrant should, 
therefore, be made to them jointly. But as J. S. Culver is 
the managing member of the firm, and he alone is authorized 
to sign the name of the firm, the warrant when issued should 
be delivered to him. As he appears to be authorized to con-
duct the business of tlle firm, and sign its ~arne~ his en-
dorsement of the name of the firm on the warrant would be 
a valid transfer. 
This substantially answers the legal questions submitted 
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in your communicatio11, but whether you sho1tld issue the 
warrant or not, as above suggested, is entirely within your 
official discretion. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CONTRACT WITH POTTA W ATOMIE INDIANS. 
The Secretary of the Interior may approve a certaiu contract of E. John 
Ellis with the Potta.watomie Indians, as recommended by the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIQE, 
February 26, 1889. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your favQr of the 25th instant, 
which reads as follows: 
"I have the honor herewith to transmit to you a contract 
in duplicate between A. F. Navarre, John Anderson, and 
Stephen Negonquit, representi11g the citizen band of Potta-
watomie Indians, on the one part, and E. John Ellis, on the 
other part, and therewith a communication from the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, recommending my approval of 
this contract (in duplicate), and also therewith accompanying 
paper8, including four opinions heretofore given to this De-
partment by you in respect to the right of this Department 
to approve the contracts; and, in view of the statements 
made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, respectfully to 
inquire whether it is now admissible under the statutes for 
this Department to approve this contract, as recommended 
to be done, limiting such approval to the services which re-
mained unperformed at the time when your former opinion 
was given, and not embraced in the act of April 4, 1888, en-
titled 'An act to euable the Secretary of the Interior to pay 
certain creditors of the Pottawatomie Indians out of the 
funds of said Indians.' " 
And in reply to the question propounded by .you I beg to 
submit that, in the opinion I rendered to you on the 16th day 
of April last, I held that the act of April 4, 1888, referred to 
by you in your communication now before me, was a curative 
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act, and made good the contract under which Mr. Ellis 
claimed, the same having been held by me in different opin-
ions as being an invalid contract for reasons stated in those 
opinions and not necessary to be repe&,ted here. While this 
act referred to had in mind especially the services then ren-
dered by Mr. Ellis, still it made valid, in my opinion, the 
contract for services that he had performed, as well as those 
he should perform in future under it; in other words, it vali-
. dated the contract for all purposes. The history of this act, 
as gathered from two reports by the Committee on Indian 
Affairs in the House of Representatives touching this very 
subject matter (Reports No. 160 and 1702, first session Fif-
tieth Congress), sustains, I think, to the fullest extent the 
view here expressed by me; and I am therefore of the opin-
ion that you can recognize the contract and act under it, 
and that the action 8f the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as 
disclosed by his letter of the 16th instant, is correct. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
In February and March, 1886, certain liquors (which bad been manu-
factured in the United States, in a bonded manufacturing warehouse 
established under the provisions of section 3433, Revised Statutes, out 
of both domestic and imported spjrits that were removed to such ware-
house without payment of either the internal-revenue or customs 
duties, and wh10h liquors had been exported therefrom) were importod 
into New York and assessed with the duty prescribed by the statute 
(Schedule H) as foreign liquors: Advised that-the liquors being of the 
manufacture of the United States and onceexported-section2500, Re-
vised Statutes, affords the rule under which to levy duties thereon. 
That section does not contemplate the levying of different rates of duty 
on the several different ingredients of which an article may be com-
posed; it is the product that is to be taxed, not its constituent in-
gredients. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 1, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 14th of February, 1889, you 
request my views on a question in which you submit the fol-
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lowing facts: One 0. M. Roof imported in. to New York in 
February and March, 1886, from Bermuda, certain liquors 
styled "bay rum," "London Club rum," "St. Croix rum," 
''Jamaica rum," "brandy," and "Hennessy and Otard 
brandy," which liquors upon importation were assessed with 
the duty prescribed by the statute (Schedule H for foreign 
liquors). 
The importer, however, prote sted and appealed to the De 
partment under the provisions of section 2931 of the Revised-
Statutes, and claimed that the liquors were of domestic manu-
facture upon which no internal-revenu~ tax had been paid, 
and that they were entitled to entry under section 2500 of the 
Revised Statutes, as contained in the act of March 3, 1883; 
that is, upon the payment of a duty equal to the tax imposed 
by the internal-revenue laws upon such articles. 
Upon investigation it was ascertained that the liquors in 
question had been manufactured in the united States, in a 
bonded manufacturing warehouse established under t~e pro-
visions of section 3433 of the Revised Statutes, from domestic 
spirits and imported rums and brandies which bad been re-
moved to such manufacturing warehouse without pa~·ment 
of either the internal-revenue tax or the duties due under the 
tariff. 
Section 3433 of the Revised Statutes provides for bonded 
manufacturing warehouses. The object intended to be pro-
moted by such bonded manufacturing warehouses was do-
mestic manufacturing for exportation. In order that the man-
ufacturers might be able to compete with others successfully 
in foreign markets, the material used in the product was re-
lieved from both customs and internal-revenue tax. The sec-
tion contemplates the product may be composed partly of 
domestic material and partly of imported foreign material. 
The first clause of the section is : ''All medicines, prepara-
tions, compositions, perfumery, cosmetics, cordials, and other 
liquors manufactured wholly or in part of domestic spirits in. 
tended for exportation." 
A later clause of the same section is: "Any materials im-
ported into the United States may, under such rules as the 
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, and under the 
direction of the proper officer, be removed in original pack-
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ages from on shipboard, or from the bonded warehouse in 
which the same may be, into the bonded warehouse in which 
such manufacture may be carried on, for the purpose of being 
used in such manufacture, without payment of duties tlwreon 
and may there be used in such manufacture.'~ 
This clause substantially declares that material imported 
which is manufactured under the section may be used in the 
product "without payment of duties thereon." The prod-
uct or manufactured article for export, therefore, whether 
composed wholly or in part of domestic material, is free from 
taxation as a manufacture of the United States. The law has 
placed such safeguards around bonded manufacturing ware 
houses as were thought necessary to avoid fraudulent or col-
-r.rable manufacturing or exportation under its provisions. 
After the exportation is completed, the operative force of the 
provisions of this section is exhausted. The general rule 
provided by the act of 1883 (free list, clause No. 649) is, that 
"articles the growth, produce, and manufacture of the United 
States, when returned in the same condition as exported,'7 
shall be free. An exception to this rule is found in section 
2500 of the Revised Statutes, which is a part of the customs-
revenue laws. That section provides: 
"Upon the re-importation of articles once exported, of the 
growth, product, or manufacture of the United States, upon 
which no internal tax bas been assessed or paid, or upon 
which such tax has been paiu and refunded by allowance or 
drawback, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty 
equal to the tax imposed by the internal-revenue laws upon 
such articles." 
Articles grown, produced, or manufactured '' ~cithin the 
United States" are regarded, in the language of the customs 
laws, as the growth, production, and manufacture of the 
United States. 
The articles referred to in your communication, as I under-
stand, you find as a fact were manufactured in the United 
States, and that they were exported and re-imported. If so, 
so far as the importations are dutiable section 2500 of the 
Revised Statutes affords the rule under which to levy the 
duties thereon. 
The communication of the naval officer, in which he sug-
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gests an analysis of the manufactured articles and the im-
position of different rates oi duty on the several elements of 
which each particular article is composed, can not be enter-
tained, for section 2500 of the Revised Statutes imposes a 
uniform tax upon the product or manufacture as an entirety. 
It does not contemplate the levying of different rates of duty 
on the several different ingredients or material of which a 
single article may be composed. It is the product or manu-
factured article that is to be taxed, not its constituent in-
gredients. 
That the manufacturing bonded warehouse system might 
be used fraudulently to evade the revenue is no sufficient 
reason to justify an unnatural construction of the statutes. 
It must be assumed that the law-makers have placed around 
the subject such guards as they believed would be sufficient 
to avoid the schemes of dishonest men. If a manufacture 
for exportation, or the exportation, were only colorable, and 
used as a means to defraud the revenue, such manufacture 
and exportation might in law be treated as voidable, and 
none of the benefits of the bonded manufacturing warehouse 
system would accrue to the wrong-doer. 
Very respectfully, 
A. H. GARLAND. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
OPINIONS 
OF 
HON. WILLIAM. H. H. MILLER, OF INDIANA. 
APPOINTED MARCH 5, 1889. 
ESTATE OF THOMAS CONNER. 
C., having for several years been a beneficiary and resident in the United 
States Naval Asylum at Philadelphia, died in the asylum in August, 
1888, intestate, leaving perAonal effects of the value of about $12,000, 
which were turned over to the proper officer at the asylum agreeably 
to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy under section 
4811, Revised Statutes, for the disposition of the property of decedents 
in such cases. In November, 1888, letters of administration were 
granted on C.'s estate under the law of Pennsylvania by the State 
court; and in December, 1888, an inquisition in proceedings in escheat 
was had jn the State court, whereby his estate purported to be 
escheated to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The escheator and 
the administrator apply to the Secretary of the Navy for delivery of 
the personal effects of the decedent now in possession of the officer of 
the asylum. It appearing that in April, 1834, the State ceded to the 
United States jurisdiction over the land occupied by the asylum: Ad-
vised that the proceedings of the State court granting administration 
of the estate of C., and escheating the same, were void for want of 
jurisdiction, and that neither the administrator nor the escheator has 
any right to the possession of such estate. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 6, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 1st of February, 1889, and the 
papers with it transmitted, it appears that for some years 
Thomas Conner bas been a beneficiary dud permanent resi-
dent in the United States Naval Asylum at Philadelphia. 
On the 25th of August, 1888, he died intestate in the asylum. 
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His personal estate at the time of his death was of the value 
of about $12,000. On the 6th day of August, 1885, in pursu-
ance of section 4811 of the Revised Statutes, the Secretary 
of the Navy had prescribed rules and regulations for the dis-
position of the estate of the beneficiaries who dwelt at and 
died in the asylum. By those regulations provisions are 
made for the discovery of the legal Leirs of a decedent, if any 
such exist, and, if any are found, for the distribution of his 
personal estate. If no heirs are found, the money and the 
proceeds of the personal effects of the decedent are to be 
turned over to the pay officer, to abide the action of Con-
gress as to its final disposition. 
In the case of Thomas Conner's estate it appears that the 
search for heirs prescribed by the regulations has not yet 
been fully made. The estate is yet held for that purpose by 
the proper officers of the asylum. 
On the 7th of November, 1888, letters of administration on 
the estate were granted, in accordance with the intestate 
laws of Pennsylvania, to WilliamN. Ritchie, of Philadelphia. 
On the 27th of December, 1888, an inquisition in proceed-
ings in escheat was filed in t!Je court of common pleas of 
Philadelphia, whereby the personal estate of the decedent 
purported to be escheated to the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania. The deputy escheator of Pennsylvania requests the 
Secretary of the Navy to deliver into his custody tLe uooks 
and other evidences of indebtedness which belonged to 
Thomas Conner, which are now in possession of the proper 
officer of the United States at the asylum. The adminis-
trator, by his attorney, joins in this request. 
You submit, substantiall;y, for my consideration under the 
above-stated facts, whether the deputy escheator of Pennsyl-
vania and the administrator appointed by the State court 
have a legal right to the personal estate of Thomas Conner 
or any part of it. 
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the solution of 
the question whether the State courts of Pennsylvania have 
jurisdiction of the tHles to the estate of the decedent. 
"It has long been settled, and is a principle of universal 
JUrisprudence in all civilized nations, that the personal 
estate of the deceased is to be regarded, for the purposes of 
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succession and distribution, where\er situated, as having no 
{)ther locality than that of his domicile, and if he dies intes-
tate the sucf!ession is go,erned by the law of the place where 
he was domiciled at the time of his decease, and not by the 
conflicting laws of the \arious places where the property 
happened at the time to be situated." (Wilkins Ys. Ellett, 9 
Wall., 7 ±1.) 
The United States :Naval Asylum was the domicile of 
Thomas Conner. If the jurisdiction of the State courts and 
the laws of Pennsyl\ania do not extend to that asylum, nor 
to the grounds appurtenant to it, the action of the courts in 
granting letters of administration and escheating the estate 
of the decedent, as a means of \esting the title to the pos-
session of the personal property, is Yoid. 
On the lOth day of April, 1834, the State of Pennsylvania, 
by an act of its legislature duly approved, ceded the juris-
diction over the territory occupied by the asylum in which 
Conner lived and died to the United States, in pursuance of 
the first article of the Constitution of the United States, 
which provides : 
" The Congress shall have power • • • to exercise 
exclusiYe legislation in all cases whatsoe\er, over such di.!s-
trict (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cessiou of 
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, uecome 
the seat of the Government of the United States, ancl to exer-
cise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of 
the legislatu-re of the State in 1.chich the same shall be, for the 
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other 
needful buildings." 
After the cession of any territory to the United States by 
a State, under this provision of the Constitution, the legis-
lative power of Congress is exclusive, and the whole undi-
minished sovereignty over the territory ceded is vested in the 
United States. Although the territory in this case was and 
is within the extet nal boundaries of the State of Pennsyl-
vania, as to its laws and judicial tribunals, since the cession, 
it is extraterritorial and constitutes a part of the exclusive 
domain of the United States. Under this clause of the Con-
stitution the ceded territory is legally hehl in the same cate-
gory as the District of Columbia, which, under the same 
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clause, was originally ceded in part by the State of Mary-
land and in part by the State of Virginia. 
In Oohens vs. Virginia (6 Wheat., 427 and 428) Marshallr 
C. J., in discussing the effect of the cession by Virginia of a 
part of the District of Columbia, declares: 
"Were any one State of the Union to pass a law for trying 
a criminal in a court not created by itself, in a place not 
within its jurisdiction, and direct the sentence to be exe-
cuted without its territory, we should all perceive and ac-
knowledge its incompetency to such a course of leg·islation. 
• • • The solution, and the only solution, of the difficulty 
is that the power vested in Congress, as the legislature of 
the United States, to legislate exclusively within any place 
ceded by a State, carries with it, as an incident, the right to 
make that power effectual. If a felon escape out of the State 
in which the act has been committed, the Government can 
not pursue him into another State and apprehend him there, 
but must demand him from the executive power of that other 
State. If Congress were to be considered merely as the local 
legislature for the fort or other place in which the offense 
might be committed, then this principle would apply to them 
as to other local legislatures, and the felon who should escape 
out of the fort or other place in which the felony may ba n• 
been committed could not be appreben<led by the ruar~bal, 
but must be demanded from the executive of the State. Dut 
we know that the principle does not apply." 
In the case of Omnmonwealth vs. Glary (S Mass., 76), in 
which a cession by the State of Massachusetts to the Uniteu 
States of the ground for the arsenal at Springfield ( substan-
tially identical with the cession in this case by the State of 
Pennsylvania) was covered, the court ruled: 
''On the facts argued in this case we are of opinion that 
the territory on which the offense charged is agreed to have 
been committed is the territory of the United States, over 
which the Congress have the exclusive power of legislation. 
• • * It will be noticed that· in this decision we make a 
distinction between the persons who actually dwell within 
the territory owned by the United States and the laborers 
and artificers employed therein who have their dwelling 
elsewhere." 
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In the case of Jiitchell vs. Tibbetts (17 Pick., 302) the court 
in passing upon the effect of a like cession ruled: 
"The provisions of the statute ceding jurisdiction of the 
navy-yar~ in Charlestown to the United States, being in thf' 
same terms and with the like qualification, we are of opinion 
that the law of Massachusetts on which this action is founded 
did not extend to and operate within that territory, and that 
consequently this vessel was not employed within this Com-
monwealth within the meaning and construction of the act." 
On the 6th of March, 1841, the legislature of Massachusetts 
asked the opinion of the judges of the supreme court as 
to the rights and obligations of persons residing upon land 
ceded to the United States, and received a reply substantially 
that-
" Persons who reside on lands pur-chased by or ceded to 
the United States for navy-yards, forts, and arsenals, and 
wh6re there is no other reservation of jurisdiction to the 
State than that of a right to serve civil and criminal process 
on such lands, are not entitled to the benefits of the common 
schools for their children in the towns in which the lands are 
situated, nor are they liable to be assessed for their polls and 
estates to State, county, and town taxes in such towns, nor 
do they gain a settlement in such towns for themselves or 
their children by residence for any length of time on such 
lands, nor do they acquire by residing ou such lands any 
elective franchise as inhabitants of such towns." 
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Young (BrightlJ's Reports, 
312), decided in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in con-
sidering a like cession to the United States, the same prin-
ciples are recognized. In Kent's Comment~ries, 430, the 
principle is thus stated: 
'' lt follows as a consequence from this doctrine of the Fed-
eral courts that State courts can not take cognizance of any 
offense committed within such ceded districts, and, on the 
other hand, that the inhabitants of such places can not ex-
ercise any civil or political privileges under the laws of the 
State, because they are not bound by those laws." 
In 2 Story on the Constitution, sections 1226 to 1326, a like 
result is reached. 
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Attorney-General Cushing, in 6 Opinions of Attorneys-
General, page 577, goes into a full discussion of the effect of 
such a cession, and concludes: 
"The persons in the employment of the United States act-
ually residing in the limits of the armory at Harper's Ferry 
do not possess the civil and political rights nor are they sub-
ject to the tax and other obligations of citizens of the State 
of Virginia." See also 7 Opinions, 628, and 16 Opinions, 468 
to the same effect. 
I concur in the views above stated. 
The result follows that the action of the courts of the State 
of Pennsylvania in granting original letters of administration 
and escheating the personal estate of Thomas Conner, under 
the laws of Pennsylvania, was without jurisdiction and is 
void. The alleged administra.tor and deputy escheator have 
no right to the possesRion of any books, papers, or personal 
property of the decedent of which he died possessed. You 
should, therefore, proceed to execute the rules and regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy with refer-
ence to such esta~es, and after those rules and regulations 
shall have been executed it will be your duty to report the 
facts with the result to Congress for such further action as it 
shall deem just. 
Very respectfully, 
~r. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
INDIAN SCHOOL SERVICE. 
The 8th section of the act of Jnne 29, 1888, chapter 503, making appro-
priations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian Depart-
ment, etc., had no effect on the then existing appointments of superin-
tendents, teachers, etc., connected with Indian schools wholly sup-
ported by the Government. The incumbents of the various positions 
referred to were lawfully in the public service after that act went into 
operation, and are legally entitled to be paid for their services during 
such period. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 13, 1889. 
Sm: A communication to this Department from your 
predecessor,dated the 28th February, 1R89,asks an opinion as 
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to ''whether the persons who have continued in the Indian 
school service and who have rendered service since the 
beginning of the current fiscal year are not legally entitled 
to be paid for such service ~" 
But for the act of 29th June, 1888 (25 Stat., 217, 238), 
making appropriations for the current and contingent ex-
penses of the Indian Department, etc., no doubt would exist 
as to the right of the persons mentioned to compensation. 
The eighth section of that act authorizes the appointment 
of a "Superintendent of Indian Schools," prescribes his qual-
ifications, duties, and powers, and is in the following words : 
"That there shall be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, a person of knowl-
edge and experience in the management, training, and prac-
tical education of children, to be superintendent of Indian 
schools, who shall, from time to time, andasoftenas the nature 
of his duties will permit, visit the schools where Indians are 
taught, in whole or in part, by appropriations from the United 
States Treasury, and shall, from time to time, report to the 
Secretary of the Interior what, in his judgment, are the 
defects, if any, in any of them in system, in administration, 
or in means for the most effective advancement of the chil-
dren in them towards civilization and self-support; and what 
changes are needed to remedy such defects as may exist; 
and shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior, employ and discharge superintendents, teachers, 
and any other person connected with schools wholly sup-
ported by the Government, and with like approval make such 
rules and regulations for the conduct of such schools as in 
his judgment their good may require. The Secretary of the 
. Interior shall cause to be detailed from the employes of his 
Department such assistants and shall furnish such facilities 
as shall be necessary to carry out the foregoing provisions 
respecting said Indian schools." 
Prior to the act of 29th June, 1888, the appointment and 
rate of compensation of persons employed in the Indian 
schools were under the direction and control of the Secre-
tary of the Interior (see act 17th May, 1882, 22 Stat., 68, 
85), but by that act the superintendent of Indian schools is, 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, em-
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powered to "employ and discharge superintendents, teach-
ers, and any other person connected with schools wholly sup-
ported by the Go\ernment." 
On the very day the act of 29th .Tune, 1888, went into effect 
the then Secretary of the Interior, by a communication to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, directed that the persons 
employed in the Indian schools on the 30th June, 1888, should 
continue in that service at the compensation then pre-
scribed until further orders. 
It was not until the latter part of October, 1888, that the 
superintendent of Indian schools entered upon the duties of 
his office, and since that time, to quote from the case stated 
for opinion," he ha8 been engaged in the Indian school serv-
ice as found by him upon entranre upon the duties of his 
office, and in submitting for the approval of the Department 
his action and recommendation regarding them." 
It is true the act of ~9th June, 1888, declares that the 
superintendents, teachers, and all persons connected with the 
Indian schools wholly supported by the Government shall 
be employed and discharged by the superintendent of Indian 
schools, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the In-
terior, but it would be very unreasonable to bold that it was 
the intention of the law to nullify all existing appointments 
and put a stop to the operations of the schools until a super-
intendent should be appointed and be able to select suitable 
persons to fill the various places made vacant by the act. 
It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that the general 
language of a statute is, if possible, not to be taken in a 
sense which would produce a public inconvenience, the courts 
being always ready to presume that the legislative depart-
ment of the Government could not have intended any such . 
meaning to be placed on their words. The Supreme Court 
of the United States bas repeatedly acted on this principle 
(United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall, 147 ; Ca-rlisle v. United States, 
16 Wall, 14 7 ; Chew Heong v. Unitecl States, 112 U. S., 536, 
555). 
It is clear, therefore, that the act itself had no effect on 
existing appointments, and that the incumbents of the "Vari-
ous positions connected with the Indian schools wholly sup-
ported by the Government were lawfully in the public service 
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after the act of 29th June went into operation, without the 
aid of the order of the Secretary of the Interior of that date, 
and should be paid accordingly. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
INDIAN ALLOTTEES-CITIZENSHIP. 
The Indian allottees of the Kickapoo tribe, under the treaty of June 28, 
1862, take their rights to the tracts allotted to them, which have not 
yet been patented, under and by virtue of the said treaty as extended 
by the act of August 4, 1866, chapter 897, and not under act of Febru-
ary 8, 1887, chapter 119. 
Patents to those allottees to whom certificates were given under said 
treaty, but who had not received patents, should be issued under and 
in accordance with the terms of the treaty as extended by the said 
act of 1866. 
The sixth section of said act of 1887, with respect to citizenship, ap-
pliesto the Kickapoos who took allotments under the said treaty before 
the passage of that act as well as to those who have taken allotments 
since its passage and in pursuance of its provisions. But as the right 
of citzenship is only to be accorded after the patent is granted, the 
oath and proof required by the treaty, being prerequisites thereunder, 
must be taken and furnished. 
DEP A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
Ma'rch 14, 188D. 
SIR: By your letter of the 7th of February, 1889, it ap-
pears that the treaty of the 28th of June, 1862, with the 
Kickapoo Indians (13 Stat., 623) in its first article provided 
for an allotment of lands in severalty to .such members of the 
tribe as desired it and were qualified, and that the remain· 
der of their reservation, not allotted, should lle held in 
common by those of the tribe who did not desire an allot-
ment. The second article provided for the issue of certificates 
to the allottees of such lands as should be set apart in sev-
eralty, on receipt of which those who took in severalty re-
linquished all further right to the lands assigned to the 
allottees in severalty or set apart for the residue of the 
tribe in common. The third article provides : 
''At any time hereafter, when the President of the United 
States shall have become satisfied that any adults, being 
256 HO~ W. H. H. MILLER 
Indian Allottees-Citizenship. 
males and heads of families, who may be allottees under the 
provisions ot the foregoing article, are sufficiently intelligent 
and prudent to control their affairs and interests, he may, 
at the request of such persons, cause the land severally held 
by them to be conveyed to them by patent in fee-simple, 
with power of alienation, and may at the same time cause to-
be set apart and placed to their credit severally their pro-
portion of the casll value of the credits of the tribe, princi-
pal and interest, then held in trust by the United States; 
and also, as the same may be received, their proportion of 
the proceeds of the sale of lands under the provisions of this 
treaty; and on such patents being issued, and such pay-
ments ordered to be made by the President, such competent 
persons shall cease to be members of said tribe and shall be-
come citizens of the United States; and thereafter the lands 
so patented to them shall be subject to levy, taxation, and 
sale, in like manner with the property of other citizens: 
Provided, That, before making any such application to the 
President, they shall appear in open court, in the district 
court of the United States for the district of Kansas, and 
make the same proof and take the same oath of allegiance as 
is provided by law for the naturalization of aliens; and shall 
also make proof, to the satisfaction of said court, that they 
are sufficiently intelligent and prudent to control their affairs 
and interests; that they have adopted the habits of civilize(l_ 
life, and have been able to support, for at least five years. 
themselves and families." 
Prior to the 8th day of February, 1887, certificates for al-
lotments were issued to one hundred and nine persons nnuer 
the second article, and patents to fifty-two under the third 
article of the treaty, leaving at that date fifty-seven persons 
to whom certificates had been given who had not received 
patents. Under this state of facts you submit the following 
inquiries: 
First. Do the one hundred and nine allottees of the Kick-
apoo tribe of Indians take their rights to the tracts allotted 
to them under the treaty of 1862, as above stated, so far as 
they have not yet been patented under said treaty, or under 
or by virtue of the act of 8th of February, 1887l (24 Stat., 
388.) 




Second. Should the patents to be issued to the remaimng 
fifty-se,-en allottees or their heirs, under the approved allot-
ments made, be such in form as the treaty of 1862 provides 
for, and be issued only when in the discretion of the Presi-
dent they are capable of receiV"ing them with safety to their 
interests, or should they be trust patents, such as are pro-
vided for under tlte act of 1887 ~ 
Third. In view of the following provisions of the general 
allotment law of 1887 for allotment of lauds in severalty 
to Indians, viz: ''And every Indian born within the terri-
toriallimits of the United States to whom allotments shall 
have been made under the provisions of this act, or under any 
law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial lim-
its of the United States who has voluntarily taken up within 
said limits his residence separate and apart from any tribe 
of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, 
is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is 
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such 
citizen, whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or 
otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the ter-
ritorial limits of the U nitetl States, without in any manner 
impairing or otherwise a:fl'ecting the right of any such Iudiau 
to tribal or other property;" whether, if the treaty of 1862. 
still remains in force, it is now necessary for the Kickapoo 
Indians to whom allotments have been made 1 o apply to the 
courts for naturalization under the third article of the treaty, 
or does the act of 1887 secure to them the advantage of such 
naturalization without further act on their part, so that, if iu 
the discretion of the President to issue their patents, they 
may be issued without that step being taken~ 
The act of the 8th of February, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), re-
ferred to in your inquiries, is described in its title as HAn act 
for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the 
various reservations, and to extend the protection of the laws 
of the United States and Territories over the Indians, and 
for other purposes." 
This act provides a general system for the partition of 
lands which, at the time of its passage, were held in common 
by the Indian tribes. Its general provisions have no rela-
tion to lands that were he\d in severalty before its passage. 
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Its operative provisions in the proceedings for allotments are 
uy the terms of the act limited to such lands as shall be allotted 
uutler the act. The language of the l:iecond section is: 
" That all allotments set apart under the provisions of this 
act shall be selected by the Indians," etc. 
'fhe language of the third section is-
" That the allotments provided for in this act shall be made 
by special agents appointed by the President," etc. 
The :fifth is the section of the act which provides for the 
issue of patents for the allotments and the trusts to which 
they shall be subjected. Its language is-
" That upon t.he approval of the allotments provided for in 
this act by the Secretary of the Interior he shall cause patents 
to be issued therefor in the name of the allottees," etc. 
The whole tenor of the act shows that so far as sllotments 
hau been made under any prior laws or treaties such allot-
ments were not intenueu to be disturbed nor the rights of the 
allottees to such lands in any way modified or impaired. 
The general purpose of the sixth section is to grant the 
personal rigbts of citizenship and the protection of the law~ 
to such of the Indians as shall have received patents for allot . 
ments. This grant is no part of the system of partition, but 
is a consequence that is to follow it. The grant of civic rights 
under this section is extended so as to include not ou ly tlwse 
who might receive patents under the act of 1887, but also 
those who might have received or might be eutitied to receive 
them "under any law or treaty." The language of the sec-
tion is-
'' Every Indian born within the territorial limits of the 
United States to whom allotments shall have been made 
under the provisions of this act, or under any lau· or treaty, 
• • • is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United 
States." 
This section neither increased nor diminished the require-
ments of the act of 1887, nor those of" any" other "law or 
treaty,'' which are prerequisites to the obtaining of patents, 
nor does it incorporate into "any " other" law or treaty" any 
requirement, limitation, or condition as to allotments which 
had been made before the passage of the act of 1887. As to 
all the proceedings in partition, and the title to be conveyed 
• 
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by those proceedings, the act of 1887 is only applicable to 
lands held in common at the date of its passage. As to the 
personal rights of citizenship which are to accrue upon the 
delivery of a patent, the act embraces not only those who ob-
tained patents under the act of 1887, but also the fifty-seven 
Kickapoo Indians who, prior to the passage of that act, had 
-obtained allotments under the second article of the treaty of 
1862. 
I therefore answer, to your first inquiry, that the Indians 
therein referred to take their rights under the treaty of 1862 
as extended by the act of August 4, 1886. (24 Stat., 219.) 
To your second inquiry I answer, the patents to the fifty-
seven allottees should be issued under and in accordance with 
tiJe terms of the treaty of 1862, as extended by the act of 1886. 
To your third inquiry I answer, the sixth section of the act 
·of 1887, with reference to naturalization, is substantially 
Identical with that of the treaty of 1862. It therefore applies 
to the allottees of the Kickapoo tribe who took allotments 
before the passage of the act of 1887 as well as to those who 
have taken since its passage in pursuance of its provisions. 
But, as the right of citizenship is only to be accorded after 
the patent is granted, the oath and proof required by the 
third article of the treaty of 1862, being prerequisites to the 
obtaining of the patent, are necessary to justify the exercise 
of the disGretion vested in the President and must be taken 
.and furnished. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
LEGISLATURE OF ARIZONA TERRITORY. 
The legislative assembly of Arizona Territory can lawfully remain in 
session only for a period of sixty days' duration, such period including 
Sundays and all intermediate adjournments. 
The word "sessions" in section 1852, Revised Statutes, as amended by 
the act of December 23, 1880, chapter 7, includes the whole period 
between the time fixeil by law for the meeting of the legislative as· 
semblies and their sine die adjournment, F!undays and intermediate 
.adjournments not excepted. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 16, 1889. 
SIR : By your letter of the 15th of ~larch, 1889, you ask 
'' whether the legislature of Arizona can continue in session 
after March 21, 1889, long enough to make up for Sundays 
and the time used in adjournments, or whether it must ad. 
journ sine die sixty days from the date it was ~upposed to be 
organized." 
Section 1852 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the 
act of the 23d of December, 1880 (1 Sup. Rev. Stat., .586), 
provides: 
"The sessions of the legislative assemblies of the several 
Territories of the United States shall be limited to sixty days' 
duration." 
The word '' sessions'' in this section is used in the plural 
to correspond with the word " assemblies," so that the session 
of each of the assemblies of the several Territories shall be 
limited to sixty days. It is used by Congress concerning 
legislative.bodies, and must be interpreted accordingly. The 
definition of the word by Worcester, as applicable to such 
bodies, is-
" The time between the first meeting of an assembly, and 
its prorogation or final adjournment; as,' a session of Con-
gress."' In 2 Bouvier's Law DictionaQ;. , 632, it is defined to 
be" the time during which a legislative body, a court, or 
other assembly sits for the transaction of business; as, a ses-
sion of Congress which commences on the day appointed by 
the Constitution and ends when Congress :finally adjourns 
before the commencement of the next session." 
The session of a legislati,·e body continues, notwithstand-
ing an adJournment, until the :final sine die adjournment, or 
the expiration of the legislative term. 
"·Where the two houses adjourn for more than three days) 
and not to or beyond the period fixed by the Constitution 
or law for the next regular session, the session is not there-
by terminated, but continues until adjournment without day, 
or until the next regular session.'' (Barclay's Digest of 1871, 
p. 7. 
From the origin of the Government all the laws passed be-
tween the legal organization and the meeting of Congress 
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awl a sine die adjournment have been treated as passed at 
the same session. The word " session" in the section quoted, 
therefore, includes the whole period between the time fixed by 
law for the meeting of the legislative assemblies of the sev-
eral Territories and their sine die adjournment, including in 
the computation of time all intermediate adjournments. 
In the computation of time Sundays are to be counted, as a 
general rule, to which the matter submitted is not an excep-
tion. Where Sundays are not to be cotmted, it arises from 
the special circumstances of the case, or is provided for by an 
~xpress exception such as is found in the second clause of the 
seventh section of the first article of the Constitution, which 
-vrovides : 
''If any bill shall not be returned by the President within 
ten days (Sundays excepted) after it sh:1ll have been pre-
"3ented to him, the same shall be a law." 
Very respectfully, 
W .. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
VACANCY IN OFFICE. 
A vacancy in an office which happens during a session of the Senate, but 
remains unfilled until a recess of the Senate occurs, may be filled by 
the President during such reces1 by a temporary appointment. 
The rule is the same in the case of a new office, which is not filled during 
the session in which it was created. The PreEtident may fill the original 
vacancy existing therein by a temporary appointment made during the 
recess of the Senate. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 20, 1889. 
SIR: You ask me whether, when a vacanc4 in an office oc-
curs during a session of the Senate, which is not filled until 
a recess of the Senate, you have power to till it, during the 
recess, by a temporary appointment and commission. 
The Constitutional provision on the subject is: 
"The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that 
may h\\ppen during the recess of the Senate, by granting 
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next ses-
sion." 
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This clause of the Constitution has been repeatedly con-
strued by my predecessors, with uniform results. 
On the 2:!d of October, 1823, a question was submitted to 
Attorney-General Wirt, which is thus stated by him (1 Opin., 
631): 
"It is the case, then, of a vacancy which arose during the 
session of the Senate, but which from the circumstance that 
bas been mentiOned, continues to exist in the recess. The 
question on which you ask my opinion is, 'whether under 
the Constitution you can fill the vacancy by a commission to 
expire at the end of the next session.'" 
He interpreted the language "may happen during there-
cess" to be equivalent to ''may happen to exist during the 
recess," and concludes : 
'"Now, if we interpret the word 'happen' as being merely 
equivalent to 'happen to exist' (as I think we may legiti-
mately do), then all v cancies which, from any casualty, hap-
pen to exist at a time when the Senate cannot be consulted as 
to filling them, may be temporarily fille(l by the President; 
and the whole purpose of the Constitution is completely ac-
complished." 
On the 19th of July, 1832 (2 Opin., 525), Attorney-General 
Taney concurred in the views above cited, and concluded as 
thus stated in the syllabus: 
"The President has power, during recesses of the Senate,. 
to fill all vacancies that may happen to exist in the subordi-
nate offices of the Government, and is not limited in its 
exercise to those which occur during recesses." 
It was the · intention of the Constitution that the offices 
created by law, and which are uecessary to the current 
operations of the Government, should always be full; and 
that, when vacancies happen, they shall not be protracted 
beyond the time necessary for the President to fill them. I 
also refer to Opinions of Attorney-General Legare, October 
27, 184:1 (3 Opin., 673); Mason, August 13, 1846 (4 Opin., 
522); Bates, October 18, 1862 (10 Opin., 357); Stanberry,. 
August 30, 1866 ( 12 Opin., 32). 
The question is exhaustively discussed in the opinions 
cited, and without reiterating the reasous assigned, I concur 
in the conclusion reached, and answer your inquiry in the 
affirmative. 
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You also suggest the question whether, when a new office 
had been created by act of Congress, and existed during the 
session of the Senate, which had not been filled before the 
close of the session, you have power during a recess to fill 
such office. 
The word ~'vacancy" in the Constitution refers to offices, 
and signifies tlw condition where an office exists, of which 
there i.s no mcuwbent. It is used without limitation as to 
how the vacancy comes to exist. The vacancy may ha\·e 
occurred hy death, resignation, removal, or any otlJer canse 1 
but, regardless of the cause or manner of the existence of the 
vacancy, the power is the r,ame. In the case submitted the 
law has created the office. The office, therefore, exists. 
There is no incum~ent. ';(:here is, therefore, a vacancy, and 
the case comes under the general power to fill vacancies. 
This conclusion is fully sustamed by the opinion of Attorney-
General Stanberry (12 Opin., 38) as follows: 
''The true theory of the Constitution in this particular 
seems to me to be this: that as to the executive power, it is 
always to be in action, or in the capacity for action; anu that 
to meet this necessity, there i~ a provision against a vacancy 
in the chief executive office, and again!;lt vacancies in all tile 
subordinate offices, and that at all times there is a power to 
fill such vacancies. It is the President whose duty it is to 
see that the vacancy is filled. If the Senate is in session they 
must assent to his nomination. If the Senate is not in ses-
sion the President fills the vacancy alone. All that is to be 
looked to is that there is a vacancy, no matter when it first 
occurred, and there must be a power to fill it. If it should 
have been filled whilst the Senate was in session, but was not 
then filled, that omission is no excuse for longer delay, forth e 
public exigency which requires the office may be as cogent, 
and more cogent, during the recess than during the session. 
I repeat it, 'wherever there is a vacancy there is a power to fill 
it. This power is in the President, with the assent of the 
Senate whilst that body is in session, and in the President 
alone when the Senate is not in session. There is. no reason 
upon which the power to fill a vacancy can be limited by the 
state of tlJings when it first occurred. On the contrary, the 
only inquiry is as to thes tate of things when it was filled." 
In reaching the above conclusions, I havl'3 not been forget-
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ful that the word ''happen" in the Constitution suggests cas-
ualty or absence of premeditation; but it is incompatible 
with the character of the high office with which the votes 
of an intelligent people have entrusted the President, to pre-
sume that a power so necessary to the public welfare will be 
used needlessly, when time allll opportunity are afforded for 
intelligent and judicious action during the session of the 
Senate. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDEN1'. 
ACCOUNTS FOR ARMY TRANSPORTATION. 
The payment of accounts of land-grant railroads ( i. e., such ag have not 
received aid in Government bonds) for Army transportation, under the 
appropriation act of September 22, 1888, chapter 1027, is not controlled 
by the proviso in the acts of June 30, 1882, chapter 254, and August 5, 
1882, chapter 390, bnt is governed by the provisions of the act of 1881::S 
alone; and under these provisions such accounts can be lawfully paid 
by a quartermaster without previous action thereon by the accounting 
officers of the Treasury. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
JJ[arch 27, 1889. 
SIR: By a letter dated the 26th ultimo the Secretary of 
War presented for the consideration of the Attorney-General 
the question whether accounts for Army transportation m-er 
-certain laud-grant railroads (viz, such as have not received 
aid in Government bonds) can be lawfully paid by a quarter-
master before adjustment thereof by the accounting officers 
-of the Treasury. 
This question is understood to refer to the payment of such 
accounts from the appropriation for the Army made by tht..' 
act of September 22, 1888, chapter 1027, under the following-
provision therein: "For the payment of Army transportation 
lawfully due such land-grant railroads as have not receh·e•l 
aid in Government bonds (to be adjusted in accordance with 
the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases decided under 
such land-grant &cts); _but in no case shall more than fifty 
per centum of the full amount of the serYice be paid: Pro-
vided, That such compensation shall be computed upon the 
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basis of the tariff or lower special rates for like transportation 
performed for the public at large, and shall be accepted as in 
full of all demands for such service." 
In the provisions for the payment of such transportation 
contained in previous appropriation acts (see act of March 3, 
1879, 20 Stat., 390; act of Feuruary 24, 1881, 21 Stat., 348; 
acts of June 30, 1882, August 5, 1882, and March 3, 1883, ~2 
Stat., 120, 261, 458 ; acts of July 5, 1884, and J\Iarch 3, 1885, 
23 Stat., 111, 360; acts of June 30, 1886, and February 9, 
1887, 24 Stat., 97, 399), accounts therefor are required "to 
be adjusted by the acco'ltnting officers in accordance with the 
decisio11s of the Supreme Court," etc.; and the practice there-
unuer has been to refer these accounts to the accounting 
officers of the Treasury for adjustment preliminary to pay-
ment-the payment thereof being ultimately made, not 
through the agency of a disbursing officer of the quartermas-
ter's department, as in ordinary cases, but directly from the 
Treasury by means of warrants issued upon requisitions of 
the Secretary of War for the balances certified b~~ the account-
ing officers to be due. 
But the provision in the act of 1888, quoted above, differs 
from those provisions in this, that it omits the words ''by th6 
accounting officers" in the clause relating to the adjustment 
of such accounts, which omission is regarded by the Quar-
termaster-General (at whose suggestion the above question 
was proposed) as indicating an intention on the part of Con-
gress to permit accounts to be paid under that provision by 
disbursing officers of the quartermaster's department as 
other accounts of that department are ordinarily paid. 
Formerly accounts of land-grant railroads were paid by 
these officers at the rates charged the public for similar serv-
ices, subject to a deduction of 33k per centum, agreeably 
to a regulation of the War Department. But by the Army ap-
propriation act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 453-454:), it was 
declared that no money should thereafter be paid for the 
transportation of property or troops of the United States over 
any railroad which in whole or in part was constructed by 
the aid of a grant of ptlblic land on the condition that such 
railroad should be a public highway for the use of the Gov-
ernment, free from toll or other charge; but that nothing 
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therein contained should be construed as preventmg any such 
railroad from bringing a suit in the Court of Claims for the 
charges for such transportation and recovering for the same, 
if found entitled thereto by VIrtue of the laws in force prior 
to the passage of that act, and to either party to the suit a 
right of appeal to the Supreme Court was given. 
Subsequent!~ suits were brought in the Court of Claims by 
certain railroad companies owning land-grant roads to recover 
compensation from the Government for transportation per-
formed for it over such roads. These suits were carried to 
the Supreme Court on appeal, and it was there held that the 
railroad companies were entitled to compensation ''for all 
transportation performed by them respectively of troops and 
property of the Government (excepting the mails) subject to 
a fair deduction for the use of their respective railroads." 
(See 93 U.S. Rep., 442.) 
.Afterwards Congress, by the act of March 3, 1879, cited 
above, made an appropriation for the payment of arrears of 
.Army transportation due land-grant railroads, to be adjustt>d 
by the proper accounting officers in accordance '~ith the de-
cision of the Supreme Court, .but in no event was more than 
50 per cent. of the full amount allowed by the Quartermaster-
General to be paid until a decision of the Court of Claims was 
had in each case. 
This provision plainly contemplated that, before making 
any payment on a land-grant railroad acc0nnt for arrears for 
Army transportation, the account should he adjusted hy the 
accounting officers of the Treasury, a11d the practice there-
under accorded with thi8 view. In thus providing that such 
accqunt should be adjusted by those officers prior to its pay-
ment, instead of letting it take the usual course, i.e., of being 
settled and paid by a quartermaster without previous action 
thereon by them, Congress doubtless regarded it more in 
the light of a claim than an ordinary transportation account-
as a claim which required, for the proper adjustment thereof, 
not only a computation of the value of the services according 
to the tariff rates applicable thereto, but a determination of 
what is a fair deduction for the use of the road (to which the 
Government was entitled free of cost), and deemed it expe-
dient to commit such determination to the accounting officers. 
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The other acts hereinbefore cited, which were subsequently 
passed, down to and including the act of February 9, 1887, 
made similar provisions for the adjustment and payment of 
acconuts of land-grant railroads for army transportation. 
Two of these acts, viz, acts of June 30, 1882, and August 5, 
1882, contain the following proviso: ''That any such land-
grant roads as shall :file with the Secretary of the Treasury 
their written acceptance of this provision shall hereafter be 
paid for like services as herein provided," etc. By this proviso 
the mode prescribed in the two acts referred to for the pay-
ment of such accounts (which necessitated the adjustment of 
the accounts by the accounting officers previous to pa.vment) 
was extended to future claims for like services where there-
quired written acceptance on the part of the roads is :filed 
with the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Recurring to the provision in the act of September 22, 
1888, the inquiry now arises, whether the mode prescribed as 
above must be followed in the adjustment and payment of 
accounts of land-grant roads thereunder, as a legal require-
ment. From an examination of that provision in connection 
with the proviso last above mentioned I think this inquiry 
should be answered in the negative, and for the following 
reasons: 
Consistently with the terms of the provision, an adjust-
ment and payment of such accounts by the disbursing offi-
cers of the Quartermaster's Department, as other transporta-
tion accounts of that Department are usually paid, would 
seem to be admissible, subject to the restrictions contained 
in the provision itself, namely, that the compensation is com-
puted upon the basis of the tariff or lower special rates for 
like transportation performed for the public at large, that 
not more than 50 per centum of the amount so ascertained 
is paid, and that this is accepted as in full of all demands for 
the services. 
The accounts are to be adjusted in accordance with the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court. But this is not by the provis-
ion required to be done, a~ theretofore, by the accounting offi-
cers. "The fair deduction for the use" of the roads, called 
for by the decision of that court already adverted to, hav-
~ng become in practice, as I am informed, uniformly :fixed at 
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a deduction of 50 per centum from the value of the services 
performed, when computed at the rates paid by the public 
at large for like services, the circumstance which formerly 
made it expedient to ha,~e the accounts adjusted by the ac-
counting officers of the Treasury previous to payment, viz 
the determination in each case of what is a "fair deduction 
for the use'' of the road, no longer exists, and it was proba-
bly in consideratiou of this that the words" by the account-
ing officers" were, in this provision, omitted in the clause re-
lating to the adjustment of the accounts. 
Furtherihore, the compensation for Army transportation, 
computed upon the- basis of the rates described in the pro-
vi:sion in the act of 1888, may be paid thereunder to the ex-
tent of 50 per centum of the amount thus ascertained, if this 
is accepted as in full of all demands for such service, although 
no written acceptance of the provision in the acts of June 
30, and August 5, 1882, as required by the proviso in those 
acts, quoted above, may have been fil'ed with the Secretary of 
the Treasury. To bring an account within the operation of 
that proviso as to payment the filing of such written accept-
ance with the Secretary is essential; whereas, under the pro-
vision in the act of 1888, an acceptance '' in full for all de-
mands," etc., would be sufficient to authorize a payment if 
expressed in a receipt given therefor to a disbursing officer 
of the Army. 
Upon the whole, I reach the conclusion that the paymeut 
of accounts of land-grant roads for Army transportation, 
under the act of September 22,1888, is not controlled by the 
proviso referred to, but is governed by the provisions of that 
act alone, and I am of the opinion that, under its provisions, 
such accounts can be lawfully paid by a quartermaster with-
out previous action thereon by the accounting officers of the 
Treasury. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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SITE FOR PUBLIC BUILDING AT BUFFALO, N.Y. 
Upon the facts submitted, which are stated in the opinion: Advised, that 
the proposal made by Messrs. Mooney & Ferguson, dated February 17, 
U:!89, to sell to the Umted States a site for a public building, at Buffalo, 
N.Y., and the response of the Secretary of the Treasury thereto, dated 
March 1, 1889, do not constitute a contract obligatory upon the United 
States. 
The Secretary can not by contract bind the Government to exercise its 
power of eminent domain, to enable persons to sell to the Government 
land which they do not own. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'1CE, 
March 27, 1889. 
SIR: You orally req nested my opinion as to whether a pro-
posal made by Messrs. Mooney & Ferguson, dated the 17th 
day of February, 1889, to sell to the United States a site for 
a public building at Buffalo, N. Y., and the reply of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury thereto, constitute a contract obli-
gatory on the United States. 
The first section of the act of the 5th of April, 1888 (Stat. 
of 1887 and 1888, p. 81), authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury ''to purchase or acquire by condemnation a site in 
the city of Bufl'alo" for a public building, with a proviso that 
the sum to be paid therefor shall not exceed ''two hundred 
and fifty thousand dollars." 
The second section provides "that no part of this sum shall 
be expended until a valid title to said site shall be vested in 
the United States, and the State of New York shall have 
ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the 
same." 
1\'Iessrs. Mooney & Fergub~n proposed to the Secretary of 
the Treasury as follows: 
''We do hereby make formal proposal to sell to tbe United 
States for the sum of $250,000 the following property, to wit:'' 
(Here follows a description of the property.) It then lJro-
ceeds: 
''It is expressly understood and agreed, in case of accept-
ance of the proposal, that in the event a good and valid title 
to the above land, or any part thereof, can not be secured 
by grant, then the United States shall institute proceedings 
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in condemnation against such part thereof, in order that a 
valid title may be secured, binding ourselves to pay all ex-
penses incurred iu tlw procurement of the same, and that the 
land embraced in the above proposal shall not cost the Gov-
ernment more than $250,000. * * * 
"P. S.-See inclosed map." 
The proposal, with the accompanying map and papers, 
shows that Mooney & Ferguson did not own any of the land 
included in the proposal, and the title appears therefrom to 
be in eight different ownerships, one of which is the city of 
Buffalo. It does not appear they had any contract with the 
owners to purchase, nor a11y power from them to sell. 
On the 1st of March, 1889, the Secretary of the Treasury 
acknowledged receipt of the proposal, and replied: 
''I have to advise you that the Department bas deter-
mined to purchase the premises em braced in your proposal, 
upon condition that you will give a good and valid title to 
the same within a reasonable time, ih accordance "·ith the 
terms of your proposal. 
"The honorable Attorney-General has this day been re-
quested to instruct the United States attorney for the north-
ern district of New York to procure the necessary evidence 
oftitle and deeds of conveyance to the United States, and to 
institute proceedings in condemnation in the event that a 
valid title can not be secured, and upou receipt of these 
papers at this Department, approved by the Attorney-Gen· 
eral, as required by law, the payment of the purchase money 
will be promptly made." 
The elements of the proposal of Mooney & Furguson, con-
sidered in detail, are : · 
(1) That they will sell to the United States lands of others, 
which they do not own, and over which they have no power 
(2) That in order to enable them to procure title in casQ 
they can not obtain it by grant from the owners, the United 
States will acquire it by proceedings for condemnation. 
(3) That if, after the title shall have beAn acquired, the 
whole expenses of the proceedings, and the consideration 
paid shall be less than $250,000, the balance of that amount 
shall be paid to them. If they exceed that amount, Mooney 
& Furguson will make up the difference. 
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If this proposal accepted be considered as a contract of 
indemnity, it was not within the power of the Secretary of 
the Treasury as agent of the United States to make it, for 
he is only authorized to purchase land or acquire land bv 
.condemnation. Neither has he power to use proceedings to 
condemn for the benefit of any private parties. He could 
Dnly condemn lands for public use. He could not by con-
tract obligate the Gove~nment to exercise the power of emi-
uent domain to enable a person to sell to the Government 
lands which he did not own, but which belonged to others. 
Neither could Mooney & Ferguson lawfully contract to sell 
specific lands belonging to other people, by a contract call-
ing for immediate conveyance and delivery of possession, 
without power from or consultation with the owners. Such 
a transaction would be a wrong to the owners of the prop-
~rty and could not be sustained in law. One person can 
not rightfully sell another's house over his bead without his 
authority. 
This transaction in another aspect is also objectionable. 
The act of the 5th of April, 1888, above cited, forbids the 
payment of any part of the contract price until exclusive 
jurisdiction over the site shall have been ceded to the United 
States. This can be done only by the legislative power of 
the State of New York. No provision is made iu either the 
proposal or the acceptance to provide for a compliance with 
this condition, nor for any delay of payment of the money 
until it shall have been done. The acceptance states that 
''upon receipt of these papers (the title papers) at this De-
partment, approved by the Attorney-General, as requireJ by 
law, the payment of the purchase money will be promptly 
made." 
. Upon all the facts shown by the papers submitted, I am of 
opinion that the proposal and acceptance do not constitute 
a contract obligatory upon the United States, and this being 
so, there is, of course, no liability on the part of any one for a 
failure to consummate the same. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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Classification under the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, of Chinese 
shoes composed of felt, leather, and cotton, and also Chinese shoes in 
which silk is the component material of chief value, considered. 
, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 3, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 30th ()f March, 1889, you in-
quire, referring to the case of Swayne v. Hager, "Whether 
the decision of the court should be acquiesced in, in so far 
as it holds that such merchandise is liable to duty at the 
rates to which the component materials thereof of chief value 
are liable, instead of as manufactures of hair.'~ 
Imports in the tariff acts may be'' non-enumerated," "gen-
erally enumerated," or ''specially enumerated;" each phrase 
marks a different degree of precision in the description of 
the imports. 
When described as a species, they are "specially enumer-
ated," and such enumeration when made determines the 
classification. 
When described as a genus, or in general terms, they are 
merely enumerated, and, in the absence of a specific enumera-
tion, such general enumeration determines the classification 
One such general enumeration may also be more specific than 
another. 
When not described either "specifically" or "generally," 
they are'' non-enumerated." 
Only "non-enumerated " imports are subject to classifi-
cation under section 2499, Revised Statutes. Part of the 
Chinese shoes involved in the case of Swayne v. Hctger were 
composed of felt, leather, and cotton. Snell felt is manu-
factured partly of the hair of the goat or other ctnimals. The 
plaintiff claimed the article was "non-enumerated," and that 
as such it should have been classified under the seventh 
clause of the cotton schedule, which provides for "all manu-
factures of cotton not specially enumerated or provided for 
in this act," by virtue of the provisions of section 2499. 
'That clause applies only to articles composed exclusively 
of cotton, and hence of itself, independently o( section 2499, 
does not sustain the classification claimed by the plaintiff. 
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Sectiou ~-!99 does not apply to the import in this case, for jt 
is euumerated iu the twelfth clause of schedule K, which pro-
Yides generally for ''all goods * * * and all manufact-
ures of every description, composed wholly or in put of 
worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other animals 
* 't * not specialiy enumerated or provided. for." 
This is a general enumeration, and if che shoes which are 
composed partly of cotton are also composed partly of hair, 
in such an amount as to be a substautial element in the value 
of the import, they should be so classified, and, in that event, 
the result reached in the case I believe to be erroneous. 
The conclusion of the court that the import should not be 
classified under the clause relating to ready-made clothing 
and wearing apparel, I concur in; but in a suit against a 
collector, if a plaintiff has made his claim, under · a clause 
that is inapplicable to the case, an erroneous classification by 
the collector, under a clause equally inapplicable, can not be 
taken advantage of. 
As to the shoes in which silk was the component material 
of chief value, the fourth clause of schedule L, which is, ".All 
goods, wares, and merchandise, not specially enumerated or 
provided for in this act, made of silk, or of which silk is the . 
component material of chief value, fifty per ceutum ad va-
lorem," is a more specific and general enumeration than the 
twelfth clause of schedule K, in that the proportionate amount 
in value of the material of which a composite article is made 
up constitutes an element to be considered in the classifica,-
tion, which is not found in the clause of schedule K above 
quoted. As to such shoes, I am of opinion that the classifica-
tion claimed by the plaintiff is right. 
Very re~pectfnlly, 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CAVEATS FOR PATENTS FOR INV.ENTIONS. 
By section 4902, Revised Statutes, the privilege of filing caveats in the 
Patent Office preliminary to applications for patents is limited to citi-
zens of the United States, and aliens who have resided therein one 
year and declared their intention to become citizens. 
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The second article of the convention t>utered into between the United 
• States and certain other nations, proclaimed by the President on June 
7, 1RB7, is not self-executing; and Congress having passed no law for 
its execution, it can not be deemed to extend the privilege granted by 
said section 4902 to all subjects and citizens of the nations parties to 
said convention. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 5, 1889. 
SIR: Your predecessor by his letter of the 15th of Janu-
ary, 1889, requested the opinion of the Attorney-General on 
the following state of facts: 
Section 4902 of the Revised Statutes grants the right to 
file caveats preliminary to applications for patent;:; for inyen-
tions and est~blishes the legal effect that shall be given to 
them. It also provides: 
"Any mtizen of the United States who makes any new in-
ventiou or discovery, and desires further time to mature the 
sarne, may • • • 1lle in the Patent Office a caveat." 
It further provides : 
"An alien shall have the privilege herein granted if he 
has resided in the United States one year next preceding the 
filing of his caveat, and has made oath of his intention to 
become a citizen." 
By the first of these clause::; the grant of the right is lim-
ited to citizens. By the second it is enlarged to include oue 
class of aliens. 'l'he grant as a whole entitles only citizens 
and aliens who ha,·e been residents one ~·ear and have legally 
declared their intention to become citizeus to file oaveats. 
It is claimed by Ferdinand Bourquin, a Swiss citizen, that 
the second article of a convention entered into between the 
United States and certain other nations, of which the Swiss 
Confederation was one, proclaimed on the 7th day of June, 
1887 (U. S. Statutes of 1887 and 1888, treaties, 37), extends 
the grant of section 4902, Revised Statutes, to all subje0ts 
and. citizens of the parties to the convention. That article 
provides: 
''The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting States 
~ball enjoy, in all the otber States of the Union, so far as con-
cerns patents for inventions, trade or commercial marks, and 
the commercial name, the advantages that the respective laws 
thereof at present accord, or shall afterwards accoru, to sub-
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iects or citizens. In consequence they shall have the same 
protection as these latter, aud the same legal recourse against 
all infringements of their rights, under reserve of complying 
with the formalities and conditions imposed upon subjects 
or citizens by the domestic legislation of each State." 
Congress has passed no law for the execution of this article, 
nor did the House of Representatives in any way consider or 
assent to the treaty. 
Section 4902 is a part of the system of laws of the United 
States concerning patents for inventions. If, therefore, the 
article abo,~e quoted has become and is self-executing as an 
infraterritorial law, by virtue of the making and proclama-
tion of the treaty by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, the claim made by Ferdinand 
Bourquin is valid. 
· By the second clause of the second section of the second 
article of the Constitution, the power to make treaties, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is vested in 
the President. 
By the second clause of the sixth article of the Constitu-
tion " all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
,authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
the land." 
By the eighth clause of the eighth section of the first article, 
the whole legislative power over the subject of patents 
is committed to Congress. It is found among the powers to 
borrow money ; to declare war; to raise and support armies; 
to constitute judicial tribunals; to regulate commerce, etc. 
It is due to the credit of the Uuited States that the provisions 
concerning the treaty-making. power of the President and 
the legislative power of Congress shall, if possible, be so con-
strued and executed as to gi \'e full and proper efi'ect to each, 
and insure harmony in their exercise. 
In the case of Foster v. Neilson (2 Peters, 314), Chief-Justice 
l\iarsball delivering the opinion of the court, in discussing the 
efl'ect of the Constitution on treaties as laws, declared: 
"A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations~ 
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, 
the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its opera-
tion i~ infraterritoriat, but is carried into execution by the 
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. 
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"In the United States a different principle is established. 
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. 
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever i~ operates 
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. Bu.t 
when the terms of the stipuJation impoTt a contract, when eitheT 
of the part·ies engaged to perform a pc(,rticula1· act, the tTeaty 
addTesses itself to the political, not the j~tdicial depaTtment; 
and the legislatuTe must execute the contract before it can be-
cmne a rule lor the court." 
The principle thus stated has been generally accepted as a 
true interpretation of the constitutional provisions relating 
to the subject of treaties. It establishes that there is a class 
of treaties which, without legislation, does not become self-
executing as a rule of municipal law. A statement is given 
of such provisions of treaties as come within this class; as 
when the terms of tile stipulation import a contract, when 
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act. 
But the decision does not enumerate or define the limitations 
of the whole class. In the treaty-making power conferred 
on the fresident the implication exists that the power is to 
be exercised by him, subject to the limitation of the Consti-
tution. If, in time of peace, he should provide by the stipu-
lations of a treaty for the quartering of soldiers in any house 
without the consent of the owner, such a stipulation would 
be simply void, because forbidden by the Constitution to 
every department of the Government. But where the Gov-
ernment of the United States has power under the Consti-
tution over a subject, although that power may be Yested by 
the Constitution exclusively in Congress, it has been claimed 
that in the making of treaties such power may be exercised 
by the President, by and with the ad vice and consent of the 
Senate, without the cooperation of the House of Repre-
sentatives or act of Congress. Issue was joined on this 
proposition in 1796, between the President and Senate in the 
affirmative and the House of Representatives in the nega-
tive, concerning certain provisions of the Jay treaty with 
Great Britain. The treaty at the end of the disagreement 
remained intact, but the House of Representath·es "passed 
resolutions disclaiming the power to interfere in making 
treaties, but asserting their right, whenever stipulations 
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were made on subjects committed to Congress by the Con-
stitution, to deliberate on the expediency of carrying them 
into effect; and in legislating on several treaties then before 
them they struck out the words ' that provision ought to be 
made by law' and substituted words which declared merely 
the expediency of passing the necessary laws." (Sargeant's 
Constitutional Law, 411; Story on the Constitution, section 
1841.) 
In the session_ of 1815 and 1816 a like disagreement arose 
concerning a commercial treaty made in the July preceding 
between the United States and Great Britain, by which it 
was agreed to abolish the discriminating duties on British 
vessels and cargoes. This disagreement was terminated with 
no decisive results. 
The treaty between the United States and the King of the 
Hawaiian Islands, signed January 30, 1875, which provided 
for commercial reciprocity between the nations, and involved 
the exercise of one of the powers submitted to Congress by 
the Constitution, provided in its fifth article that it should not 
be ratified " until a law to carry it into operation should be 
passed by the Congress of the United States of America." 
(19 Stat., 6~7.) In execution of this treaty Congress, on the 
15th of August, 1876 (19 Stat., 200), passed au act in accord-
ance with the provisions of the treaty. The treaty by its 
terms, however, was clearly a contract, by which, in consider-
ation of certain special commercial privileges granted on the 
one part, certain other like privilege~ were granted on the 
other. Such special priYileges granted in consideration of 
others received the Supreme Court of the United States, in 
the case of Bartram v. Robertson (1~2 U.S. R., 120), ruled con-
stitute a contract. Field, J., delivering the opinion (speaking 
of the treaty with Denmark as compared with that of the 
Hawaiian Islands), declared: "Those stipulations, even if 
conceded to be self-executing by the way of a proviso or ex-
ception to the general law imposing the duties, do not cover 
concessions like those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a 
valuable consideration. They were pledges of two contract-
ing parties, the United States and the King of Denmark, to 
each other, that, in tile imposition of duties on goods im-
portecl into one of the countries which were the product or 
manufacture of the other, there should be no discrimination 
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against them in favor of goods of like character imported from 
any other country. They imposed an obligation on both 
countries to avoid hostile legislation in that rp,spect. Bnt 
they were not intended to interfere with special arrangement8 
'with other countries founded upon a concession of special privi· 
leges." (See also Whitney v. Robertson 124 U. S. 192.) 
If the treaty-making power, in all treaties whose execu-
tion require the exercise of powers committed to Congress, 
should uniformly provide in the treaties for their proper 
submission to Congress before they should be effective, con-
sequences might be avoided which may jeopardize the credit 
of the nation. Under the British constitution, with refer-
ence to this subject, the jurisdiction of Parliament is thus 
stated in 1 Todd's Parliamentary Government in England,. 
page 610: 
"The constitutional power appertaining to Parliament in 
respect to treaties is limited. It does not require their formal 
sanction or ratification by Parliament as a condition to their 
validity. Tbe proper jurisdiction of Parliament in such mat-
ten; may be thus defined: First: It is right to give or with-
hold its sanction to those parts of a treaty that require a 
legislative enactment to give it force and effect; as, for ex-
ample, when it provides for an alteration in the criminal or 
municipal law, or proposes to change existing tal'iffs or com-
mercialregulations. * * * If a treaty requires legislative 
action in order to carry it out, it should be subjected to the 
fullest discussion in Parliament, and especially in the House 
of Commons, with a view to enable the Government to pro-
mote effectually the important interests at stake in their 
proposed alterations in the foreign policy of the nation." 
It is not necessary to the decision of the question sub-
mitted to me in the matter under consideration to determine 
whether all the provisions of treaties, whose execution re-
quires the exercise of powers submitted to Congress, must 
be so submitted before they become law to the courts and 
Executive Departments, for the treaty under consideration 
i~ a reciprocal one; each party to it coven~nts to grant in the 
future to the subjects and citizens of the other parties certain 
special rights in consideration of the granting of like special 
rights to its subjects or citizens. It is a contract operative 
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in the future infraterritorially. It is therefore not self-exe-
cuting, but requires legislation to render it effective for the 
modification of existing laws. 
Very respPctfnlly, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRE'l.'ARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
PURCHASE O"F UNITED STATES BONDS. 
The power given the Secretary of the Treasury by section 2 of the act of 
March 3, 1-3:-31, chapter 1:3:1, to purchase United StareH bonds with the 
surplus money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, dot·~:~ not 
include the payment of commissions to private parties to purchase for 
the Government. 
Only the market price of the bond at the time of the purchase should be 
paid ; no commissions in addition to the par value of the bond and the 
premium thereon can be lawfully paid. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 10, 1889 • 
. SIR: By your letter of the 30th of March, 1889, :you ask, 
"'Whether, under existi.ng law, the Secretary is limited to 
the market price in purchasing United States bonds wi Lh tbe 
surplus or for the sinking fund, and particularly whether, if 
he may lawfully pay more than the market price, there would 
be any distinction between an additional premium paid to 
the owners of the bonds purchased and a commission paid to 
such holders or other persons." 
The last clause of section 1 of the act of t.he 11th of July, 
• 1862, (1 2 Stat., 532) provides that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury ''may purchase, at rates not exceeding that of the cur-
reut market, and cost of purchase not exceeding one-eighth 
of one per centum, any bonds or certificates of debt of the 
United States as he may deem advisable." 
Section5596, Revised Statutes, declares: "All acts of Con-
gress passed prior to said first day of December, one thou-
sand eight hundred and seventy-three, any portion of which it:i 
embraced in any section of the said revision, are hereby re-
pealed, and the section applicable thereto shall be iu force iu 
lieu thereof; all part~ of such acts not contaiued in such re-
vision having been repealed or superseded b.v subsequent 
acts or not being general and perm au en t iu their nature.'' 
A portiou uf ISectiuus 1 aud 2 of the act of July 11, 1862, 
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above quoted, is embraced in and supplied lJy sections 3579 
and 3577 of the Revised Statutes. The clause of that act 
above cited, which is referred to in your letter, is therefore 
repealed by the revision of the statutes. 
The second section of the act of the 3d of March, 18~1 (21 
Stat., 457), provides : 
"That the Secretary of the Treasury may at any time ap-
ply the surplus money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated, or so much thereof as he may consider proper, to the 
purchase or redemption of United StatPs bonds: Prol)ided, 
That the bonds so purchased or redeemed shall constitute no 
part of the sinking fund, but shall be canceled." 
The only express li~nitation to the exercise of the power to 
purchase conferred by this section is that the amount to be 
applied in the purchase or redemption of the bonds shall not 
at any time or in any event exceed the surplus in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated. Within this maximum 
amount it confers on the Secretary an official discretion to 
purchase or redeem from time to time whatever amount~ 
may to him seem to be for the best interests of the Unite<l 
States. The legislature, no doubt, intended, in conferring 
this discretion~ to prevent loss to the Government by com-
binations which might be made to raise the price of bonds, 
if the Secretary had been required at any giveu time to pur-
-chase any fixed amount. It was not intended that forced 
purchase on an artificial, inflated market should Le made. 
It is also intended that the Secretary shall be free to make 
purchases when the market price is depresseu. This discre-
tion was intended to be exercised with the same watchfuluess 
for the interests of the Government that a prudent prh·ate 
dealer would exercise for the protection of his own interest, 
with this difference, that the Gov-ernment should act upon a 
somewhat broader view with reference to tlle effect of tLe 
purchase upon the general business of tlle whole country. 
The intent of the law is tllat tlle exercise of the discretion 
should generally be dependent upon tlle state of the market 
as a chief element. Keeping this in view, the discretion was 
uot intended to be so rigorous1y limited as to prevent pur-
chases, e"Ven though the market price, by reason of sucll 
purchases or other natural cause~, might rise, or even in 
special emergencies, ''" lll'll a general financial crisis conlcl be . 
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avoideu or stayed u~· a mouerate advauce alJo\e the then 
market values. But the poliey of tile GoYernment, gener-
ally applicable in its purcilases, is to buy in a free and open 
market, where all sellers of the commodity can readily com-
pete and where the Government can have the benefit of such 
competition. This policy should be recognized in the exer-
cise of tile power. 
The power conferred by the statute does not extend to the 
makiflg of coutracts for future deli\ery, but is limited to 
actual cash purchases. The purchases are to be made b,y 
the Secretary. He is to do this directly, through the proper 
officers of the Government, and is not authorized by law to 
pay any commissions to private parties to purchase for the 
Government. He is ouly authorized to apply the surplus 
money to the purchase of bonds, and not to the payment of 
salaries or commissions. 
There is a distinction between the vayment of premiums 
abcve tha par value of the bonds to the owner and a commis-
sion to a tilird party who is not the owner. The premium i.s 
a part of the actual consideration paid for the bond to the 
owner thereof or his agent. A commission for his owu use, 
paid by the Gov·erumeu t to one who is not the owner, is an 
apvlication of the mouey intended for the purchase of the 
l.>Omls to a purpose for which the law has uot appropriated it. 
I therefore answer your i uquiry that, except when special 
aud emergent general financial necessities demand relief, it 
is the intention of the law that only the market price at the 
time of purchase should be paid, and that no commissions in 
addition to the par value of the bond and the premium 
thereon can be lawfully paid. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF COURT OF CLAIMS. 
Where a judgment against the United States was recovered in the 
Court of Claims, and a stipulation was made, which is of record in 
the case, to the effect that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would 
take an appeal from such j ndgment: Advised thatthere is no legal ob-
jection to paymeiJt of the judgment before the expiration of the ninety 
days allowed by statute for taking an appeal. 
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DEP.ART.l\IENT OF JUS1.'ICE, 
April 11, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours 
of the 16th ultimo, in relation to the payment of the judg-
ment of the Court of Claims in favor -of Patrick J. Kennedy 
for the sum ot $2U,379 before the expiration of the ninety 
clays allowed by statute in which an appeal may be taken to 
the Supreme Court. 
I find among the papers transmitted by you (1) a copy of 
the communication from the War Depart tilent in which tLe 
claim originated, addressed to the Attorney-General, dated 
the 19th of February, 1889, in which it is suggested in effect 
that no further action is desired by that Department; (2) a. 
certificate from the Assistant Attorney-General who Las 
charge of the business in the Court of Claims stating that no 
appeal will be taken on behalf of the United States; ( 3) a 
solemn stipulation in duplicate dated March 12, 1889, siguetl 
by the claimant in person, and by the said Assistant Attor-
uey-General, to the effect that neither the plaiutiff nor the 
tlefenuant will appeal from the said judgment of the Court 
of Claims. A copy of this stipulation is of record in the case 
in the Court of Claims. These are tile facts in the case as 
now presented. 
Upon these facts you reque~t advice as to "wlletiler tlw 
right of appeal Las expired in this case," witiliu tile purpose 
of the proviso to section 1 of "An act rnakiug· avpropriations 
to supply deficiencies," etc., appro\·ed Marcil 2, lti89. 
The proviso, althougll in absolute terms, was for tLe pro-
tection of the defendant Government. The Go\"ernmenr, 
having first demanded of the claimant that he would release 
and waive all right of appeal, has consented tllat she would 
execute a waiver which is of record. 
I, therefore, give an opinion in accordance with your re-
quest, that there is no legal objection to the payment of this 
judgment or judgments which stand in similar attitude. Tile 
question remains of administration, and is so referred to the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
Ver.v respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
• 
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CASE OF MAJOR W. F. SMITH. 
Under the act of February 14, 1>389, chapter 166, S. was appointed from 
civil life to the position of major of engineers in the Army, and there-
upon was placed on the retired list of the Army as of that grade: Ad-
vised, that he must take the oath required by section 17!16, Revised Stat-
utes, and that this act would be in law a legal acceptance of the office' 
and, as such, a sufficient formal acceptance. 
The provisions of sections 1259, 1763, 1764, and 1765, Revised Statutes, do 
not require the annulment of the appointment held by S. as agent in 
charge of river and harbor work at Wilmington, Del., and that he be 
relieved from that work. 
A retired officer of the Army is not ineligible to hold an appointment to 
a civil office. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 13, 1889. 
SIR : By your letter • of the 1st of April, 1~89, you ask : 
"(1) Before entering upon the enjoyment of the office of 
major upon the retired list, United States Army, is it a legal 
prerequisite that Major Smith should formally accept said 
office~ 
" (2) Do the provisions above referred to require that the 
appointment of Major Smith to the charge of the river anu 
harbor work at; Wilmington, Del., be canceled, and that he 
be Telieved from such work~ 
" (3) Do the provisions of the said section render Major 
Smith, as a retired officer of the Army. ineligible to receive a 
civil appointment at a fixed rate of compensation, to take 
charge of work in connection with the improvement of rivers 
and harbors~" 
Section 1094, Revised Statutes, includeR "the officers of the 
Army on the retired list" in the Army of the United States. 
They are therefore officers of the United States. 
• In the letter above referred to the Secretary of War states ''that Mr. 
W. F. Smith, who by civil appointment has been employed as a United 
States agent in charge of river and harbor work at Wilmington, Del. 1 at 
an annual compensation of $3,000, was on March 1, ultimo, commis-
sioned major United States Army, auG. placed upon the retired list as of 
that rank on that date; " and in view of these facts the Secretary calls 
attention to sections 1259, 1763, 1764, and 1765, Revised Statntes, and 
propounds the questions set forth in the Attoruey-General's opinion. 
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Sections 1756 and 1757, Re~ised Statutes, require'' every 
person elected or appointe<l to any office of honor or profit, 
either in the civil, military, or naval service, * * * be-
fore entering upon the duties of such office, and before being 
entitled to any part of the salary or other emoluments thereof,'' 
to take and subscribe a prescribed oath, before entering upon 
the enjoyment of the office to which he has been appointed. 
l\ir. Smith, of whom you write, must take the oath required. 
This qualification imposes upon him full official obligation 
anu is in law a legal acceptance of the office, and, as such, a 
sufficient formal acceptance. 
The last two questions submitted have substantially been 
passed upon by the Senate, by this Department, and by the 
courts before. 
On the 14th of April, 1882, the following resolution was 
submitted to the Senate of the United States: 
"Resolved, That the Committee ou the Judiciary be in-
structed to inquire, and report by bill or otherwise, whether 
or not a retired Uniteu States Army officer can lawfully hold 
a civil office under the Government of the United States." 
It was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, which, 
on the 18th, through :Mr. Garland, reported t~ the Senate, 
"answering the question in the affirmative." 
On the 7th of June, 1851, a similar question was sulmi1tted 
to Attorney-General Crittenden under the statutes of the 3J 
of :March, 1839 (5 Stat., 334-349), and of the 23d of August, 
1842 (5 Stat., 508-510), from which section 1765, Revised 
Statutes, was derived. He replied (5 Opin., 768): 
''The plain meaning of this seems to be that an individual 
holding one office and receiving its salary shall, in no case, 
be allowed to recei ,-e also the salary of another office, which 
he does not hold, simply on account of his having pefformed 
the duties· thereof. The prohibition is against his receiv-ing 
the salary of an office that he does not hold, and not against 
his receiving the salaries of two offices which he does legiti-
mately hold." 
On the 11th of June, 1877, like questions were submitted 
to Attorney-General Devens. In his reply (15 Opin., 306) 
he considers and interprets all the sections to which you 
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refer, and declares: ''Sections 1763, 1764, and 1765, above 
referred to, are condensations from statutes which were in 
existence at the time that this decision ( Oonve'tse v. The 
United States) was made, and in conformity with it I deem 
it my duty, in answer to your inquiry, to say that a retired 
officer may draw his pay as such, and may also draw the 
salary of any civil office which he may hold under the Gov-
ernment, assuming always that the duties of the civil office 
are performed under anu by virtue of a. commission appoint-
ing him to that office which he holds in addition to his rank 
as a retired officer." 
This interpretation is sustained by the Court of Claims in 
Jieigs v. Unitecl States (19 C. Cis. R., 497), and by the Supreme 
Court in Omwerse v. United States (21 How., 464), United Statell· 
v. Brindle (10 U.S. R., 688), and United States v. Saunders (120 
U.S. R., 1.26), in which last case Miller, J., delivering the opin-
jon, declares: 
''We are of opinion that, taking these sections (1763, 1764, 
and 1765) all together, the purpose of this legislation was t& 
prevent a person holding an office or appointment, for which 
. the law provides a definite compensation by way of salary or 
otherwise, which is intended to cover all the services which, 
as such officer, he may be called upon to render, from receiv-
ing extra compensation, additional allowances, or pay for 
other services which may be required of him either l>y act ot 
Congress or by order of the head of his Department, or in any 
other mode, added to or connected with the regular duties of 
the place which he holds; but that they have no application 
to the case of two distinct offices, places, or employments, 
each of which has its own duties and its own compensation, 
which offices may both be held by one person at the same 
time. l14 the latter case he is in the eye of the law two otlicers, 
or holds two places or appointments, the functions of which 
are separate and distinct, and, according to all the decisions, 
he is in such case entitled to recover the two compensations." 
I am of opinion that the above interpretation of sections 
1259, 1763, 1764, and 1765, RevL:;ed Statutes, to which you 
refer, is well established alike by reason, precedent, and au-
thority. 
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I therefore answer your first inquiry in the affirmative, and 
your second and third inquiries in the negative. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF. WAR. 
ZOOLOGICAL PARK COMMISSION. 
Under section 4 of the act of March 2, 1889, chap. 370, the Commission 
thereby created have authority to defray out of the appropriation for 
establishing the Zoological Park all necessary expenses incidental to 
the selection and acquisition of the land for the park, but not to apply 
the appropriation to laying out the land, erecting buildings thereon, 
etc. The provisions of that section extend no further than the selec-
tion and acquisition of the land. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Aprill3, 1889. 
SIR: In reply to your communication asking an opinion 
as to whether the Commission for the establishment of a 
zoological park has authority under section 4 of the act of 
2d .March, 1889, establishing the Commission, ~'to incur ex-
penses, not only for purchasing, but for laJing out the land, 
purchasing or erecting buildings, or accepting donatio11s of 
land, buildings, or money, connected with the scientific or 
other purposes of the park, and to pay from the appropria-
tion the necessary clerk hire and incidental expenditures of 
the Commission." 
While the Commission thus established seems to be in-
tended as a permanent institution to have charge of the 
Zoological Park provided for, it seems equally clear that it 
was the intention of Congress to confine the powets of the 
Commission, for the present, to making a selection of land for 
the park within the limits stated in the act, to having a map 
made of the park so selected in accordance with the direc-
tions of the act, to fixing the price to be paid for eacll parcel 
of ground, with the approval of the President of the United 
States, and to purchasing the same at such price or to insti-
tuting proceedings for the condemnation of the property 
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of such owners as should not agree to the prices fixed as 
above stated. 
To enable the Commission to perform the duties cast on 
them, I think they must be held to have authority by impli-
cation to employ clerks to assist them and to incur other 
necessary incidental expenses, and to defray such clerk hire 
and expenses out of the appropriation of $200,000 for estab-
lishing tte park; but I do not think the Commission have 
power to lay out the land, otherwise than by making ''the 
careful map" directed by the act, or to purchase or erect 
buildings or to accept donations of land, buildings, or money. 
In my opinion Congress did not intend by this provision of 
law to go further than the selection and acquisition of the 
land for the contemplated park, reserving all other matters 
for future legislation. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT TUNNEL. 
Provisions of the contract with Messrs. Beckwith & Quackenbush, en-
tered into on October 29, 1883, for the construction of a tunnel to in-
crease the water snpply of Washington, D. C., and of the agreements 
supplementary thereto, considered with reference to certain inquiries 
propounded; and advised (1), that should Major Lydecker, or his suc-
cessor, legally appointed, with the sanction of the Chief of Engineers, 
annul the contract, and give notice thereof to the contractors, the 
right of the latter to make good the defective work may legally Le 
denied; but so long as the contracts remain iu full force the contractors 
have the right, at their own expense, within a reasonable time, to 
make the defective work good; (2) should the contracts be annulled, 
• as above, the contractors can not be legally compelled thereafter to 
make the defective work good, but they can be made liable for the 
actual necessary expenditure whiclr the Government may incur in 
making it good; (3) that to meet such liability the Government may re-
tam any money it now has, to which the contractors would have been 
entitled had the work been good; ( 4) the expenditure authorized by 
the resolution of October 19, 1888, includes expenses attending the in-
spection of the repairs necessary to protect and preserve the work 
already done, but not those attending the inspection of other work. 
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DEP.A.RT~IENT OF JUSTICE, 
April17, 1889. 
SIR: Your letter of the 2d of April, 1889, with the accom-
panying papers, has been received and considered. You ask: 
"(1) Can it legally be denied to the contractors to make 
good the defective work, and to' cause it to conform to the 
specifications of the contract entered into with them~ 
" (2) If this denial can be made, then may the contractors 
be legally compelled to make such defective work good at 
some future time, or be made liable for the expense of the 
same~ 
'' (3) If the contractors were to proceed with the repairs to 
the defective work, could the expenses attending the inspec-
tion of the repairs be paid out of moneys appropriated by the 
act of the 30th of March, 1888, for superintendence and en-
gineering, having in view the terms of the joint resolution of 
October 19, 1888." 
The ·material facts on which the inquiries arise are that on 
the 29th day of October, 1883, Beckwith & Quackenbush en-
tered 'into a contract with the United States to "furnish the 
material and do the work for construction of t~tnnel for in-
creasing tile water supply of Washington, D. C.," according 
to specifications and on terms and conditions prescribed in the 
contract. It is provided by the contract that the adve.rtise-
ments and specifications attached shall form part of it. 
The specifications require that ''All work and workmanship 
must be the best of its kind, satisfactory in every respect to the 
United States engineer," * * * and that "failure on the 
part of the contractor to comply with any of the require-
ments contained in this paragraph will be authority for the 
United States to annul the contract, and proceed with the , 
work in such manner as may be deemed necessary for its most 
speedy and ecor..omical completion, and to withhold from the 
contractor all retained percentages and other moneys that 
may be due or become due." 
The contract also provides : 
"If in any event the party of the second part shall delay 
or fail to commence with the delivery of the material or the 
performance of the work on the day specified herein, or s.hall 
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in the judgment of the engineer in charge fail to prosecute faith-
fully ancl diligently the work in accordance toith the specifica-
tions and requirements of this contract, then, in either case, the 
party of the first part, or his successor legally appointed, 
shall have power, with the sanction of the Chief of Engi-
neers, to annul this contract, by giving notice in writing to 
that effect to the party or parties or either of them of the 
second part; and upon the giving of such notice all money 
or reserved percentage due or to become due to the party or 
parties of the second part by reason of this contract shall be 
and become forfeited to the United States, and the party of 
the first part shall be thereupon authorized, if an immediate 
performance of the work or delivery of the material be in his 
opinion required by the public exigency, to proceed to provide 
for the same by purchase or contract, as prescribed in section 
3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States." 
The contract also stipulates that-
" If at any time during the prosecution of the work it be 
found advantageous or necessary to make any change or 
modification in the project, and this change or modification 
should involve such change in the specifications as to char-
acter and quantity, whether of labor or material, as would 
either increase or diminish the cost of the work, then such 
change or modification must be agreed upon in writing by 
the contracting parties." 
In pursuance of this last stipulation, " a change or modifi-
cation in the project" having been determined upon, an agree-
ment. was entered into between the parties, supplemental to 
the first contract, with the express covenant that the provis-
ions of the first contract should apply to the second so far as 
the party of the first part deemed them applicable. On the 
5th of December, 1887, another change or modification was 
made in the first contract, as supplemented by the second, 
by virtue of which 85 per cent. of the 10 per cent. of each 
monthly payment which had been retained by the United 
States in accordance with the contract till the final "comple-
tion and acceptance of the work" was paid to the contractors, 
part of the consideration for the " work already done to the 
satisfact" on of the party of the first part." 
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This third contract expressly pro\ides: 
"It is understood and agreed that notlling herein contained 
shall'be construed to release f.eom or add . to any obligation, 
liability, right, or duty devolving on either party under the 
operation of the two several articles of agreement to which 
the foregoing are supplemental." 
On the 8th day of May, 1888, an additional change or mod-
ification was made in the original contract, as before supple-
mented, in which it was expressly provided: 
" It is further understood and agreed that nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to release from or add to any 
obligation, liability, right, or duty, involved in the original 
contract of October 29, 1883, or any articles of agreement 
supplemental thereto, so far as concerns the parties in inter-
est, except as specifically provided in these final supple-
mental articles." 
There is nothing in any of the contracts, or the accompa-
nying papers, which militates against or changes tlle cove-
nant of the contractors in the first contract that ''all work 
and workmanship must the best of its kind, satisfactory in 
e\·ery respect to the United States engineer." The original 
contract and all its supplements are to be construed together. 
Where their provisions are consistent, they all stand; where 
inconsistent, the latest provision supersedes the earlier one. 
The contractors, in their letter of the 9th of 1\Iarch, 1889, 
state: "We concede tllat there bas been mucll bad work 
done in the lining of this tunnel by the subcontractors, who 
had entire charge of this lining. We deny that we knew of 
this bad work, and we are prepared to prove specifically two 
facts wllich conclusively show such want of knowledge." 
That the bad work was done by subcontractors of Beck-
with & Quaekenbush, either with or without their knowl-
edge, is entirelJ immaterial so far as the rights of the United 
States are concerned. The subcontractors were the agents 
or employes of the contractors alone, and if they Wfjre either 
incompetent, negligent, or dishonest, it was the duty of their 
emplosers to see to that, and take measures to prevent losi-i 
or wrong on any account by their agents. They could not, 
by a subcontract, to which the United States was not a 
party, relie,·e themseh·es from the obligation of their cove-
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nant, nor impute the effect of the carelessness or wrong-doing 
of their own agents to the United States. The payment 
which they in their communication allege they made after 
the 5th of December, 1887, to their subcontractors is urged 
by them as an estoppel against any claim for future liability 
for past bad work after the contract of the 5th of December, 
1887. The contract furnishes a full reply to this, for it pro-
vides that nothing therein contained "shall be construed to 
release from * * * liability under former contracts." 
That contract, so far as material in the questions submitted, 
is inconsistent with the first contract only in that it released 
85 per cent. of the fund retained to that date on the prior 
contracts which was to ha,~e been "retained until the final 
completion and acceptance .of the work." Throughout all 
the supplements the provisions of the first contract, that" all 
work and workmanship must be the best of its kind, satis-
facto:ry in every respect to the United States engineer," and 
the consequences of a failure to perform as above set forth, 
remain in full force. The fact that the work was admittedly 
bad warrants the exercise of the power contained in the con-
tract providing for its annulment. The contractors, by no-
tice or otherwise, can not prevent the exercise of this power, 
if the proper officer of the United States determines in good 
faith that the exercise of it is necessary to subserve the best 
interests of the Government. 
The contract pro\ides, in case of an annulment, the United 
States may "proceed with the work in such manner as may 
be deemed necessary tor Its most speedy and economical com-
pletion, and to withhold from the contractor all retained per-
centages and other moneys that may be due or become due.'' 
In case this action on the part of the Government is taken, 
one of the first clauses of the contract provides: 
" The party of the second part shall be responsible for and 
pay all liabilities incurred in the prosecution of the work for 
labor and material." 
A prior clause had provided that while the contractors were 
conducting the work they should furnish the material and 
do the work for the prices therein named. The last clause 
{}noted was intended to define the responsibilities of the con· 
• 
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tractors when the Government did or relet the work after 
notice of annulment. 
The act of the 30th of March, 1888 (Statutes of 1887 and 
1888, page 51), requires that the work on the tunnel then pro-
vided for shall be completed on the 1st day of November, 
1888, and by its terms contemplates that the work may be 
done either under existing contracts or by a reletting. The 
resolution of the 19th of Octoher, 1888 (id., 632), authorizes 
and directs the Secretary of 'rV ar to expend so much of the 
unexpended balance of the appropriation in the last act as 
may be necessary for the P':lrpose of protecting and preserv-
ing the work already done on the tunnel. The direction con-
tained in this resolution for the protection and preservation 
only is a limitation of the use of the unexpended balance to 
those purposes. The implication arises that that balance can 
only be drawn upon for the purposes named. It follows that, 
so far as the repair of the defective work is necessary to pro-
tect and preserve the work already done, the Secretary of 
War has power to expend so much of the balance as may be 
necessary for the protection and preservation of the work. 
Such power would include the necessary expenditure for in-
spection of the repairs to insure good work and proper ma-
terial. But iftlte repairing is done by the former contractors, 
they would be only doing over that which was badly done 
before, and they would not be entitled to any compensation 
for such repairs out oft he appropriation. If such repairing 
should be done directly l>y the Secretary of War or by a re-
letting, the expense incurred for the material and work as 
well as the inspecting may be paid for out of the balance of 
the appropriation. 
To your first inquiry I therefore answer, that if Major 
Lydecker, or his successor legally appointed, with the sanc-
tion of the Chief of Engineers, annul the contracts, and giv-e 
notice thereof to the contractors, the right of the contractors 
to make good the defective work can be legally denied. But, · 
so long as the contracts remain in full force, they have the 
right at their own expense, within a reasonable time, to make 
the defective work good. 
To your second inquiry I answer, if the contracts be an-
nulled as stated in my answer to your :first inquiry, the con-
• 
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tractors can not be legalJy compelled thereafter to make the 
defective work good, but they can be made liable for the 
actual necessary expenditure which the United States may 
incur in making it good. To meet such liability the United 
States may retain any money it now has, to which the con-
tractors would have been entitled if the work bad been good. 
Your third inquiry I answer in the affirmative, so far as 
the inspection of such repairs may be necessary to protect 
and preserve the work already done. .As to any work ex-
cept such as may be necessary to protect and preserve the 
work already done, I answer in the negative. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
MARSHAL OF INDIAN TERRITORY. 
The marshal appointed under the act of March 1, 1889, chapter 333, pro-
viding for the organization of a court in the Indian Territory, has the 
same powers in that Territory which a sheriff in Arkansas has in h1s 
own county; and his power to appoint deputies is limited only by the 
necessity of the case. 
He may call to his assistance, in the execution of the law, civilians, but 
not the military forces of the United States, the use of th~ latter as a 
JJosse comitatus being forbidden by the act of June 18, 18i8, chapter 263. 
It is competent to the President, unl1er section 5298, Revised Statutes, 
to direct the military forces to render the marshal such aid as may be 
necessary to enable him to maintain the peace and enforce the laws of 
the United States in that Territory. 
" 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 18, 188D. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit that, by section 2 of the 
act of March 1, 1889, providing for the organization of a 
court in the Indian Territory, it is provided that the marshal, 
appointed under the provisions of that act, "shall discharge 
the like duties and receive the same fees and salary as now 
received by the marshal for the western district of Arkansas. 
The said marshal will appoint one or more deputies, wlw 
shall have the same powers aud perform the like duties and 
294 HO~. W. H. H. MILLER 
Marshal of Indian Territory. 
------~---------------
be removable in like manner as other deputy United States 
marshals." 
By section 6322 of the Revised Statutes of Arkansas it is 
providetl: 
''Each sheriff shall be a conservator of the peace in his 
county, and shall cause all offenders against the laws of this 
State, in his Y"iew or hearing, to enter into recognizance to 
keep the peace, and appear at the next term of the circuit 
court of the county; and on the failure of the offender to 
enter into recognizance to commit him to jail.'' 
Section G~24: : 
''He shall quell and suppress all assaults and batteries, 
affrays, insurrections, and unlawful assemblies." 
Section 6325 : 
"He shall apprehend and commit to jail all felons and 
other offenders." 
Section 6370: 
'"The sheriff of any county shall not only htwe power to call 
to his assistance every man to aid him in discharge of his 
duty in the execution of the Jaws of this State, but shall be, 
and is hereby, authorized and empowered to make a requisi-
tion upon any officer commanding a regiment or battalion of 
militia or brigadier or major-general of militia within this 
State for such number of men as may be necessary to sup-
press sll resistance to his authority in the execution of the 
laws of this State within any county." 
Section 6375 authorizes the sheriff, having arrested any 
offender, unless such offender shall enter into recognizance, 
with two or more sufficient securities in at least double the 
highest sum fixed for the offense, to commit said offender to 
prison for safe-keeping, and he is authorized to put him 
in any prison in the State. 
The marshal of this new Territory, therefore, seems by 
force of the act under which he was appointed to be endowed 
with very large authority as a peace officer, ha"Ving the same 
powers in the Indian Territory as the shel"iff of any countJ~ in 
Arkansas has in his own county. This is in accordance with 
the general policy of the Federal legislation on this subject. 
Section 788 of the Redsed Statutes of the United States 
reads: ,., The marshals and their deputies shall ha \Te in each 
State the same powers in executing the laws of tlJe United 
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States as the sheriffs and their deputies in such States may 
have by law in executing the laws thereof." 
This section, 788, is cited not because it is supposed to up-
ply to this particular case, as it clearly does not, l>eing lim-
ited to States and this being a Territor~·, but as showing 
that the same policy is pursued with reference to the powers 
granted to the marshal in this Territory as is granted to the 
marshals iu the States. Under section 788 the United States 
marshals in Arkansas would ha\·e all the po,vers of the 
sheriffs in that State. 
Under section 2 of the act organizing the court in the In-
dian Tt>rritory, the marshal of tile court has the same author-
ity. This section is fortified by section l .'i76 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, which provides: "That the 
marshals of each Territory shall have the powers and perform 
the duties and be subject to the regulations and penalties im-
posed by law upon the marshals for the several judicial clis-
tricts of the United States." 
Section 2 provides that the marshal may appoint one or 
more deputif's. In other words, his power to appoint deputies 
is not limited except by tile necessity of the case~ and lle may 
call to his assistance, in the language of the statute of Ar-
kansas, "every man to aid him in the discharge of his duty 
in the execution of the laws of this State." 
Section 787 provides that the marshal shall have power to 
command all necessary assistance in the execution of his 
duty. 
So far the statutes would have reference, I should think 
clearly, to calling upon civilians for aid; but, the sheriffs in 
Arkansas are authorized to call upon the military forces, also, 
if necessary; and by parity of reasoning it would seem that 
the marshal iu the Indian Territory, being a Federal officer, 
would in like manner be authorized by section 2 of the act 
organizing that court to call upon the military forces of the 
Government to aid him in maintaining veace and enforcing 
the laws, if necessary. 
This would undoubtedly be so, but for the provisions of 
section 15 of the act of June 18, 1878, forbidding the use of 
the army as posse co•nitcttlUJ except as expressly authorized 
by the Constitution and laws. 
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But notwithstanding this pro,ision, certainly it. is compe-
tent for the President, under Sectjon 5:!98 or the Revised 
Statutes of the United State~, to direct the ruilitarJ· forces to 
render such aid to the marshal, upon his request, as may be 
necessary to enable him to maintain the peace and enforce 
the laws of the United States in that Territory. 
Respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
UNITED S'I'ATES MARINE HOSPITAL SERVICE. 
The provision in section~ of the act of January 4, 1889, chapter 19, that 
"no officer shall be promoted to the rank of passed assii>tant surgeon 
until after four years' service," applies to all assistant tSurgeons in the 
Marine Hospital Service without any exception. 
DEP AR1.'MENT Olt' JUSTICE, 
April 24, 1889. 
SIR: I have considered the petition of certain assistant 
surgeons of the United States Marine Hospital Service a8k-
ing that the requirement of the second section of the act of 
.January 4, 18~9, entitled ''An act to regulate appointments 
in the Marine Hospital Service of the United States," that 
no officer shall be promoted to the rank of passed assistant 
surgeon until after four Jears' service, shall be held not to 
-extend to the petitioners. 
The ground on which this application is made is that the 
petitioners, as they say," came into the service under a regu-
lation requiring but three years' service previous to examina-
tion for promotion, which regulation had the force of law, and 
the application of said clause of the new law would make it 
ex post facto and raise~ doubt as to its legality." 
I am of opinion that the proviso in question applies to the 
petitioners, and that it is not open to the objection urged 
against it, but that Congress had undoubted power to make 
the term of service necessary for the promotion of all assist-
ant surgeons, including the petitioners, to the rank of passed 
assistant surgeon, four years instead of three. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. B. ~fiLLER. 
The SECRETARY OF. THE TREASURY. 
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PUBLIC BUILDING SITE AT SPRI~GFIELD, MO. 
The act of March 29, 18138, chap. 45, entitled ''Au act for the 'erection of a. 
public building at Springfield, Mo.," authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to purchase "a site," and when this is done his auth'lrity in 
that regard is exhausted; he is not at liberty to buy another site in 
addition to the first. 
As such authority is limited to a single site, so the authority derived 
thereunder to select and contract for the purchase of a site is likewise 
restricted. 
Assuming that the contract to purchase a particular site, made with 
Messrs. Wooley, Porter & Hubbell, still exists, the Secretary is with-
out authority to select a second site and contract for its purchase. 
Should that contract become rescinded, or otherwise determined, with-
out any actual sale taking place, the authority to select and contract 
for the purchase of another site would revive. 
The obligation to pay for the property arises when a valid title thereto 
is conveyed and becomes vested in the United States; hence not until 
acceptance of the deeds tendered by the vendors. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April ~9, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 23d instant, and the papers 
which accompanied the same, it appears that, under the pro-
visions of the act of March 29, 1888, entitled " An act for the 
erection of a public building at Springfield, Mo.," the Treas-
ury Department on the 1st of December, 1888, advertised 
for proposals for the sale to the Government of property 
suitable for a site for the building authorized to bP. erected 
by that act, such proposals to be received until12 o'clock noon 
9f December 15, 1888. 
On January 10, 1889, in a letter addressed to Messrs. 
Wooley, Porter & Hubbell, Springfield, Mo., the Secretary 
of the Treasur.v accepted their proposal, bearing date De-
cern ber 15, 1888, for the sale of certain property located in 
that place for the sum of $1, on condition that they give a 
good and valid title to the same within a reasonable time; 
adding: "The honorable the Attorney. General has this day 
been requested to instruct the United States attorney for the 
western district of Missouri to procure the necessary evidence 
of title and deeds of conveyance to the United States, and 
when these papers are received at this Department, with 
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the approval of the ..:\..ttorney-General, as required by law,. 
the payment of the purchase money will be promptly made.'" 
Subsequently the United States attorney for said district,. 
pursuant to instructions given him by the Attorney-General 
in compliance with a request made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury ur!.der date of January 10, 188D, forwarded to this. 
Department title papers relating to the property em braced 
in the sairl proposal of Messrs. Wooley, Porter & Hubbell,. 
including certain deeds to the United States ofiered by them 
for the acceptance of the Government. 
These papers were afterwards transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Treasury by the .Attorney General with a letter dated 
the 23d ultimo, wherein the latter stated that in his opinion 
the deeds offered for acceptance, as above, are sufficient to 
convey a valid title to the whole of the premises, suluect to 
such taxes as are assessed thereon and remain unpaid. It 
was assumed in that opinion that three unrecorded releases 
of certain deeds of trust were executed (us they were alleged 
to be) by the holders of the notes secured by such deeds of 
trust. But the Secretary was at the same time ad vised by 
the Attorney-General that before accepting a transfer of the 
property the United States attorney should ascertain whether 
the persons who executed such releases are the l.J.oluers of 
such notes, and, if so, see that their releases are duly recorded, 
awl furthermore that he should see that all unpaid taxes upon 
the property are discharged by the grantors of the premises, 
etc. 
On the 26th ultimo the Secretary of the Treasury wrote to 
}Iessrs. Wooley, Porter & llubbell, as follo\\S: 
"I have to advise you of the receipt from the Attorney-
General of a letter of the 23d instant, transmitting abstract 
of title and other. papers covering property situated on the-
southwest corner of St. Louis antl Jefferson streets, having 
a frontage of 145 feet on the former and 100 feet on the lat-
ter street, selected as a site for the public building to be 
ert-cted at Springfield, }lo. Before completion of the transfer 
to the Government of the property in question, in the opinion 
of the Attorney-General it will be necessary for the district 
attorney under whose charge the papers were prepared to 
obtain certain information and perform certain duties, which 
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action he will be at once requested to take, aud upon indica-
tion from him of a compliance with-the requirements of the 
Attorney-General, a formal transfer of the property to the 
Government will be effected, and action taken looking to a 
compliance with the requirements of the act of Congress 
authorizing tlle erection of the building in question." 
In connection with tlle foregoing you present for my con-
sideration the following questions: 
"First. When does the discretionary power of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury in regard ~o the selection of property 
for a site for said building cease~ 
"Second. \Vhen does the obligation of the Departmeut 
to make payment of the purchase money for said property 
become established 1 
" Third. When does the title to said property become 
vested in the United States. 
''Fourth. Has the opinion delivered by the Attorney-
General May 6, 1861, been or should be modified." 
By the act of March 29, 1888, cited above, the Secretary 
of the Treasury is ''authorized and directed to purchase or 
otherwise provide a site" for the proposed building. Under 
this provision he undoubtedly derived authority to select 
and contract for the purchase of a site, subject to the re-
strictionR imposed by the act as to cost, etc., and the corre-
spondence with :Messrs. Wooley, Porter & Hubbell disclose 
the fact that the site offered by them was select~d and their 
proposal for the sale of the same accepted by the Secretary, 
on condition that within a reasonable time they give a valid 
title thereto bearing the approval of the Attorney-General. 
This condition being assented to by them, as shown by their 
acts, the contract to purchase the site so offered on such 
condition thus became complete. 
The deeds with the evidence of title submitted by them 
have been found by the Attorney-General sufficient to pass 
a valid title to the site (assuming that certain releases were 
executed by competent parties, as claimed), subject to such 
taxes as may remain unpaid, the papers not showing that 
there were no unpaid taxes thereon. 
Should it appear, on further investigation, that those re-
leases are good, that there are no unpaid taxes on the prem-
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ises, that the same are free from other liens and incumbrances, 
and that nothing bas occurred since the date of said deeds 
affecting the title of the grantors thereto, in such case the 
conditions imposed by the Secretary in his acceptance of the 
proposal of Messrs. 'Vooley, Porter & Hubbt-11 would seem 
to be ful1y performed, and the agreement to purchase the site 
offered for sale by them to be obligatory. It may be that, as 
matter of fact, all the conditions required of them have al-
ready been pprformed, and, in the absence of investigation, 
the contrary can not well be affirmed . 
.Assuming that the above-mentioned contract to purchase 
still subsists (which may fairly be inferred from the papers 
here before me), and that there is not sufficient ground for its 
rescission on the part of the Government, I submit the follow-
ing in answer to the questions proposed in your letter in the 
order in which they are quoted above. 
(1) The act of March 29, 1888, authorizes the Secretary of 
the Treasury to purchase "a site." When this is done his 
authority to purchase is exhausted; be is not at liberty to 
buy another site in addition to the first. As such authority 
is limited to a single site, so the authority derived there-
under to sel~ct and contract for the purchase of a site is 
likewise restricted. Thus the latter authority does not ex-
tend to the selection of two or more sites, and to the mak-
ing of contracts for the purchase of each at the same time, 
excepting, perhaps, where the contracts are expressly made 
to take effect successively and contingently upon the an-
nulment of prior contracts or the termination thereof with-
out purchase. Agreeably to this view, and on the assump-
tion thatthecontracttopurcbase with Messrs. Wooley, Porter 
& Hubbell still exists, the Secretary is now without authority 
to select a second site and contract for its purchase. Shonld, 
however, that contract become rescinded or otherwise deter- . 
mined without any actual sale taking place, the authority to 
select and contract for the purchase of another site would 
revive. 
(2) The obligation to pay for the property arises when a 
valid title thereto is conveyed to and becomes vested in the 
United States; hence not until acceptauce of the deeds ten· 
dered by the vendors, previous- to which the investigation 
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hereinbefore mentioned should be made, and it should ap1iear 
therefrom that the conditions of the contract of purchase 
have been fully performed by them. 
(3} ThA answer to the third question is contained in the 
preceding paragraph. 
( 4) I am not aware of any modification of the opinion re-
ferred to, nor am I prepared to say (speaking generally) that 
it should be modified. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
G. A. JENKS, 
Actinq Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS LAWS-CLASSIFICATION. 
Opinion of April 3, 1889 (ante, p. 272), respecting the classification for 
duty of certain descriptions of Chine~e shoes, explained ; and advised 
that the opinion referred to does not justify any change m the admin-
istration of the customs laws, except as to importations like those con-
cerning which it was written. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.jJ1.ay u, 1880. 
SIR: I reply to your communication of the 12th ultimo 
that the opinion rendered on the 3<1 of April, to which you 
refer, should be interpreted with reference to the facts set 
forth in the case submitted to which it was a reply. The 
underlying principle of the opinion is that "enumeration 
must be exhausted before assimilation can be resorted to." 
Applying the principle to the case, it was intended to estab-
lish, in the opinion rendered, that the Chinese shoes described 
in the case of Swayne v. Hager were enumerated in the clause 
quoted in the opinion, and in no other; that, as there were 
not two enumerative clauses which might be applicable to 
the import, the last clause of section 2499 was inapplicable; 
that the prior clauses of section 2499 were limited to non-
enumerated articles, and under the facts were not applicable; 
that even if the cotton clause, under which the court bad 
ruled the goods should be classified, might be applied in some 
cases, yet as the hair clause cited provided for" all manufac-
tures of every description composed wholly or in part of hair 
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not specifically enumerated or provided for," it was a more 
specific general enumeration than the cotton clause, whict 
was not so extended by the act of 1883 to imports composed 
wholly or in part of cotton, and therefore this last clause did 
not subject the import to tl1e operation of the last clause of 
section 2499 of the act of 1883, which pro\ides: "If two or 
more rates of duty should be applicable to any imported arti-
cle, it shall be classified for duty under the highest of such 
rates." 
The opinion referred to, thus limited to the facts of the case 
on which it was rendered, does not JUStify any change in the 
administration of the customs laws, except as to imports like 
those concerning which it was written. 
I am, y~mrs, respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVAL ACADEMY. 
Where certain naval cadets were found deficient at the semi-annual ex-
amination held at the Naval Academy in January, 1889, and, without 
the recommendation of the Academic Board, were granted leaves of 
absence by the Secretaryofthe Navy with permission to report to the 
Superintendent of the Academy to join the next fourth class : Held that 
the Secretary had no power to continue these cadets in the Academy 
without the recommendation of the Academic Board. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Jl.fay 7, 1~89. 
SIR: Your communication of the 4th April, 1889, requests 
an opinion on the question whether the twenty naval cadets 
who were found deficient at the semi-annual examination 
held at the Naval Academy in January last, and who, with-
out the recommendation of the Academic Board of the Academy, 
were granted leaves of -absence by t\e then Secretary of the 
liavy, with permission to report to the Superintendent of the 
Academy to join the next fourth class, can be regarded as 
legally continued in the Academy by this action of tbe Sec-
retary. 
In my opinion the Secretary had no power to continue 
these cadets in the Academy without the recommendation of 
the Academic Board. This is removed beyond doubt by sec-
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tions 1519 and 1525, Revised Statutes, which expressly pro-
vide that cadet midshipmen anu cadet engineers, or naval 
cadets as they are now all designated under a later law (2~ 
Stat., 285), "found deficient at any examination," shall not be 
continued at the Academy or in the sen·ice, "except" or 
''unless" "'ltpon the recommend ttion of the Acadernic Board." 
A regulation of the Naval Academy to the same effect had 
been in force for some years when the legislation now em-
. bodied in those sections was enacted, and the reason for 
this interference of Congress was, no doubt, to prevent the 
bad effect on the discipline of the institution produced by 
the occasional and perhaps not always well considered inter-
ferences of the Navy Department with the operation of that 
executive regulation. 
The importance attached by Congress to the functions of 
the Acauemic Board in the economy of the Naval Academy 
is, it may be observed, shown to be undiminished by the re-
cent act of March 2, 1889, entitled ''An act to regulate the 
course at the Naval Academy " (Pamphlet Laws, 1889, pp. 
878-879). 
In conclusion it may be proper to refer to the observations 
of 1\:t:r. Solicitor-General Phillips in his opinion of the lOth 
July, 1877, on the wisdom and effect of the legislation con-
tained in the above-mentioned sections 1519 and 1025 (15 
Opin., 636, 637). 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. l\IILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
TREATY WITH GREECE. 
The rights and privileges granted to the subjects of Greece by the first 
article of the treaty between the United States an1l that country, of 
December 22, 1837, are guarantied to them with all the force of law. 
The word "subjects," in the treat,\, embraces corporations, joint-stock 
companies, and other associations, commercial and industrial, consti-
tuted in conformity with the law of Greece. 
No legal objection exists to the Secretary of State instructing the United 
States minister at Athens to give the Government of Greece au assur-
ance that such corporations aud a:-,sociations may exercise in the United 
States all the rights aml pri\"ileges granted, as above, subject to the 
appropriate laws of the United States and those of the several States. 
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 10, 1889. 
SIR: By your letter of the 2d of April, 1889, you submit ' 
the following inquiry: 
"Whether, in your opinion, there would be any objection 
to this Department instructing the minister of the United 
States at .Athens to give the Hellenic Government an assur-
ance * * * that corporations, joint-stock companies, and 
other associations, commercial and industrial, constituted in 
conformity with the laws in force in Greece, may exercise in 
the United States all their rights, including that of appear-
ing before tribunals for the purpose of bringing an action. 
or defending themselves, with the sole consideration in exer-
eising such rights of always conforming to the laws and cus-
toms in force in this country." 
The first article of the treaty of the 22d of December, 1837,. 
between the United States and Greece provides: 
'' The citizens and subjects of each of the two high con-
tracting parties may, with all security, for their persons, 
vessels, and cargoes, freely enter the ports, places, and rivers 
of the territories of the other wherever foreign commerce is 
permitted. They shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in 
all parts whatsoever of said territories; to rent and occupy 
houses and warehouses fur their commerce; and they shall 
enjoy generally the most entire security and protection in 
their mercantile transactions, on conditions of their submit-
ting to the laws and ordinances of the respective countries.'" 
By virtue of the provisions of the sixth article of the Con-
stitution of the United States this treaty became a part of 
the supremP. law of the land, and is obligatory as such in 
every court, both national and State. Whatever rights the 
treaty grants are guarantied to the subjects of Greece with 
all the force of law. 
The second section of the third article of the Constitution 
declares the judicial power of the United States "shall 
extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Con-
stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made 
or which shall be made under their authority * * * be-
tween a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, 
citizens, or subjects." 
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This section is enforced by proper legislatioTJ. Both the 
right and the remedy are thus assured to Grecian snbjects. 
The word "subjects" in the Constitution is used as descrip-
tive of those who owe perpetual allegiance to a government 
monarchial in form, as the word " citizens" is used to de-
scribe those who owe perpetual allegiance to our own gov-
ernment or other republics. The word "citizens" in the 
Constitution has been interpreted in the courts to include 
corporations and associations such as are described in your 
Jt-.. tter. The word ''subjects" is entitled to a like interpreta-
tion, so as to include like foreign corporations and associa-
tions. The protection and guaranty to corporations, as citi-
zens, of their lawful rights and remedies has been carefully 
considered and frequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
In the case of the Louisville Railway Co'mpany v. Letson 
(2 How., 558) the law is thus declared: 
"A corporation created and doing business in a particular 
State is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, 
although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the same 
State, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being 
treated as a citizen of that State, as much as a natural per-
son. Like a citizen it makes contracts, and though in regard 
to what it may do in some particulars it differs from a 
natural person, and in this especially, the manner in which 
it can sue and be sued, it is substantially, within the meaning 
of the law, a citizen of the State which created it, and where-
its busines" is done, for all the purposes of suing and being 
sued." 
In the case of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company v. 
Wheeler (1 Black, 296), the court, citing tue above case with 
approval, declared. the principle settled, in the following 
language: 
"That where a corporation is created by the laws of a 
State, the legal presumption is that its members are citizens 
of the State in which alone the corporate body has a legal 
existence, and that a suit by or against a corporation, in its 
corporate name, must be presumed to be a suit by or against 
citizens of the State which created the corporate body; and 
that no averment or evidence to the contrary is admissible 
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for the purposes of withdrawing the suit from the jurisdiction 
of a court of the U mted States." 
The same doctrine is maintained in the cases of Marshall 
v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company (16 How., 329); 
Covington Draw-bridge Company v. Shepherd (20 How., ~33), 
and Cowles v. Mercer County (7 Wall., 121). 
The word" ~ubjects" in the treaty embraces such corpora-
tions and associations as are described in your communica-
tion, and in the courts of the United States their legal rights, 
as defined and limited by the laws of the United States and 
of the several States, are fully protected by adequate reme-
dies. There is, therefore, no legal objection to your com-
municating to the minister of the United States at Athens 
such instructions as are suggested in your letter, with the 
qualification which is annexed as a condition to the first ar-
ticle of the treaty, that the rights and remedies of such cor-
porations and associations are to be enjoyed subject to the 
appropriate laws of the United States and the laws of the 
several States. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
OKLAHOMA. 
The Indian title to the lands within the Territory known as Oklahom~1 
having become extinguished, and the lands thrown open to settlement, 
that Territory has ceased to be "Indian country," and sections 213~1 
and 2140,Revised Statutes, are accordingly no longer applicable there. 
to; nor is the sale of spirituous liquors and beer in such Territory for. 
hidden thereby. 
Yet, for reasons stated, the Internal Revenue Department may declinft 
to furnish special revenue stamps for the sale of intoxicating liquom 
within that Territory until Congress shall have time to consider thEt 
subject. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE, 
May 15, 1889. 
SIR: I received your letter of the 17th of April, with its 
inclosure, in which yon ask: ''Whether the collector of in-
ternal revenue for the district of Kansas, to whose jurisdic-
/ 
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tion the Indian Territory was assigned some time ago by an 
Executive order, shall issue special-tax stamps to retail iiquor 
dealers who desire to carry on business in that portion of 
the Indian Territory about to be opened up for settlement by 
the recent proclamation of the President pursuant to 'An 
act making appropriations,' etc., approved March 2, 1889 ¥" 
Also your.s of the 19th of April, in which you ask: 
~'Whether it is legal to sell beer and other spirits in Okla-
homa, and whether this Department should furnish revenue-
stamps for that purpose '" 
Section 3448, Revised Statutes, which is a re-enactment of 
section 107 of the act of the 20th of July, 1S68, provides: 
"The internal-revenue laws imposing taxes on distilled 
spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuffs, and cigars, shall 
be held to extend to such articles produced anywhere within 
the exterior boundaries of the United States, whether the 
same be within a collection district or not." 
This section in terms extends the system of internal-reve-
nue laws, as to distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and to-
bacco, throughout all the domain within the exterior boun-
daries of the United States. 
In the Cherokee Tobacco Oase (11 Wall., 616) the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled that the Indian Territory 
was not an exception to the generality of the enactment, 
and as to distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and tobacco, 
the provisions of the internal-revenue laws were applicable 
to and enforceable therein. 
The territory embraced in the President's proclamation to 
which you refer comes within this ruling, and the appro-
priate provisions of the system relative to stamps and penal-
ties for violations of the law apply with full force. 
The sale of beer and other spirituous liquors, if forbidden 
in that portion of the country to which the proclamation of 
the President of the 23d of March, 1889, applies, must fall 
within the prohibition contained in sections 2139 and 2140 of 
the Revised Statutes. 
Section 2139 declares: ''No ardent spirits shall be intro-
duced under any pretense into the Indian country. Every 
person (except an Indian in the Indian country) who sells, 
exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any spirituous 
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liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian 
superintendent or agent, or introduces or attempts to intro-
duce any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indicm country, 
shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more than two 
years and by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars. 
But it shall be a sufficient defense to any charge of introduc-
ing or attempting to introduce liquor into the Indian country7 • 
that the acts charged were done by order of or under authority 
from the War Department, or any officer duly authorized 
thereunto by the .vVar Department." 
Section 2140 declares: ''If any superintendent of Indian 
affairs, Indian agent, or commanding officer of a military 
}Jost has reason to suspect or is informed. that any white per-
son or Indian is about to introduce or has introduced any 
spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian count~·y in violation 
of law, such superintendent, agent, subagent, or command-
ing officer may cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons~ 
sleds, and places of deposit of such person to be searched, 
and if any such liquor is found therein, the same, together 
with the boats, teams, wagons, and l:)led.s used in conveying 
the same, and also the goods, packages, and vel tries of eaeh 
perHon shall be seized and delivered to the proper officer, 
and shall be proceeded against by libel in the proper court 
and forfeited, oue-ha1f to the informer and the other half to 
the use of the United States; and if such person be a trader, 
his license shall be revoked and h·is bond put in suit. It 
~:)hall moreover be the duty of any person in the service of 
the United States, or of any Indian, to take and destroy any 
ardent spirits or wine found in the Indian country except 
such as m~y be introduced therein by the War Department. 
In all cases arising under tllis and the preceding section 
Indians shall be competent witnesses." 
These sections are by their terms limited to the ''Indian 
country." Their intent is to protect the Indians from the 
pernicious effect of intoxicating drinks, which is, and has 
been, the bane of their race. Whenever a portion of the ter-
ritory of the United States ceases to be the exclusive and 
rightful place of residence of the Indians, and has become 
legally appropriated to settlement ty the white race, the pro-
visions of the Indian code, of which tile two se£tions quoted 
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are a part, if they bad been before applicable, lose their 
effective force. 
The lands concerning which the questions submitted arise 
had been a part of the Indian Territory over which the Indian 
title had not been extinguished. When in that condition the 
rightful and exclusive ownership, with the possession inci-
dent to it, was vested in the Indians. While thus owned by 
the Indians the sections quoted were in full operation; but, 
on the 1st of March, 1889, in execution of previous negotia-
tions with the Indians, Congress passed an act (Statutes of 
1888 and 1889, page 757) by which, as to a part of the lands, 
the entire title, with the right of exclusive possession, which 
had been vested in the Musco gee and Creek Indians, became 
vested in the United States. On the ~d of March, 1889, Con-
gress passed an act (Statutes of 1888 and 1889, page 1005) 
for the purchase of the balance of the land involved in your 
inquiries from the Seminole Indians, in pursuance of which 
on the 16th day of March, 1889, the land was duly conveyed 
to the United States. By the last-named act the h;tnd ac-
quired was made a part of the public domain; land offices 
were provided for the disposal of the land to actual settlers; 
and the President was authorized to make public proclama-
tion of the opening of the Territory for the disposal of it. 
In pursuance of tlle act the land was by proclamation 
opened to settlement on the 22d day of April, 1889. The 
Indian title to the la.nd was thus extinguished and vested in 
th.e United States. Formal possession has been taken in pur-
suance of the purchase, and doubtless much of it has been 
legally occupied by white settlers. The rights of the Indians 
to or their power of government over the land no longer 
exist. 
What constitutes "Indian country" in the sense in which 
it is used in sections 2139 and 2140 has frequently receivetl 
.careful consideration by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. and the signification of the phrase has a well-defined 
JUdicial interpretation. 
In the case of Bates v. Clark (95 U. S., 204) Captain Bates 
was the defendant in the court below in an action of trespass 
for the seizure of a ''lot of whisky." ·He defended under 
the sections of the law above cited, alleging that the seizure 
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was made in the Indian country. Judgment was rendered 
against him. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of the 
Uniteu States the judgment was affirmed. .Miller, Justict-, 
in delivering the opinion of the court, in answer to the ques-
tion, "Wbat, then, is Indian country within the meaning of 
the acts of Congress regulating intercourse with the In-
dians," replied : 
''The simple criterion is that, as to all the lands thus de-
scribed, it was Indian country wherever the Indian title 
had not been extinguished, and it continued to be Indian 
country so long as the Indians had title to it and no longer. 
As soon as they parted with the title it ceased to be Indian 
country, without any further act of Congress, unless by the 
treaty by which the Indians parted with their title, or by 
some act of Congress, a different rule was made applicable 
to the case." 
The opinion is supported by the cases of American Fur Gom,-
pany,~. United States (2Peters, 358) anil United States v. Forty-
three Gallons of Whisky (93 U. S. R., 561). The definition is 
quoted with approval in the case of Ex pa-rte Grow Dog (109 
U. S. R., 561). 
As shown by the facts above stated, the Indian title to the 
land referred to in your letters has been extinguished. The 
lanu has heen thrown open to the legally qualified people of 
the United States for settlement as a part of the public do-
main. It is not "Indian country." The provisions of sec-
tions 2139 and. 2140 are not applicable to it, and the sale of 
"beer and other spirits" in it are therefore not forbidden 
there,by. 
But while the sale of intoxicating liquors is not forbidden 
in the Oklahoma region and the internal-revenue laws rela-
tive to them are in force, their unrestricted sale in that 
oountry, in its present state, would be a public disaster. The 
land lies immediately adjacent to and is partly surrounded 
by Indian reservations, occupied by large numbers of Indians 
of different tribes. That they shall be protected from the 
baneful effect of intoxicating drinks, is a well-established 
policy of the Government. An unrestricted sale of such 
liquors in their immediate vicinity would be almost as harm-
ful and dangerous to the public peace as on the reservations. 
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The laws which were passed at. the last session of Con-
gress, opening the Territory to settlement, are incomplete. 
Congress doubtless iuteuded to speedily supplement them 
witb. appropriate adequate legislation. No Territorial nor 
State organization exists. No county, nor municipal organi· 
zations, officers, or laws are provided for. The influx of 
populatiou has been sudden and from widely diff,,rent parts 
of the country. For a considerable period of time the moral 
force of good neighborhoocl and society may not have power 
to keep in ch~ck tile lawless element. For a short time a 
state of legal chaos must exist. The obvious inference from 
this condition of affairs is that the peace will be best pro-
moted by tern porarily declining to assess special taxes, or 
issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors in that re-
gion, until Congress shall have time to take such action as 
the emergent necessity of the case calls for. You may refuse 
temporarily to issue such licenses without a violation of law, 
for sections 3240 and 3241 clearly contemplate that when a 
license is granted it shall specifically define and describe 
tiOme known place of doing busiue~s under it. There being 
no counties nor legally organizetl towns whose limits are 
capable of detinitiou, nor, as yet, any permanent well-known 
buildings, the legal description and location required by the 
statutes can not with sufficient certainty be set forth in the 
licenses. Intelligent public opiuion will approve delay in the 
issue oflicenses and Congress will doubtless ratify it. If the 
unprincipled and reckless should attempt to make sales with-
out license the offenders may be sevP-rely punished for a vio-
lation of the revenue laws. In this manner the evils that 
would be incident to a general unrestricted sale of intoxi-
cating liquors may be to a large extent prevented. 
I am, therefore, of opinion that, in the exercise of a judi-
cious discretion in the execution of the internal-revenue laws, 
you may decline to issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating 
liquors within that r.egion until Congress shall have time to 
consider the subject. 
I am, yours respectfully, 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES REPORTS. 
In making up complete sets of the Supreme Court Reports for the places 
to be supplied under the act of February 12, 1889, chapter 135, the vol-
umes heretofore distributed to the circuit and district judges are not to 
be taken into account. 
The distribution of the reports provjded for by that act has no reference 
whatever to former distributions of reports to judges. 
Where the circuit and district courts bold their sessions in the same 
rooms, one set of reports only are to he provided for the 1)laces where 
such courts sit. But where these courts hold their sessions in different 
buildings or in different rooms of the same building, a set of reports 
are to he provided for the place where each court sits. 
Places where the Territorial courts sit are not within th e provisions of 
the act. 
DEPART:i\fENT OF JUSTICE, 
· .May 15, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of 24th April, ultimo, askiug- an 
c•pinion on certain questions which have arisen in carrying 
out the act of Congress of February 12, 1889, entitled '·Au 
act to amend section six hundred and eighty-three of the 
Revised Statutes relating to the distribution of the reports 
of the Supreme Court," bas recei\ed my consideration. 
The first section of the act pro\ides as follows: 
"That section six hundred and eighty three of the Re,·ised 
Statutes of the United States be, and the Sallie i-; lie! euy, so 
amended as to provide for the distribution, by the SL'Cl'etary 
of the Interior, of one set of the official reports of the ded-
sions of the Supreme Court of t~e United States or un e:s:act 
reprint of the same, comprising volumes one to one hundred 
and twenty-two, inclusi,e, or so many volumes as may ue 
needed with those already supplied to make one such set, to 
each of the places where the circuit and district courts of the 
United States are regularly held: Provided, That where a 
circuit court and district court are both holden at the same 
place, only one such set, or so many volullles as may ue 
needed with those already supplied to make one such set, 
shall be distributed to that place: Provided ft~'i·ther, That 
for the sets or parts of sets distributed as aforesaid not ex-
ceeding two dollars per volume shall be paid; and said re-
ports shall be kept by the clerks of sai1l courts and their sue-
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cessors in Qffice for the use of said courts and the officers 
thereof; and the sum of twenty-eight thousand dollars, or so 
much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated to 
carry out the above provision." 
It is in the application of this section to its subject matter 
that have arisen the questions submitted for opinion. Tllese 
questions I now proceed to treat in their order. 
The first question is: Whether the volumes of Supreme 
·Court reports already supplied by the Department of Justice 
to the circuit and district judges of the United States are in 
all cases to be regarded as a part of the sets required by the 
law above referred to to be furnished, or only in cases where 
the judges reside in places at which circuit and district courts 
are held, or in no case whatever. 
The law seems to imply that those volumes already sup-
-plied by the Department of Justice are to be regarded as now 
and hereafter available for the use of the circuit and uistrict 
.courts, and that only those not hitherto furnished are to be 
purchased under its provisions. Some of the judges, how-
ever, take the ground that these volumes are designed for 
their personal use, and are not, therefore, to be counted ·in 
completing sets under the provision of the new law. If this 
-view is adopted, the numb& of volumes to be purchased will 
be very largely increased over what it otherwise would be. 
It does not seem to me that there is anything in this act 
which interferes with the right of each circuit and district 
judge to continue to receiv-e a copy of each volume of theRe-
ports of the Supreme Court of the United States for his pri-
vate use while holding his commission as a judge, nor do I 
see anything there which appropriates to any other use the 
volumes of said reports furnished to these judges up to the 
date of the approval of the act. 
As I read the act, it allows the law existing at tile time it 
went into operation as to the distribution of the Supreme 
Court reports among the judges to remain in full operation, 
.and makes an additional provision for distributing full sets 
of these reports "to each of the places where the circuit and 
district courts of the United States are regularly held, • 
• * for the use of saiu courts and the officers thereof." 
I am of opinion that the volumes heretofore furnished 
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the circuit and district judges are not to be taken into ac-
count in making n p complete sets of the Supreme Court 
reports for the places to be supplied under the law. The 
language of the act which is referred to as perhaps favoring 
that interpretation is where it provides that the volumes 
to be supplied to each place shall be only so many "as may 
be needed with those already supplied to make one such set." 
Any difficulty caused by this language would seem to be 
removed by the information furnished by thA files of this 
Department that there are already incomplete sets of the 
Supreme Court reports at some of the places where circuit 
and district courts of the United States are held, which are 
the property of the United States. 
In interpreting a statute we may look at the surrounding 
facts just as in the case of a private writing, and it some-
times occqrs that but for such extraneous evidence it would 
be difficult to make sense of the law. (Platt v. Union Pacific 
R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; United States v. Union Pacific R. R. 
Co., 91 U.S., 72.) 
Reading the statute, then, by the light of this extraneous 
information, I am clearly of opinion that the distribution of 
reports provided for has no reference whatever to former dis-
tributions of reports to judges. 
The second question is as follows: Whether, when tlw cir-
cuit and district courts are holden in the same cit~, a~ for 
instance, Boston, but in different buildings or itt different 
parts of the same building, so that the library of the ci1 cuit 
court is not conveniently accessible to the officers ()f the dis-
trict court, a set is required by the law to be provided for each 
court. In other words, whether the phrase" the same place," 
used in the law, refers to the town or city or has a more lim-
ited application. 
I am of opinion that the meaning of the law is that where, 
a,s in some instances is the case, the circuit and district courts 
of the United States for certain districts, sitting at different 
times, respectively, hold their sessions in the same rooms, 
one set of reports shall be furnished for the places where such 
courts sit, and that, in all cases where the circuit and district 
courts for any district hold their sessions in different build-
ings or in different rooms of the same huilding, a set of re-
ports shall bP- provided for the place where each court sits, 
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for the u~::Je of the court and the officers thereof, irrespective 
of any consideration of convenience or proximity. This seems 
to me to be the intent of the act, which provides for a want 
seriously felt in many places where United States courts are 
held; and which should therefore be liberally interpreted, 
according to the well-known rule applicable to the statutes 
affording remedies for public inconveniences. 
The third question is as follows: Wllether the law requires 
that these reports shall be ~up plied for the use of the Terri-
torial courts, a number of applications having been made by 
the judges of said courts for said reports under the provisions 
-of this act. 
I am of opinion that the places where the Territorial courts 
are held do not come within the act, it having been repeatedly 
decided by the Supreme Court that Territorial courts are not 
embraced by the terms "circuit and district courts of tile 
United States." (See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S., 154, 
and cases cited.) 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
NATIONAL BANK IN OKLAHOMA. 
Under existing legislation relating to the establishment of national 
banking associations, antl in the present condition of Oklahoma (being 
wit.hout a government and system of laws), such banking associations 
can not lawfully be authorized and established in the Territory kno,.-n 
by that name. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
lJfay 18, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of April4, 1889, asks an opinion 
as to whether national banks may be lawfuJly authorized and 
established in the region of country recently acquired and 
thrown open to settlement, and commonly known as Okla-
homa. 
It is provided by section 5146, Revised Statutes, as follows : 
'"Every director (of a national banking association) must, 
during his whole term of service, be a citizen of the United 
States, and at least three-fourths of the directors must have 
resided in the State, Territory, or district in which the associa-
... 
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tion is located ]or a.t least one year imntediately p1·eceding thei\ 
election, aml must be residents therein during their continu. 
ance in office.'' ThiR provision of law I understand to be in 
force still. 
It would seem that this reqairement of one year's resiaence 
in the State, Territory, or district in which a national bank-
ing associatiou is located, as to at least three-fourths of the 
directors, presents a barrier to the organization of any such· 
institution in Oklahoma for quite a year to come, as it may 
be assumed that no person elected a director of any such in-
stitution to be located in Oklahoma would possess, sooner, the 
qualification as to residence. 
The legislation authorizing national banking associationR 
to be established in a Territory has in view, I think, a Ter-
ritory regularly organized, with a government and a system 
.of laws for the protection of persons and property, and not a 
Territory like Oklahoma without any government at all and 
destitute of laws for the regulation of the civil relations of 
its people-a Territory without rules of .property, and with-
out even customs to take the place of legislation. 
It was not a Territory in the condition of Oklahoma that 
Congress could have referred to in section 5197, Revised 
Statutes, which declares that any association may charge on 
loans or discounts made, or on notes, billsofexcllange, or other 
evidences of debt," interest at the rate allowed b;y the laws 
of the * * * Territory * * * where the bank is 
located, and no more, except," etc. 
Nor could Congress have had such a Territory in contem-
plation when it directed in section 5226, Revised Statutes, 
that on the failure of a national banking association tore-
deem its circulating notes they should be protested '' by a 
notary public," and yet have omitted to provide the Territory 
with such an officer for that purpose. 
It is not necessary to look further into the legislation on 
this subject to establish the proposition that there is no 
authority to make the dangerous experiment of locating a 
national banking association in a country destitute of the 
laws and sanctions that are essential to the safety of a bank. 
Very respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILI.~ER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TR}!}ASURY. 
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DUMPING MATERIAL IN THE HUDSON. 
The authority conferred upon the Secretary of War by the act of June 
29, 18!::!!::!, chapter 496, does not extend to the waters of the Hudson 
Riv~r a~ far distant from New York harbor as Troy, Albany, and New 
Baltimore. 
The term "tributary waters," as used in that act, covers only such parts 
of the river as, in a brolOI.d sense, can be regarded as connected with 
that harbor. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 21, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your. 
letter of the 20th instant, asking my opinion "as to the 
powers of your Department, and its jurisdiction ·under the 
act of Congress approved June 29, 1888, relative to the de-
terioration of the channel of the Hudson River near 'troy t 
Albany, and New Baltimore, caused by the clumping of 
dredged material into the channel under the authority of 
the State ofNew York; that is, under contracts made with 
the State for deepening the channel by dredging out various 
points between the towns named." 
Answering your inquiry I beg to say, that the jurisdiction 
conferred by the act referred to is limited ''To the tidal waters 
of the harbor of New York, and its adjacent or tributary 
waters, or to those of Long Island Sound." And by section 
5 of said act provision is made for the designation by the 
President of an officer to be known as " Supervisor of the 
Harbor," to act under the direction of the Secretary of War 
in enforcing the provisions of the act, and detecting of-
fenders against the same. The only expression iu the act 
·which would seem to give any color to the claim of juris-
diction in the waters of the Hudson Hiver, as far away as 
the points named, is "tributary waters;'' hut I think it is 
plain from the connection that by the use of these words 
Congress did not intend that the authority of this supervisor 
of the harbor should extend to the remote limits of the nav-
igable waters of tributary rivers. On the contrary, I am of 
the opinion that the term "tributary waters" must be re-
stricted so as to cover only such parts of the river as, in a 
broad sense, can be regarded as connected with the harbor 
• 
/ 
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of New York. It can hardly have been intended, for in-
stance, that a person designing to ex~avate or dredge the 
river 150 miles above New York shouhl, before commencing 
work, apply to the harbor-master of New York for a permit 
as provided in section 3 of the act in question. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE. 
By section 1754, Revised Statutes, it is made the duty of those making 
appointments to civil offices to give a preference, other things hein~ 
equal, to the class of persons named in that section; but the matter of 
capacity and personal fitness for the place is for the determination of 
the appoint~ng power. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 24, 1889. 
SIR: Your note of May 21, inclosing the opinion of the 
Assistant Attorney-General for the Post-Office Department 
as to the construction of section 1754 of the Revised Statutes 
of the United States, and asking my opinion upon the ques-
tion whether that section is mandatory or not, is recei ,-eu. 
In response I have to say that I concur in the opinion of 
the Assistant Attorney-General upon that question. I have 
no doubt that it was the purpose of Congress to make it the 
duty of those making appointments for civil offices to give a 
preference·, other things being equal, to the class of persons 
named in this section. Of course, as the .Assistant Attor-
ney-General for the Post-Office Department says, the matter 
of capability and personal fitness is still a matter of judg-
ment for the appointing power. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 319, 
Arizona Legislature. 
ARIZONA LEGISLATURE. 
Statutory provisions regulating the assembling of Territorial legislatures 
reviewed; and, upon consideration thereof, advised that the governor 
of Arizona Territory is without power to convene a special session of 
the Territonallegislature. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 29, 1889. 
SIR: I ha\e the honor to acknowlerlge the receipt of a tele-
gram from the governor of Arizona Territory. addressed to 
the President, asking his consent to the calling of an extra 
session of the Territorial legislature, which you have referred 
to me with the request that I give an early opinion upon the 
question whether an extra session can be called, and whether 
the President's consent thereto is essential. Accompanying 
said telegram is a copy of a communication addressed to you 
by the governor of Arizona Te;ritory, and also a copy of the 
opinion of the Attorney-General upon the question whether 
the legislature of Arizona can legally continue in session after 
the expiration of sixty days from its organization. 
The general law governing the.sessions of the legislative 
assemblies of the several Territories as to the time of assem-
bling and duration of the session is found in section lS!G 
Revised Statutes, and the act of December 23, 1880 (Supple-
ment Revised Statutes, 586), amending section 1852, Revised 
Statutes. 
Section 1846 provides that the sessions of the respective 
legislative assemblies shall be biennial, and that each legisla-
tive assembly shall fix by law the daj· of the commencement 
of its regular sessions. 
By section 2880, Revised Statutes of Arizona, it is provided 
that" the legislative assembly shall meet at the capitol on the 
third Monday in January, 1889, and every two years there-
after." 
The duration of said sessions is limited by the act of De-
cember 23, 1880, to sixty days, and for the sessions covering 
that period appropriations have from time to time been made 
by Congress. The appropriation for the legislative expenses 
of Arizona Territory for the session of 1889 was made by the 
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legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act of July 
11, 1888 (25 Stat., 276), appropriating therefor the sum of 
~24,250. No provision was made for legislative expenses for 
the Territory of Arizona by the act making appropriation for 
the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Gov-
ernment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1890. (25 Stat., 
726.) 
Section 1886, Revised Statutes, provides that ''no session 
of the legislature of a Territory shall be held until the ap-
propriation for its expenses has been made," and section 1888,. 
Revised Statutes, provides that "no legislative assembly of a 
Territory shall in any instance or under any pretext exceed 
the amount appropriated by Congress for its annual expenses.'~ 
The foregoing are all the provisions of the statutes rela-
tive to the biennial session of the legislature. The governors 
of the Territories of Washington, Idaho, and Montana are 
authori~ea under section 1923, Revised Statutes, to conYene 
an extra session of the legislative assembly on extraordinary 
occasions at any time. Said section is as follows : 
H In each of the Territories of ~T ashington, Idaho, ·and 
Montana, the governor shall have the power to call the legisla-
tive assemllly together by proclamation, on an extraordinary 
occasion, at any time." 
This power gi\en to the governors of the said three Ter-
ritories seems to have been contemplated by the organic acts 
uf these three Territories, which provide that "no session in 
any one year" (which implies there may be a session oftener 
than once in two years) "shall exceed the term of forty uays,' 
etc., whereas in the acts organizing the other Territories it is 
provided " that no one session shall exceed the term of forty 
days," etc. 
Under the authority contained in this section the governor 
of Montana convened an extra session of the legislative as-
sembly of said Territory April14, 1873, and Congress subse-
quently, in making an appropriation to defray the expense of 
said extraordinary session by the deficiency appropriation act 
of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 135), embodied in said act this pro-
vision: ''But hereafter no extraordinary session of the leg-
islature of any Territory, 1cherever the same is now a,uthorized 
by law, shall be called until the reasons for the same have 
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been presented to the President of the United States and 
his approval thereof has been duly given." This provision 
is embodied in the Suplement to the l~evised 3tatutes (pag~ 
65) and is now in force, applicable to all the Territories. 
From the authorities contained in the sections of the Revised 
Statutes and the act above referred to, it seems clear that the 
governors of the several Territories have no power to convene 
extra sessions of the legblative assemblies, except in the Terri-
tories of Washington, Idaho, and Montana, and that since the 
act of June 22, 1874, the governors of these Territories have 
no such power except upon the approval of the President. 
Referen.ce is made by the governor of Arizona to section 
2939 of the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1887 for the au-
thority of the governor to convene the Territorial assembly 
of that T~rritory in extra session. The particular paragraphs 
of the section referred to are as follows : 
2939 (Sec. 1). ''In addition to the powers conferred upon 
the governor by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States, he has the power and shall perform the duties pre-
scribed in this chapter . 
• • • • • • 
(Sec. 16). "He may convene the legislature by proclamation 
on extraordinary occasions by the consent of the President 
or Congress of the United States." Revised Statutes of Ari-
zona, 524. 
The question therefore arises whether this act of the Ter-
ritorial legislature enlarging the powers of the governor of 
the Territory is within the scope of its authority and not in 
conflict with existing laws of the United States. 
The organic law contained in the Revised Statutes and 
subsequent legislation applicable to all the Territories pro-
vides that "the legislative power of every Territory shall 
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States." (Rev. 
Stat., sec. 1851.) 
It further declares that the secretary of the Territory shall 
transmit copies e>f the laws and journals to the President and 
the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of 
Representatives for the use of Congress (section 1844, Rev. 
Stat.), and section 1850, Revised Statutes, provides that "all 
274-VOL XIX--21 
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laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor of any 
Territory, except in the Territories of Colorado, Dakota, 
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall be submitted to Con-
gress, and if disapproved shall be null and of no effect." 
After a careful consideration of the foregoing provisions I 
am satisfied that in the Territories of "' ... atshington, Idaho, 
and }fontana, the same being authorized by law, the gov-
ernor of such Territory may, with the consent of the Presi-
dent, convene extraordinary sessions of the Territorial as-
semblies, notwithstanding no provision may have been made 
by Congress tor the legislative expenses of said session, and 
that section 1886, providing that " no session of t,he legisla· 
ture of a TerritoT·y shall be held until the appropriation fo1· 
its expenses has been made," has reference solely to the reg· 
ular biennial session provided for by law, and does not re-
strict or limit the power of the governor, if approved by the 
President, from convening extraordinary sessions of the 
legislature, although no appropriation may have been Qiade 
therefor. 
It is obvio~s that it_ was not contemplated that the power 
. oeonferred upon the governor, with the consent of the Presi-
-dent, to convene the Territorial assemblies in extraordinary 
.session should be dependent upon the action of Congress in 
making appropriation therefor before it could be exercised, 
because extraordinary sessions would .not be required except 
when the exigencies of the occasion demanded prompt action 
on the part of the executive, and it was . not contemplated 
that the necessity for such session could alway3 be known 
while Uongress was in session, or that Congress should l>e 
con ,-euetl to make provision for this purpose. 
I am therefore of the opinion that the governor of thost: 
Territories, where authority is expressly conferred by law to 
convene the Territorial assemblies in extraordinary session, . 
may submit the reason for calling an extraordinary session 
to the President, aml if he approve the same such sessiou 
may be called although no appropriation has been made for 
that pQ.rpOS~. 
The difficult and imporpant question to determine, how-
ever, is whAther the governor of Arizona Territory has auy 
power to convene an extra session of the Territorial astsembly . 
• 
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If such power exists, it can only be derived from the act of 
the Territorial legislature above cited conferring this power, 
because no such power exists by the organic law; but, on the 
contrary, as such power is expressly conferred by the organic 
law upon governors of the Territories of Washington, Idaho, 
and Montana, by the well-established canon of construction 
such power is therefore withheld from the governors of the 
other Territories. 
All acts of the Territorial legislature inconsistent with the 
organic act are void. • 
The question camt? before the Supreme Court in the case of 
Ferris v. Higley (20 Wall., 375), whether the act of the legisla-
ture of Utah Territory conferring on the probate court gen-
era] jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, in both chancery 
and common law, is inconsistent with the organic act. 
The act of September 9, 1850, establishing a Territorial 
government for Utah Territory, contained the provision com-
mon to all Territories, that the legislath·e power of the Terri-
tory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, con-
sistent with the Constitution of the United States and the 
provisions of the act, and that all laws passed by the legis-
lative assembly and governor shall be submitted to the Con-
gress of the United States, and if disapproved shall be null 
and of no effect. 
With thiR act of Congress in force the Territorial legisla-
ture in 1855 enacted a law giving to probate courts in their 
respective counties power to exercise original jurisdiction, 
both civil and criminal, and as well in chancery as at com-
mon law, when not prohibited by legislative enactment. 
Congress had not enacted any act disapproving of this Ter-
ritorial act, and thus rendering it by Federal legislation null 
and of no effect. But the court held that "The acts of the 
legislature are not the only law to which we must look for the 
powers of any of these Territorjal courts. 'rhe general his-
tory of our jurisprudence and the org-anic act itself are also 
to be considered, and any act of the Territorial legislature in-
consistent with the latter must be held void." 
A similar question arose in the case of Miners' Bank v. Iowa 
(12 How., 1), in which it was contended that as Congress re-
served the power of disapproving and thereby annulling the 
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acts of the Territorial government, and had in the exercise of 
that power stricken out several of the provisions of the act 
under consideration and assented to the residue, that it should 
be regarded as an act by Congress rather than that of the 
Territorial government; but the court held to the contrary. 
See also National Bank v. Omtnty of Yankton (101 U. S., 129) 
as to authority of Uongress in relatioll to the government of 
the Territories, making the enactments of Congress supreme 
and in effect the constitution of the respective Territories. 
From the authorities cit eel I am of the opinion that the 
Territorial legislature of .Arizona bad no authority to confer 
upon the governor of said Territory the power to convene 
the legislature in extraordinary session, and that although 
the act conferring such power was submitted to Congress iu 
compliance with the organic law, and no action was taken 
by Congress disapproving of the sa rue, that it can not be 
considered an act of Congress authorizing and confirming 
the same, and, being inconsistent with the organic law·, is 
therefore void. If this view is correct it follows that no 
power exists in the governor of Arizona to convene a special 
session of the Territorial legislature. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. ~fiLLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CLERKS AND EMPLOY:gS IN THE POSTAL SERVICE. 
The authority conferred upon the Postmaster-General by the act of 
March 2, 18tl9, chapter 374, to classify and fix the salaries of the clerks 
and employes in first and second class post offices is not merely dis-
cretionary with him. It imports a dnty to make the classification 
of such salaries which is provide<l for in the act. 
DEP ART.:\lENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 3, 1889. 
SIR: The question submitted in your letter of May 24th for 
an opinion is whether, under the provisions of the act making 
the appropriations for the service of the Post Office Depa!'t-
ment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1890, approved March 
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2, 1889 (Pamphlet Laws, p. 841), you are bound to make the 
classification of salaries as tllerein set forth, or are merely in· 
vested with autllority so to do in your discretion. 
This question is one of not a little difficulty. The language 
used imports, in its ordinary use, simply authority with a 
discretion. On the other hand, where public rights or duties 
are involved, words wllich ordinarily import merely permis-
sion or authority are lleld to impose a duty or an obligation. 
(Ritchie v. Franklin County, 22 Wall., 68; The Supervisors v. 
The United States, 4 Wall., 435; 15 Opin., 321.) Thus" may" is 
often construed as "shall" or " must; " "authorized" is held 
to mean the same as" required;" and the question i~ in which 
sense the word" authorized" is used in the statute under con-
\~ideration. This statute is the Post Office appropriation bill. 
There is, however, injected into it legislation foreign to the 
ordinary scope of such a bill. The act provides " for com-
pensation of clerks in post offices six million five hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars;" and then follows the language to 
which your inquiry is addressed. "And that the Postmaster-
General be, and is hereby, authorized to classify and fix the 
salaries of the clerks and employes attached to the first-class 
post offices from and after July 1, 1889, as hereinafter pro-
\ided: Provided, however, that the aggregate salaries as 
fixed by such classification shall not exceed the same hereby 
appropriated, namely." Then in minute detail the classifi-
cation is fixed~ which is designed to embrace all employes 
of first-class post offices, commencing with tile assistant post-
master, the number of gradts into which each class of em-
ployes is divided be.ing minutely stated, and at the end a 
proviso (bottom of page 843) that when the salaries so stated 
are adjusted and fixed no clerk or employe shall be promoted 
or advanced in grade or salary without the approval of the 
Postmaster-General in accordance with the requirements of 
section 464, Postal Laws and Regulations of 1887. "And 
hereafter postmasters at offices of the first and second classes 
Bhall submit rosters of the clerks attached to their respective 
offices to the Postmaster-General, to take effect from the first 
day of the fiscal year, July first, instead of January first, 
as heretof?re, and no roster shall be considered in effect 
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until approved by the Postmaster-General." Then follows 
the following sentence: "That all acts and parts of acts that 
conflict with the provisions herein before state<l are hereby 
repealed." 
It should be stated that the same provisions are made to 
. apply to second-class as to fir.st-class post offices. 
So far as fixed by legislation the employes in these post of-
fices have heretofore been divided into four grades. (Rev. 
Stat., sec.163; 22 Stat. L., p. 406, subdivision 2 of sec. 6.) 
As matter of fact, I am advised by the assistant attorney-
general of the Post Office Department that the salaries of 
· the employes in first and second class post offices at the pres-
ent time are divided into more than four grades, and are in 
fact substantially graded according to the provisions of the 
act under consideration. 
However that may be, the minuteness of detail with which 
Congress has seen fit to treat this subject matter in this act,. 
together with the fact that the proviso, commencing on the 
bottom of page 843, seems to contemplate that the classifica-
tion detailed in the act is to be made, an provides what 
shall and shall noi be done '' hereafter", induces the conclu-
sion in my mind that it is the legislative will that these sal-
aries shall hereafter be graded upon the basis of this legisla-
tion. I am strengthened in this view by the supposition, 
which I think is authorized,. that the aggregate of the ap-
propriation was made with reference to this classification. 
Furthermore, to hold that this act gives only a discretion-
ary authority to the Postmasoor-General is to assume that 
Congress framed t~is legislation in all its minuteness of de-
tail, and then left it to the Postmaster-General to say whether 
it should ever have the force of law, or enter into the adminis-
tration of the aft'airs of the Department or not. I can not 
believe that such was the intention of Congress. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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SUPERVISING EXAMINERS OF THE BUREAU 01'~ PENSIONS. 
The special authority giv,·u i1y the act of Jul.v 11, 11-lRR, chapter GlG, to 
appoint or detail five supervising examiners Ill the Bnrean of Pensions, 
with headquarters in the District of Colnmhia, is prohibitory of the 
appointment or detail of a greater nurubPr for the District or for place 
other than the District. 
DEP AR'£:MEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
June 6, 1889. 
SIR : I have considered your communication of the 22d 
May, ultimo, requesting an opinion on the question whether 
more than five supervising special examiners in thB Pension 
Office may be appointed, "provided their headquarters are 
at places other than in the District of Oolum bia ~" 
The question arises upon the act of July 11, 1888 (Pamph-
let Laws, p.286). The act after, interalia,appropriatingasum 
sufficient to pay the per diem allowance and the aetna! and 
necessary expenses of "special examiners, or other persons 
employed in the Pension Office detailed for the purpose of 
making special investigations pertaining to said office" 
when "absent from home," cont~.ins a proviso that five spe-
cial examiners, or clerks detailed and acting as supervising 
examiners, anrl special examiners ·or clerks detailed as such, 
not exceeding three in number, with headquarters in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, may be allowed, in addition to their sala-
ries and in lieu of per diem and all expenses for· subsistence, a 
sum not excee.ding nine hundred dollars each per annurn." "" "" "" 
The only provision made in the law for supervising exam-
iners is the one just given. They and the three special ex-
aminer~, also provided for, are required to perform duty in 
this DiRtrict, and, accordingly, are placed on a different foot-
ing as to pay and allowances from the one hundrerl and fifty 
special examiners provided for•in the paragragh imrnedia,tely 
following, as ''an additional force of one hundred and fifty 
special examiners for one year." 
In view of the particularity with, which Congress has dealt 
with the subjects of supervising and special examiners, I see 
no reason whatever for the implication that Congress in-
tended to authorize the appointment of supervising exam-
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iners, without limitation as to number, to perform duty out-
side this District. The special authority to appointor detail 
fil"e supervising examiners with headquarters in the District 
of Columbia must, in my opinion, be regarded as prohibitorJ 
of the appointment or detail of a greater number for the Dis· 
trict or for any other place. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
0. "\\ .... CHAP:\IAN, 
Acting Attorney- Genm·al. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
EMPLOYMENT OF CO"CNSEL. 
The provision in the act of July 18, 1888, chapter 677, making an appro· 
priation ''for carrying out the provisions of the act of May ~9, loo4, es-
tablishing the Bureau of Animal Industry,'' does not authorize the 
Commissioner of Agriculture to employ counsel for the defense of 
employes of the Bureau for acts done by them in carryiu( out such 
provisions under its direction. Employment of counsel in such easel!' 
is governed by sections 189, 362, and 363 Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JuS1'ICE, 
· J'une G, 1889. 
SIR: I have duly considered your communication asking 
an opinion as to whether the Bureau of Animal Industry, in 
the Department of Agriculture, has authority under tile pro-
Yision in the act of July is, 1888, making an appropriation 
for the salaries and expenses of that Bureau, to retain and 
compensate legal counsel for the defense of employes of the 
B~reau sued for acts done by them in caqyiug out, under the 
direction of the Bureau, the act of May 29,1884, entitled ''An 
act for the establishment of a Bureau of Animal Industry, to 
prevent the exportation of diseased cattle, and to provide 
means for the suppression and extirpation of pleuro-pneumo-
nia and other contagious diseases among domestic animals." 
The provision of the act of July 18, 1888, referred to, is 
in the following words : 
"For carrying out the provisions of the act of May twenty-
ninth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, establishing the 
Bureau of Animal Industry, five hundred tuousand dollars; 
and the Oommissioner of A_g-riculture is hereby authorized to 
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ustl any part of this sum he may deem necessary or expedient, 
and in such manneF as he may think best, to prevent the spread 
of :pleuro-pneumonia, and for this purpose to employ as many 
versons as he may deem necessary, and to e*-pend any part 
of this sum in the purchase and destruction of diseased or 
exposed animals, and the quarantine of the same, whenevm 
in his judgment it is essential to prevent the sprt>ad of pleuro-
pneumonia from one State into another. * • * " 
At the time this provision went into effect sections 189, 
362, and 3G3 of the Revised Statutes were in force. 
Section 189 provided: 
"No head of a Department shall employ attorneys or coun-
sel at the expense of the United States; but when in need of 
counsel or advice shall call upon the Department of Justice, 
thp, officers of which shall attend to the same." 
Section 362 provided: 
"The Attorney-General shall exercise general superintend-
ence and direction over the a,ttorneys and marshals of all the 
districts in the United States and the Territories as to the 
manner of discharging their respective duties; and the se\-
eral district attorneys and marshals are required to report 
to the ~'-\.ttorney-General an account of their official proceed-
ings, and of the state and condition of their respective offices, 
in such time and manner as the Attorney-General may di-
rect." 
Section 363 provided : 
"The Attorney-General shall, whenever in his opinion the 
public interest requirPs it, employ and retain, in the name of 
the United States, such attorneys and counselors at law as 
he may think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the 
discharge of their duties, and shaH stipulate with such as-
sistant attorneys and counsel the amount of compensation, 
and shall have supervision of their conduct and proceedings." 
If these provisions of the Revised Statutes are still in 
force, and I will assume that they are so for the present, it 
is difficult to see how you have authority to employ counsel 
for the purposes mentioned in your communication. 
It may be that the acts of the employes of the Bureau of 
Animal Industry, when they are not engaged in execut-
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the transportation of live stock entering into foreign or 
interstate commerce, must be largely performed under the 
authority of State law; still they are, at the same time, per-
formed by directiou of the National Government and at the 
expense of its Treasury, so that it would seem to follow inev-
itably that if an employe of the Bureau of Animal Industry 
be sued for acts done by him by State authority, and under 
the orders of that Bureau, a case has arisen for the attention 
of a regular law officer of the Government or of some pro-
visional law officer to be appointed by the Attorney-General 
under section 363, Revised Statutes. 
The public interest that called for the use of the money of 
the United States in extirpating and preventing the spread 
of a malignant c lttle disease is the public interest that re-
quires that the paid agents of the United States who may be 
sued for acts done in advancement of that object, it makes 
no difference whether under State or National authority, 
should be defended by the law officers of the United States. 
If, then, the legislation contained in the sections of the 
Revised Statutes given above is still in force, it would seem 
clear that the question submitted is governed by them. 
The next inquiry is whether the provision above quoted 
from the act of July, 1888, has supplanted or otherwise af-
fected the previous legislation regulating the matter in hand. 
The provision in question contains no words of express 
repeal or of reference to that legislation. If then that legis-
lation is affected by the pro·dsion in question, it must be by 
force of the words empowering the Commissioner of Agri-
culture ~'to employ as many persons as he may deem necessary" 
to carry out the purposes of the act. 
Without stopping to consider whether counsel employed to 
defend agents of the Bureau of Animal Industry could under 
any circumstances be held to fall within the class of persons 
named in the law, it may be safely said that it would not be 
admissible to give such scope to this general language as 
would operate a repeal, so far as the Bureau of Animal Indus-
try is concerned, of the legislation regulating the subject of 
employing counsel for the Government-legislation which was 
intended to apply to all branches of the Go\Ternment, which 
has remained in force for many years, and the want of which 
had led to some abuses . 
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Repeals by implication are never favored, as the carry 
with them the imputation that the legislature was ill-informed 
or inattentive with reference to the state of the law in force 
before the passage of the repealing statute, and the judi-
ciary properly hesitate to seem to make such ·:~. reflection on 
a co-ordinate department of the Government unless compelled 
to do so by the impossibility of making the last statute stand 
in harmony with previous legislation. (Red Rock v. Henry, 
106 U.S., 596, and Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S., 536, 
and the authorities cited in these cases.) 
So far, however, from the language of the act of July 18, 
1888, being repugnant to the above quoted-sections of the 
Revised Statutes, it might with good reason be said that 
this language requires some latitude of interpretation to 
make it embraee the subject of counsel to be employed for 
the defense of agents of the Bureau of Animal Industry who 
may be sued. 
It does not appear admissible upon any sound rule of inter-
pretation to hold that the act of July 18, 1888, authorizes the 
Secretary of Agriculture to retain counsel for the purposes 
mentioned; on the contrary, the presumption is that Con-
gress did not intend by the general words of the act to go 
hack to the old practice which had been found so objection-
able. 
It is, indeed, fair to conclude that if Congress had pur-
posed to make so radical a change in its policy, even though 
that change was to be so circumscribed, it would not have 
left its intention to be gathered by imvlication. 
I have the honor tc be, sir, your obedient servant, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Where, from an examination of the papers submitted, it appeared that 
the question proposed (which involved the construction of a statute) 
did not spring out of any case actually existing in the administration 
of the Department seeking advice, the Attorney-General deemed that 
it would be improper for him to give au official opinion thereon. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 17, 1889. 
SIR: I h~ve the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
favor of June 7, wherein you ask " Whether the act of Feb-
ruary 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), prohibiting the importation and 
migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agree-
ment to perform labor in the United States, its territories, 
and the District of Columbia, as amended by the act of Feb-
ruary 23, 1887 (24 Stat., 414), and by the amendment con-
tained in the deficiency bill approved October 19, 1888 (25 
Stat., 566), includes within it~ prohibition certain professors 
or men of learning in Europe whom the managers of the 
Catholic University of America desire to employ in their 
university as lecturers?" 
Inclosed you also submit a letter from :Mr. M. F. Morris, 
"as attorney for the newly established Catholic University of 
America," in which he calls your attention to certain doubts 
that have been suggested with reference to some proceedings 
· of the managers vf the institution "under the act referred 
to," and requests H that yon will be pleaRed to advise him 
whether such proceedings, or rather contemplated proceedings, 
are in contravention of that act or of any other law of the 
United States.'; He further says that these proceedings ha,·e 
"not yet assumed the shape of contract, but it is desired that 
it should do so as soon as possible," and expresses the wish 
to have your 'Official opinion, and, if need be, your official 
action on the subject, and in conclusion says "the managers 
of the university desire to be advised by you whether their 
construction of the acts is not the correct one." 
From this statement it appears that tbe question submitted 
does not spring out of any present actually existing cas~ 
"arising in the a.dministration" of your Department. It is 
a question in a hypothetical case, and one indeed which may 
never arise, and calls in advance for an opinion as to what 
the Department would hold in the future upon a somewhat 
indefinite state of facts. 
That being the case, it is respectfully submitted that this 
Department is not permitted, by statute or precedent, to give 
an opinion upon it. 
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Allow me first to call your attention to Revised Statutes, 
section 356, as bearing generally upon the question, which 
reads: 
"The head of any Executive Department may require the 
opinion of the Attorney-General on any question of law 
arising in the administration of his Department." 
Next I respectiully refer you to the following extracts from 
opinions of this Department, which will serve to show how 
uniformly it has adhered to the position herein indicated: 
"It has always been the rule of this office to give advice 
only in actual cases. • • • It is impossible to reply to 
mere speculative points or supposed cases." (9 Opin., 82.) 
"'It is not the duty of the AttorneJ'-'General to give an 
opinion on a question • • • with which the Government 
has no present concern." (9 Opin., 355.) 
'"The Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an im-
portant legal question when it is not practically presented 
by an existing case before a Department." (9 Opin., 421 ; 10 
Opin., 50.) 
"The opinion of the _.;\.ttorney-General may be required on 
questions of law arising in the actual administration of a De-
partment, but not upon hypothetical cases merely." (13 
Opin., 531.) · 
"'It is not the duty or practice of the Attorney-General to 
officially answer abstract or hypothetical questions of law." 
(13 Opin., 568.) 
Later opinions fully harmonize with the above. 
Permit me also to quote the following from 13 Opinion._r 
531, as giving a reason for the rule: 
"You will readily perceive the inconvenience of giving 
upon a hypothetical case an opinion which, upon the consid-
eration of an actual case, might require modification on 
account of circumstances not imagined, and therefore not 
considered in the preparation of the opinion." 
To attempt in advance to settle such qut:>stions, in the 
words of a.nother eminent Attorney-General, is "to antici-
pate trouble," (9 Opin., 421), and, it may well be added, to 
promote trouble. 
The Solicitor of the Treasury doubtless hafl the statute and 
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these opinions in mind at the time of penning the closing par-
agraph of his opinion, namely : " Whether or not you will 
desire to construe this statute upon a hypothetical case, is 
not for me to determine. The difficulties of so doing could 
not be better illustratecl than by the case Lere preseuted." 
In view of the foregoing I ba\"'e no doubt you will readily 
, perceive that it would be improper for this Department to 
give an opinion upon the question submitted. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS LA WS-CLAS IFICATION . 
.Advised, that the decision of the Treasury Department of April, l!:l71, 
holding that the article knowu as New Zealand tlax ib duitiable as flax 
not hackled or dressed, should be modified so as to classify the article 
for duty under the proviRion for sunn, sisal-grass, and other vegetable 
substances not specially enumerated or provided for. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 18, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your let, 
ter of June 12, 1889. It submits for my COJJsideratiou, under 
section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, ''papers receh·ed from 
the ports of New York and Boston, relative to the claRsifica-
tion of an article known as New Zealand flax," in whicl1 you 
say the article '' would seem to be properly dutiable under 
the provisions for sunn, sisal-grass, and other-vegetable sub-
stances, not specially enumerated ()r provided for in T. I. 
333, act of March 3, 1883." 
It also appears from the letter and the inclosures that this 
is "the classification considered applicable by the collectors 
and appraisers of the two ports above named." My atten-
tion is also called to the fact that your Department, by a de-
cision in "April, 1871," held the article to be dutiable as flax 
not hackled or dressed, and that your Department is unable., 
owing to the provisions of section 2 of tbe act of March 3, 
1875, to modify the above decision, and my views are asked 
as to whether such decision shall be continued in force or 
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shall be modified in accordance with the views of the cus-
toms officers. 
I am of the opinion that the above decision of 1871 should 
be modified so as to classify the article referred to as dutia-
ble under the provi~ions of T. I. 333, act of March 3, 1883 ; 
and if you decide to modify said decision as indicated, I con-
cur in such modification and recommend the same. 
I return all the inclosures, as requested. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ARIZONA TERRITORY. 
The act of the legislature of Arizona Territory, approved 'March 21, 
1889, providing for the holding of a convention for the purpose of 
forming a State constitution to be submittted to the legal voters of 
the Territory for their approval or rejectiou, is not inconsistent with 
the organic act of the Territory or any other law of Congress, or 
with any provision of the Constitution, and is therefore valiC:. 
Whether such legislation is "premature" is a question that addresses 
itself solely to the legislature that passed, the governor who approved, 
and to Congress which had the power :finally to ratify or annul the 
measure. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE, 
Ju,ne 19, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 
favor of the 16th of May, ultimo, inclosing a copy of a letter 
from the governor of Arizona, dated May 1, 1889, with 
papers, and requesting an opinion relative to the validity of 
an act "to provide for the holding of a convention for the 
purpose of framing a State constitution to be. submitted to 
the people for their approval or rejection," passed by the last 
legislature of the Territory and approved by the then gov-
ernor. 
Such act provides for an election in said Territory of dele-
gates to a convention to frame a State constitution to be sub-
mitted to the legal voters of the Territory for their approval 
or rejection; specifies the number of delegates to be chosen, 
and apportions them among the various counties; prescribes 
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the qualifications of delegates and of the persons to vote; 
and provides the machinery of such elect.ion and the returns 
thereof. It also provides in a general way for the organiza-
tion of the convention and the election of its officers; directs 
that the convention proceed to frame "a form" of a consti-
tution for" a" State, which constitution shall be submitted 
to the voters of the Territory for ratification or rejection, 
with a provision as to a separate submission of any separate 
article; leaves with the convention the time for such sub-
mission, and in their discretion to provide for an election of 
officers at the same time; and provides for a return of the 
votes upon the constitution and candidates, if any are sub-
mitted. It requires the governor to issue a proclamation 
calling for the election of delegates, and subsequently to de-
clare the result of the vote upon the adoption or rejection of 
the cons'titution. It provides also for the pay of the dele-
gates and officers of the convention, and section 11 reads: 
"Nothing in this act contained shall be intended or con-
strued a~ altering or repealing any election or other law of 
this 'rerritory," except, etc. The act was approved March 
21, 1889, by the then governor. 
The question presented is whether the Territorial legisla_ 
ture of Arizona had the right to pass, and the governor to 
approve, the act submitted. 
I am unable to find anything in the Constitution or in any 
statute which invalidates this legislation. The provisions of 
the organic act of this Territory are few (see 12 Stat., 664), 
and, upon examination, none of them will be found bearing 
restrictively upon this question, unless it be the clause in 
section 1, which provides that the Territorial "government 
shall be maintained and cont-imted until such time as the peo-
ple residing in said Territory shall~ with the consent of Con-
gress, form a State government * * * and apply for and 
obtain admission into the Union as a State," etc. 
Now, what is there in the act submitted for examination 
that is in any way inconsistent with the above provisions~ It 
\n no way seeks to prevent the Territorial go"Vernment "from 
being maintained and continuecl "just as long as the' organic 
law provided it should he. This act does not propose to 
"form a State government." It is simply tentative and con-
, 
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ditioned uvon Congressional consent and admission. It con-
temvlates entire submission to the fundamental law and to 
the maintenance of the Territorial governllient, until Congress 
shall consent to its forming a State government, and, indeed, 
until the Territory shall be admitted as a State. It declares 
that nothing in it ~'shall be intended or construed as alter-
ing or repealing any law of this Territory" (with an excep-
tion immaterial to this issue). "A form" of'' a" constitution 
which shall be satisfactory to the people is what is sought io 
be obtained. ...-\..ll the steps which the act authorizes to be 
taken are of the same character. There is nothing in the act 
itself, or in the circumstances surrounding its inception, so 
far as appears from any papers or information furnished this 
Department, antagonistic to the Constitution or the orgamc 
act of Congress. It only provides for a peaceful method of 
formulating proposals for admission after submitting the 
same to the tribunal of a popular vote. It proposes simply 
to ascertain wllat kind of a constitution (and perhaps officers) 
would be acceptable to the people. 
While there is nothing ln any statute or in the Constitu-
tion expressly prohibitory, there are provisions of both which 
~eem to authorize the legislation in question. 1'he Revised 
8tatutes provide that ''the legislative power of every Terri-
tory shall extend to all rightf~tl subjects of legislation not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States" (Re\T. Stat., § 1851), and then specify certain sub-
jects of restriction on this very general legislative power, as 
follows: / 
":No law shall be passed interfering with the primary dis-
posal of the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property 
of the United States, nor shall the lands or other property of 
non-residents be taxed higher than the lands or other prop-
erty of residents." 
Section 1860 enumerates other "restrictions on the power 
of the legislative assembly," namely, it can not enlarge the 
list of persons who can exercise the right of suffrage and 
hold office; it prohibits a denial of such right to a citizen on 
account of race, color, or previous condition. of servitude; 
and provides that certain officers in the Army and Navy can 
not be authorized to vote nor be elected to or hold office or 
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appointment in the Territory. So also section 1889 provides 
that the legislative assemblies of the several Territories shall 
not grant private charters or especial privileges, etc., and, 
m 1886 (24 Stat., 170), legislation upon a large number of 
ad<litional subjects was prohibited. Now if Congress llad 
desired to restrict tlle passage of any act relative to the for · 
mation of a State constitution without the authority of an 
enabling act, it would have been very easy during all the8e 
years, while making restrictions, to ba\e added this one. 
The question of the power of a Territorial legislature to pass 
such an act had been a subject of discussion almost from the 
foundation of the Gm'ernment, and if it was the legislativ-e 
intent to restrict this power, it seems certain that such intent 
would !lave been expressed. among the other restrictions. 
But in8tead of ::;o doing, Congress in terms conferred upon 
the legislatures the power to legislate upon "all rightful sub· 
jects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the United States." Now, why is not tllis act within 
that power~ It is not in conflict with Oonstitution, statute, 
or fundamental law. It is not within any of the many re· 
:Strictions which Congress has seen fit to specify, and it would 
seew to be in relation to a subject upon which the people of 
a Territor~·, about to ask admission into the Union, ought to 
have the right to speak. 
The Constitution guaranties to them the right of petition, 
and if they conceive themselves aggrieved in being deprived 
of the privileges of statehood, they can petition for the l'l!Uress 
of such grievance. If so, why have the~T not the right to 
adopt any orderly method for obtaining a popular expression 
as to the fo 'rm and the terms of such petition ~ \Vhy is not 
this a rightful subject of legislation under this constitutional 
provision~ In view of the precedents hereinafter cited, it i~ 
submitted that Congress, having so frequently accepted the 
results of such l~gislation and having so often admitted States 
coming with constitutions formed under similar act:s, has 
given expression to. its judgment that it is a rightful subject 
of legislation~ (See Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 434, 444, 
445.) 
But Congress has further provided "that all laws passed 
by the legislative assembly and governor of any Territory 
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* * * shall be submitted to Congres~, and if disapproved 
shall be null and of no effect" (sec. 1850), thereby retaining 
power in itself to declare void any act of a Territoriallegis-
lat ure. Such a provision implies the Yalidity of an act until it 
shall be so declared void; always, of course, assuming that 
it is not inconsistent with the organic act, a law of Congress, 
or the Constitution. And so the Supreme Court held in 
JJiiners' Bank v. State of Iowa (12 How.) that "though by the 
fundamental law of a Territory its legislation is to be sub-
ject to the disapproval of Congress, yet, till disapproved, it 
is Yalid and operative," etc. (See also Smith v. Foster, dis-
trict court of Arizona, Judge Porter, in 1889.) 
But the courts have held that Congress has not only the 
power to declare void, but unlimited power to amend, by 
reason of ·the relations existing between Congress and the 
'Territories. It is declared in National Bank v. Yankton (101 
U. S. R., 129-133) that "Congress is supreme, and for the 
purposes of this department of its governmental author-
ity has all the powers of the people of the United States, 
except such as have been expressly or by implication reserved 
in the prohibitions of the Constitution. * * * Such a 
po~r [to amend the acts of Territorial legislatures] is an in-
-cident of sovereignty, and continues until granted away. 
Congress may not only abrogate laws of the Territorial leg-
islatures, but it may legislate directly for the local govern-
ment. It may make a void act of a Territorial legislature 
valid, and a valid act void. Irr other words, it has full and 
complete legislative authority over the people of the Terri-
tories and all the departments of the Territorial governments " 
This doctrine is not novel, but it is more succinctly stated in 
this case, perhaps, than in any other. 
The precedents also clearly justify such legislation. In many 
cases-perhaps generally-Congress has taken the initiative 
and passed an enabling act; but in many other cases the 
Territories took the initiative, and were admitted without 
enabling acts. Sometimes Congress has modified proposed 
-constitutions before acceptance, and sometimes has accepted 
without modification. The Territorial legislature of Michi· 
gau passed an act providing for a convention to frame a con-
.stitution, although Congress pas~ed no enabling act. Such 
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convention framed a constitution; provided for its submis-
sion to the people, who ratified it, and at the same time State 
offiers were elected. Subsequently, Congress by act ratified 
what had been done upon condition that a change in bound-
ary should be consented to. California was admitted with-
out an enabling act, and, indeed, without having been or-
ganized as a Territory. Its constitution was framed by a 
convention called by proclamation of its military governor, 
and the convention elected State officers. Iowa, without an 
enabling act, provided by a Territorial act for a convention, 
which framed a constitution; Congress ratified its action, 
only requiring consent to a change of boundaries. Florida 
also! without an enabling act, provided for a convention bj-
act of its Territorial legislature, wllich framed a constitution, 
and Congress ratified it. Arkansas, without an enabling act, 
initiated proceedings to frame a constitution, and Congress 
ratified its act by admission. Oregon, without an enabling 
~ct, provided by act of the Territorallegislature for a conven-
tion, which framed a constitution an<l which was ratified at 
the popular election, and Congress admitted the State. In 
the cases of Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Maine, also, 
there were no enabling acts. Hence, impliedly at lea~, by 
Constitution, statute, judicial authority, and precedent, the 
legislative assembly had the right to pass the act, and in the 
absence of any specific restrictive provision to the contrary 
such right seems to be certain and unequivocal. 
Besides, I am unable to perceive an,y good reason why the 
people of tlle Territory should not have the right to meet in 
convention, frame a proposed State constitution, and with it 
in hand petition Congress for admission to the Union. 
Whether such a convention shall come into life by voluntary 
assemblage, by the selection of delegates in the primary as-
semblies, or by and through a proper act of the Territorial 
-legislature can not be material. The latter course would seem 
to be preferable, because it would throw around tht-. proceed-
ings the sanction and protection of official safeguards, and 
would be more certain than either of the others to secure a 
true expression of the popular will. If such act is surrounded 
by an atmosphere of entire loyalty to the Constitution and 
the laws, so long as Congress is the supreme and final arbiter 
as to all questions and propositions contained in it, it is di:ffi-
f 
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cult to see how harm can come therefrom in any direction. It 
would seem to be the safest, most expressive, and highest 
form of petition. I do not see, therefore, bow the act sub-
mitted is assailable on principle or authority. 
I have not overlooked the opinion of this Department given 
in 1835. What was held in that opinion is that the Territorial 
legislature of Arkansas had no right to pass laws "authoriz-
ing the formation of a constitution and State government" (2 
Opin., 728). That is not this cat:se. But when, upon investi-
gation, we find that within a year after such opinion was 
rendered the people of Arkansas held a con~·ention, and did 
(to quote the language of the act of Congress~ 5 Stat. L., 50) 
"form for themselves a constitution and State Government" 
without any enabling act, and that Congress thereon ad-
mitted the State, we find a legislative opinion not in entire 
·harmony with the other. And since 1835 much has been 
done in the same direction in the way of statute, precedent, 
and judicial decision, as we have seen. So far, therefore, as 
the opinion may be construed as antagonistic to the views 
herein expressed, if at all, I can only say that it does not 
commend itself to my judgment. 
As to the suggestions made by the governor that the en-
acting clause does not allude to the provision in the body of 
the act as to the election of State officers, I would say that 
while such an objection would be good under some State 
constitu~ions, I know of no law applicable to this case that 
is therein violated. (See Cooley Cons::. Lim., 170 et seq., 5th 
ed.) 
With the question as to whether this is unwise or "pre-
mature" legislation, this Department bas nothing to do. 
That question addresses itself solely to the legislative as-
sembly that passed; the governor that approved, and to 
Congress which had the power, finally, to ratify or annul 
the measure. 
Trusting I have been sufficiently explicit, I am, very re-
spectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
Tbe SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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NATIONAL BANK IN INDIAN TERRITORY. 
Upon consideration of the effect of certain provisions in treaties with the 
Creek Nation of Indians of August 2R, 1856, and August 11, 186n, 
wbiP-h render inoperat,ive in the Creek territory the various national 
banking laws: .Advised that a national bank can not lawfully be es-
tablished at Muscogee, a town in the territory of that nation. 
DEP ART:MENT OF .JUSTICE, 
June 24, 1889. 
SIR: The question upon which an opinion is asked in your 
communication of May 23 ultimo is, wl1ether a national 
bank could be established lawfully in that part of the Indian 
Territory "lying within the jurisdiction of the Union Agency 
(at Muscogee), which extends ov£>r the country occupied by 
the five civilized tribes, viz, the Cherokees, Creeks, Semi-
noles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, provided the directors shall 
be citizens of the United States." But as these names rep-
resent so many different nations or commumties, and as the 
application which has given rise to the question~ submitted 
is for authority to organize a national bank at Muscogee, a 
town in the territory of the Creek Nation, I shall limit mysrlf 
to the question thus narrowed, and as the one act~tally arising 
in the administration of the Treasury Department. (See 
sec. 356, Rev. Stat.) 
The objections to entertaining favorably this application to 
establish a national bank at 1\fuscogee appear to me to be in-
surmountable. 
These objections grow out of the treaties now in force be-
tween the United States and the Creek Nation. 
Article 15 of the treaty of August 28, 1856, provides as 
follows: 
"So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the 
United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, reg-
ulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the 
Creeks and Seminoles shall be secured in the ~tnrestricted right 
of selj-govermnent andf~tlljurisdiction ot'er persons and prop-
erty within their 'respective limits; excepting, however, all 
white persons, with their property, who are not, by adoption 
or otherwise, members of either the Creek or Seminole tribe; 
and all persons, not being members of either tribe, found 
within their limits, shall be considered intruders, and be re-
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moved from and kept out of the same by the United States 
agents for said tribes, respectively (assisted, if necessary, hy 
the military), with the following exceptions, viz, such incli-
viduals, with their families, as may be in the employ of the 
Government of the United States; all persons peaceably 
traveling or temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading 
therein under license from the proper auth9rity of the United 
States, and such persons as may be permitted by the Creeks 
and Seminoles, with the assent of the proper authorities of 
tlle United States, to reside within their respective limits 
without becoming members of either of said tribes." (Rev. 
Treat., p. 111.) 
Article 10 of the treaty of August 11, 1866, provides as 
follows: 
"The Creeks agree to such legislation as Congress and 
the President of the United States may deem necessary for 
the better administration of justice and the protection of the 
rights of person and property within the Indian Territory: 
Provided, hotcever, (that) lJaid legislation shall not in any ·man-
ner interfere with or annu,l their present tribal organizations, 
rights, laws, privileges, and customs. 
"The Creeks also agree that a general council consisting 
of delegates elected by each nation or tribe lawfully resident 
within the Indian Territory may be annually convened in 
said Territory, which council shall be organized in such 
manner and possess such powers as are hereinafter de-
scribed." (Ibid., p. 119.) 
To these may be added article 4 of the above-cited treaty 
of August 28, 1856, which is as follows: 
"The United States do solemnly agree and bind themBelves 
that no State or Territory shall ever pass laws for the gov-
ernment of the Creek or Seminole tribes of India us, and that 
no portion of either of the tracts of country defined in the 
first and second articles of this agreement shall ever be em-
braced or included within or annexed to any Territory or 
State, nor shall either, or any part of either, ever be erected 
into a Territory without the full and free consent of the legis-
lative authority of the tribe owning the same." 
The effect of these proYi:5ious would seem to be to invest 
the Creek ~ation with the right of self-government, to the 
extent, certainly, of making it entirely safe to say that the 
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various national banking laws are not in operation in the 
Creek Territory, and could only be in operation there by en-
actment by the legislath·e authority of that 11ation. The 
national banking laws do not fall within any of those de-
scriptions of legislation by Congress which it is stipulated 
shall be in force in the Creek territory. 
The right of the Creek Nation to govern itself, so carefully 
guarded and protected by these treaties, is a right fonuded 
on a consideration of great value, mo\ing directly from the 
Creek Nation to the United States, and the faith of the latter 
is pledged for the protection of the Creeks in a1l the rights 
secured to them by the treaties mentioned. 
To say that Congress, by making it lawful to establish a 
national bank in a "territory" (section tH34 Revised Stat-
utes), meant to O\erride these solemn treaty obligations, by 
implication merely, is a position that can not be acquiesced 
in for a moment. (Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S., p. 
536, and cases there cited.) 
It follows, then, necessarily, that #t national bank can not 
be established in 1\Iuscogee or any other place where the 
national banking laws can not have effect as laws of the 
Unite~ States. 
Without expressing any opinion on the subject, I ma_v add, 
that it will probably be found to be the case that what hab 
been said with reference to the Creeks holds good as to the 
other four tribes mentioned in your communication. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient ser,ant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRE1'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
COMPROMISE OF JUDGMENT. 
Where a judgment was recovered by the United States against a corpora-
tion in a suit .. for a penalty for violation of the :provisiOns of the act 
of February 26, 181:!5, chapter 164, entitled "An act to prohiLit the im-
portation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or 
agreement to perform labor in the United States," etc.: Advised, that 
it is extremely doubtful whether the power given to the Secretary of 
the Treasury by section 3469, Revised Statutes, to compromise "auy 
claim," extend11 to a judgment such as the above-i.e., for a fine, pen-
alty, or forfeiture. 
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DEP ARTl\'IENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 27, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of 16th April, ultimo, submits 
for opinion the question whether you have to entertain the 
vroposition of the Church of the Holy Trinity, a religious 
corporation of the State of New York, to compromise a judg-
ment of $1,041.25, recovered against that corporation by the 
United States in the circuit court of the U nite<l States for 
the southern diAtrict of New York, the amount recovered 
being the penalty of $1,000, with the addition of coscs, for 
-violating the act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), entitled 
''Au act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreign· 
ers and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor 
in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Co-
lumbia," by importing from England a clergyman to act as 
pastor of the church owned by the defendant corporation. 
If the power to make the proposed compromise resides in 
the Secretary of the Treasury, it must be by virtue of section 
34.69, Revised Statutes, which is in the following words: 
" Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attor-
ney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the 
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, 
and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, 
and recommending that it be compromised up.on the terms 
so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of 
the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to 
compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the 
postal laws." 
I say that any power the Secretary may have in the mat-
ter must be referred to section 3469, because an attempt has 
been made to bring the case within section 5292, Revised 
Statutes, by taking the steps therein prescribed. · 
Looking now at the language of section 3469, it may be· 
said that although the word " claim" therein used may em. 
brace a judgment in favor of the United States for the 
amount of a fine, when taken in a very extended sense, it does 
not follow, neeessarily, that it has so large a meaning in the 
present instance; for it may appear from the context, or in 
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some other proper way, that Congress must have intended to 
use it in a more restricted acceptation, as the Supreme Court 
held was the case with this same word as used in section 34:7, 
Revised Statutes (see Bailey v. United States, 109 U.S., 437, 
and cases cited), the court being of opinion that "claim," as 
used in the section last mentioned, only meant any 'ltnliquid· 
ltted claim against the Government, and " that the statutes 
in question are not to be interpreted according to the literal 
acceptation of the words used." 
The language of section 3469 does not seem, in some par-
ticulars, to be that which the legislature would have chosen 
if it had had the purpose to extend the law to fines. Thus, 
without stopping to criticize the use of "claim" to co~er 
the right to a fine, or a penalty, or a forfeiture, the sectiou 
requires ''a report by a district attorney, or any special 
attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the 
United States, showing in detail the condition of such clctim,n 
etc. Now, the requirement that the report. shall show " in, 
detail the condition of such claim." would seem hardly to apply 
to a fine incurred which is a fixed definite sum of money, ad. 
mitting of no detail and requiring no explanation. 
It may be that no important inference can be drawn from 
the improbability of tlle use by Congress of inappropriate 
language alone, but, at the same time, it must be admitted 
that such a consideration may be important in conuection 
with other considerations, all pointing in the same direction. 
Equally, if not more, inappropriate was it to authorize the 
Secretary of the Treasury'· to compromise" fines, if it was in· 
tended that they should. come under the words "any claim." 
By compromise we understand that each party to a trausaction 
gives up something, and that there are opposing views as to 
the amount legally demandable. But in the case of a fine 
there is no room for compromise, because the party held for 
the fine ba~ no right wh.a,tever to ask au abatement of the 
full penalty. If any abatement is made by the proper au-
thority, it is not because the party benefited bas a right, or 
even an equity, to it, but it is on the public consideration 
that in the particular case the penalty for the violation of 
the law happens to be disproportionately heavy, aml calls for 
mitig.ation, m order to prevent impairment by too much 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 347 
Compromise of Judgment. 
severity of the general moral effect of the administration of 
the laws for the prevention of offenses. 
But compromise is an inappropriate word for still another 
reason. It does not involve the power to release or relin-
qui~b the entire demand, which it is important the Secretary 
0f the Treasury shoulU be in\ested with authority to do to 
meet cases occasionally happening, and which he is empow-
ered to do by section 5292, Revised Statutes, authorizing him 
to mitigate and remit any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability 
''under the customs and navigation laws." 
These considerations suggested the advisability of an ex-
amination of the various laws which Congress has passed 
from the foundation of the present National Government 
down, giving the Secretary of the Treasury power to abate 
or entirely forgive penalties or forfeitures, references to all 
which laws will be found in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in 
the case of the Laura (114 U.S. R., 415), and the result of the 
examination is that, up to the enactment of the Revised 
Statutes, which took effect as of the 1st of December, 1873, 
there is not a single instance in that legislation in which 
Congress has conferred the power to co'mpromise, but, with-
rmt an exception, the power conferred has been "to mitigate 
or remit," and, as was to be expected, the same words are used 
in the Revised Statutes (section 5292) to invest the Secre-
tary of the Treasury with the authority to abate or forgive 
fines, forfeitures, or penalties. 
But the inappropriateness of the verb compromise, in the 
view of Congress, to convey this power over fines, penalties, 
or forfeitures is strikingly shown by the third section of the 
act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 593), which provides'· that in all 
··nses of fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability, or alleged lia-
bility, for any sum or sums of money by way of damages or other-
wise, under any provision of law relating to the Post-Office 
Department, * * * the said Auditor shall have power, with 
the written consent of the Postmaster-General, to mitigate or 
remit such penalty or forfeiture, 'remove such disability, and 
to compromise, release, and discharge such claims for such sum 
or sums of money and damages, on such terms as the said 
Auditor shall deem just and expedient; and that in a11 cases 
where a judgment shall have been obtained for a debt or dam-
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ages • • * to compromise such judgmeut and accept in 
satisfaction thereof less than the amount of such judgment: 
Provided, That the power conferred by this section shall not 
extend to any case of fine, penalty, forfeiture, disability, 
alleged liability, or claim which shall be incurred, accrue, or 
arise subsequent to the passage of this act, or to any judg-
ment obtained after the passage thereof.'' The same atten· 
tiveness to the proper use of the word co1'nprornise is shown 
in section 316 of the act of Junes, 1872 (17 Stat.,325), which 
also relates to the Post-Office DepartmeiJ.t, in the very words 
of the act of 1831 (supra). 
Looking at the entire line of legislation giving the Secre-
tary ofthe Treasury power over fines, penalties, and forfeit-
ures, from the beginning to the present vime, we discoYer a 
single instance only in which Congress has used the word 
compromise to convey to the Secretary of the Treasury the 
power to remit or mitigate fines, penalties, anu forfeitures, 
and that instance occurs in section 19 of the act of J uue 22, 
1874 (18 Stat., 190), where the customs officers are forbidden 
"to compromise or abate auy claim" for ''any fine, penalty, 
or forfeiture," and any such attempt" to make such compro-
mise or abatement, or in any manner reJieye or attempt to 
relieve from such :fine, penalty, or forfeiture,'' is declared a 
fdony: '' P.rovided, however, That the Secretary of the 'Ireasury 
shall have power to remit any fines, penalties, or forfeitures, 
or to compromise the same in accordance with existing law."' 
It is noticeable, furthermore, that thn next stction (sec. 20) 
of this act prescribes certain steps to be taken when appli(:a-
tion is made "for the rnitigcttion or remission of any fi.ue, }Jen-
alty, or forfeitur~, or the refund of any duties," droppiug t IJe 
word compromiRe altogether. 
It is significant, although not conclusive, that a title of the 
Revised Statutes (LXVIII) is exclusively devoted to the ~ul.>­
ject of" remission of fines, peualties, and forfeitures;" that 
by this title the Secretary of the Treasury is invested with 
the power to " mitigate or remit" or simply ~' to remit," but 
not once to compromise fines, penalties, and forfeitures; that 
section 346§ does not belong to this title, but to title XXXVI, 
which relates to "Debts due by or to the United States," and 
that title LXVIII covers the whole subject of the mitigation 
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and remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures under the 
revenue and navigation laws. 
Unless, therefore, the fact that the demand for the fine 
has passed into judgment, and in that way undergone some 
fundamental change in its character-a point to be next con-
sidered-it seems to me to follow from what has been stated 
that it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether Con-
gress intended to include fines by the words "any claim" in 
section 3469. 
In United States v. ~Mortis (10 Wheat., 246) it was held that 
the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit forfeit-
ures was not defeated by the fact that a judgment for the 
value of the property forfeited was rendered before the Sec-
retary's act of remission, although the effect of the remission 
Nould be to destroy the claim of the collector and surveyor 
to a moiety of the judgment. -
This power of remission being founded on public consider-
ations, it was wisely held that those considerations were as 
applicable after condemnation or judgment as before. 
The case of Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company (127 
U.S. R., 265) was an action brought in the Supreme Court of 
the United States by the State of Wisconsin on a judgment 
rendered by a court of that State against the Pelican Insur-
ance Company, of New Orleans, La., the amount ofithe said 
judgment representhlg certain fines and forfeitures which the 
Pelican Insurance Company had incurred in conseqence of 
its failure to obey certain statutory regulations of the State 
of Wisconsin, and, it being objected that the cause of action 
was criminal and not civil in character, and so without the 
jurisdiction of the court, the court looked beyonu the judg-
ment of the State courts, and, finding the objectjon to its 
jurisdiction well founded, refused to entertain the suit further. 
If, then, ·the Supreme Court thought it proper to go out-
side the judgment of condemnation in United States v. JJiorris 
(supra) for the purpose of maintaining the power of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to remit penalties and forfeitures, 
and in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insu,rance C01npany (supra) to go 
into the facts on whicll tile judgment sued on was founded 
in order to protect itself against an abuse of its jurisdiction, 
it seems to me to be entirely proper in the matter before me 
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to make a similar iuquiry into the premises on which the 
judgment rests, in order to prevent a subject which there is 
reason to think does not come under section 3469 from being 
brought within that section for some such technical reasou as 
that the judgment against the Church of the Holy Trinity is a 
novation of the original right to the fine sued for. In a, word, 
I am doing with reference to the authority of the Secretary of 
the Treasury under that section precisely what the Supreme 
Court did in TVisconsin v. Pelicctn Insr~tance Company (suprq,) 
with reference to its original jurisdiction. Indeed, if in United 
States v. JforritJ (sup'ra) it was held proper to go behind the 
judgment of condemnation to support the power of the Sec-
retary as to penalties and forfeitures, it would seem, by a 
parity of reasoning, to be equally proper to do the same thing 
in the matter in hand, to prevent what might perhaps be a 
misuse of the Secretary's power under section 3469 to com-
promise "any claim in favor of the United States." 
My opinion, therefore, is that it is extremely doubtful 
whether the power to compromise gi \en in section 3469 ex-
tends to the case of a fine; and I am confirmed in this view 
by the consideration that there is, as already stated, another 
section in t.he Revised Statutes (sec. 5292) which invests the 
Secretary of the Treasury with ample power to mitigate or 
remit all fines growing out of infractions of the revenue and 
navigation laws. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H . .MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
RESIGNATION OF NAVAL CADETS. 
Where a naval cadet tendered his resignation, and it was accepted by the 
Secretary of the Navy and the cadet duly notified tLereof, but in a 
short time (about two weeks) afterwards the cadet made application 
to withdmw his resignation, which was granted by the Secretary, who 
at the same time instructed him to report to the Superintendent of the 
Acad~my: Held that by the resignation and its acceptauce the rela-
tions of the cadet with the Naval Academy were complt>tely tSe\·ered 
and his position there became vacant; that he could not be reinstated 
otherwise than by an appointment in comformity to sections 1514 and 
1515, Revised Statutes; and that the action of the Secretary in per-
mitting the withdrawal of the resignation after its acceptance had no 
legal effect whatever. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J~tly 8, 1889. 
SIR: It appears by your communication of 18th l\iay, ul-
timo, that on December 13, 1888, a naval cadet at the Uuited 
States Naval Academy, of the fourth class, tendered his res-
ignation as a naval cadet with the consent of his parents. 
The resignation was accepted by the Secretary of the Navy 
<>n the 17th of the same month of December, to take effect as 
of that date. On the 3d of January, 1889, this cadet requested 
permission to withdraw hiR resignation, and on the 5th of the 
.same month the Secretary of the ~aYy informed him that his 
resignation was regarded as withdrawn, and at the same time 
instructed him to report to the Superintendent of the Naval 
Academy. 
Upon this state of facts the following questions are sub-
mitted by you for an opinion: 
"(1) Whether the tender by such naval cadet of his resig-
nation and its acceptance by the Secretary of the Navy, and 
the notification thereof to the cadet, createrl a vacancy in the 
Congressional district from which snch cadet was appointed; 
and, if so, whether such vacancy could be filled in any other 
manner than as provided in section 1514 of the Revised Stat. 
utes' 
" (2) Whether, such cadet having tendered his resignation 
a.nd the same having been accepted by the Secretary of the 
Navy and the cadet notified of such acceptance, it was within 
the power of tl.le Secretary of the Navy to revoke his order 
of acceptance of the resignation as tendered, and thereby to 
reinstate and restore such cadet to the Academy?" 
If the cadet receiv-ed his appointment from the Secretary 
of the Navy in pursuance of law, there would seem to be little 
room for question that the Secretary had authority to create 
a vacancy by accepting his resignation. The power to accept 
a resignation, like the power to remove from office, is deduced 
from the power to appoint, and is as firmly established as the 
power to remove. In this case is the Secretary of the Navy 
the appointing power~ 
Sections 1513, 1514, and 1515 of the Revised Statutes are 
in the following words : 
" SEc. 1513. There shall be ~llowed at said Academy one 
352 HON. W. H. H. MILLER 
Resignation of Naval Cadets. 
cadet midshipman for every Member or Delegate of the House 
of Representatives, one for the Di:strict of Columbia, and ten 
appointed annually at large. 
"SEC. 1514. The Secretary of the Navy shall, as soon after 
the 5th of March in each year as possible, notify in writing 
each Member and Delegate of the House of Representatives 
of any vacancy that may exist in his district. The nomina-
tion of a candidate to fill said vacancy shall be made upon 
the recommendation of the Member or Delegate, if sueh rec-
ommendation is made by the first day of July of that year; 
but if it is not made by that time, the Secreta.ry of the Navy 
shall fill the vacancy. The candidate allowed for the Dis-
trict of Columbia and all the candidates appointed at large 
shall be appointed by the President. 
'~SEc. 1515. All candidates for admission into the .Academy 
shall be examined according to such regulations and at such 
stated times as the Secretary of the Navy mf.l.y prescribe. 
Candidates rejected at such examinations shall not have the 
privilege of another examination for admission to the same 
class, unless recommended by the board of examiners.'' 
.According to these provisions the following steps are nec-
essary to the appointment of naval cadets: that is to say, 
each one, accoruing as he resides in a State or Territory, must, 
except as to eleven of them, be recommended by a Member 
or Delegate of the House of Represeutatives from the Con-
gressional district or Territory of which the proposed cadet 
is a resident, and upon such recommendation he must be nom-
inated to fill a vacancy in the .Academy, or in the case of a 
failure by a Member or Delegate to make such recommenda-
tion ''the Secretary of the Navy shall fill the vacancy," and 
in the eleven excepted cases the persons to fill vacancies 
'' shall be selected by the President." In other words, the 
Member or Delegate in the one case recommends, and the 
President, in the other, selects, but neither appoints the naval 
cadet. 
The "nomination," based on the '' recommendation" or the 
"selection," is made to the Naval .Academy or to the exam-
ining committee selected from the Academic Board of the 
.Academy by the Superintendent of the Academy under para-
graph 37 of the regulations of the Secretary of the Navy for 
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the government of the Academy. As ~ectiou 1515 provides, 
''all candidates for admission into the Academy shall be ex-
amined according to such regulations and at such stated times 
cts the Secretary of the Navy 1nay prescribe." It 'is, therefQre, 
only by virtue of regulation~ made by the Secretary of the 
Navy, and carried into effect by officers immediately or medi-
ately detailed or appointed by him, that a candidate is ad-
mitted to the Academy. Indeed, not an important step can 
be taken looking to the admission of a candidate without the 
.13xpress approval of the Secretary of the Navy, saving, per-
naps, the election and :findings of the committees appointed 
to conduct the mental and physical examinations of candi-
dates. 
From this it would seem to follow, necessarily, that ad-
mission or appointment to the Naval Academy is the act of 
the Secretary of the Navy, and hence that the acceptance by 
him of the resignation of the cadet in question created a va-
uancy in the Academy. 
It is to be observed, furthermore, that while the law says 
that a candidate must have undergone a successful examin-
ation and possess certain other quali:ficationR before he can 
be admitted to the Academy, it does not say that a candi-
llate possessing those q nali:fications must be admitted. Where 
a. candidate had passed' successfully the graduating examin-
ation, as the law stood before Mie act of August 5, 1882" 
(sMpra), it was made the duty of the Secretary to appoint him 
a midshipman (section 1521, Rev. Stat.), and, as the law now 
stands under that statute, it is the duty of the Secretary to 
make so many appointments from the graduating class as 
may be necessary to fill vacancies in the line of the Engineer 
and Marine Corps. By this difference of language great sup-
port is given t!l the conclusion that it is by the act and per-
mission of the Secretary alone that a candidate having all 
the qualifications is admitted to the Academy. 
This, I believe, answers the first question. 
The seeond question I have less difficulty in answering. 
·The cadet having declared his purpose to resign, and the 
Secretary of the Navy having signified his acquiescence in 
that purpose, the result was a. complete severance of the 
cadet's connection with the Academy and as much a vacancy 
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there as if the cadet had died. The consent of the parties 
to the act of resignation could not be recalled except by the 
re-appointment of the same person as cadet in conformity to 
sections 1514 and 1515, Revised Statutes. I need only refer, 
in support of this proposition, to the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in Jlf.imrnac'U v. United States (97 U.S., 436, 437); United 
States v. Corson (114 U. S., 619). 
It follows, then, that the attempted consent of the Secre-
tary of the Navy to the withdrawal of the cadet's resignation, 
after acceptance thereof, had no legal effect whatever. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
COMPENSATION OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY AT NEW YORK . 
When the United States attorney at New York appears in the cases 
mentioned in sectiop. 827 Revised Statutes, by direction of the Secretary 
.or Solicitor of the Treasury, a proper and reasonable allowance for h1s 
services in such cases may be made to him by the Secretary of the 
Treasury under that section. 
'The allowance so made under section 827 is in addition to the ammal 
salary provided by sBction 770, Revised Statutes1 for the ordinary 
.official services of the district attorney. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 8, 1889. 
·SIR: I received your letter of June 6, 1889, contaiuiug, with 
other inclosures, the Department's circular of December 24-, 
1887 (No. 143), in which you ask for" an expression of my 
'-riews as to whether the Secretary of the Trea8ury is author-
ized to make any allo.wance to the United States attorney at 
New York" for "sen·ices in suits brought against collectors 
of customs for the recovery of alleged excessive duties on 
imported merchandise,'' etc., under "section 827 of the Re: 
vised statutes." 
I havP- also to thank you for your letter of July 1, 1889 
(in response to mine of June 27), containing the Department 
circular of ~Tune 4, 1877 (No. 71), and also containing tlle 
additional information that the items in question arose in 
cases where the United States attorney appeared in behalf 
• 
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of the collector of customs " by direction of th~ 'Secretary 
of the Treasury;" and also " that from the date of said cir-
cular of June 4, 1877, until the date of the circular of De-
cember 24, 1877, it was the practice to allow the United' 
States attorney at New York, whenever it appeared th:1,t he 
had earned the amount in customs suits, the sum of $ !,000 
a year, under said section 827; * * * and that since the 
date of the last-mentioned circular it has been the pr~ctice 
to allow the United States attorney at New York such sum 
for services rendered in those suits certified by the court to 
be correct which are approved by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.'' 
In reply I respectfully submit the following: 
Section 770, Revised Statutes, provides that " The district 
attorney for the southern district of New York is entitled to 
receive quarterly, for all his services, a 8alary at the rate of 
six thousand dollars a year." * * * The words " for all 
his Aervices" refer to his ordinary personal services as dis-
trict attorney, such as are indicated in the next section, in 
which it is provided, among other things, that "It shall be 
the duty of every district attorney, * * * unless other-
wise instructed by the Secretary of the Treasury," to appear 
in behalf of the officers and in the proceedings therein men-
tioned. For all such services during the year this six thou-
sand dollarsjs made full payment. 
But section 827 provides that " 1ohen a district attorney 
appears by direction of the Secretary or Solicitor of the 
Treasury in behalf of" the same officers in similar proceed-
ings "he shall receive such compensation as may be certified 
to be proper by the court in which the suit is brought and 
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury." 
The question is, whether this compensation, under section 
827, is in addition to the $6,000 mentioned in section 770. 
The duties contemplated under section 827 are apparently 
beyond or outside of those mentioned in section 771, because 
they are limited to the cases where he appears ''by direction 
of the Secretary or Solicitor of the Treasury." This seems to 
assume that there are cases where the Secretary or Solicitor 
may desire for some reason to give special directions, perhaps 
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for the performance of extraordinary or unusual services. 
However this may be, section 827 plainly indicates a legisla-
. tive intent, by its limitations, specifications, and different 
methods of auditing, to prescribe other and additional com-
pensation for services rendered under the immediate direc-
tion of the Secretary or Solicitor. • 
The argument under section 770 is that the $6,000 is given 
for all his services, and hence he is entitled to no additional 
compensation for any services whatever. But there are well-
recognized exceptions, which certainly have no firmer ground 
to stand upon than has this one. For example, by section 
825 he is entitled to receive '' 2 per cent. upon all moneys" 
collected in the suits therein referred to (7 Benedict, 405), as 
additional compensation. Moreover, although by section 833 
•' every district attorney " is req uirecl to "make to the Attor-
ney-General" semi-annual returns of fees received by him, 
yet, under section 834 "the fees and compensation allowed 
district attorneys by sections eight hundred and twenty-five 
and eight hundred and twenty-seven" are. expressly excepted 
from the provisions of section 833. Besides, it has been for 
many years the rule of th1s and of the Treasury Department 
to permit the district attorney of southern New York tore-
tain such 2 per cent. given him under section 825 without 
return or question (11 Opin., 88). Again, by looking at sec-
tion 4646 we see that the district attorney is ~iven . " a just 
and suitable compensation for his respective services in each 
prize case to be adjusted and determined hy the court." This 
was held by this Department in 1864 to be allowable, even 
though above the $6,000 given by a statute differing but 
slightly from section 770 (11 Opin., 79). If in these two 
cases, under section 825 and section 4646, the district attor-
ney at New York is entitled to receive compensation in ad-
dition to his $6,000, no possible argument can be made 
stronger than in those cases for his not receiving the additional 
compensation in the cases specified in section 827. 
The opinion above indicated is strengthened, if we note 
the order in which these various provisions were originapy 
enacted, and likewise the order in which they stand in the 
Revised Statutes (15 Opin., 492). The latter sections seem 
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to have been intended to create specific exceptions to the 
general phraseology of the former. (14 Opin., 573.) 
This construction finds ample justification in the uniform 
practice of the Treasury Department, at least since J nne 4, 
1877. Indeed, it is plainly announced in the Department 
circular No. 71 of that date, and also in the Department cir-
cular No. 143, under date of December 2!, 1887. I do not 
see how, in the face of these circulars, and of such uniform 
practice -for so many years, any other interpretation can now 
be given to the statutes, wh:-ttever might be said if the ques-
tion were an original one. (United' States v. Hill, 120 U. S., 
169-180; Hahn v. United States, 107 U.S.~ 402-406, and cases 
cited.) 
In addition to the authorities above referred to, permit mo 
to call your attention to 9 Opin., 146; and McCulloch's Case, 
6 First Comptroller's Decisions, 36. 
My opinion is that, in the cases mentioned in section 827 
in which the United States attorney at New York appears 
by ''direction of the Secretary or Solicitor of the Treasury," 
the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make proper 
and reasonable allowance to him for his services under 6uch 
section. The amount is always within control, because such 
amount must he certified to be proper by the court in which 
the suit is brought, and m~st be approved by tbe Secretary 
of the Treasury. The Secretary has the right, under sections 
827 and 846, to scrutinize, reverse, and cut down all charges 
under that section. (15 Opin., 277.) 
The inclosures are herewith returned as requested. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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SURPLUS GRADUATES OF THE N.A. VAL ACADEMY. 
Where certain members of the graduating class at the Naval Academy 
were reported as physically disqualified for the naval service, but as 
mentally and professionally qualified, and were placed among the 
"surplus graduates:" Advised that under the acts of August 5, 1882, 
chapter 391, and March 2, 1889, chapter 396, they were each entitled as 
such surplus graduates to a certificate of graduation, an honorable 
discharge, and one year's pay, and that there is no authority in the 
law for stating in such certificate the physical disqualification of the 
graduate. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 9, 1889. 
SIR: By your communication of July 2, instant, it appears 
that in the class of naval cadets that was graduated at the 
Naval Academy in June last there were three who were re-
ported as "physically disqualified for the naval service," 
but as" mentally and professionally qualified." 
Assuming that the imputed physical disqualification of 
these cadets exists, the questions presented for opinion are, 
(1) whether these three cadets, who are physically unfit for 
the service, are entitled to certificates of graduation and 
honorable discharges with one year's sea pay, or shall be 
simply dropped from the service ; and (2) if such certificates 
and discharges may be given, whether they should contain, 
respectively, the statement that the cadet named therein is 
physically disqualified for the service. 
Under the acts of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 285), and March 
2, 1889 (25 Stat., 878), it is provided that if, after filling exist-
ing vacancies in the Navy and in the Marine and Engineer 
Corps from the graduating class of the Academy for any 
year, there shall be'' a surplus of graduates," to each of them 
"shall be given a certificate of graduation, an honorable dis-
charge, and one year's sea pay, as now provided by law for 
cadet midshipmen." 
As the cadets in question are, as your letter indicates, 
"surplus graduates.'' whatever may be their physical con-
dition and whatever may be the reason they did not receive 
appointments in the service, I am clearly of opinion they are 
entitled to the cP-rtificate of graduation, an honorable dis-
charge, and one year's sea pay. 
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Being entitled to these three things as H surplus gradu-
ates," I do not think there is any authority in the law for 
stating their physical disqualification in the certificates to 
be given them, for the reason that physical condition does 
not enter into the idea of graduation, except in so far af 
graduation presupposes a sourH.l physical condition at the 
time of admission to the Academy. Such a statement would 
be objectionable as out of place, which is alone a good reason 
for omitting it. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
. W. H. H. J\IILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
ACCRUED PENSION. 
The proviso in the act of March 1, 1889, chapter 332, authorizing payment 
to a. deceased pensioner's legal representatives,in certain contingencies, 
of the accrued pension clue on his pension certificate at the time of his 
death, is to be construed as applicable to all outstanding pension cer-
tificates, whether issued before or since the passage of the act. 
But the pensioner must have died since the passage of that act to en-
~itle his legal representatives to claim such accrued pension. 
DEPART~IENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 12, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of the 5th June, ultimo, submits 
for opinion a proviso of the act of 1\-farch 1, 1889, entitled 
~'An act making appropriations for the payment of invalid 
and other pensions of the United States for the fiscal year 
ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety, and for 
other purposes" (25 Stat., 782), which said proviso is in the 
following words : 
"Provided further, That hereafter whenever a pension cer-
t ~ificate shall have been issued and the pensioner mentioned 
therein dies before payment shall have been made, leaving no 
widow and no surviving minor children, the accrued pension 
due on said certificate to the date of the death of such pen-
sioner may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, 
be paid to the legal representativeR of said pensioner.'' 
A question has arisen upon this provision as to whether 
it applies to all outstanding pension certificates, or only to 
tho e that have been issued since the passage of the act and 
that may hereafter from time to time be issued. 
If, prior to this statute, a pensioner died without leaving 
a widow or a minor child or children, the accrued pension due 
on the pensioner's certificate up to the date of his death was 
not d~andable by his legal representatives, and this was 
\ost to creditors and others entitled to share in his estate. 
It is evident that legislation of this kind is in furtherance of 
natural equity, and of a highly beneficial character. 
Now, it seems to me, that the case of a pensioner whose 
certificate was issued before the passage of the act is as much 
within the mischief sought to be !J'VOided as that of a pensione1 
whose certificate was issued since the act -went into effect, 
and it is more than probable that if Congress had intended 
to restrict the law to the latter cases. it would have said. 
"that whenever hereafter a pension certificate shall have 
been issued," and oot " t~at hereafter whenever a pension 
certificate shall have been issued.'' 
Supposing, however, that the meaning is doubtful, as may 
well be said in view of the difference of opinion between two 
high officers as to the scope of the proviso which you bring 
to my notice, it seems to me quite proper to give the largest 
operation to the proviso that can be given without doing 
violence to its language, or, as Mr. Wilberforce says. speak-
ing of remedial statutes, where the words are open to doubt 
they are to receive a construction which will ad vance the 
objects of the act. (Wilb. on Stat., p. 235.) 
Anot.he~ question that has arisen is as to whether a pen-
sioner must have died since the proviso was enacted to en-
title his legal representatives to claim the amount of pension 
that had accrued at the time of his death. 
This question must be,answered in the affirmative, for other-
wise the word" hereafter" would be consigned to silence, in 
violation of the rule that every word of a statute mllst, if pos-
sible, have some meaning attache<\ to it. We have said that 
Congress by the use of " hereqfter " had no reference to the 
time when a pension certificate was issued. It follows, then, 
that Congress must have in~ended by that word, if it was to 
have any effect at all, that the berlefit of the proviso could 
only be extended to cases where the pensioner died after the 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 361 
De v i c e o n Go v ern m en t F i r e ·A r m s • 
proviso went into operation. Indeed, the use of the present 
tense'' dies "-namely, "that hereafter, whenever a pension 
certificate shall have been issued and the pensioner mentioned 
therein dies," etc.-prevents the proviso from being applied 
to cases where pensioners had died when the law took effect. 
This use of the present tense in connection with certain ad· 
verbs of time to denote futurity, as in the expression ''when 
he arrives I will send for you," is not peculiar to the English 
language, and is so common, that we must suppose that Con-
gress meant by the use of the present tense "dies" in connec-
tion with ~'whenever" precisely what would be conveyed 
thereby in common speech. 
As your communication refers me to the papers accom-
panying it for the questions you desire to submit, and as I 
may have failed to gather exactly what those questions are, 
you will please inform me if this opinion does not cover every-
thing submitted. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
DEVICE ON GOVERNMENT FIRE·ARMS. 
Sernble that the United States, having first appropriated the device of an 
eagle, with the letters U. S. under it, for the purpose of marking fire-
arms manufactured by the Government, may prevent any private 
manufacturer using the same device on fire-arms manufactured by 
him, and thus falsely representing to the world that his fire-arms were 
made by the United States. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 12, 1889. 
SIR: ln reply to the communication of your predecessor 
to this Department of the 26th of February, 1889, I have to 
say that whether the United States can be the proprietor of 
a trade-mark need not be considered, as it is clear enough 
that the United States, having appropriated to itself the de-
vice of an eagle, with the letters U. S. under it, for the pur-
pose of indicating that fire-arms on which that device is 
stamped have been manufactured by the United States, has 
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a right to preYent any private manufacturer using the same 
device on fire-arms manufactured by him, and thereby falsely 
representing to the world that his fire-arms were made by 
the United States. This is precisely what the Whitney 
Arms Company is doing, and doing so aggressively as to 
give uneasiness to persons in foreign parts who have made 
large purchases of arms from the United States stamped 
with the device in question, by threatening them with a suit 
for infringing what is claimed to be the trade-mark of that 
company. 
It seems to me that, in view of the frequent occasions the 
United States have to sell old fire-arms to make way for im-
proved ones, it would be advisable for the United States to 
apply to the proper court for an injunction to restrain the 
Whitney Arms Company from using the said device and 
thereby causing the United States great and irreparable 
damage. 
It seems not improper for me to suggest that Congress 
should be asked to pass a law making it an offense to nse 
in connection with anything any mark or device lawfully 
used and employed by the United States in connection with 
the same thing. 
I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. :\fiLLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
KANSAS FIVE PER CENT. FUND-PAYMENT OF. 
The provision in the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 410, for payment to the 
State of Kansas of $43,790.32 on account of 5 per centum fund arising 
from the sale of public lands in said State, precludes all inquiry on the 
part of the accounting officers of the Treasury as to the legality and 
justness of the claim. It is their duty to allow and certify the claim 
for that amount, "as per decision of the First Comptroller of the 
Treasury of date May 6, 1880, and as stated by the Commissioner of 
the General Land Office." 
DEPARTl\fENT OF JUSTIOE, 
Jttly 13, 1889. 
SIR: I have received the letter of the First Comptroller, 
under date of July 1, 1889 (with inclosures), with your in-
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dorsement thereon of July 2 requesting my opinion upon the 
question submitted in his letter. 
The question is, "In your opinion do you regard said ap-
propriation mandatory upon the Comptroller to allow and 
certify said claim for payment, without further regard to the 
legality and justness of the same¥" 
The ~'appropriation " above referred to is found in the de-
ficiency act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 921), and reads as 
follows: 
'~For payment to the State of Kansas, on account of five 
per centum fund arising from the sale of public lands in said 
State from July first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, to 
J nne thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-five, as per de-
cision of the First Comptroller of the Treasury of date May 
sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty, and as stated by the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office, forty-three thou-
sand seven hundred and ninety dollars and thirty-two cents." 
This provision clearly appropriates $43,790.32 "for pay-
ment to the State of Kan.sas on account of 5 per centum fund 
arising from the sale of public lands in said State, :jjt * • 
as 11er decision of the First Comptroller * • * and as 
stated by the Commissioner of the General Land Office." 
Under this language it does not seem necessary to go back 
over the previous history of how this "5 per centum fund" 
originated, or as to its " legality and justness," or to look at 
previous opinions and decisions. <Jongress having seen fit 
to make the appropnation, and having the right to make it, 
out of "any money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated," has shut the door against all such inquiries. The 
only questions under the language of the appropriation seem 
to be, (1) What was the decision of the First Comptroller 1 
and (2) How was the account stated by the Commissioner of 
the General Land Office~ 
Looking at the latter question first, it is fair and proper to 
assume that the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
(being a public officer connected with one of the chief Exec-
utive Departments of the Government) stated the account 
then as he presente~ it to your Department under date of 
June 15,1889, and as shown in the First Comptroller's letter, 
submitted. It will be noticed that the account is precisely 
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the same, and for the same per centum upon sales, between 
exactly the same dates as are mentioned in the appropria-
tion. The account is ~lso stated from " the sales of lands 
within the limits heretofore embraced in certain Indian reser· 
vations," so that, presumably, and almost inevitably, Con-
gress had this account thus stated before it at the time of 
making this appropriation. 
Now, all that remains is to see what was the" decision of 
the First Comptroller of the,Treasury, of date May 6, 1880, '' 
on the question of the payment to the State of Kansas on ac-
count of the " fund arising from the sale of public lands in 
said state." The following extracts from his opinion will 
clearly show how the question came up, what his decision was, 
its bearing upon the question submitted, and the very 
marked significance of the words " as per decision of the 
First Comptroller" contained in the appropriation: 
" The State of Kansas has presented a claim against the 
United States amounting to $90,566.08, being for 5 per cent. 
on the net proceeds of sales from the 29th of January, 1861, 
· to the 30th of June, 1877, inclusive, of lands within the limits 
of that State heretofore embraced in Indian reservations. 
The reservations were known as the Shawnee, Absentee 
Miami, Kansas Trust, Kansas Trust and Diminished Reserve, 
Osage (Jeded, Osage Trust and Diminished Resm·ve, New York 
Indian, and Cherokee Strip. The entire cla~m has been al-
iowe by the Commissioner of the General Land Office and 
the account is now before this office f"m' examination. 
" The claim is founded upon the fifth clause of section 3 of 
the act for the admission of Kansas into the Union, approved 
January 29, 1861. That clause enacts that 5 per centum of 
the net proceeds of sales of all public lands lying within said 
State, which shall be sold by Congress after the admission of 
the State into the Union, after deducting a1l expenses inci-
dent to the same, shall be paid to said State for the purpose 
of making public roads and internal improvements, or for 
other purposes, as the legislature shall direct. • • • 
"The case turns upon a proper answer to be given to the 
question, What lands were publiG lands lying within said State, 
within the meaning of this clause!" 
At the date of the passage of the act there were Indian 
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reservations within the exterior limits of the State which 
em braced about 13,800,000 acres. But the Comptroller holds 
that certain of these lands can not go into the account for rea-
sons given, but he decides that-
" The rest of the lands included within Indian reservations 
were held by the tribes accompanying them in the manner in 
which lands have usually been held by Indians occupying 
reservations. This title is popularly known as the common 
Indian title. 
"In lands of the last-named class the Indians have no other 
title than a mere right of occupancy (United States v. Cook, 
19 Wallace, 591). The possession when abandoned by the 
Indian occupants attaches itself to the fee without further 
grant (Id). So restricted is their estate that though they 
may clear the lands of timber to such au extent as may be 
reasonable for a profitable use for agriculture, and may sell 
the timber thus removed, they may not sever timber except 
for this use. They may not sever it for the purpose exclu-
ively of sale. If they do the severance is wrongful, and the 
timber when cut becomes the absolute property of the United 
States. (Id.) * * * 
"The right of the United States to dispose of the fee of 
land occupied by Indians under 1he common Indian title has 
always been recognized by the courts of the United States 
from the foundation of the Government. ·=~~= * * 
'~Not only have the courts uniformly decided that lands 
held by the common Indian title are pul)lic lands, but that 
they are such has l)een repeatedly assumed in the legisla-
tion of Congress. * * * 
"Lands, therefore, held by Indians in reservations by the 
common Indian title are public lands. They will pass, sub-
ject only to the Indian right of occupancy, by a grant of 
public lands by the United States; and, in the absence of 
, language evincing a different intent, a grant to a State by 
Congress of 5 per cent. of the proceeds of sales of the public 
lands within the State will be held to include 5 per cent. of 
the proceeds of sales of lands held by Indians by the common 
Indian title. * * * 
'' 'fhe grant of the 5 per centum having been made, it could 
not afterwards have been revoked. The right of the State 
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became by the grant a vested right which Congress could not 
recall. By treaties made after the admission of the State 
with the several tribes who occupied these lands it was stip-
ulated that the net proceeds of the sales of all but one of 
the reservations, viz, the Kansas Trust, should be invested 
by the United States for the benefit of the respective tribes. 
Without doubt these treaties, together with subsequent acts 
of Congress passed to carry out their provisions, entitled these 
tribes to a sum equal to these net proceeds, but they did not 
destroy the antecedent right of the State of Kansas to the 5 
per cent. which had been granted when the United States, 
holding the fee in said lands, had capacity to make the grant 
and made it without provision for any subsequent limita-
tion. • • • 
''In the light of this legislation, and of the clear provis-
ions of the act for admitting Kansas, it would appear to be 
doing violence to the terms of the act and to the policy of 
Congress to construe the 5 per cent. clause to be applicable 
only to lat;tds to which the Indian title had been extinguished 
prior to the admission of the State. · 
'' The amount ascertained to be due to the State of Kansas 
on the account under examination will therefore be reported 
to the Secretary of the Treasury." • • • 
This decision, under the language of the appropriation, 
seems to be conclusive upon this point. 
I am constrained, therefore, by these considerations, to 
answer the question asked by the First Comptroller in the 
affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION. 
Sawed mahogany boards are not dutiable under scheduleD (act of March 
3, 1883, chapter 121) as "manufactures of mahngany," but are duti· 
able under the provision of that schedule "for all other articles of 
sawed lumber," etc. Opinion of Attorney-General Garland of January 
21, 1887 (18 Opin. 535), concurred in. · 
• 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 16, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
communication from your Department, dated June 15, ask-
mg my opinion 4 ' as to tlle classification, under existing tariff 
.acts, of sawed mahogany boards." You state that the ques-
tion now at issue is whether imported "sawed mahogany 
boards are dutiable at the rate of $2 per thousand feet, board 
measure, under tlle provisions of Schedule D, T. I. 219, for 
.all articles (varieties) of sawed lumber," or" at tlle rate of 
35 per cent. ad valorem," under the further provisions of 
Schedule D, T. I. 232, for "manufactures of mahogany.'' 
The question is not without great difficulty, as the various 
provisions of the tariff acts, as they now exist and have here· 
tofore existed, are 'conflicting, and have naturally been sub-
jects of conflicting decisions in the administration of ~Tour 
Department. Howe\er, whenever the question at issue has 
been the subject of adjudication in the courts, the decisions 
seem to have been uniform, and upon a well-defined prin-
ciple. ln determining whether an article is subject to duty 
as a "manufacture,'' the test applied by the courts is, 
whether by the application of labor, manual or mechanical, 
it has been put in a condition for " ultimate" consumption; 
that is, whether it is ready to be put to its final use without 
further manipulation or 44 manufacture." Of course, the ap-
plication of this test is liable to some uncertainties and ex-
ceptions; but this is the general principle. An article may 
be in condition for remanufacture and at the same time largely 
used for" ultimate" consumption, and in that case it would 
be liable as a'' manufacture;" as, in the case of India rub-
ber (Lawrence v. Allen, 7 Howard, 785). But, as expressly 
decide~ in that case, the test is the adaptability of the article 
and its use, in the form of its importation, for "ultimate" 
consumption without remanufacture. This principle has 
been a number of times applied by the courts. The latest 
decision upon this question is Hartranft v. Wiegmann (121 
U. S., 609), where it was held that ''shells cleaned by acid 
and then ground on an emery wheel and some of them after-
ward etched by acid, and all intended to be sold for orna-
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ments as shells, were not dutiable at 35 per cent. ad valorem 
as manufactures of shells." The rule above stated, and the 
cases illustrating and supporting it set forth in that decision. 
are, it seems to me, conclusive on this question. It is matter 
of general information that ordinary sawed mahogany boards 
are not used in that form as articles of ultimate consumption, 
but are fitted for such consumption by remanufacture and 
manipulation. I therefore adhere to the opinion of my pre-
decessor, given to your Department under date of January 
21, 1887, to the effect that '' sawed mahogany boards are not 
dutiable as manufactures of mahogany." 
I return herewith all of the papers. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN ALASKA. 
Question as to what extent and under what circumstances the military 
forces of the United States may be used for the protection of life and 
property in Alaska, considered ; and the views expressed in a former 
opinion, dated April18, 1889 (ante, p . 293), submitted as covering the 
question. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 19, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your letter of yesterday, asking my opinion as to the extent 
of the use which could be made of the United States troops 
for the protection of life and property in Alaska, having in 
view the restrictive provisions of the act approved June 18, 
1878. 
Answering this request, I have the honor to say that the 
following is an opinion which I rendered to ~the President 
under date of April18 last, which I think covers the ques-
tion you submit. 
[Here follows the opinion referred to. See ante, p. 293.] 
The condition of things in Alaska, under the act providing 
for the civil government (23 Stat., 24), does not, so far as this 
question is concerned, differ from that in Oklahoma, with 
reference to which the opinion was given. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR. 
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CHINESE LABORERS. 
Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of December 26,1882 (17 Opin., 
483 ), touching the right of Chinese laborers to pass through the United 
States in the course of their journey to and from other countries, re-
affirmed. 
The application of that opinion to the case presenteu is unaffected by the 
acts of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, and October 1, 1888, chapter 1064. 
DEPAR1':i\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 23, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
two communications upon the subject of" the transit of Chi-
nese laborers through the territory of the United States in 
the course of their jouruey to or from other countries," one 
under date of July 19, instant, inclosing a letter of the So-
licitor of the Treasury, a circular of the Treasury Department, 
No.5, dated JanuarJ" 23, 1883, and a telegram from John W. 
Foster, counsel of the Chinese legation, the other under date 
of July 20, inclosing a letter from the Acting Secretary of 
~tate and a copy of a telegram from the Chinese minister. 
Yon state: H Certain Chinese laborers have arrived at 
the port of New Orleans and are now awaiting the determi-
nation of the question as to whether they have the right to 
pass through to San Francisco for the purpose of embarking 
for China, and I wHl therefore thank you for an expression of 
your opinion on this question at as early a day as practicable" 
In reply I would say that the same question arose under 
the act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat., 58). It was submitted to 
this Department, and the opinion of December 26, 1882 (re-
considering a former opinion) was given. The conclusions 
reached in that opinion I believe to be correct. 
Moreover, it appears that from that time the Department 
of State uniformly, and the Treasury Department generally, 
baverecognizedandacted upon the construction !riven therein, 
at least down to the passage of the act of October 1, 1888. 
Manifestly, the act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 115), did not 
render the opinion mapplicable to the question submitted, 
nor does the act of October 1, 188~, known as "the Scott 
exclusion act" (25 Stat., 504), at:l'ect its application. That act 
was directed to" Chinese laborers'' who had been or m1ght 
be r~sidents here, and related to their departure and return. 
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I have been able to find no other legislation bearing mate· 
rially upon the question. But it is possible that some of the 
''collectors of customs" to whom you refer may have been 
influenced by the stringent provisions of the act of Septem-
ber 13, 1888 ( 25 Stat., 476). The restrictive provisions of 
that act, however, by its very terms, do not take effect till 
"the date of the exchange of ratifications of the pending 
treaty," which date has not ;yet arrived. 
I therefore adopt the carefully considered opinion of this 
Department, given under date of December 26, 1882, as ex-
pressing my views upon the question you submit, without 
additional argument. 
I return the inclosures as requested. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
• Solicitor- General. 
The SECRE'fA.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
FORT MISSOULA MILITARY RESERVATION. 
By Executive order of August 5, 1878, 50 acre~ of land were added to 
the Fort Missoula military resen7 ation, which was originally estab-
lished with an area of 640 acres by Executive order of February 19, 
187i. The land covered by th0se orders was formerly within the Ter-
ritory of Oregon; but nuder the act of March 2, 1853, chapter 90, estab-
lishing the Territory of Washington, it fell within the latter Terri-
tory; and when the Territory of Montana was create<l, by the act of 
May 26, 1864, chapter 95, it became a part of that Territory, and so 
remained at the time said orders were issued. By the act of February 
14, 1853, chapt('r 69, it was provided that all reservations theretofore 
as well as thereafter made under the act of September 27, 1850, chapter 
76 (which applied to Oregon only), should as to forts b~ limited to not 
exceeding 640 acres at any one place ; and the aforesaid aet of May 
26,1b6.!, <leclared that all laws of the United States not locally inappli-
cable shall have the same force and effect within theTerritory of Mon-
tana as elsewhere within the United States: Held that the act of 1864 
was in ten <led to give effect in Montana only to such generalla ws of tbe 
Umted States as were not inapplicable to that Territory, and not to 
legislation of a speCial or local character; that the limitation of 6<!0 
acres was not made operative thereby in Montana; that the President 
was fully empowered to make the order of August 5, 1888; and that 
while such orller remains unrevoked the land covered thereby is not 
open to entry or settlement. 
, 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 31, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of the 22cl April ultimo pre-
sents for opinion the question of the validity of the Execu-
tive order of .August 5, 1878, by which 50 acres of land were 
added to the Fort J\iissoula Military Reservation of 640 acres 
originally established by au Executive order made on Feb-
ruary 19, 1877. This ExecutiYe order of .August 5, 1878, 
enlarging the reservation, the late Secretary of the Interior 
declared to be invalid, because made without authority and 
in contravention of the 9th section of the act of Congress or 
February 14, 1853 (10 Stat., 158). 
The land covered by both Executive orders lay within the 
boundary of the Territory of Oregon, as defined by the act or 
.August 14, 1848. (9 Stat., 323.) 
By the fourteenth section of the act of September 27, 1850 
(9 Stat., 500), being ".An act to create the office of surveyor-
general of the public lands in Oregon, and to provide for the 
survey and to make donations to settlers of the said public 
lands," the authority of the President to make reservations 
for the purposes of "forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, 
and other needful public uses" was without any restriction 
whatever. 
In this partieular, however, the aet was amended by sec-
tion 9 of the aet of February 14,1853 (10 Stat., 159, 160), which 
is entitled ".An act to amend an act entitled '.An act to create 
the office of surveyor-general of the public lands in Oregon, 
and to provide for the survey and to make donations to the 
settlers of the said public lands,' approved September twenty-
seventh, eighteen hundred and fifty." This act provides that 
all resetvations heretofore as well as hereafter made under 
the act of September 27, 1850, shall as to forts be limited 
to an amount not exceeding 640 acres "ctt any point or pla:.fe·" 
.At the time the Executive order of August 5,1878, enlarg-
ing the reservation, was made, the land covered by it, as well 
as by the Executive order of February 19, 1877, had ceased 
to be within the boundaries of the then State of Oregon, and 
was in the Territory of Montana. 
• 
372 HON. W. H. H. MILLER 
I<'ort llissoula llllitary Re~crvation. 
It appears by the act of :\:farch 2, 1853 (10 Stat., 172), en-
titled "An act to establish the Territorial government of 
Washington," that the land covered by the executive orders 
in question was taken from the then Territory of Oregon and 
thrown within the limits of the Territory of Washington, as 
fixed by that act. And that by section 6 of the act of July 
17, 1854 (10 Stat., 305), entitled "An act to amend the act 
approved September twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and 
fifty, to create the office of surveyor-general of the public 
lands in Oregon, etc., and also the act amendatory thereof, 
approved February nineteen (fourteen)~ eighteen hundred 
and fifty-three," it is declared that all the provisions of this 
act, and the acts of which it is cunendatory, shctll be extended to 
all the lands in Oregon cmd Washington Territories." 
Afterwards, when the Territory of l\fontana was created 
partly out of the Territories of Oregon aud Washington by 
the act of l\Iay 26, 186± (13 Stat., 85), the land covered by the 
Executive orders in question fell within the limits of the new 
Territory of ~fontana when the Executive orders in question 
were made, and still is. 
The legislation ty virtue of which it is contended that the 
second Executive order of August 5, 1878, was invalid is 
that part of the thirteenth section of the act of May 26, 1864: 
(supra)~ which provides" That the Constitution and all law~ 
of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall 
have the same force and effect within the said Territory of 
:\fontana as elsewhere within the United States." 
It is said that the limitation of 640 acres for forts, at first 
especially a1iplied to Oregon Territory, and, afterwards, espe-
cially applied to Washington Territory, is in force in l\fou-
tana under the provision just quoted from the act of May 
26, 1864 because that limitation is not locally inapplicable to 
Montana. 
But was it the purpose of Congress to make operative in 
Montana all the special and local legislation in the statute 
books of· the United States that might not be locally inap-
plicable to that particular region~ It is manifest that the 
argument that would admit any particular special legislation 
would necessarily extend to all; the language being '' alllawB 
• • • not locally inapplic~ble." The result of such an in-
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terpretation of the act of 1864 would be a medley of laws, 
no one of which migllt be locally inapplicable to Montana, 
while, taken together, they would make an incongruous mass 
of legislation. 
In my view such was not the intention of Congress, but 
that intention was, I think, to give effect in ~fontana only to 
all general laws of the United States not locally inapplica-
ble; such, for instance, as laws relating to civil rights, marine 
ports of entry, etc. I do not think it would be reasonable or 
safe to give any larger sense to the act of 1864. 
In addition to the considerations already stated, it may 
be remarked that the legislation specially applicable to Ore-
gon was, as we have seen, made operative in Washington 
Territory by express tenns, and it may be entitlefl to some 
weight in this discussion that during the period of ele\en 
years which has elapserl. since the alleged invalid Executi\e 
order of August 5, 1878, was made, Congress has seemingly 
acquiesced in that ord£'r, which would probably not ha\e 
been the case if Congress had thought that the executive 
department of the Government had acted in open disregard 
of limitations of authority which were intended to apply to 
that department. 
Unless, therefore, I should take the extraordinary position 
that the effect of section 9of the act of 1853 (s~tpra) was to im-
pose a burden on all the land in the then Territory of Oregon, 
and that Congress intended that the burden so imposed should 
run with and follow that land, like a covenant, after the land 
had ceased to belong to that particular Territory, I must con-
clude that the Executive order of August 5, 1887, was not in 
conflict witn sectwn 9 of the act of February 14,1853 (s~tpra), 
that statute having no application to the subject whate\er. 
If it is objected that, if we exclude, as inapplicable to the e 
lands in Montana, the act of 1853 restricting the reservation 
to 640 acres, we for the same reason must exclude the origi-
nal act of 1850, which, it is said, grants to the Presideut the 
power to make any reservation. To this I answer that in 
my opinion the validity of the Executive order of August 
5, 1878, and that of February 19, 18~·7, to which it was sup-
plemental, rest not on that statute, but on a long-established 
and long-recognized power in the President to withhold from 
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sale or settlement, at discretion, such parts of the national 
domain, open to entry and settlement, as he may deem 
proper. This power Congress recognizes in the legislation 
above discussed, which does not grant any such power, but 
only seeks to restrict one already existing. When Congress 
creates an exception from a power, it necessarily affirms the 
existence of such power, and hence the well known axiom 
that the exception proves the rule. 
It may indeed be stated that Congress has, in other legis-
lation, repeatedly recognized the existence of this power of 
the President. For instance, the pre-emption act of 29th of 
May, 1830 (4 Stat., 421), contains the followmg clause: "Nor 
shall the right of pre-emption contemplated by this act ex-
tend to any and which is reserved from sale by act of Congress 
or by order of the President, or which may have been appropri-
ated for any purpose whatever." So by the pre-emption act 
of September 4, 1841 (5 Stat., 456), "land included in any 
reservation by any treaty, law, or proclantation of the Presi-
dent of the United States, or reserved for salines or for other 
purposes, are exempted from entry under tlle act." 
In addition to this Congressional recognition, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has repeatedly adjudged the ex-
istence of this power in the President. (Wolcott v. Des jl'Joines 
Company, 5 Wall., 681; GYiSM' v . . McDowell, 8 ib., 363; Wol-
sey '· Chapman, 101 U. S. R., 755; Williams v. Baker, 17 
Wall., 144; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498). 
It follows, therefore, that the President was fully em-
powered to make the Executive order of ..A.ugust 5, 1878, and 
that while that order remains unrevoked the land covered by 
it is not open to entry or settlement. In reaching this con-
clusion I have not overlooked the distinction, claimed on be-
half of the "\Var Department to obtain, between 4' , posts" 
anu "forts," and which some of the statutes seem to recog-
nize, but have preferred to rest my conclusions on the 
broader grounds that the restrictive act of 1853 is wholly in-
applicable to these lands in Montana. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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ROCK ISLAND BRIDGE. 
Provision in the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 411, making an appro-
priation" for repairs to draw-!Jier of the Rock Island Bridge," etc., 
considered with reference to the duty thereby devolved upon the Sec-
retary of War concerning its expenditure, and the further duty to 
require of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company 
reimbursement of one-half of the expenses incurred in said repairs . 
DEP A.RT:\fENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 14, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication under date of August 7 instant (with in-
closures), requesting that this Department advise the Secre-
tary "whether or not he should go on and execute the law, 
notwithstanding the letter of May 21" inclosed. 
The" law" referred to is in the appropriation act (25 Stat., 
963), and is as follows: 
''For repairs to draw-pier of the Rock Island Bridge, and 
for replacing the cement in the joints of the stones forming 
the piers of the Rock Island Railroad and wagon bridges, 
thirty-seven thousand six hundred and eight dollars; and 
the Secretary of War shall require of the Chicago, Rock 
Island and Pacific Railroad Company the reimbursement of 
one-half of all the expenses incurred in the repairs of said 
draw-pier under this and the appropriation of fifty thousand 
dollars made for this object in the sundry civil appropriation 
act for eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, as provided in 
their guaranty executed to the U niteu States under the acts 
of Congress providing for the construction of said bridge." 
The " letter" referred to is dated l\Iay 21, 1889, and is as 
follows: 
" SIR: A few days since the attention of the officers of 
this company was called to certain plans for the construction 
of a draw-pier under the bridge at Rock Island. The exe-
cution of these plans involves the expenditure of a much 
larger sum of money than is needed for the repair of the 
pier, which formed a part of the bridge when it was com-
pleted. This company was not consulted in regard to such 
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plans before they were adopted by t.he officers of the War 
Department, and this is to advise you that it will decline to 
contribute to the expenses which may be incurred in erect-
ing such pier any sum in excess of one-hrJf of what would 
be the necessary cost of placing the existing one in as nearly 
as is practicable the condition it was in when the bridge 
was completed. 
" Respectfully, 
"R. R. CABLE, President. 
'' Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR, 
"Secretary of War, Washington, D. 0." 
I Know of no rule of law which compels you to expend all 
of the sum above appropriated, or any more than shall be 
necessary for you to properly do the work specified in the 
above appropriation. So much of the Rum as it is necessm·y 
for you to use for the purposes indicated you can not well 
avoid using. How much that is it is not for this Department 
to say. That is purely a question of administration in your 
Department, and calls for the exercise of good judgment, 
bearing in mind that temporary repairs are not always 
the most economical or the most expedient. The same wise 
discretion, inside the lines of the appropriation, of course, 
should h · exercised in this matter of public interest as 
would be given to a private matter of like character~ mag-
nitud-e, prominence, and importance. 
If the question as to the necessity of any expenditure is 
in doubt, due weight should be given to the judgment of the 
law making power as expressed in the appropriation. 
The letter of the president of the company, above quoted, 
in no way relieves you from the performance of your duty, 
as above in11icated. It does not change your legal rights or. 
relations with the company, the Government, or the public. 
It naturally and properly may ten 1 to induce a more careful 
scrutiny, and perhaps revision, of plans of the contemplated 
work, to see whether they are necessary, within the definition 
above given; but nothing in it should prevent the exercise of 
the wise, prudent, and comprehensive judgment required of 
you in the first instance. 
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When the Government shall have performed its duty, it 
will doubtless be ready to require the railroad company to 
comply with the terms of its contract and perform its duty. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CONVICTS OF CONSULAR COURTS. 
There is no statute which authorizes a convict, sentenced to prison by a 
consular courtofthe United States, to be hronght to the United States 
for imprisonment and there held to serve out his sentence; and in the 
absence of such a statute, the removal of the convict to this country 
for that purpose would be unlawful. Opinion of Attorney-General 
Williams, of February 4, 1875 (14 Opin., 522), cited with approval. 
The President, by virtue of his office and without authority given by 
some statute, has no power to remove a con viet from one prison to 
another. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 14, 1889. 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com-
munication of August 3, 1889, in which you ask for my opin-
ion upon the following questions: 
"(1) Uan a convict sentenced to a prison by a consular 
court of the Unite<l States sitting in Madagascar be lawfully 
conveyed to the United States for imprisonment, and there 
held to serve out his sentence~ 
"(2) If so, what are the necessary formalities and proced-
ure to effect the transportation of the prisoner and lodge 
him in the prison selected for his confinement in the United 
States~" 
In reply thereto, I would say that on the 12th of .1\iay, 1864, 
Congress passed an act (13 Stat., 74) conferring on the Secre-
tory of the Interior power to designate the place of confine-
ment for United States prisoners convicted of crime in a 
District or Territory where there was no suitable penitentiary. 
This act was limited in its application to prisoners con-
victed in courts within the boundaries of the United States. 
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The proviso in the first section uses language which hardly 
admits of any other interpretation. 
On the 5th of 1\'Iarch, 1872 (17 Stat., 35), this power was 
transferred to the Department of Justice. 
These acts were incorporated into section 5546 of theRe-
vised Statutes (first edition). 
On the 4th of February, 1875, the Attorney-General ren-
dered an opinion to the Secretary of State, in which he held 
that the sentence of imprisonment imposed by a consular 
court clothed with criminal jurisdiction ''can not be legally 
executed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court which 
pronounced it, unless authority thus to execute the sentence 
is conferred by the legislature," and that, therefore, prisoners 
· convicted at Smyrna or Constantinople could not legally be 
held if sent to this country for imprisonment. 
It appears from the record_s of Congress and of this De-
partment that the Attorney -General in his report for the year 
1875 called the attention of Congress to section 5546 of the 
Revised Statutes (first edition), and said that by it "the At-
torney-General is empowered, when at the time of C01\_Viction 
there may be no suitable prison in the district, to designate 
some prison in a convenient State or Territory; but has no 
power after the criminal is consigned to a State prison to 
change his place of confinement or relieve him from inhuman 
treatment. Such authority might easily be given by Con-
gress." 
Certain correspondence also passed between the Attorney-
General and Sen.ator Clayto-: (who subsequently introduced 
a bill in the Sm•ate to amend the section referred to) in re-
lation to this subject, which sho,vs that it was the intent of 
the amendment to empower the Attorney-General to change 
the place of confinement after the.prisoner had been con-
signed to any State prison. 
Congress thereupon, on the 12th of July, 1876 (19 Stat. 88), 
amended the section (Rev. Stat. 5546), so that it now reads 
(amendments in italics) as follows: 
'"All persons who have been, or who may Lereafter be, 
COJlVicted of crime by any court of the United States whose 
punishment is imprisonment in a District or Territory where 
at the time of conviction, or at any tirne during the term of 
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imprisonment, there may be no penitentiary or jail suitable 
for the confinement of convicts or available therefor, shall 
be confined during the term for which they have been or 
may be sentenced, or during the residue of said term, in some 
suitable jail or penitentiary in a convenient State or Territory 
to be designated by the Attorney-General, and shall be 
transported and delivered to the warden or keeper of such 
jail or penitentiary by the marshal of the District or Terri-
tory where the con victi011 has occurred; and if the conviction 
be had in the District of Columbia, the transportation and de-
livery shall be by the warden of the jail of that District; 
the reasonable actual expense of transportation, necessary 
subsistence, and hire and transportation of guards and the 
marshal, or the warden of the jail in the District of Colum-
bia, only, to be paid by the Attorney-General, out of the 
judiciary fund. But if, in the opinion of the Attorney-Gen-
eral, the expense of transportation from any State, Territory t 
or the District of Columbia, in which there is no peniten-
tiary, will exceed the cost of maintaining them in jail in the 
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia during the period 
of their sentence, then it shall be lawful so to confine them 
therein for the period designated in their respective sen-
tences. And the .place of imprisonment may be changed in 
any case, when, in the opinion of the Attorney-General, it is 
necessary fm· the prese'i·vation of the health of the prisoner, or 
when, in his opinion, the place of confinement is ·not sufficient to 
secttre the custody of the prisoner, or because of cruel or improper 
treatment: Provided, however, that no change shall be made in 
the case of any prisoner on the ground of the unhealthiness of 
the prisoner, or because of his treatment, after his conviction and 
du,ring his term of imprisonment, unless such change shall be 
applied for by such prisoner, or some one in his behalf." 
There is nothing, therefore, in this amendment, when rea 
in the light of its history, which extends the Attorney-Gen-
eral's authority beyond the boundaries contemplated in the 
., section as it stood before the amendment. 
Convicts sentenced in consular courts seem to be spe-
cially provided for in section 4121, which enacts that the 
Presidant, when provision is not otherwise made, is author-
ized to allow, in the adjustment of the accounts of such 
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consul, the actual expenses of the rent of'' suitable building·s" 
to be nsed ~s a prison, " and also the wages of the kP.epers 
of the same and for the care of offenders," not to exceed a 
limited sum. 
The question remains, whether the President has power, 
by virtue of his office, to remove the prisoner. 
In your letter you call my attention to the fact that the 
President of the United States has twice in different cases 
• by executive order directed that prisoners convicted of crimes 
in foreign count.ries by consular courts of the United States 
be brought here to serve out the residue of their sentences in 
a suitable penitentiary; but it appears that in each of the 
cases commutation of death sentence was made conditional 
upon the prisoner assenting to his transfer to the United 
States and confinement in a penitentiary therein. 
• 
In the case of Stephen P. Mirzan, brought to this country 
under executive order of August 3, 1882, it appears that on 
July 29, 1880, the President by executive order pardoned 
the said Mirzan, " on condition that the said Stephen P. Mir-
zan be imprisoned for the term of his natural life in the 
United States consular prison at Smyrna aforesaid, or in such 
other prison or prisons from time to time in said dominions, 
or in the United States, as the President of the United States 
of America may at any time hereafter direct." In the other 
case to which you refer-that of William Dinkelle-a pardon 
was granted on August 6, 1880, ''on condition that the said 
William D'nkelle be imprisoned at hard labor for the term 
of his natural life in the Albany penitentiary, in the State of 
New York." It has been held that the President has po"'er, 
under the language of the Constitution, to pardon cortdition-
ally, and that the acceptance by the convict of the condition 
binds him. (18 How., 307). It will be seen, therefore, that 
here is nothing in this executive action which is in any 
way in contravention of the opinion of the Attorney-General 
above referred to. It does not seem to me that the Presi-
dent, by virtue of his office, has authority to remove a pris-
oner from one prison to another by mere executive order, 
unless such power is expressly given by some statute, and I 
am unable to find any such statute. 
In is evident that Congress did not have in mind at the 
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time of the passage of the acts hereinbefore cited the case of 
prisoners convited by consular courts. The former opinion 
of this Department therefore seems applicable to the case in 
hand. 
Very clearly this case is one of a class for which some pro-
vision should be made. It is presumed that the prisoner can 
be retained in custody under section 4121, Revised Statutes, 
until such time as Congress shall have an opportunity to 
pass upon the propriety of an amendment extending section 
554:6 so as to cover cases of conviction in consular courts. 
The conclusion I have reached renders it unnecessary to 
answer your second question, 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
TIMBER TRESPASSES. 
The provisions of sections 2461, 2462, 2463, and 4751, Revised Statutes, 
are intended to protect and preserve live oak, red-cedar, and other 
like timber, whether the samo shall be upon land reserved or pur-
chased by the United States for the purpose of supplying such timber 
for the Navy, or whether it be upon other lands of the United States, 
provided only that the timber is live oak, or -red-cedar, or other like 
timber, such as would be useful to the Navy for naval purposes. 
Where trespasses were committed in the State of Michigan, by cutting, 
destroying, removing, etc., live oak or red-cedar trees, or other like 
timber useful for naval purposes, on and from lands belonging to the 
United States: Advised that informers in such cases are entitled to one-
half of the penalties, etc., recovered under section 4751, Revised Stat-
utes, bearing in mind the power given to the Secretary of the Navy ·u 
that section. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 15, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August 5th, instant, with inclosures, in which you 
submit for my consideration "the question whether inform-
ers oftrespasses committed in the State of Michigan are en-
titled to one-half the penalty and forfeiture incurred under 
the provisions of sections 2461, 2462, and 2463, Revised 
Statutes," and requesting an opinion thereon. 
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In reply I would say that section 2461 provides that (omit-
ting the unnecessary portions) " If any person shall cut 
• • • or aid • • • in cutting, or shall wantonly 
destroy • • • or aid • • • in wantonly destroying, 
any live-oak or red-cedar trees, or other timber • • • 
being on any lands of the United States which in pursuance 
of any law passed, or hereafter to be passed, have been re-
served or purchased for the use of the United States for sup-
plying or furnishing thereform timber for the Navy of the 
United States ; or if any person shall remove • • • or aid 
• • • in removing from any such lands which have been 
reserved or purchased, any live-oak or red-cedar trees or other 
timber unless • • • for the use of theN avy of the United 
States; or if any person shall cut • • • or aid • • • 
in cutting any live-oak or red-cedar trees or other timber on, 
or shall remove • • • or aid • • • in removing 
any live-oak or red-cedar trees or other timber from any other 
lands of the United States acquired, or hereafter to be ac-
quired, with intent to export, dispose of, use, or employ the 
same in any manner wbatsoeveF other than for the use of the 
Navy of the UnitedSta.tes, every such person shall pay a fine 
of not less than triple the value of the trees or timber so cut, 
destroyed, or removed," etc. 
It seems clear that this section is directed to the preser\"'"a· 
tion of live-oak and red-cedar trees, and other timber of like 
character, useful to the Navy of the United States, not only 
upon the lands of the United States which have been resert,ed 
or purchased for the express purpose of furnishing timber for 
the Navy, but also live-oak and red-cedar trees and other 
timber useful to the Navy upon other lands of the United 
States actually acquired at the time of the passage of the 
section or which might be thereafter acquired. 
Section 2462provides: "If the master, owner, or consignee 
of any vessel shall knowingly take on board any timber cnt 
on lands which have been reserved or purchased as in the pre-
ceding section prmmribed • • • for the use of the Navy 
of the United States; or shall take on board any live-oak 
or red-cedar timber cut on any other lands of the United 
States with intent to transport the same • • • or to ex-
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port the same * * * the vessel • * • shall * * "" 
be wholly forfeited to the United States, and the captain or 
master of such vessel * "" * shall forfeit and pay to the 
-United States a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars." 
This section seems also to recognize not only timber cut 
from lands which have been 'reserved or purchased for the use 
of the Navy, but also live-oak and red ceJar timber cut from 
other lands belonging to the United State~. 
Section 2463 makes it the duty of the collectors within the 
States of Alabam.t, :Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, be-
fore allowing a clearance to any vessel laden with live-oak 
timber, to ascertain satisfactorily that such timber was cut 
from private lands, or if from public lands, cut by consent of 
the Navy Department. It also makes it the duty of the cus-
toms officers and land officers of those States to cause prose-
cutions to be seasonably instituted against all persons known 
to be guilty of depredations on or injuries to the live-oak 
growing on the public land. 
The substance of the fir~t part of this section is also con-
tained in section 4205, Revised Statutes. 
Section 4751 provides that "All penalties and forfeitures 
i~curred under the provisions of sections twenty-four hun-
dred and sixty-one, twenty-four hundred and sixty-two, and 
twenty-four hundred and sixty-three, title' The Public J_jands' 
shall be ~ued for, recovered, distributed and accounted for, 
under the directions of the Secretary of the Na,y, and shall 
be paid over, one-half to the informers, if any, or captors, 
where seized, and the other half to the Secretary of the Navy 
for the use ofthe Na\·y pension fund, and the Secretary is 
authorized to mitigate, in whole or in part, on such terms 
and conditions as he deems proper, by an order in writing, 
any fine, penalty, or forfeiture so incurred." 
The object sought to be attained by this legislation appar-
ently is to protect and preser\e live-oak and red-cerlar, and 
other like timber, whether the same shall be upon lands re-
served or purchased by vhe United States for the purpose of 
supplying such timber for the Navy, or whether it be upon 
other land~ of the United States then owned, or thereafter 
to be owned, by the United States, provided only that the 
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timber was live-oak or red-cedar trees, or other like timber 
such as would be useful to the Navy for .Navy purposes. And 
in order the more clearly to indicate that the object of this 
legislation was to protect and conserve the interm;ts of the 
~avy, section 4151 confers special and in some respects ex-
traordinary powers (see 15 Opin., 436) upon the Secretary of 
the Navy, who, as the head of his Department, is presumed 
to have full information as to the needs of the Government, 
and a direct interest in the preservation of all such timber as 
is specially useful in naval architecture. 
I have used the phrase "or other like timber," following 
the words "live-oak or red-cedar trees," in accordance with 
the following rule of statutory construction: " Where par-
ticular words are followed by general ones, the latter are to 
be held as applying to persons and things of the same kind 
with those which precede." (Potter's Dwarris on Stats., 236. 
See also Sedgwick on Stats., 361, 2d edition; Endlich on 
Stats., sec. 405 et seq.) 
If, therefore, the " trespasnes committed in the State of 
Michigan," to which you refer in your question, consist in the 
cutting, destroying, removing, etc., of" live-oak or red-cedar 
trees~" or other like timber useful for Navy purposes, from 
lands belonging to the United States, I am unable to see why 
"informers" thereof are not entitled to "one-half the penal-
ties and forfeitures'' referred to in section 4751, bearing in 
mind, of course, the power given therein to the Secretary of 
the Navy. 
If the trespasses to which you refer do not pertain to the 
class of Navy timber described, then the sections above do 
not apply; and it will be readily seen that not infrequently it 
may be a question of fact as to whether the case in hand is 
or is not covered by the sections quoted. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney-General .• 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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CLAIM OF PENNSYLVANIA-RE-EXA:\HNATION OF. 
Where a resolution of the Senate (dated January 10, 1889) directed the 
Secretary of the Treasury "to re-examine and audit the claim of the 
State of Pennsylvania for money expended in 1864, for which reim-
bursement was provided by act of April 12, 1886," and it appeared by 
that act the claim was required to be " examined and settled by the 
Secretary of War," by whom this duty had been discharged: Held, that 
the Secretary of the Treasury has not sufficient authority, under said 
resolution, to re-examine the claim in such sense as would make of 
the re-examination an audit, adjudication, or settlement thereof. 
A resolution of one house of Cvngress can not empower the head of a De-
partment to re-examine and audit a claim which by statute is re-
quired to be examined and settled by the head of another Depart-
ment. 
DEP .ARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
August 20, 1889. 
SIR:. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
•eomm unication of August 5, instant, in which you refer a 
resolution of the Senate of January 10, 1889, to the "Attor-
ney-General for his opinion as to whether, in viaw of the 
facts set forth in Senate Report No. 518, Fiftieth Congress, 
first session, and other papers bearing upon the case in-
dosed herewith, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
under the within resolution of the Senate of the United 
States of January 10, 1889, to direct a re-examination of the 
claim of the State of Pennsylvania arising under the act of 
April 12, 1866 (14 Stat., 32), and report the balance found 
due thereon for the consideration of Congress~" 
The resolution above referred to is as follows: 
"IN THE SENATE OF THE UNri.'ED 8'l'.ATES, 
"January 10, 1889. 
"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and is 
hereby, directed to re-examine and audit the claim of the 
State of Pennsylv-ania for money expended in1864, for which 
reimbursement was provided by act of April 12, 1866 (14 
Stats., 32), and to report the balance found due thereon for 
the consideration of Congress, provided the appropriation 
made by said act is not available to the payment thereof. 
"Attest: "ANSON J. McCooK, 
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Secretary." 
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On l\Iarcll 3, 1817 (3 Stat., 366), Congress pro·dde<l tllat all 
claims against the United States should be settled and ad-
justed in the Department oftlle Treasury, and the reYisers 
ern bodied tbis provision in section 236 of the Revised Stat-
utes. In the absence of any other legislation, this section 
would undoubtedly confer upou you authority to act upon 
the matter referred to in the above resolution. But on April 
12, 1866 (14: Stat., 32), Congress, with this act before it, for 
satisfactory reasons, saw fit to declare that the Secretary of 
War should examine and settle this particular claim. Tbe 
act making the appropriation hinges it~ payment upon the 
following proviso: 
"Provided, That before the same is paid the claim of the 
said State shall be again examined and settled by the Secretary 
of War." 
In accordance with the abo\e proviso the \Oucbers ano 
pay-rolls were examined by the PaJ·master-General and Pro 
vost Marshal General, and a report was made to the Seen· 
tary of War, and thereon the Secretary approved the clain 
to the extent of $667,074.35, and issued his requisition, No. 
4195, June 16,1866, for that amount. It seems clear that this 
award was an adjudication by the Secretary of 'Yar under 
this act, and this Department bas so held. (16 Opin., 4:89.) 
It appears further that the precise sum which tlle Secre· 
tary of War approved, after his examination and settlement 
under this act, was paid by your Department under its war-
rant·, No. 84:47, dated June 18, 1866, for $667,074.35. 
'rbere is, however, accompanying this warrant (and that 
is the onlJT thing that raises any question here) the following: 
~' NoTE.-This payment approved by the Secretary of 'Yar 
is made as au advance to the State of Pennsylvania. Tht: 
accounts as approved by the Secretary of War not havin~· 
been fully stated and passed by the accounting officers of tb(~ 
Treasury Department, will be subject to re-Pxamination and 
final settlement at this Department hereafter. 
" H. 1\lcOuLLocn, 
'' Secretary." 
Now, if what was then paid was simply'' an advance," and 
ift.he account, ''as approved by the Secretary ofWar," bad not 
been" fully stated awl pa~se<liJs the accountiug officers of the 
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Treasury Department," and was therefore'' subject tore-ex-
amination and final settlement" at your Department, as stated 
in the above ''note," a \ery different question is presented 
than the one herein considered. But the records seem to 
show a materially different state of facts. It appears that the 
accounts as appro\ed by the Secretary of War had been fully 
stated and passed by the accounting officers of the Treasury 
Department, and that the exact sum founu by the Secretary 
of War upon his examination, and approved by him, and for 
which he drew his requisition, was paid by your Department. 
Indeed., the papers indicate that your Department did not 
make, and never has made, any examination in the sense of 
au adjudication of this claim; and the letter received to-day 
from your Department assures me that while the accounting 
officers irr your Department did " technically" state and pass 
the account as appro\""ed by the Secretary of War, they did 
o "without examination, and passed the amount thereof to 
the credit of Pennsylvania on the books of the Auditor, to 
offset the charge which had been raised by the requisition 
of the Secretary of War." AU that the accounting officers 
of the Treasury Department did therefore, apparently, was 
to examine and audit the requisition of the Secretary of War, 
recognizing that it was his duty under the act to examine 
and audit the claim. 
And uow these accounting officers insist that, inasmuch as 
both Houses of Congress have prodded by statute that the 
Secretary of War shall be the tribunal to examine and set-
tle this claim, one House alone can not by mere resolution 
in effect repeal such provision and take away from the War 
Devartment the jurisdiction once given. This position is 
sustained by very eminent authority. It was held by Attor-
ney-General Cushing, in an elaborate and carefully consid- · 
ered opinion, that while joint resolutions of Congress are 
binding, ''separate resolutions of either House of <Jongress, 
except in matters appertaining to their own parliamentary 
rights, ha\e no legal effect to constrain the action of the 
President or of the heads of Departments." (6 Opin. 680.) 
My attention has been called to the opinion of Attorney-
General Black (9 Opin., 387), to the effect that when a claim 
has been referred by Congress to a head of a Department, 
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and his construction defeats the claim, in whole or in part, 
and Congress afterwards by reports of committees, or other-
wise, indicates its opinion to be against his decision, the case 
may be opened by his successor. It will be noted, in passing, 
that he also holds that " such indications of opinion from 
the legislature are not binding on the Department, but are to 
be regarded merely as ground for the reconsideration of the 
case." This is but a declaration that the head of the Depart-
ment has authority to reconsider a question decided by his 
predecessor, and that upon a reconsideration he is at lib-
erty "to determine the case again, according o his own con-
scientious convictions of duty." That is good law, and if the 
Senate resolution had been directed to the Secretary of War 
this opinion wonld have been in point; but the question here 
is vastly different. It is whether a resolution of •one House 
of Congress can empower the head of one Department tore-
examine and audit a claim which both Houses by statute 
ha,~e declared shall be examined and settled by the head of 
another Department. 
It seems to me that there can be but one answer to that 
question. It is respectfully submitted that it would never 
do tq admit that one House can deprive a Department of 
jurisdiction once expressly given to it, or in any way nullify, 
overturn, or repeal the previous deliberate action of legisla-
ture and Executive. 
I am constrained, therefore, to hold that you have not suf-
ficient authority to direct a re-examination of the claim of 
the State of Pennsylvania, arising under the act of April 12, 
1866, in any such sense as will make of such re-examination 
an audit, adjudication, or settlement of such claim. 
You should not, however, overlook section 248 of the Re-
vised Statutes, which requires that-
" The Secretary of the Treasury * • • shall make re-
port and give information to either branch of the legislature, 
in person or in writing, as may be required, respecting all 
matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Represent-
atives." * * • 
So far, therefore, as the resolution above requires you to 
"make report and give information" respecting the matter 
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referred to you therein, it is obligatory upon you. The re-
quest by the Senate is for information with a view to further 
legislation. I suggest, therefore, that you have an examina-
tion and report made giving to the Senate all the information 
available in compliance with its resolution. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW TREATY OF 1866. 
\rticle 38 of the treaty of April 28, 1866, with the Choctaws and Chick-
asaws, which declares that "every white person who, having married 
a Choctaw or Chickasaw, resides in tho said Choctaw or Chickasaw 
Nation, etc., is to be deemed a member of said nation ," does not con-
fer upon such white person the right of suffrage . 
Whether he is entitled to such right must be determined, not by that 
article alone, hut by the provisions of the constitution of the nation in 
which he may be domiciled, and its laws relating to suffrage and elec-
tions. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
A'ltgust 28, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August• 22, ~'requesting an opinion as to whether 
Article 38 of the treaty of 1866 (14 Stat., 769), between the 
United States and the Choctaws and Chickasaws, gives a 
white man, who marries a Choctaw or Chickasaw, the right 
of sufl'rage.'1 Article 38 of that treaty reads as follows: 
"Every white person who, having married a Choctaw or 
Chickasaw, resides in the said Choctaw or Chickasaw Nation, 
or who has been adopted by the legislative authorities, is to 
be deemed a member of said nation, and shall be subject to 
the laws of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, according 
to his domicile, aml to prosecution and trial before their tri-
bunals, and to punishment according to their laws, in all re-
spects as though he was a native Choctaw or Chickasaw." 
An opinion was rendered upon a question quite similar by 
Attorney-General Cushing, on January 7, 1857 (8 Opin., 300). 
Article 5 of the treaty between the United States and the 
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Choctaws and Chickasaws, concluded June 22, 1855, reads as 
follows: 
"Article V. The members of either the Choctaw or the 
Chickasaw tribe shall have the l'ight freely to settle within 
the jurisdiction of the other, and shall thereupon be entith'd 
to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens thereof; 
but no member of either tribe shall be entitled to participate 
in the funds belonging to the otl.Jer tribe." 
The constitution of tl.Je Chickasaw Nation did not give to 
resident Choctaws the right of suffrage, and it was contAnded 
that the constitution was therefore in conflict with article 5 
of the treaty above. 1\ir. Attorney-General Cushing held 
otherwise, pointing out with great clearness and force the 
distinction between citizenship and electorship, which per-
vades all public law of the United State8. He states what, 
of course, is a matter of common information, that a very 
large majority of the citizens of any State or district are not 
electors ; women may be, and most of them are citi.~ens ; so 
of minors, and yet they have not the right of suffrage. So, 
the provision conferring" all the rights, privileges, and im-
munities of citizens" does not necessarily include the right 
of suffrage. 
It may well be, therefore, that article 38, above referred to,. 
may make a white man who has married a Choctaw or Chick-
asaw and resides in either of these nations a member of said 
nation, subject to the laws of the nation, according to his 
domicile, and yet not entitle him to the right of suffrage. 
Whether he is entitled to such right must be determined not 
by article 38 alone, but by the provisions of the local consti-
tution of the nation in which he may be domiciled and its 
laws with relation to suffrage anrl elections. .A provision of 
the constitution or statute of the nation which should exclude 
such white men from suffrage would not be in conflict with 
article 38. I am unable, therefore, to say that article 38 en-
titles a white man, having so married and become domiciled 
in the nation, to the right of suffrage. 
It may be of a little significance in this connection that 
'article 3 of said treaty, providing for the condition of freed-
men in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, gives to them 
the rigl.Jt of suffrage. The language of that section, requiring 
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certain legislation on the part of the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
~ations as a condition of their receiving certain moneys, is 
that they shall make-
'' Such laws and regulations as may be necessary to give 
all persons of African descent resident in the said nations at 
the date of the treaty of Fort Smith, and their descendants, 
heretofore held in slavery among said nationR, all the rights, 
pri'dleges, and immunities, inclucling the Tight of su.ffrage, of 
citizens of said nations," etc. 
It is fair to infer that if it had been the purpose of this 
treaty to confer the right of suffrage upon white men married 
and domiciled in these nations the language would have been 
equally explicit. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ARENAS KEY ISLAND. 
Upon the facts submitted in relation to the alleged abandonment upon 
the island of Arenas Key, l\Iexico, by the mttster of au American 
schooner, of three meu, one of whom was killed by another of the 
three: .Advised that, if a crime was committed by one of the men on 
the island, it was commi!ited within the j uriscliction of Mexico, and 
the courts of the Unitetl States have no j nrisdiction over the same; 
furthermore, that the master and owners of the vessel do not appear 
to have committed auy offense cognizable under the statutes of the 
United States. 
DEPAR'rl\'IENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 28, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August 23d, with the inclosures, giving an account 
of the abandonment upon the island of Arenas Key, by the 
master of the American schooner Anna, of three men belon·g-
ing to that vessel. The papers seem to show that this island is 
within the jurisdiction of the Government of Mexico, though 
the property of ::\lessrs. Bruner & Bro., of Chicago, Ill.; 
that it is a small uninhabited island, visited by this vessel 
for the purpose of bringing away a cargo of guano; that 
while at the island putting in the cargo, on account of vio- · 
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lent storms aud bad anchorage, it was concluded by those in 
charge of the vessel to be unsafe longer to remain; that, as a 
consequence, though having a charter authorizing the bring-
ing away of 700 tons of guano, the vessel brought away only 
70 tons and left upon the island three men to look after the 
property of the company (I suppose of Bruner & Bro.), the 
superintendent at the time of leaving promising that he 
would charter a vessel and send for the three men and the 
property of the company. There seems to La \-e been left 
.with these men 1 barrel of beef, 4: barreis of flour, and 1 peck 
of white beans and peas. The vessel, the schooner Anna, 
according to the statement of its master, left Arenas KeJ 
Island on the 29th of June, 1889, aml on the 23<1 day of July~ 
at Mobile, he made an affidavit setting forth the alJOve facts, 
and stating that to the best of his belief no vessel had been 
sent for these three men, and that unless they were sent for 
they would probably perish, as they were out of the cours€ 
of any vessels except those in the guano trade This fact be· 
ing made known to your Department, the United Statef 1 
steamer Ossipee sailed from Port Royal, Jamaica, on the 6tb 
of August for Arenas Key, arriving there on the 11th. Twc 
of the men (Evans and King), were found alive, the othm 
(O'Brien), from the statement of King and Evans, appears tc-
have been shot by Evans in self-defense. King and Evam· 
are now on board of the Ossipee, at Hampto:.1 Roads, Virginia. 
So far as it appears, these men were left upon the island. 
without opposition on their part; there is nothing to indicatf; 
that any force or authority was used to compel them tore· 
main. Under the circumstances I do not see that there iE' 
any occasion for action by this Department. If a crime waE, 
committed in the killing of O'Brien, it was committed within 
the jurisdiction of the Government of Mexico, and the courts 
of the United States are without jurisdiction in the premises . 
In the second plac(.', however culpable the owners of thi1 
vessel and island and their superintendent may be, it doen 
not appear that they have committed any crime cognizable 
under the statutes of the United States. The section of the 
statutes more nearly covering the case than any other is 
section 5353 of the Revised Statutes, which makes the forci-
ble abandonmAnt. of an officer or a ma.rine!' i~ a foreign port 
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a crime; but in this case it is not shown that these men were 
mariners or that they were left upon this island against their 
will. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE N.A. VY. 
DISBURSING AGENTS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT 
Upon consideration of the various statutory provisions in force relating ~ 
to disbursing agents for the payment of moneys for the construction 
of public buildings (sees. 36f>7, 3658, and 255, Rev. Stat.): Advised (1) 
that in the absence of any special designation by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the collector of customs of the district in which the building 
is being erected should act as such disbursing agent; (2) that it is 
competent to the Secretary, in any case, to designate the collector or 
any other bonded officer to act; (3) that when such building is at a 
place in which there is no collector, the Secretary may, in his discre-
tion, designate a private citizen to act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 10, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August 26, in which you say: 
" Referring to the several acts of Congress in regard to 
disbursing agents and to the fact that the records of the De-
partment show that there has been uo uniform rule observed 
in making appointments to such positions, I have the honor 
to request your opinion as to what bonded Federal officers 
should be appointed to such positions under the law, and as 
to whether there is any legal warrant, under any circum-
stances, to appoint a person not a bonded Federal officer as 
disbursing agent of funds on account of an appropriation for 
the com~truction of a public building." 
The following are . the provisions of the statutes in relation 
to this subject-matter: 
" The collectors of customs in the several collection dis-
tricts are required to act as disbursing agents for the pay-
ment of all money~ that are or may hereafter be appropriated 
for the construction of custom-houses, court-houses, post-
offices, and marine hospitals, with such compensation, not 
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exceeding one-quarter of one per centum, as the Secretary of 
the Treasury may deem equitable and just." (Rev. Stat.; 
3657; June 12, 1858.) 
"Where there is no collector at the place of location of 
any public work specified in the preceding section, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury may appoint a disbursing agent for 
the payment of all moneys appropriated for the construction 
of any such public work, with such compensation as he may 
deem equitable and just." (Rev. Stat., 3658; July 28, 1866.) 
" The Secretary of the Treasury may designate any officer 
pfthe United States who has given bond for the faithful per_ 
formance of his duties to be disbursing agent for the payment 
of all moneys appropriated for the construction of public 
buildings authorized by law within the district of such officer.'' 
(Rev. Stat., 255; March 3, 1869.) 
The statute first quoted (Rev. Stat., 3657) ::,eems to make it 
obligatory that such moneys should be disbursed by the col-
lector of the district in which the public building was being 
erected. Such a rule would sometimes iuvolve great incon. 
venience. Accordingly, some years later, by section 3658, 
Revised Statutes, it was pro·dded that in case the building 
was being erected at a place where there was no collector, the 
Secretary of the Treasury might appoint some other dis· 
bursing agent, no limitation being made as to the person. It 
will be observed that under the first section no appoint-
ment by the Secretary was necessary; the law fixed upon 
the collector as the disbursing agent, without any special des_ 
ignation by the Secretary. Three years after the enactment 
of this second statute a new statute was enacted (Rev. Stat., 
255) giving to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to 
designate any bonded officer of the United States to be dis-
bursing agent in such case. This law is general and without 
limitation as to place. It applies to " all moneys appropri-
ated for the construction of public buildings authorized by 
law within the district of such officer." Thi.s law is not in-
consistent with either of the two preceding provisions in any 
such sense that all of them can not stand together. It modi-
fied the first provision (sec. 3657) to this extent, that it is no 
longer imperative that the collector shall be the disbursing 
agent for a building, even at the place of his location. It 
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seems to have been the sense of Uongress, doubtless the re-
sult of experience, that it might be more conducive to public 
interest, even in a case where there was a collector located at 
the place where a public building was being erected, that 
some one other than the collector should act as disbursing 
agent. It is easy to understand that the multiplicity and 
magnitude of business imposed upon the collector of a great 
port like ~ew York might make the imposition of this addi-
tional burden inexpedient and against public. interest. 
Jiy conclusion, therefore, is : 
First. That in the absence of auy special designation the 
collector would act as such disbursing agent. 
Second. That it is competent for the Secretary to designate 
the collector or any other bonded officer to act as such dis-
bursing agent in any case. 
Third. That in case of any such building at a place other 
than where there is a collector, the Secretary may designate 
a private citizen to act, in his discretion. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
The obstructiOns to navigation contemplated by sections 9 and 10 of the 
act of August 11, 1888, chapter 860, are such as pertain to the structure 
and plan of the bridge, in view of its location. Obstructions caused by 
. failure to promptly open the draw of the bridge forpassing vessels are-
not within those sections. 
DEP AR'I:MENT OF JUS'1'ICE, 
September 17, 1889 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
letter from General R. l\Iacfeely, Acting Secretary of War, 
with inclosures, under date of August 23, ul1Jimo, ''regarding 
complaints against t.he Pennsylvania Railroad Company and 
the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company for 
failure in promptly opening the draws of their bridges for 
· passing vessels, and to request your [theAttorney-General's] 
opinion as to whether such failure constitutes such an ob-
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struction to navigation as is contemplated by sections 9 and 
10 of the river and harbor act of .August 11, 1888 (25 Stat., 
424 and 425)." 
The'' obstructions" referred to in the above-mentioned sec-
tions 9 and 10 are suc-h as appertain to the structure of the 
bridge and its plan, in view of its location. They are such as, 
under the language of the sections, can be remedied by" al-
terations.'' 
The obstructions complained of were apparently caused 
in each instance, not by any fault of structure, plan, or de-
sign of the bridge or its approaches, but by the negligence 
or willfulness of the bridge-tenders in their manipulation or 
operation of the" draw." 
Whether or not these bridge-tenders were excusable under 
the circumstances surrounding them at the time may be a 
question for litigation, but it is one foreign to your present 
inquiry. 
I return your inclosures as requested. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF W A.R. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Where numerous papers relating to a claim against the District of Co-
lumbia were referred by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Attorney-
General with request for an opinion of the latter as to what action the 
Secretary should take in respect to the payment of the claim, in view 
of all the facts presented in the papers, but no statement of facts and 
no question of law were submitted by the Secretary, the Attorney-
General declined to express any opinion in the matter as thus pre-
sented. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 17 ~ 1889. 
SIR: On the 6th of February, 1R89, Mr. Assistant Secre-
tary Thompson, acting as Secretary, sent to this Department 
a communication from the First Comptroller addressed to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, dated January 29, 1889, re-
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lating to a claim of Samuel Stron against the District of 
Columbia, together with a large bundle of papers inclosed. 
The following indorsement appears on the Comptroller's com-
munication: 
'' TREASURY DEP AR1'MEN'r 
"February 6, 1889. 
"Respectfully referred to the Ron. Attorney-General for 
his opinion as to what action the Secretary of the Treasury 
should take in connection with the payment of this claim in 
view of all the facts presented . 
. "HUGH S. THOMPSON, 
"Secretary." 
This is the only inquiry made by your predecessor, upon 
the then Attorney-General, that I find in the papers. 
It is to be observed that the indorsement presents no 
statement of facts, and, indeed, asks no question of law, but 
the Attorney-General is left to grope through all the papers, 
and possibly to pass upon all questions of law arising 
therein. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the uniform rulings 
and decisions of this Department, from its organization down, 
the Attorney-General 8hould not be asked to act on a case so 
presented. By section356 of the Revised Statutes "the head 
of an Executive Department may require the opinion of the 
Attorney-General ou any question of law arising in the ad-
ministration of his Department." This provision has always 
been understood to require a specification of the question of 
law which is to be submitted, as will appear further on, so 
that the Attorney -General may be directly apprised of the 
very question of law on which his opinion is sought. 
If then a statement of facts, in other words a case, had 
been submitted, the omission to specify any particular points 
of law for an opinion would alone prevent my acting on that 
case. 
That it is not prcper for me to act upon anything short 
of a case stated, the equivalent of a special verdict, is clearly 
shown by an opinion of Mr. Attorney-General Garland of 
the 12th of October, 1887, in which he says: 
"It must, I conceive, be deemed settled that the Attorney-
General can only act upon a determinate statement of facts 
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furnished by the office sking his opinion (10 Opin., 267; 11 
Opin., 189). 'Where,' says :Mr. Attorney-General Stanbery, 
'a question of law arises upon facts submitted to the Attor-
ney-General such facts must be (tgreed and stated as facts estab-
lished' (12 Opin., 205)." Said ~lr. Attorney-General 'Yilliams 
upon the 8ame point: "I deem it proper here to remind you 
that where an official opinion from the head of this Depart-
ment is desired on questions of law arising on any case, the 
requests should be accompanied with a statement of the 
material facts of the case, and also the precise questions on 
which advice is wanted. By the observance of this simple 
rule the real point of difficulty in the case will be at once 
perceived, much inconvenience avoided, and more practica-
ble and satisfactory results obtained." (14 Opin. 367, 368.) 
On June 23, 1887, Attorney-General Garland returned 
papers to the Secretary of the Interior with the following 
suggestion, which seems pertinent here: 
"As I should prefer not to give an opinion upon such a 
- case as I might collect from these inclosures, for fear that I 
might not see the case in all its · parts in the same light as 
that in which it is seen by you, I have thought it best to ask 
a statement of the exact case on which an opinion is cle-
sired." 
I am quite sure that upon reflection you will fully concede 
the propriety and wisdom of the rule, and the reason for my 
return of the papers, to the end that you maJ·, if you shall 
now so desir~, present a statement of facts, and the question 
of law depending thereon which you wish answered. 
It is proper that I should say further that the first knowl-
edge I had of the existence of these papers was obtained just 
previous to my leaving the city near the close of last mouth. 
I took them up for examination, and found them in the con-
dition above indicated. This reference having been madf: 
and left undisposed of by our predecessors, and the conflicting 
claimants being now actually engaged in the trial of the 
question as to their respective rights in the courts, it is pos-
sible that you may not now desire to present any questiou 
for adjudication; but, if otherwise, and you will give a state . 
ment of the facts upon which you wish an opinion, and will 
indicate the question of law which you desire answl'red. this 
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Department will, at the earliest opportunity, cheerfully take 
up and pass upon the question so presented. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PREVENTION OF EPIDEMIC DISEASES. 
Upon the facts submitted: Advised, that the President has aQthority to 
use so much of the unexpended balance of the sum appropriated by the 
joint resolution,s approved September 26 and October 12, 1888, as may 
be necessary in his judgment for the purpose of keeping the various 
quarantine stations open throughout the fiscal year 1889-'90. 
DEP .A.RTJ\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 21, 1889. 
SIR: I have just received your communication of Septem-
ber 18th, instant, transmitting" certain papers relating to the 
appropriation for preventing the spread of epidemic diseases." 
The papers referred to consist of "letters from the Surgeon-
General of the Marine-Hospital Service, the health officer of 
Savannah, the mayor of Savannah, and others, requesting 
that the various quarantine stations be kept open throughout 
the fiscal year 1889-'90." These reports and your lette as-
sure me that there is need for the maintenance of these quar-
antines as sanitary defenses. You also assure me that "the 
Surgeon-General has received information of the outbreak of 
-cholera in Asia Minor, European Turkey, and other places 
on the continent of Europe, and, to be prepared for the pre-
vention of the introduction of cholera, it is in his opinion 
necessary that the quarantines shall be kept open throughout 
this coming winter, not only in the general interest but as a 
direct aid to local boards of.health." 
Upon these facts my opinion is asked as to whether or not 
'the President is authorized to use so much as may be nec-
essary of the unexpended balance of the sum appropriated 
by the joint resolutions approved September 26 and October 
12, 1888, for the purpose of keeping the quarantine stations 
open throughout the fiscal year 1889-'90. 
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The two paragraphs referred to in your letter are as follows 
(25 Stat., 954): 
''Quarantine service.-For the maintenance and ordinary 
expenses, including pay of officers and employes of quaran-
tine stations at Delaware Breakwater, Cape Charles, South 
Atlantic Quarantine Station (Sapelo Sound), Key West, 
Gulf Quarantine Station, San Diego, San Francisco, and Port 
Townsend, fifty thousand dollars." 
"Prevention of epidemics.-The President of the United 
States is hereby authorized in case of threatened or actual 
epidemic of cholera or yellow fever, to use the unexpended 
balance of the sum appropriated by the joint resolutions ap. 
proved September twenty-sixth and October twelfth, eight-
een hundred and eighty-eight, and one hundred thousand 
dollars in addition thereto, or so much thereof as may be 
necessary, in aid of State and local boards or otherwise, in , 
his discretion, in preventing and suppressing the spread of 
the same." 
4-fter a careful examination and consideration of the above 
paragraphs, I am of the opinion that the case you present is 
one in which the President of the United States is author-
ized to use so much of the unexpended balance referred to in 
the paragraph relative to'' prevention of epidemics" as may 
be necessary in his opinion for the purpose indicated. 
the $50,000 appropriated by the clause relative to H quar-
antine service," is intended apparently for the ordinary ex-
penditures of that service. You present a case which seems 
to require extraordinary expenditure, and it is one that is 
apparently, and it seems to me, quite clearly, within the 
scope and the intent of the clause providing for an expendi-
ture made necessary to prevent the spread of epidemic dis-
eases, At least it is one that addresses itself to the discre-
tion of the President of the United States under such clause· 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting A. ttorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CUSTOMS LAWS. 
Shellfish, such as oysters, Chinese abelones, etc., when prepared by 
drying or pickling, are entitled to free entry. 
DEP ART:YIENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 24, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of June 11, ultimo, asks an 
opinion upon the question "whether shellfish, such as oys-
ters, Chinese abelones, lobsters, etc., when prepared by dry-
ing or pickling, are dutiable under the provision in schedule 
G., T. I. 283, for salmon and all other fish prepared or pre-
served, or are exempt from duty by the provision in the free 
list, T. I. 783, for shrimps or other shellfish," and calls my 
attention to decisions in 1883 (S. 5902 and 5905). 
Upon an examiuation I agree with you that the principle 
of the decision of your Department under date of August 22, 
1885 (S. 7080), is applicable to the shellfish mentioned in the 
previous decisions of your Department under date of Septem-
ber 13 and 18, 1883 ( S. 5902 and 5905 ). I think, therefore, 
that the shellfish referred to are entitled to free entry, and 
accordingly concur with you in opinion and recommend a 
reversal or modification of such previous decisions, in com-
pliance with chapter 136, section 2, (18 Statutes, 469). 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ACCOUNTS OF PERSONS IN THE REVENUE SERVICE. 
The SeCl'etary of the Treasury has power, under section 161, Revised 
Statutes, to make a regulation which prescribes that the oaths to be 
taken by an officer of the Revenue Marine Service, or an officer or em-
ploye in any branch of the customs service, to the correctness of his 
account for pay or salary, as required by sections 1790 and 2693, Re-
vised Statutes, shall be taken before some person authorized to admin-
ister oaths generally. 
The fee paid by the officer or employe in such case for administering the 
oath does not constitute a proper charge against the United States, 
and if charged in his account should not be allowed in the settlement 
thereof. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 24, 1889. 
SIR: The two questions submitted by you for an opinion 
in your communication of May 13, 1889, have arisen upon 
Treasury Circular, No. 8741, dated March 21, 1888, which is as 
follows: 
•'TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
" OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF CUS'l'OMS, 
'' Washington City, D. C., March ~1, 1888. 
" To the collectors and other officers of the customs: 
"The Solicitor of the Treasury has given an opinion under 
date of February 9, 1888, that an auditor or Clerk in the 
customs service appointed as a deputy collector can admin-
ister only such oaths as the collector bas authority to admin-
ister, and that the collector has no authority by law to ad-
minister oaths generally; and that the oath required of an 
officer of the Revenue Marine Service, or of any officer or 
employe in any branch of the customs service, which he is 
required to take to the correctness of his account for pay or 
salary as provided by sections 1790 and 2693 of the Revised 
Statutes, must be taken before some person authorized by 
law to administer oaths generally; and that a collector, deputy 
collector, auditor, or clerk for the customs service is not such 
a person. You will take notice of this opinion, and conform 
thereto. 
"Approved. 
" JoHN s. McCALMON'r, 
'' Commissioner of Oustorns. 
"c. s. FAIRCHILD, 
"Secretary." 
These questions, as I gather them from your communica-
tion, are (1) whether the Secretary of the Treasury bad the 
power to declare by regulation that the oaths required bylaw 
to be taken y an officer of the Revenue Marine Service, or 
an officer or employe in a.ny branch of the customs service, 
to the correctness of biR account for pay or salary, as pro-
vided by sections 1790 and 2693 of the Revised Statutes, must 
be taken before some person authorized by law to administer 
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oaths generally; ancl that a collector, deputy collector, audi-
tor~ or clerk in the customs service is not such a person; and 
(2) whether in cases where an officer of the Revenue Marine 
Service, or an officer or employe in any branch of the customs 
service, is compelled to pay a fee to some officer for adminis-
tering the oaths required by the said sections, the fee so paid 
may be lawfully repaid at the Treasury to the officer as a 
-charge or expense that should be borne by the Government. 
As there is no law requiring customs or revenue marine 
officers to administer oaths under sections 1790 and 2693! I 
have no difficulty in answering the first question in the af-
firmative, in view of section 161 of the Revised Statutes, 
which is as follows: "The head of each Department is au-
thorized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law 
for the government of his Department, the conduct of its offi-
cers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its 
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the rec-
ords, papers, and property appertaining to it." 
It would hardly seem to admit of doubt that the regulation 
under consideration was within the powers conferred on the 
heads of Departments by section 161, for it is quite clear that 
a head of a Department has, under those powers, the right to 
say what duties the officers and clerks under him shall do or 
not do, so long as he does not go counter to any law. 
I proceed, therefore, to consider the second question. 
This question requires more attention. It seems not to 
have arisen earlier, because until the prohibition contained 
in circular 8741 went into effect, the oaths required by sec-
tions 1790 and 2693 were, as your communication states, ad-
ministered by customs officers without charge. Indeed, even 
now in some revenue districts the oaths in question are still 
administered by revenue officers who have, by authority of 
some of ~he States, become qualified to administer oaths gen-
€rally, and thus are not subject to the prohibition of circular 
87 41. In these cases no charge is made for administering 
the oaths, and so the question under consideration does not 
arise. 
In other districts, however, where, under State law, hold-
·ng an office under the United States constitutes a disquali-
fication for holding at the same time a State office, the 
404 HON. 0. W. CHAPMAN 
Accounts of Persons in the Revenue Service. 
convenient arrangement mentioned is not practicable, and 
the oaths in question must be taken before some State officer 
who, not being an officer of the customs, charges a fee for 
the service, as in other cases. 
It is not pretended that the Government has not paid the 
full amount of his salary to each officer who claims that the 
expense of making oath to his salary account should be re-
paid to him out of the Treasury. The whole question is that 
of the liability of the United States to make good the expense 
of the oath as something additional to the salary. 
The sections of the Revised Statutes requiring these oaths 
are as follows : 
"SEC.1790. No officer or clerk whose duty it is to make pay-
ments on account of the salary or wages of any offieer or 
person employed in connection with the customs or the inter-
nal-revenue service, shall make any payment to any officer 
or person so employed on account of services rendered or of 
salary, unless such officer or person so to be paid ha.s made 
and subscribed an oath that, during the period for which he 
is to receive pay, neither he, nor any member of his family, has 
received, either personally or by the intervention of another 
party, any money or compensation of any description what-
ever, nor any promises for the same, either directly or indi-
rectly, for services rendered or to be rendered, or acts per-
formed or to be performed, in connection with the customs 
or internal revenue; or has purchased, for like services or 
acts, from any importer, if affiant is connected with the cus-
toms, or manufacturer, if affiant is connected with the inter-
nal-revenue service, consignee, agent, or custom-house 
broker, or other person whomsoever, any merchandise, at 
less than regular retail market prices therefor." 
" SEc. 2693. No account for the compensation for services 
of any clerk, or other person employed in any duties in rela-
tion to the collection of the revenue, shall be allowed, until 
such clerk or other person shall have certified, on oath, that 
the same services have been performed, that be has received 
the full sum therein charged to his own use and benefit, and 
that he has not paid, deposited, or assigned, or contracted to 
pay, deposit, or assign, any part of such compensation to ttbe 
use of any other person, or in any way, directly or indirectly,. 
paid or given, or contracted to pay or give, any reward or 
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compensation for his office or employment, or the emoluments 
thereof." 
In my opinion the precedents and the practice of the Gov-
ernment are against the validity of such claims. 
Like its exemption from suit, the right of the United States 
to be exempt from liability for costs of all sorts and for inter-
est inheres in its character of sovereign, and is not to be 
found in any provision of law. Said Chief-Justice Marshall 
in United States v. Barker (2 Wheat, 395), "The United States 
never pay costs." And in .Angar·ica v. Bayard (127 U.S. R., 260) 
will be found collected the authorities on which the principle 
that the United States is not liable for interest is recognized 
in this latest case on the subject. 
In bringing claims against the Government before its ac-
counting officers, and in transacting business generally in 
the Executive Departments, the citizen is continually called 
on to incur expenses in order to meet the requirements of 
official routine; yet it was never heard that such expenses 
were recognized as proper demands against the Govern-
ment; and the long acquiescence of the public and of Con-
gress in the practice of requiring the claimant to meet all 
the expenses connected with the presentation and payment 
of his claim may well be regarded as conclusive against all 
claims of that character which do not rest on some special 
law. 
In 1885 this suuject received some attention in a case be-
fore the First Comptroller of the Treasury, and while that 
officer held that under certain legislation the cost of making 
oath to pay accounts should be paid at the Treasury in cer-
tain special cases, he also recognized as firmly established 
the general rule that such allowances should not be made, 
and at the same time adduced important official evidence to 
show the existence of this general practice. (6 Lawrence's 
· Decisions, 99.) 
But shortly afterwards this ruling by the Comptroller be-
came the subject 9f consideration by a committee of the House 
of Representatives, appointed to investigate certain charges. 
In their report the committee held that the Comptroller was 
in error in the case mentioned, to allow an exception from the 
general rule that Government does not pay costs of any de-
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scription, upon the idea that Congress had authorized the 
exception. And as the question under discussion depends 
somewhat on official custom, it may tend to throw light on 
the subject to know what the committee said on this poiut. 
Accordingly, I make the following quotation from the report: 
" t is, in the opinion of the committee, clearly error to hold 
tha one who has a claim against the Government is not act-
ing for his own benefit when he makes the proof necessary to 
secure its payment. That this proof is in the Departmeut 
regarded as a part of the voucher of the Government does not 
divest it of its original character as proof. If the principle 
is once established that the Government is to pay not only 
its debts, but all the expenses of proving them, then it would 
have to pay all the expenses of litigation against it, including 
the fees and commissions of attorneys and all ot:her legiti-
mate costs that the creditor may choose to incur. This is 
clearly wrong. Nor does the fact that the expense Qf proving 
the claim lessens the per diem of the officer alter the case. 
He accepts the office knowing that this expense is to borne, 
nd it is a part of the contract. The payment by the Govern-
ment of such expenses in other cases does not make the prac-
tice right, but rather shows the extent to which this erroneous 
principle has extended. It is fair to say tqat Judge Law-
rence found the practice of paying this class of claims to ex-
ist when he came into the office, dating back probably to 
· 1876, and that after considering the matter he decided that 
they should be paid, and cites authorities." (6 Lawrence's 
Decisions, 286.) 
I do not see that there is anything in the nature of the 
pay accounts required to be verified by oath by sections 1790 
and 2693, which enables me to distinguish them in principle 
from the great mass of claims and demands which from the 
beginning of the Government down have been held subject 
to the rule that the United States pays no costs of any kind • 
incurred by claimants in submitting their claims or demands 
for paym~nt. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Acting A. ttorney- General. 
· The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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PATENTS ~'OR INVENTIONS. 
A naval officer or employe of the Government at a navy-yard, who has 
invented an article for use in the naval service and patented 1t, if the-
invention does not relate to a matter as to which he was specially 
directed to experiment with a view to suggest improvements, is enti-
tled to compensation from the G,JVernment for the use of such article,. 
in addition to his salary or pay as sue h officer or employe. 
U makes no difference that the invention consists of an improvement 
upon an article already patented, and that when the improvement 
was patented the officer or employe was assigned to the duty of super-
intending for the_ Government the manufacture of the article improved 
upon. 
The Secretary of the Navy can not legally contract with the patentee 
for the purchase of his patent, or for a license to use it, under an ap-
propriation limited to the purchase of material and the employment of 
labor in the manufacture of such article out of it. 
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE, 
October 4, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of August 24 ultimo submits for 
an opinion the following questions : 
"(1) Whether an officer of the Navy or a civil employe at 
a navy-yard, who has invented, or improved and patented, 
under the circumstances hereinbefore stated, any article or 
appliance for use in the naval service, is entitled to receive 
from the Government, in addition to his salary or pay as such 
officer or employe, compensation for the use by this Depart-
ment of such invention~ 
"(2) Whether an officer of the Navy or a civil employe at 
a navy-yard who, while assigned to the duty of superintending 
the manufacture of a patented article or appliance, makes 
andpatentsanimprovementtherein,is entitled to receive from 
the Government, in addition to hi::; salary or pay as such 
officer or employe, compensation for the adoption or use by 
this Department of such improvement 1 
" (3) If you shall be of opinion that such officer or em-
ploye is, under the circumstances stated in either or both 
ofthe preceding questions, entitled to compensation for the 
use or adoption by the Government of such patented inven-
tion, could this Department legally contract with such officer 
or employe for the purchase of such invention. or for the pay-
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ment of royalty thereon, from an annual appropriation pro-
viding for the furnishing or manufacturing of an article or 
appliance used in the naval senTice and covered by such pat-
ented invention, or must such purcltase or payment be pro. 
vided for by an appropriation explicitly setting forth that it 
is for such patented invention"?" 
In connection with these questions your communication 
states: 
"It will be seen, from the correspondence referred to, that 
Lieutenant Dunn h~s submitted to the proper bureau of the 
Department a proposal to sell to the Government the absolute 
right to manufacture and use tn the naval service snell an. 
chors of his patent as may be required, or to permit the same 
to be used under agreement for the payment of royalty there-
on; that at the time he obtained a patent upon his invention, 
Lieutenant Dunn was on duty in the Bureau of Equipment 
and Recruiting in this Depart.ment, which Bureau is charged 
with the selection and furnishing of anchors for the Navy; 
that he was not, while attached to sai Bureau, especially 
employed to make experiments with a view to suggest im-
provements in anchors, nor assigned to the duty of making 
or improving them; that the fees and expenses of obtaining 
the letters patent were paid by him; that no expense was 
authorized or facilities furnished by the Bureau to aid him 
in making or perfecting his invention; and that with the 
exception of determining the number of anchors to be carried 
by each of the new ships, Lieutenant Dunn's duties in the 
Bureau were not connected with the work of supplying an-
chors to vessels of the Navy." 
It is also stated therein that other cases are now under 
consideration in the Navy Department involving the same 
questions as arise in Lieutenant Dunn's case, and present-
ing substantially the conditions of fact on which that case 
rests. 
It is important to observe that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has settled the point that tlle United States is 
as much bound to respect the rights secured to a patentee by 
his letters patent as an ordinary person, even in cases where 
the invP-ntion covered by the patent could be useful only in 
the administration of Government; as, for instance, "explo-
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sive shells, rams, and submarine batteries to be attached to 
armed vessels." (James v. Campbell, 10! U. S.R., 356; United 
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. R., 262; Hollister v. Benedict Manu-
facturing Company, 113 U.S. R., 60.) 
It is also to be noted that the same court has decided that 
a person in the military service of the United States has a 
right to patent an invention made by him and relating to 
the branch of the service to which he belongs; and that the 
United States has no right to use such invention without 
making proper compensation, as in other cases where the 
property of the citizen is taken and used for public purposes. 
(United States v. Burns, 12 Wall., 246; United States v. 
Palmer, 128 U. S. R., 262.) 
The only qualification of this principle the court makes is, 
that the invention of a person in the Government service 
shall not relate to a matter as to which he was specially 
directed to experiment with a view to suggest improvements. 
In such cases the fruits of the inventor's ingenuity belong to 
the Government. (United Sfutes v. Burns, supra; and see 
also Agawam Co. v. Jordon, 7 Wall., 603). But no one of the 
cases referred to in your communication falls within this 
qualification of the general principle. 
It follows, therefore, that an officer of the Navy or a civil 
employe of the Government at a navy-yard, who has made 
au invention and patented it uH.der the circumstances stated 
in your communication, cau demand compensation from the 
Government for the use of such invention, in addition to his' 
salary or pay as such officer or employe. 
Nor does it, in my opinion, make any difference in the ap-
plication of the general principle that the invention consists 
. of an improvement upon a patented thing, and at the time 
the improvement was patented the officer was assigned to 
the duty of superintending for the Government the manufac-
ture of the patented thing improved upon. 
It follows, then, that the first and second qu~stions should 
be answered in the affirmative. 
This affirmative answer to the first and second questions 
makes it necessary to consider the remaining question. 
In considering the third question we must bear in mind 
section 3718, and the several consecutive sections that follow 
410 HON 0. W: CHAP.\Ll~. 
Railway llail Service-Appointment. 
it and provide in what way supplies for the Navy may be 
purchased or contracted for. 
If the patentee of an article is the lowest bidder for fur-
mshing that article, the Secretary of theN avy may, it wouhl 
seem clear, accept his proposal and make a contract with 
him. So if the article needed be one for which the Secretary 
of the Navy may negotiate without advertising for proposal::;, 
it would seem that the Secretary may contract with a patentee 
of the article to furnish the needed supply. 
This, I apprehend, he may do under any gener~l appropri-
ation that is applicable to the subject contracted for. 
But however desirable Lieutenant Dunn's improvement 
may be, Congress has not, so far as I am able to discover, 
appropriated any money for buying either his patent right 
or a license to use it. No such power can, in my opinion, be 
deduced from the simple power to buy iron and employ labor 
to make it into anchors. 
This disposes of the third question. 
As the law requires me to act upon a case stated, and not 
upon mere evidence, I have confined myself to the state-
ment of facts contained in your communication, and have 
not looked into the correspondence that accompanied it, 
which I return herewith as requested by you. 
I have the honor to be. sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
RAILWAY ~fAIL SERVICE-APPOINTMENT. 
T. was appointed a railway postal clerk by the Postmaster-General on • 
April 29, 1889, without having undergone a civil-service examination 
(none being then required for such appointment), but he did not take 
the oath of office and enter upon its duties until May IS, 1889. In the 
mean time, namely, on May 1, 1889, civil-service rules for the Railway 
Mail Service went into effect, requiring an examination thereunder as 
a preliminary to making an appointment like the above : Held that 
T. was legally appointed on April 29 ; that his appointment was com-
plete on that date, although he did not qualify by taking the oath of 
office until afterwards; and that no examination under the civil-service 
rules was required in his case. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 14, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
request for an opinion from this Department upon a question 
submitted by the honorable the Civil Service Com,mission-
ers Theodore Roosevelt and HughS. Thompson, under date 
of September 24, 1889. 
The letter of the Commissioners and the letter inclosed 
therewith of the General Superintendent of the Railway .Mail 
Service to the Ron. John Wanamaker, Postmaster-General, 
dated July 9, 1889, present the following facts: 
On Apri129, 1889, one J. M. Taylor was appointed a rail-
way postal clerk. The Superintendent's letter asserts-and 
the facts thus asserted seem to be accepted by the Commis-
sioners-that his "appointment was made in the usual way 
upon April 29, 1889, and upon that day the appointment pa-
pers were regularly made up, executed, and recorded, and, as 
i customary, were at once forwarded to the Superintendent 
of the fifth divisiop., and notice as well given Taylor. There 
was nothing unusual in the method observed in the making 
out of the appointment papers, neither was there anything 
out of the usual course in connection with the forwarding of 
the appointment and the notice to the appointee." This ap-
pointment was approved by the signature of the First Assist-
ant Postmaster-General on April29; Tay~or, however, did 
not take the oath of office until :.May 18, 1889. 
It so happens that on l\Iarch 11, 1889, the President issued 
the following order: 
" Whereas civil-service rules for the Railway Mail Service 
were approved January 4, 1889, to go into effect March 15, 
1889; and 
"Whereas it is represented to me by the Civil-Service 
Commission, in a communication of this date, that it will be 
impossible to complete arrangements for putting such rules 
into full effect on said date, or sooner than May 1, 1889; it 
is therefore 
Ordered, That said railway mail rules shall take e.ffect Jfay 
1, 1889, instead of l\Iarch 15, 1889 ; provided that such rules 
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shall become operative and take effect in any State or Terri-
tory as soon as an eligible register for such State or Terri-
tory shall be prepared, if it shall be prior to the date abo"Ve 
fixed." 
My attention is also called to section 7 of the civil-service 
act of January 16, 1883, and General Rule III, seclion 1. 
Upon this state of facts the question is asked whether Mr. 
Taylor was legally appointed on April 29, so that his exam-
ination under the civil-service rules is not required; or 
whether the time of taking the office and entrance upon 
duty is decisive as to the requirement of an examination. 
It will be noticed that said section 7 and said General 
Rule III did not ''take efl'ect" until May 1, 1889, under 
the terms of the President's order of March 11, 1889. 
The law as to Taylor's appointment in force down to May 
1, 1889, was section 4025 Revised Statutes, which reads: 
" The Post'inaster Gener~tl may appoint clerks for the pur-
pose of assorting and distributing the mail in railway post-
offices, each of whom shall be paid out of the appropriation 
for transportation of the mail a salary at the rate of not 
more than one thousand four hundred doll'ars a year each to 
th~ head clerks, nor more than one thousand two b undred 
dollars a year each to the other clerks." . 
Under this section the Postmaster-General had the right 
on April29 to appoint Taylor in the way he was appointed. 
His appointment at the time it was made was, therefore, in 
every sense legal and valid; and it only remains to see 
whether the mere fact that he did not take the oath required 
until after May 1 in any way affected the completeness and . 
.finality of that appointment. 
The Supreme Court of the United States seems to ha,Te 
settled a principle which is conclusive upon this question. 
In the case of the United States v. Le Baron (19 How., 73), 
the question was considered whether a deputy postmaster's 
appointment was in force at the time 9f his giving his bond. 
It appeared that his nomination had been confirmed by the 
Senate, and his commission had been signed by President 
Taylor, who shortly thereafter died, such commission not 
having been delivered to him at the time of executing his 
bond. The court held-
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"When a person has been nominated to any office by the 
President, confirmed by the Senate, and his commission has 
been signed by the President, and the seal of the United 
States affixed thereto, his appointment to that office is com-
plete. Congress may provide, as it has done in this case, 
that certain acts shall be done by the appointee before he 
shall enter on the possession of the office under his appoint-
ment. These acts, then, become precedent to the complete 
investiture of the office, but they are to be performed by the 
appointee, not by the Executive. All the Executive can do 
to invest the person with his office has been completed when 
the commission has been signed and sealed; and when the 
person has performed the required conditions his title to enter 
on the possession of the office is also complete. The transmis· 
sion of the commission to the officer is not essential to hi8 
investiture of the office. If by any inadvertence or accident 
it should fail to reach him, his possession of the office is as lawful 
as if it were in his custody. * * * It is of no importance 
that the person commissioned must give a bond and take an 
oath before be possesses the office under the commission; 
nor that it is the duty of the Postmaster-General to transmit 
the commission to the officer when he shall have done so." 
See also the case of Marbttry v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137), 
in which the court remarks : 
''The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until 
the appointment has been made. But having once made the 
appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all 
cases where by law the officer is not removable by him. The 
. right to the office is then in the person appointed ; and he has 
the absolute, ttnconditional power of accepting or rejecting it." 
No material distinction is apparent between the case of an 
appointment by the President, after confirmation by the Sen-
ate, and an appointment by the Postmaster-General. The 
qu~stion in each case binges upon the time when the appoint-
ment is complete; and, under the authority of the above 
cases, the appointment of Taylor under the facts stated must 
have been complete before l\fay 1, 1889, the day when the 
civil-service rules took effect. 
I am therefore constrained to hold that Mr. Taylor was 
legally appointed on April 29th under the laws of the United 
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States, and that the fact that be did not take the oath of of-
fice until after May 1st is immaterial upon the question of his 
right to hold the office to which be was appointed on April 
29th. 




0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Where no actually existing case was presented, bnt the call apparently 
was for an opinion in advance as to what would in the future be held 
upon indefinite and varying facts, the Attorney-General returned the 
papers, declining to give an opinion on tl,le matter submitted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 25, 1889. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of October 17,1889, relating to" the status 
of officers and men who served in what is known as the 
· Quartermaster's Brigade or Quartermaster's Volunteers," etc., 
with inclosures. 
I am unable to see bow this Department has any right to 
pass upon the suggestions contained therein. They do not 
seem to present any actually existing case, arising in the ad-
ministration of your Department. They apparently call for 
· an opinion in advance as to what this Department would 
bold in the future upon indefinite and varying facts. In such 
eases the Department has uniformly declined to give opinions. 
I take the liberty of q nothig from a late opinion of this De-
partment, which will serve to show how uniformly this rule 
has been adhered to, and the reasons therefor, as follows: 
''From this statement it appears that the question sub-
mitted does not spring out of any present, actually existing 
case, 'arising in the administration of your Department.' It 
is a question in a hypothetical case, and one indeed which 
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may never arise, and calls in ad vance for an opinion as to 
what the Department would hold in the future upon a some-
what indefinite state of facts. 
"That being the case, it is respectfully submitted that this 
Department is not permitted, by statute or precedent, to 
give an opinion upon it. 
"Allow me first to call your attention to Revised Statutes 
section 356, as bearing generally upon the question, which 
reads: 'The head of any Executive Department may require 
the opinion of the Attorney-General upon any question of 
law arising in the administration of his Department.' 
''Next, I respectfully refer you to the following extracts 
from opinions of this Department, which will serve to show 
how uniformly it has adhered to the positions herein indi-
cated: 
"'It has always been the rule of this office to give advice 
only in actual cases. • • * It is impossible to reply to 
mere speculative points or supposed cases.' (9 Opin., 8!3.) 
"'It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an 
opinion on a question * * * with which the Government 
has no present concern.' (9 Opin., 355.) 
'' 'Th~ Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an im-
portant legal question when it is not practically presented 
by an existing case before a Department.' (9 Opin., 421 ; 10 
Opin., 50.) 
"'The opinion of the Attorney-General may be required on 
questions of law arising in the actual administration of a 
Department, but not upon hypothetical cases merely.' (13 
Opin., 531.) 
"'It is not the duty or practice of the Attorney-General to 
officially answer abstract or hypothetical questions of law.' 
(13 Opin., 568.) 
''Later opinions fully harmonize with the above. Permit 
me also to quote the following from 13 Opin., 531, as giving 
a reason for the rule : 
"'You will readily perceive the inconvenience of giving, 
upon a hypothetical case, an opinion which, upon the consid-
eration of an actual case, might require modification on 
account of circumstances not imagined, and therefore not 
considered in the preparation' of the opinion.' 
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"To attempt in advance to settle such questions, in the 
words of another emi~ent Attorney-General, is 'to antici-
pate trouble' (9 Opin., 421), and it may well he added to 
promote trouble." 
If you will examine the authorities cited above, I think 
yon will see that the rule sh nld be maintained. 
The papers transmitted are respectfully returned herewith,. 
with the suggestion that if you have the actual case of any 
clerk applying for re-instatement, and will present it with a 
statement of the agreed facts (see 12 Opin., 206; 10 Opin., 
267; 3 Opin., 30, and many opinions to the same effect) and 
the question of law you desire answered, this Department 
will cheerfully submit its opinion thereon. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
Approved: 
U. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H;. H. MILLER. 
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F., a clerk in the War Department, resigned June 30, 1888, and on No-
vemb~r2, 1888, was re-appointed to a clerkship in the same Department 
on a certificate for re-instatement given by the Civil Service Commis-
sion under Departmental Rule X, but failing to avail himself of this 
opportunity to re-enter the service, the last-mentioned appointment 
was canceled January 28, 1889. On August 13, 1889, the Secretary of 
War requested that F. be again certified by the Commission for rein-
statement, but the Commission on August 25, 1889, declined to issue a 
certificate, on the ground that he bad been separated from the service 
more than a year, and was not eligible for re-appointment under said 
rule: Held that the decision of the Commission, namely, that a sec-
ond certificate for re-appointment could not issue to F. because he had 
been separated from the service for more than a year, was in accord-
ance with Rule X. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 26, 1889. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
request for an opinion upon the letter and inclosures for-
warded to yon by the Hons. Charles Lyman and Hugh 8. 
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Thompson, Civil Service Commissioners, under date of Octo-
ber 16, 1889. 
The letter of the honorable Commissioners does not give 
the necessary statement of a case upon which to base an 
opinion, but, from a .careful examination of the inclosures, 
the essential facts appear to be as follows : 
Louis M. Fitch "resigned his clerkship" ' in the War De-
partment'' June 30, 18R8." "He was re-appointed November 
2, 1888," upon the "certification" of the Commission; ''but as 
he failed to avail himself of this opportunity to re-enter the 
service, his appointment was canceled on January 2_,, 1889." 
On August 13, 1889, the Secretary of War requested that 
Mr. Fitch's "name be certified for re-instatement." 
To this request for a second certificate, the Civil Service 
Commission, through its president, on August 15, 1889, re-
plied as follows, viz: 
" As Mr. Fitch did not appear and take the oath of office 
upon his re-appointment iu November, 1888, and as that ap-
pointment was therefore never consummated, but was can-
celed on January 23, [28] 1889, and more than one year hav-
ing elapsed since the date of .Mr. Fitch's separation from the 
service, namely, on June 30, 1888, he is not eligible for re-ap-
pointment under Departmental Rule X, not having served in 
the Army or Navy during the late war of the rel)ellion. Cer-
tificate for his re-appointment can not, therefore, issue." 
The letter of the honorable Commissioners to the President, 
dated October 16, 1889, says: 
"The Civil Service Commission has the honor to submit 
herewith the request of the Secretary of "\Var for a certificate 
for the re-instatement ·n the War Department, under Depart-
mental Rule X, of Mr. Louis 1\'I. Fitch, with accompanying 
papers: 
"The Commission declined to issue the certificate, on the 
ground that Fitch had beenmorethan one year separated from 
the service, and so informed the Secretary of War, under date 
of .August 15, 1889 (a copy of letter inclosed), and in view of 
the opinion of the Attorney-General in the matter of the 
appointment of J. M. Taylor as a railway postal clerk, the 
Commission has been led to doubt the correctness of this 
action. It has therefore been thought best to submit the 
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cage to the Presiuent, with tlJe request that the opinion oft he 
Attorney-General be obtained upon the question whether the 
proceedings had in Fitch's case in No\ember, 1888, consti-
tuted an appointment, in \iew of the fact tlJat he failed to 
take the oath of office and enter u.pon duty, and the subse-
, quent cancellation of the appoiutment by the Department." 
Departmental Rule X is as follows: 
"Upon requisition of the head of a Department the Com-
mission shall certify for reinstatement in said Department, 
in a grade requiring no higher examination than the one in 
which be was formerly employed, any person who within one 
year next p~·eceding the date of the requisition has, through 
no delinquency or misconduct, been separated from the clas-
sified service of that Department, provided that certification 
may be made, subject to the other conditions of tlJis rule, for 
the reinstatement of any person who served in the military 
or naval service of the United States in the late war of the 
rebellion and was honorably discharged therefrom, without 
regard to the length of time he has been separated from the 
service." 
Under the phraseology of this rule it will at once be seen 
that the question here is not" whether the proceedings had 
• * • constituted an appoint1nent," etc., but whether Mr. 
Fitch had ''been separated from the classified sen·ice of that 
(the War) Department"" within one year next prece ling the 
date of the requisition," which date was August 13, 1889. 
It is conceded that Mr. Fitch resigned his clerkship June 
30, 1888, and hence on that day he "separated from the 
ser\ice." The separation which thus began to run on the day 
be resigned must have continued until he did actuall.r re-
enter tlJe service. ''A certificate for reinstatement" as per 
Rule X did not put him in; a mere "appointment" under it 
did not put him in. These, together, gave him a right to go 
in, which until canceled or revoked he could accept or refu:se. 
But it so happens that his appcintment was canceled before 
acceptance and before any service und~r it, and at a time 
when the Secretary of War bad full authority to so cancel 
it. If at. any time before such cancellation Fitch bad com-
plied with the necessary formalities and bad entered the 
service he would then have been re-instated. But the Sec-
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' retary of War asserts, and the Commission agrees, that he 
"failed * * * to re-enter the sm·vice" prior to such can-
cellation. The mere fact that he had a right to go into the 
service did not put him in; and if he did not get in at the 
time indicated, he could not thereafter have " been sepa'tated" 
from it within the wording of said rule. 
These considerations show clearly a very wide distinction 
between this case a'nd the case of J. M. Taylor, referred to 
in the Commissioners' communication. Without alluding to 
differences in the wording and the application of the law 
governing the two cases, it is sufficient here to say that in 
the Taylor case the appointment was not canceled at any 
time, either before or after acceptance and service, while in 
this case the appointment was canceled before either accept-
ance or service. A eareful reading of the opinions in Mar-
bury v. Madison (l Cranch, 137) and United States v. Le 
Baron (19 How., 73), cited by this Department in Taylor's 
case, will show the importance of this distinction. 
It is said that Mr. Fitch, prior to June 30, 1888, had been 
for many years an efficient clerk, that he resigned and was 
unable to re-enter by reason of impaired health, etc. I need 
not say that while these considerations appeal to an exercise 
of all discretion in his favor, they do not bear upon the ques-
tion submitted as to what is the law. 
The decision of the honorable Commission, rendered Au-
gust 15, 1889, to the effect that a second certificate for reap-
pointment could not issue to Mr. Fitch, because he had been 
separated from the service for.more than a year, seems to be 
in accordance with Rule X. 
Very respectfully, 
The PRESIDENT. ~ 
Approved: 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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INSPECTORS OF CUSTOMS. 
Inspectors of customs are not entitled to receive a per diem compensa-
tion under section 2733, Revised Statutes, for periods during which they 
are absent from duty on account of sickness or for any other cause. 
The fourth section of the ant of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, does not affect 
the provisions of said section 2733 regulat.ing the compensation of 
such inspectors. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 31, 1889. 
SIR : Your communication of the 26th March, ultimo, 
taken in connection with the report of the Commissioner of 
Customs which accompanies it, presents for opinion the 
question whether inspectors of customs can receive compen-
sation for any time during which they are absent from duty 
on the ground of sickness. 
These officers, like clerks and employes generally, hold 
their positions subject to removal at the pleasure of the 
appointing power. 
By section 2733, Revised Statutes, it is provided that 
"each inspector shall receive, for every ilay he shall be actually 
employed in aid of the customs, three dollars." * * * 
By the fourth section of the act of~iarch 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 
563) it is provided: "That hereafter it shall be the duty of 
the heads of .the several Executive Departments, in the in-
terest of the public service, to require of all clerks and other 
employes, of whatever grade or class, in their respective De-
partments, not less than seven hours of labor each day, ex-
cept Sundays: Provided, That the heads of the Departments 
may by special order, stating the reason, further extend or 
limit the hours of service of any clerk or employe in their 
Departments respectively. but in case of an extension it shall 
be without ' additional compensation; and all absence from 
the Departments ou the part of sa1d clerks or other employes 
in excess of such leave of absence as may be granted by tbe 
heads thereof, which shall not exceed thirty days in any one 
year except in ~se of sickness, shall be without pay." 
It may be proper to say also that section 2733, already 
quoted in part, further provides that the compensation of 
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persons employed as " occasional inspecto'rs "shall be $3 a day 
while" actually employed" in aid of the revenue. 
This further provision of section 2733 is referred to as show-
ing that the law authorizes the appointment of occasional 
tern porary inspectors as well as inspectors, who are, as to offi-
cial tenure, on the footing of the regular clerks and employes 
of the Government; and it appears from the letter of the 
Commissioner of Customs accompanying your communica-
tion that it has been the invariable rule in the Treasury De-
partment not to allow occasional temporary inspectors pay 
during sickness or for any other time during which they 
could not be properly said to be "actually employed" in aid 
of the revenue. But it also appears that the view of the 
Treasury Department has not been uniform as to the mean-
ing of the law with regard to the compensation of the regu-
lar or permanent inspectors, although the law on that sub-
ject has been substantially the same ever since the act of 
August 4, 1790, section 2 (1 Stat., 172). 
Recurring to the letter of the Commissioner of Customs, 
it appears that on May 2, 1833, the then Secretary of the 
Treasury, Mr. McLane, instructed Samuel M. Swartwout, 
then collector of customs at New York, that'' when an in-
spector, other than an occasional inspector, is taken ill w bile 
on duty, and it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the 
surveyor that he is unable through illness to perform his 
duty, his allowance may be continued during such absence 
unless it shall appear that the disqualification is of a perma-
nent nature." 
So far as the Commissioner has been able to gather from 
the" traditions" of the Treasury Department, it appears that 
the practice of the Department was in accordance with these 
instructions of Secretary McLane until January 27, 1885; 
and this is confirmed by section 636 of the general Treasury 
Regulations of 1857 and article 1490 of the general Treasury 
Regulations of 1884. 
On January 27, 1885, Mr. Attorney-General Brewster gave 
an opinion that Thomas Whelan, an inspector of customs, 
was not entitled to pay for the time during which be had been 
suspended from duty, inasmuch as Whelan coald not have 
been "actually ernployed" during such suspension "in aid of 
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the customs," and thereupon the then Secretary, Mr. )lcCul-
loch, made an order conforming the practice of the Depart-
ment to this opinion . 
. In some way, which does not clearly appear, the opin·:.on of 
:Mr. Attorney-General Brewster was · reviewed by the then 
Solicitor of the Treasury, who held that inspectors couh1, 
after assignment to duty, claim pay for Sundays and other 
holidays, and while performing clerical duty, or awaiting 
directions, and " while confined by temporary sickness in-
curred while on duty," referring with approbation to the 
opinion of l\Ir. Secretary l\IcLane. On another occasion, in 
the same year, the same officer gave an opinion that the rule 
established in the above quoted act of l\Iarch 3, 1883, applied 
to inspectors. 
But these views are, perhaps, not to be regarded as in-
tended to be in conflict with the opinion of the Attorney-
General; first, because the case before the Attorney-General 
was one of an inspector's actual suspension from duty; and 
secondly, because the learned Attorney-General does not ap-
pear to have considered the act of March 3, 1883, in connec-
tion with section 2733, Revised Statutes. 
There is certainly a palpable distinction between an in-
spector's suspension from duty by the appointing power and 
his absence from duty caused by sickness. Whether that 
distinction is recognized by the law is a question that doe 
not appear to have been passed upon by any of my prede-
cessors. 
In fixing' the compensation of inspectors of customs the 
law (Rev. Stats., sec. ~733) doe::; not say, as we have seen, 
that an inspector shall receive $3 a day merely, but $3 "for 
every day he shall be actually mnployed in aiel of the cnstorns." 
This language is very different from that usuall~· employed 
by Congress in determining the compensation of public 
officers, even when such compensation is by the day. For 
instance, section 2650, Revised Statutes, directs that certain 
special Treasury agents shall receive ''a com]Jensation of $10 
·per day," all(l others ''a compensation of $8 per day," and 
others "a compensation of $6 per day," and others "a com-
pensation of $5 per day," without saying while actually em-
ployed, or its equivalent. Something like the language used 
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in section 2733 may be found in section 4017, Revised Stat-
utes, authorizing the Pm~tmaster-Geueral to employ special 
agents, ~nd providing that they shall receive a stated salary 
each, and be allowed for traveling and incidental expenses, 
'' while actually employed in the service, a sum not exceeding 
$5 a day." 
It is plain, from the reading of this section, that Congress 
intended to establish by it a distinctiOn between' the two cases 
of a special agent in the service of the Post-Office Depart-
ment and drawing an annual salary, and a special agent as 
"actnally employed" in that service, and for that reason en-
titled to a pet diem allowance. 
There is a palpable distinction between au officer who is 
at his post ready for duty, and one who is away from his post, 
whether with leave or on account of sickness. In the former 
case he is "actually employed" in the public service, while in 
the latter he is an employe, but not for the time being ''actu-
ally employed " in that service. 
The same sort of distinction is made in section 824, Re-
vised Statutes, between a district attorney's "necessary at-
tendance" on court and i::; mere ''attendance." When the 
court sits at his place of re:sidence the district attorney gets 
only a per diem for "necessary (tttendance," but when the 
court sits elsewhere he receives his per diem for "attendance" 
for each day of the term. 
I think, therefore, that when Congress declared that an 
inspector of customs should receive a per diem for "every 
day he shall be act'ltally employed in aid of the customs,''' it did 
not mean that he should continue to draw his per diem, when 
kept from his post even by sickne~s, or, as .Mr. Brewster 
held, when suspended from duty, or when away on leave of 
absence. In none of the"'e instances can it be said that the 
inspector is "actually employed," without ignoring a distinc-
tion which Congress obviously intended to establish. 
So much for the legislation as it stood when the act of l\farch 
3, 1883 (supra), went into operation. 
The next inquiry is, whether that act had any effect, and, 
if any, what effect, on section 2733, Revised Statutes, regu-
lating the compensation of inspectors of customs. 
It will be remembered that the act of 1883, after declaring 
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that seven hours Qf labor, daily, should be required of ail 
clerks and other employes in the several Departments, Sun-
days and other public holidays excet~ted, goes on to .say, in 
a proviso, that "all absence from.. the Departments on the 
part of said clerks or other employes in excess of such leave 
of absence as may be granted by the heads thereof (i.e., of 
Departments), .which shall not exceed thirty days in any one 
year, except in case of sickness, shall be without pay;" not 
saying, it will be noticed, that a leave of thirty days shall be 
granted in all cases or in any case, but putting a limitntion 
of thirty days on such leav~ in any case where it is allowable 
under existing laws. 
It does not seem to be open to doubt that this is a general, 
comprehensive law, applicable to all the Departments of the 
Government, and conforming to and sanctioniug the long 
practice of granting emplo~~es in the civil service a leave of 
absence of thirty days per annum, whether on account of 
sickness or otherwise. 
On the other hand, as I think has been satisfactoril~· shown, 
the legislation embodied in section 2733 should be regarded 
as exceptional and particular in character, a·nd as lying en-
tirely outside the purview of the fourth section of the act 
of March 3, 1883 (supra), because of its exceptional and par-
ticular nature. This is certainly true, unless the act of 1883 
. impliedly repeals section 2733 as to the point under consid-
eration. 
The rule in relation to this subject, as quoted by the Su-
preme Court in Ex parte Cow-Dog (109 U. S., 570, 571), is 
that "a general act is not to be construed to repeal a pre-
vious particular act, uule~ there is some express reference 
to the previous legislation on the subject, or unless there is 
a necessary iaconsistency in the two acts standing together." 
And the same court says in the same case, adopting the lan-
guage of Vice-Chancellor Wood in Fitzgerald v. Ohampenys, 
that the reason of the rule is "that the legislature having 
bad its attention directed to a special subject, and having ob-
served all the circumstances of the case and provided for 
.them, does not intend by a general enactment afterwards to 
derogate from its own act, when it makes no special mention 
of its intention so to do." In addition to the case just cited, 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 425 
Compen~atlon for Disbursing Public ~Ioney. 
the following cases will be found instructive, also, on this head, 
namely, Stette v. Stoll (17 Wall., 431); Williams v. Pritchard 
(4 T. R., 2); Brown v. Omtnty Commissioners (21 Pa. St., 37); 
Rounds v. Waymart Borough (81 Pa. St., 395), a very strong 
case; Blain v. Bailey (25 Ind., 165); Sedgw. Con. & Stat. Law, 
123,124. 
The same conclusion is strongly confirmed by the universal 
rule that repeals by implication are not favored, and that a 
former law is not to be affected by a subsequent one which • 
does not refer to it, "if by any reasonal>le construction they 
can be made to stand together'' (United States v. Langston 
118 IT. S. R., 389, 393. See also Ohezc Heong 'T· United States, 
112 U. S.R., 536, and cases cited.) 
I repeat, then, in conclusion, that inspectors of custom~ can 
not receive a per diem compensation under section 2733 "for 
periods of absence from duty on account of sickness or other-
ise." 
Very respectfully, your obe ient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
COMPENSATION FOR DISBURSING PUBLIC MONEY. 
By the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 130, it was provided that the money 
appropriated for the erection of the building for the Departments of 
State, \Var, and Navy should be expended under the direction of the 
Secretary of War; and in March, 1877, C. (then a lieutenant-colonel in 
the Corps of Engineers), by order of the Secretary of \Var, took charge 
of the construction of the building and continued in charge thereof 
untii May 31, 1888, when the building was completed. From July 1, 
1878, until May 31, 1888, by direction of the Secretary of War, C. dis-
bursed the appropriations made from time to time for the building; 
and for this service he claims compensation at the rate of three-eighths 
of 1 per cent. upon the amount of money disbursed by him: Held, upon 
consideration of sections 1153 and 3654, Revised Statutes, and the act of 
March 3, 1875, chapter 131, that the claim is controlled by the pro vis-
'ions of section 1153, Revised Statutes, and is not allowable thereunder. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Nm,ember 9, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a com-
munication from the Ron. GeorgeS. Batcheller, Acting Sec-
I 
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retary, under date of October 22, 1889, transmitting, with 
inclosures, dan opinion of the Solicitor of the 'rreasury on 
the a plication of Brig. Gen. Thomas Lincoln Casey, Chief of 
Engineers, U. S. Army, for allowance of compensation for 
disbursing moneys appropriated for the construction of the 
building for the State, War, and Navy Departments," and 
asking whether this Department'' concurs in the views ex-
pressed therein touching the question at issue." 
The material facts appear to be, that hy an act approved 
March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 494), the sum of 8500,000 was appro-
priated by Congress for the construction of a building for the 
State, War, and Navy Departments. The construction of the 
building was commenced under the direction of the Secretary 
of State, and during its progress from July 1, 1871, to July 
1, 1878, the money appropriated" for the work was disbursed 
successively by certain Department clerks." But in 1875 
the clause making the appropriation provided that the money 
should" be expended under the direction of the War Depart-
ment," and on March 3, 1877, General Casey (then lieutenant-
colonel Corps of Engineers) was ordered by the Secretary of 
War to take charge of the construction of the building. In 
obedience to this order General Casey entered upon that 
duty and continued in charge of such construction until the 
completion of the work, May 31, 1888. 
On June 17, 1878, and while" engaged about the execu-
tion" of this work, he addressed the following application to 
the then Secretary of War: 
H SIR : In order to conform to the provisions of section 
1153, Revised Statutes, I have most respectfully to request 
that the disbursement of the fund pertaining to the State, 
War, and Navy Department Building be placed in my hands 
to date from July 1, 1878. 
"The present disbursing agent, so far as I am informed, has 
performed his duty with credit, but the language of the stat-
ute would seem to be imperative as to the duty which should 
devolve upon me, the superintending engineeerofthis public 
work." 
This communication was referred June 20, 1878, by the 
Secretary of War to the Judge-Advocate-General for an 
{ 
,. 
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opinion thereon. The Judge-Advocate-General, on June 22, 
1878, replied, among other things, as follows : . 
"But, in view of the general terms and application of 
the rule set forth in this section (sec. 1153, Rev. Stat.), 
and of the fact that it is there expressly declared that 
t:he engineer officer shall be entitled to no additional com-
pensation for making the disbursement, I can not but be of 
opinion that it was the intention of Congress that this rule 
should be followed, and any commissions which would other-
wise be paid by the United States be thus saved, except in 
cases where the Secretary of War, by the authority of law 
and upon sufficient public grounds, might properly assume 
a difl:'eren t course. 
" This view is fortified by the consideration that sucli a 
provision as that. an appropriation ' shall be expended under 
· the direction of the Secretary of War' is not special or un-
usual, but bas been quite common for many years past in 
the acts appropriating funds for works intended to be super-
\ised by engineer officers; and further, that, as I am informed, 
the expending of the appropriations in such cases has habitually 
I been (levolved upon the office~· in charge, in compliance with the 
enactment of 1838, now contained in the section indicated of the 
Revised Statutes. 
''It is therefore my conclusion that, unless the public in-
terests clearly make it desirable, the Secretary of War would 
hardly b~ warranted in excepting the present case from the 
operation of the general rule prescribed in section 1153, Re-
vised Statutes, and thus incurring a public charge which that 
enactment was apparently designed to dispense with." 
Thereupon, and on June 27, 1878, the Secretary of War 
~ave the following direction : 
"The Secretary of War directs that Colonel Casey assume 
charge of the disbursement of the money upon the new State, 
War, and Navy Department Building." 
Under such order, from July 1, 1878, until May 31, 1888, 
General Casey disbursed the appropriations as they were 
made from year to year, he all the time having charge of the 
construction of the building. 
On December 21, 1888, General Casey presented to the 
First Comptroller of the Treasury the following statement of 
account against the United States : 
The United States to Brig. Genl. T. L. Casey, Chief of Engin~s, Dr. 
1888. DeCt21. For compensation under the 4th section of the act of 
March 3, 1875, for disbursing moneys appropriated for and expended in 
the construction of the public building known as the State, War, and 
Navy Building, in the city of Washington, D. Q., between the 1st day of 
July, 1878, and the 31st day of May, 1888, both inclusive, said disburse-
ments amounting to $4,322,273.81, as is shown by my accounts for the 
same filed in the Treasury Department, at three-eighths of i per cent. 
upon said disbursements, $16,208.52. 
After some correspondence between the parties the Comp-
troller finally, on February 9, 1889, decided, for reasons 
stated in his letter of that date, that he was not" authorized 
to fix and allow the same." 
General Casey, on July 9,1889, presented the matter to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, who referred the communication 
to the Solicitor of the Treasury for an opinion, etc. 
On August 27, 1889, the Aeting..Solicitor rendered his opin-
ion to the effect that'' General Casey is entitled to recover 
a fair and reasonable compensation within the limit of the 
act of March 3, 1875, for the d(sbursements made by him in \ 
the construction of said building by virtue of his appoint-
ment by the Secretary of War." 
After a careful examination of this opinion, in the light of 
the facts hereinbefore stated and of the statutes applicable, 
I find my judgment forced into agreement with the opinions 
.()fthe First Comptroller and the Judge·Advocate-General. 
Whether General Casey is entitled to compensation " for 
disbursing moneys appropriated for and expended in the con-
struction" of this public building, under the conceded facts, 
turns entirely upon the construction of the following stat-
utes: 
Congress, by an act of July 5• 1838 (5 Stat., 260, sec. 27), 
entitled "An act to increase the present military establish-
ment of the United States, and for other purposes," provided 
" that it shall be the duty of the engineer superintending the 
construction of a fortification, or engag,d about the execution 
of any ·other public work, to disburse the moneys applicable 
to the same; and as a compensation therefor may be allowed 
by the Secretary of War at the rate of two dollars per diem 
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during the continuance of such disbursements: Provided, 
That the whole amount of emolument shall not exceed one 
per cent. on the sum disbursed." 
The same session of Congress, July 7, 1838 ( 5 Stat., 308), 
provided, by an ''act supplementary'' to the aboYe, "that 
the act to which this is a supplement shall be and the same 
is hereby explained, limited, and modified as follows * * * 
sixth: That no compensation shall l>e allowed to officers ot' 
the Engineer Department for disbursement of public money 
while superintending public works." 
These provisions were carried into the revision as section 
1153, as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of the engineer superintending the 
construction of a fortification, or engaged about the execution 
of any other public work, to disburse the moneys applicable 
to the same; but no compensation shall be allowed hirn for 
ncb disbursement." 
In 1869, by an act of ~larch 3 ( 15 Stat., 311, 312), Con-
gress, in a deficiency bill, after appropriating a certain sum 
for the Treasury Building, attached the following proviso: 
"Provided, That no extra compensation exceeding one-
eighth of one per centum in any case shall hereafter be al- ' 
lowed to any officer, person, or corporation for disbursing any 
moneys appropriated for the construction of any public build-
ing." 
This proviso was afterwards incorporated in the Revised 
Statutes as section 3654. 
Congress again, in another act to supply deficiencies, on 
March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 415), provided: 
''That the provisions contained in the act approved March 
third, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, entitled 'An act 
making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appro-
priations for the service of the Government for the fiscal 
year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, 
and for other purposes,' limiting the compensation to be al-
lowed for the disbursement of moneys appropriated for the 
construction of any public building, was intended and shall 
be deemed and held to limit the compensation to be allowed 
to any disbursing officer who disburses money appropriated 
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for and expended in the construction of any public building 
as aforesaid to three-eighths of one per centum for said serv-
ice." 
This provision was carried into the Supplement to the Re-
vised Statutes, page 166. ' 
These acts of 1869 and 1875, when read together, declare 
that no extra compensation beyQnd one-eighth of one per 
~ent. should be paid to any _one for disbursing, and that the 
total compensation paid to any one for disbursing should not 
exceed three-eighths of 1 per cent. on any public building. 
These acts did not assume to fix the compensation to be 
allowed to disbursing agents, but only to indicate the limits 
heyond which compensation should not go. Under them no 
disbursing officer was permitted to receive more than therein 
\specified. 
It is of course not c~aimed that these acts expressly re-
pealed section 1153, Revised Statutes. I think it is also clear 
that they effect no such repeal by implication. Repeals by 
implication are not favored by the law. These statutes may 
all stand without in any way impinging upon each other. 
!rhey can be read together and full force and effect given to 
each as follows : 
. No compensation shall be allowed to any engineer officer 
for disbursin·g money lqlplicable to any public work about 
the execution of which he is engaged (and the reason for this 
in an engineer's case seems not difficult to find), and no dis-
bursing officer shall receive an extra of more tha.n one-eighth, 
or a total of more than three-eighths of 1 per cent. upon his 
disbursements upon any public building. 
It is not at all certain that the limitations as to the one-
eighth and the three-eighths of 1 per cent. on disbursements 
for public buildings-inasmuch as they are coupled with an 
appropriation in connection with the Treasury Department-
were not intended to apply sole~v to the disbursing agents 
appointed for public buildings by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury under section 255 ; but it is not necessary to consider 
that question. 
It is said, however, that this section 1153 is in Title XIV, 
Revised Statutes, which relates to 1;he "Army," and that, 
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therefore, the phrase" any other public work" in section 1153 
refers only to work in the line of an engineer's duty as an 
officer of tlle .Army. · But its phraseology came from the acts 
of July 5 and July 7, 1838, and do not admit of that narrow 
interpretation. Bestdes, this suggestion loses sight of sec-
tion 5600 of the Revised Statutes, which prohibits inferences 
being drawn from thi~ title. 
That General Casey, while superintending the construction 
of this building, was superintending a "public work," and 
that he was ''engaged about the execution of a public work," 
seem too clear to admit of argument. If a building which 
is being erected to furnish three of the most important state 
departments in the government with headquarters and 
offices for the transaction of executive bus·ness, and rooms 
and vaults for the preservation of governmental archives, 
books, records, and property, is not "a public work," it would 
be difficult to understand what these words mean. 
It seems to me that section 1153, Revised Statutes, con-
trols and disposes of this claim. In any event, the right of 
General Casey to compensation does not seem so clear as to 
justify me in advising its payment. 
It appears to be conceded on all sides that General Casey's 
.services were exceedingly meritorious, and resulted in a 
large saving to the Government; but this consideration, 
while addressing itself with full force to any tribunal having 
discretionary power, can not affect the legal question. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Sf)licitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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FUR SEALS-LEASE OF RIGHT TO TAKE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury derives no authority, under section 1963, 
Revised Statutes, to make a new lease of the right to take fur seals on 
the islands of St. Paul and St. George, in Alaska, until the expiration 
of the existing lease. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 11, 1889. 
Sm: I have the honor ·to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of November 7 in which you ask my opinion 
as to your authority 'to execute a new lease, or contract, giv-
ing the right to take fur seals from the islands of St. Paul 
and St. Georgejn Alaska before the expiration of the present 
lease, whfch occurs on the 30th day of April, 1890. In this 
connection you call my ~ttention to section 1963 of the .Re-
vised Statutes, which provides that-
'' When the lease heretofore made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury to 'The Alaska Commercial Company' of the right 
to engage in taking fur seals on the islands of St. Paul and 
St. George pursuant to the act of July 1, 1870, chapter 169, 
or when any future similar lease expires, or is surrendered, 
forfeited, or terminated, the Secretary shall lease to proper 
and responsible parties, for the best advantage of the United 
States, having due regard to the interests of the Govern-
ment, the native inhabitants, their comfort, maintenance, 
and education, as well as to the interests of the parties here-
tbfore engaged in trade, and the protecti on of the :fisheries, · 
the right of taking fur seals on the islands herein named, 
and of sending a vessel or vessels to the islands for the skins 
of such seal, for the term of twenty years, at an annual 
rental of not less than :fifty thousand dollars, to be reserved 
in such lease, and secured by a deposit of United States 
bonds to that amount ; and every such ·lease shall be duly 
executed in duplicate, and shall not be transferable." 
In your communication you. further inform me that there 
is no expectation that the present lease will be surrendered, 
forfeited, or terminated prior to its expiration by limitation. 
You further say : '' If the execution of a lease for a new 
term of twenty years should be deferred until that date, there 
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would not be time for the lessee to prepare for the season's 
catch of 1890, and serious loss might thereby result to the 
Go\ernment as well as to such lessee." 
I~ seems clear from these statements that the public inter-
est would be subserved had you the power to anticipate the 
expiration of the present lease by making another to take 
effect at the date of such expiration. But the question I am 
called upon to deci.de is not wh<\.t the public interest uemands, 
that being a question for Congress, but what IS your power 
in the premises. Congress, by the enactment of this law. has 
seen fit to invest you with the power to execute this lease or 
contract, and in connection with that grant of power has pre-
...;cribed a limitation as to the time when it may be done. That 
time is when the present lease expires. S1uppose that you 
now execute a new lease or contract, and on or before April 
30, 1890, there should be another Secretary of the Treasury 
who should conclude that a more advantageous contract could 
be made, would your action conclude him 1 Or, suppose you 
should now, or at any time, before the 30th of April, 1890, 
execute such a contract securing an annual rental of, say, 
$75,000 a year, and that on the 30th day of April, 1890, a 
responsible party should ofl'er to take the lease and pay the 
Government $100,000 a year, wo ld you not be bound to ac-
cept the latter and better offer 1 It is well-settled law that 
the donee of a statutory power can only make a valid execu-
tion of such power by a strict compliance with the statutory 
grant (Endli.ch on the Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 353; 
Sedgwick on Construction of the Statutes, econd edition, pp. 
329, 330) This being so, I do not think that under this stat-
ute you can execute the contract in question until the expi-
ration of the present lease. 
While it is not a matter called for by your communication, 
I suggest that probably Congress, if its attention were called 
to this matter, would promptly grant the necessary power to 
enter into a lease far enough in advance to save the ttovern-
ment from loss in the premises. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. !fiLLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
274-VOL XIX--28 
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QUARTERMASTER'S VOLUNTEERS. 
Where one served {n the war of the rebellion in the military organizativn 
known as "Quartermaster's Volunteers," or "Quartermaster's Brig-
ade," and was honorably discharged from the service: Held, that be 
is entitled to the benefit of the proviso in Departmental Rule X of the 
civil service, as one who" served in the military service of the United 
Stat;es in the late war of the rebellion, and was honorably discharged 
therefrom," within the meaning of that rule. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
November· 19, 1889. 
SIR: Your favor, with inclosures, under date of November 
2, instant, submits the ques'tion whether the service of Samuel 
McPherson in what is known as the" Quartermaster's Brig-
ade" or " Quartennaster's Volunteers " was such as would 
entitle him to the benefit of the proviso in Departmental 
Rule X of the civil service. 
That rule is as follows: "Upon requisition of the bead of 
a Dep~rtmet:~t the Commission shall certify for reinstatement 
in said Department, in a grade requiring no higher examina-
tion than the one in which he was formerly employed, any 
person who, within one year next preceding the date of the 
requisition, has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been 
separated from the classified service of that Department: 
Prov·ided, That certification may be made,subjecttotbe other 
conditions of this rule, for the reinstatement of any per~ou 
. who served in the military or naval service of the United 
States in the late war of the rebellion, and was honorably 
discharged therefrom, without regard to the length of time 
he has been separated from the service." 
MePherson seeks to be reinstated under the pr0\7 iso in the 
above rule. The real question, therefore, to decide is, n.ot 
necessarily whether McPherson was ever regularly enlisted 
in the .Army, or was a part of the military establishment of 
the UJ!ited States, but whether he "served in the military 
• • • service of the United States in the late war of the 
rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom," U'ithin 
the meaning of this rule. 
The papers submitted show that be was "captain of Com-
pany K, Seventh Regiment of Quartermaster's Volunteers," 
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and that he performed such military services for the United 
States in the late war as were performed generally by such 
T"olunteers. 
The organizations known as" Quartermaster's Volunteers" 
were first ordered into sen·ice by President Lincoln, Septem-
ber 2, 1862, by Special Order No. 218, section 3 of which is 
as follows: 
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 
AD JUT .A.N'r-G EN ER.A.i.'s OFFICE, 
· "Special Orders, No. 218. 
September· 2, 1862. 
"3. By direction of the President all the clerks and em-
ployes on the public buildings in Washington will be imme· 
diately organized into companies, under the direction of 
Brigadier-General Wadsworth, and will be armed nnd sup-
plied with ammunition for the defense of the capital. 
''By command of Major-General Halleck : 
"E. B. TOWNSEND, 
"Assistant Adjutant- General." 
It appears further that subsequently" directions were given 
by the Secretary of War during the rebellion to enroll the 
employes of the Quartermaster's. Department at various 
places, and to organize them into companies, troops, and regi-
ments; that these directions were carried out, and such em-
ployes were duly enrolled, uniformed, armed, equipped, fur-
nished with horses and accouterments, and were drilled, and 
frequently employed on scouting and other duty, even fight-
ing; that the officers of these organizations were duly com-
missioned, and services were rendered under the command of 
officers of the Army; that they received rations and performed 
service of a military char·acter j * * * that the pay received 
by these men was not the pay ordinarily given soldiers, but 
1 the same received by them when performing cleri~al work 
alone, and was paid from the same appropriation; that they 
were never formally 'mustered in' nor 'mustered out' of the 
service." 
It may be asked, in passing, what difference it makes of 
the question of their service how these men were paid, so long 
as it appears that they were clothed, armed, equipped, and 
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rationed from the army appropriation 1 \Vllat difference doe~ 
it make on the question of serv·ioe whether they were "mus-
tered in" or "mustered out," so long as they were" ordered 
in" and ''ordered out f" There is nothing in Rule X that (at 
least in terms) requires an applicant for reinstatement to have 
been mustered in or out, to have received pay while serving, 
or to have served a long or a short term. All that is required 
in that regard is that he shaH have served. · 
That these men did serve faithfully and well seems to be 
conceded. .Among the papers submitted is the report of the 
Quartermaster-General in 1864~ from which I take the follow-
ing extract: 
" In the last annual report of this office, I had the honor to 
report the service rendered in the field as soldiers, at Nash-
ville, at Jacksonville, and at Washington City, by the Quar-
termaster's Volunteers, a military organization under your 
sanction of the clerks, agents, and operatives of the Quarter-
master's Department at the principal depots. • * * Two 
brigades of these troops, 4,500 strong, were assigned a position 
in the operations of the 15th and 16 of December, 1864, the 
days of the decisive battle of Nashville, and so conducted 
themselves as to meet and receive the approvat of their com-
manders." 
Thus it will be noticed that, during the war, Quartermaster-
General Meigs, in an official report, speaks of them as "sol· 
diers," and their organization as a " militar~· organization." 
Now, taking all the foregoing facts into consideration, were 
not these men, under these circumstances, H serving in the 
military service of the United States f" 
This inquiry, if answered in the negative, brings up sev-
eral very embarrassing questions, not simply to the men 
themselves, but to the President and Secretary of War who 
ordered them to serve, and to the officers who commanded 
and led them in such service. If they were not lawfully 
serving in the military service of the United States, what 
were they doing Y They were enrolled and organized into 
companies, troops, and regiments; they were uniformed, 
equipped, rationed, furnished with United States horses and 
accouterments, and armed with United States guns and 
ammunition; they were led and drilled by Army officers duly 
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commissioned by the United States; they were employed in 
scouting, in fighting, and in other service of a military char-
acter in behalf of the United States. Nor can it be claimed 
that they were not serling in the military service when they 
were engaged side by side with other soldiers on the scout, 
in the trenches, and in the field. Can it be said that when 
they were fighting and killing the enemy in skirmish or bat-
tle they were outside the laws of war~ Were the~e Army 
officers who led them commanding troops and regiments of 
guerrillas and marauders? If they were not in such service, 
then must they not be classed among those described in the 
celebrated General Order of the War Department No. 100, 
who, ''if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of pris-
oners of war, but shall be treated !3Ummarily as highway rob-
bers or pirates~" 
But it is suggested th~t they were not honorably dis-
charged. That these men received formal written certifi-
cates of discharge, such as regular Army soldiers receive 
after being mustered out, I do not understand to be claimed; 
but that they were ordered into the service of the United 
States-that at the close of war, as their services were not 
needed, they were released from time to time from further 
service-honorably released, as ~ppears from these papers, 
does not seem to he questioned. This was certainly an hon-
orable discharge from further service. Whether we say that 
they were honorably discharged, as the word~ are used in 
.Army circles, or that they were honorably released, or that 
their regiments were honorably disbanded, does not seem to 
be very material, under the wording of this rule, so long as 
they were honorably dismissed from the service in which they 
had been compulsorily engaged. 
It is of course plainly apparent that if we give to the 
phrases "military or naval service" and "hClnorably dis-
charged" the restricted meaning they have in Army circles, 
the rule will only cover soldiers who have taken all the formal 
steps of a regular enlistment, service, and discharge. But, 
if we take the whole clause together, we see an apparent 
intent to give a broader meaning to these words than is per-
missible in strict military parlance. If, in place of the words 
" military sen·ice" the word "army" ha<l been used, there 
438 liON. W"' H. H. MILLER 
Quartermaster's Volunteers. 
would be no difficulty in determining the meaning of the rule. 
But the words'' military service" and Hdischarged therPjrom" 
are not as sharp in definition and limitation as the words 
"army" and" discharged therefrom" would have been, and 
the use of the more general aj).d indefinite phrase is indicati \"'e 
of an intent to broaden the meaning. It is believed that 
there were many instances of State troops irregularly in the 
service of the United States in the late war whose rights 
under this rule would not be questioned. Moreover, what 
overriding necessity is there for applying here any strict rule 
of construction 7 This is not a statute; it is a mere ordi-
nance, which can at any time be modified by the President. 
It will also be noticed that the rule only provides as to the 
re-instatement of ~lerks, and not to original appointments; so 
that there are very few persons who can be at all interested 
in this question. My attention has been called to but two ex-
isting cases, and in any event the number must be exceed-
ingly small. The rights and privileges of all old soldiers are 
· protected by statute, and are not aft'ected by any conclusion 
that may be reached here; so that it is not see how the 
question is one of any very great practical importance. 
There is, therefore, believed to be no necessity either in the 
wording of the rule, its purpose, surroundings, or practical 
workings, which calls for a technical interpretation of its 
phraseology. There is no need for any one-eyed-co~struc­
tion here. 
In view of the foregoing, therefore, and especially in view 
of the consequences of any other reading of the rule, I am 
inclined to hold that the Quartermaster's VQlunteers, while 
their position was somewhat anomalous, did "serve in the 
military service of the United States in the late war of the 
rebellion and were honorably discharged from such serviee," 
within the intent of Rule X. 
The inclosures of your letter are herewith returned as re-
quested. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF 'V AR. 
Approved: 
0. W. CH~PMAN, . 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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REOPENING OF SETTLEMENTS. 
P. served as a. cadet at the Military Academy from July 1, 1865, o June 
15, 1869, when he wasa,ppoiuted a second lieutenant, and has ever since 
served as a commissiOned officer in the Army. In February, 18tl4, he 
presented a claim for increased longevity pay under any law allowing 
credit for cadet service, and by settlements made 111 April, !885, he was 
allowed an increas.e commencing from February 24, 1881, on a construc-
tion of law since declared by the Supreme Court, in the case of United 
States v. Watson (130 U. S., 80), to be erroneous. After the decision in 
that case (March 11, ltl89) he filed a claim for longevity pay due under 
said decision: Held that the settlements made in April, 1885, can not 
be reopened upon the ground that they proceeded on a mistaken view 
of the legislation governing the subject involved. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
Novernber 19, 1889. 
SIR: The general question submitted by your communica-
tion of August 22, 1889, riamely, "whether the Comptrollers 
of the Treasury should reopen accounts and claims settled 
by their predecessors on a construction of law since declared 
by the Supreme Court to have been erroneous," is hardly 
within my competency under section 356 of the Revised Stat-
utes of the United States, which declares that ''the head of 
any Executive Department may require the opinion of the 
.Attorney-General on any question of law arising iu the 
administration of his Department." But there is a question 
of law presented in your communication which does arise 
in the administration of your Department: namely: 
In February, 1884, John W. Pullman, captain, assistant 
quartermaster, U. S . .Army, filed a claim for service pay 
"under any and all laws allowing credit for cadet service at 
the United States Military Academy." By settlements Nos. 
6979 and 6980, confirmed April 11, 1885, he was allowed 
$583.09 percentage increase upon said claim, the increase 
commencing February 24, 1881; it being held that prior to 
the act of that date (21 Stat., 346) no allowance for longeY-
ity or percentage increase could be made by computing serv-
ice as cadet at the United States Military Academy. 
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in case of United 
States v. Watson (~larch 11, 1889) he bas filed a claim for all 
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longevity rations and increase pay due under said decision. 
This claim is regarded as an application for a rehearing. 
There was no error in computation in the settlements here-
tofore made, and no newly dfscovered material evidence has 
been filed; hence claimant is not entitled to have his longe,y-
ity account further considered, unless the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the Watson case opens all settlements 
made by the accounting officers upon a different construction 
of the act of July 5, 838 (5 Stat., 258). · 
Captain Pullman served as a cadet from July 1, 1865, to 
June 15, 1869, when he was appointed a second lieutenant 
17'. S. Army, and he has since been continuously, in the 
hervice. 
The question thus presented I may properly consider. 
It is to be observed that my opinion in this matter must be • 
governed by the same general principles that regulate simi-
br transactions on settlements between indi'\idnals; for, as 
the Supreme Court of the United States said in the case of 
.McKnight v. United States (98 U. S., 186), "with a few excep-
tions growing out of considerations of public policy, rules of 
law which apply to the government and to individuals are the 
same. There is not one law for the former aud another for 
the latter." There is nothing that I ca.n see in the case be-
fore me which withdraws it from the control of this genera 
principle. 
If it had happened that Captain Pullman had, through a 
mete mistake of law of the accounting officers of the United 
States, been paid too much, instead of too little, H would seem 
quite clear that the excess could not be reco\yered back~ if the 
principle applicable to a similar case between indh·idual8 
should govern; for the Supreme Court of the United States 
have said that" a voluntary payment, made with a full knowl-
edge of all the facts and circumstances of the case, though 
made under a mistaken view of the law, can not be revoked, 
and the money so paid can not be recovered back." (Lamborn 
v. County Commissioners, 97 U. S., 185). 
It was held by Attor·ney -General Brewster in 1882, in Gen-
eral Swayne's case, that this principle was applicable to set-
tlements between the United States and private individuals. 
General Swayne was entitled to a certain allowance as per-
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eentage increase on his retired pay. But the accounting 
officers of the Government held that as he had contin-
ued to draw pay as a major-general of volunteers after be 
was appointed colonel in the Regular Army and until he 
was regularly mustered out of the service as major-general 
of volunteers, the Government was entitled to set off against 
his demand the difference between the pay of a colonel and 
that of a major-general of volunteers. The Attorney-
General held that" upon principles of administrative policy, 
which ought to be considered firmly established, the settle-
ments between Colonel Swayne and the accounting officers in 
the matter of his pay as a major-general of volunteers are 
conclusive upon the executive department of the Govern-
ment, and can not be reopened in the way indicated." 
In support of this view t,be Attorney-General cites Hedrick's 
Case (16 C. Cls. R., 88), where the Court of Claims refused to 
allow the United States to set off against the claim sued on 
the amount of moneys that had been, from time to time, :paid 
the claimant under a mistaken interpretation of a statute, the 
court holding that the question raised by the set-off must be 
determined by the ordinary principles of law governing indi-
viduals. The same doctrine seems to have been approved by 
.Judge Blodgett in the recent case of T~tthill v. United States 
(Chicago Leg. News, June 8, 1887). 
The principle, that men must be assumed to know the law, 
is indispensable to the administration of government and to 
the finality of settlements made by it and by individuals. 
The ease and truthfulness with which such an excuse as 
ignorance of law could be set up, if permitted, and the diffi-
culty in most cases of disproving it, would introduce insta-
bility and uncertainty into the most solemn transactions. 
It is no less important to the citizen than to the Govern-
ment that this principle should be applicable to settlements 
between him and the Government; for it would be a serious 
public inconvenience if the government could sue the citizen, 
at any distance of time, to recover back moneys which its 
officers had paid to him under some mistake of law, but with 
a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
If ignorance of the law entering into a settlement is to be 
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fatal to such settlement, then almost any settlement made as 
a compromise might be upset. Nothiug is more common 
than concessions made upon oue side and the other resulting 
in a settlement, for the very reason that each party is in 
doubt as to what may be his status in the law, and is willing 
to surrender a part of his claim rather than incur the risks 
and delay of a test of his rights by a judicial examination. 
If, however, a party may thus enter into such a settlement, 
and when, afterwards, the law shall be ascertained to be more 
favorable to him than the view upon which he acted, that 
Rettlement may be wiped out and the parties required to settle 
de novo, the public policy which favors compromises would be 
reversed. It is better that no settlement be made than that 
one be made which is ineii'ectual. 
It is to be observed, furthermore, that if ignorance of law 
could be urged' as a reason for reopening settlements which 
had been deemed closed, cases would sometimes occur when 
differences of opinion among courts and lawyers would make 
it by no means easy to find a satisfactory criterion by which 
to determine whether what was set up as mistake of law was 
such or not. 
If, then, the' principle that every one is assumed to know 
the law can be relied on by the citizen for his defense when 
sued by the Goyernment for an overpayment made to him 
under a mistake of law, it must be conceded that the Go·v-
ernment may equally rely on the same principle as a defense 
when sued by the citizen. For if the principle is to be ap-
plicable at all it must be mutual in its operation; and it is 
more for the benefit of the citizen than the Government that 
it should be so; for while the Government, if the principle 
were otherwise, would always be ready, at any distance of 
time, to refund money paid to it under mistake of law, the 
same can not, for the most part, be said of individuals. 
It follows, therefore, that the settlement in Captain Pull-
man's case can not be reopened upon the ground that it pro-
ceeded on a mistaken view of the legislation governing the 
subject involved. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
,V. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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UNITED STATES COURT FOR INDIAN TERRITORY. 
The United States court for the Indian Territory is not invested with 
authority to appoint commissioners; and hence the accounts of com-
missioners thereby appointed, for issuing writs for the arrest of per-
sons charged with offenses, are inadmissible. 
Such writs are no protection to the marshal for anything he may do 
under them, nor is be entitled to compensation for serving them. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 6, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of November 11, signed by the Acting Sec-
retary, informing me that the First Auditor of the Treasury 
is in l'eceipt of sundry accounts of commissioners, acting as 
such under appointment by the United States court for the 
Indian Territory, for issuing process for the arrest and ex-
amination of persons charged with ofl"enses falling within the 
jurisdiction of that court; also, sundry accounts of the mar-
shal of that court for fees and disbursements incident to 
these proceedings. Upon these facts ;you ask my opinion 
upon two q nestions: 
First. Whether said court possesses the power to appoint 
t:!ommissioners; and, in case the answer shall be in the neg-
ative, then 
Secondly. Whether the marshal is entitled to fees for service 
of process, etc., emanating from said commissioners as de 
facto officers, or is to be reimbursed for witness fees or other 
expenses paid by him under their orders. 
I. lu my judgment United States commissioners are 
purely statutory officers, and any warrant for their appoint-
ment must be found in some United States statute. The act 
organizing the court for the Indian Territory (25 Stat., 783) 
does not, in terms, contain any provision authorizing the ap-
pointment of commissioners. Is such authority to be found 
in any other statute~ 
Commissioners of the circuit courts of the United States 
are appointed under the provisions of section 627, Revised 
Statutes, which reads as follows: 
"Each circuit court may appoint in different parts of the 
district for which it IS held so many discreet persons as It 
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may deem necessary who shall be called ' commissioners of 
the circuit. courts','' and shall exercise the powers which are 
or may be expressly conferred by law upon commissioners 
of circuit courts. 
Section 760 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District 
of Columbia proYides that the supreme court shall possess 
the same power and exercise the same jurisdiction as the 
circuit courts of the United States. Under this act the su-
preme court of the District of Columbia has appointed United 
States commissioners, who exercise all the rights and per-
form all the duties belonging to commissoners of the circuit 
courts. 
Section 6 of the act of Congress passed June 23, 1874 (18 
Stat., 253), giYes to the supreme court of Utah the authority 
to appoint commissioners, who shall haYe and exercise all 
the duties of commissioners of the circuit courts of the United 
States, and also shall have the same powers, as examining 
and committing magistrates, as justices of the peace. 
Section 1910, Revised Statutes, gives district courts of the 
Territories of New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Ari-
zona, Montana, and Wyoming the same jurisdiction as 
United States circuit and district courts. 
The act of January 31, 1877 (19 Stat., 230), confers upon 
the district court of the western district of Arkansas; in ad-
dition to the ordinary power and jurisdiction of district 
courts, jurisdiction of all causes, except _appeals and writs of 
error, which are cognizabl~ in a circuit court, and provides 
that it shall proceed there in the same manner as a circuit 
court. 
The last-named act can hardly be considered as giving 
power to appoint commissioners. It simply adds to the nulll-
ber and kind of cases over which the co·urt has jurisdiction. 
There is no statute conferring upon the Unit~d States 
courts generally the power to appoint commissioners; and 
wherever Congress has granted this authority to other than 
the circuit courts it has been done in express terms, as in 
the case of Utah, where the supreme court is authorized to 
appoint commissioners; or by conferring circuit coU'rt powers 
and jurisdiction upon the supreme or district courts, as in 
the District of Columbia and the Territories above named. 
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It follows that unless the power to appoint commissioners 
in the Indian Territory is expressly conferred upon the court 
there established, or language is used from which the power 
can be reasonably inferred in the statutes establishing the 
United States court for that Territory, then no such power 
exists, and the appointment of commissioners was illegal and 
unauthorized. 
An examination of the law creating tqe court in the Indian 
Territory shows it to be neither a district nor a circuit court, 
but, to a certain extent, it partakes of the characteristics of 
both, and in certain other matters it is unlike either of said 
courts. 
Its authority and jurisdiction are set forth with reasonable 
clearness and certainty. Its territorial jurisdiction is defined. 
The attorney and marshal are appointed by•the President. 
The judge is expressly authorized to appoint the clerk and 
three jury commissioners. His jurisdiction is over all offenses 
against the laws of the United States committed within the 
Indian Territory, not punishable by death or imprisonment 
at hard labor. 
The practice, pleadings, and forms of proceeding are to 
conform as near as may be to the practice existing at the 
time in the courts of record in the State of Arkansas, in lik~ 
cases. The plaintiff is entitled to the same remedies as exist 
under the laws of Arkansas. It also provides that the pro-
visions of chapter 18, title 15, of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States shall apply to said court, so far as applicable. 
By section 16 of the act the judge is granted the same au-
thority to issue writs of habeas corpus, injunctions, man-
damus, and other similar process as exists in the circuit 
courts of the United States. 
There is no provision conferring upon the court the general 
powers or jurisdiction of circuit or district courts. 
The power to appoint commissioners is nowhere given in 
express terms, nor is it included in any of the provisions of 
chapter 18, title 13, referred to and made part of the statute. 
It would be a very strained construction to say that it was 
covered by the sixteenth secUon, under the head of other 
remedial process. 
::\Iy conclusion, therefore, is that the power to appoint com-
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missioners is not found in the ~t creating the court, nor in 
any of the acts referred to therein; that. such power exis:s 
only when it is expressly conferred in terms, or when language 
is used which necessarily implies the right to exercise such a 
power; that neither of these conditions exist in the present 
case, an~, as a consequence, the appointment of commission-
ers was unauthorized and illegal, and they are not entitled 
td compensation for services rendered. 
II. We come, then, to the second question, viz, whether the 
marshal of the Indian Territory is entitled to compensation 
for ser,·ing writs and process issued to him by the commis-
sioner~ so appointed. 
If the marshal, in good faith, in what he conceives to be 
the proper discharge of his duty, receives and senres writs 
issued to him•by the commissioners so appointed, and these 
writs are regular and in due form, it seems inequitable to de-
prive him of pay for st.~rviees rendered. The writ assumes to 
be issued by a commissioner. This" commissioner" ~o actillg 
has been appointed by the court. Is it for the marshal to 
question the legality of that appointment Y 
In the case of Keely v. Sanders (9 Otto, 441) the court says: 
"The law presumes that persons acting in a public office 
have been duly appointed with authority until the contrary 
is shown." In 3 Opinions of Attorney-General, 496, it is 
held that ''where a mars'\lal received in due course of law 
processes of sum~ons and subpcena for the same witnesses, 
it being the usual mode of procuring the attendance of wit-
nesses in the court from which .they issued, and served the 
same as required, be is entitled to his fees for both services, 
on their being allowed and certified by the district judge." 
1\farshalsbave nocontrolover the practice of the courts, nor 
over the kind of process which they may issue; they are 
simply bound as officers of the courts to execute the process 
issued to them. In the ~ase of the United States v. Peralta 
et al. (19 Howard, 343), the court says, on page 347: "We 
have frequently decided that the public acts of public offi-
cers, purporting to be exercised in an official capacity and by 
public authority, shall not be presumed to be usurped, but 
that a legitimate authority had been previously given or sub-
sequently ratified." 
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In the case of Noble & Eastman v. Holrnes (5 Hill, 194:), it i& 
held that: "As a general rule, process regular upon its face 
is sufficient to protect a ministerial officer acting under it, al-
though it m£ty have been issued. \Yithout authority." 
In the case of Ea-rl v. Oarnp, ( 16 Wendell 562), Cowen, J., 
says: ''It is insisted that the plaintiff, being a ministerial 
officer, should be protected by his process, which was fair on 
its face, thougl) the magistrate wanted jurisdiction; and so, 
indeed, he should within the ease of Savecool v. Boughton (5 
Wendell, 170), and various cases decided by this court (.JJlc-
Guinty v. Herrick, 5 Wendell 242, 243; Wilcox v. Smith, id.j 
231; Reynolds v. Moore, 9 id.; 35, 37, per Sutherland; J. Alexan-
der v.Hoyt, 7 id.j 89, Goon v. Oongden, 12 icl.j 406, 499; Roge,rs '· 
Mullin 6 ld.j 597). These cases go to the utmost length and 
the true length in the protection of ministerial officers. The 
law imposes various duties upon them on deliv:ering to them 
the process of the superior or inferior courts, or the warrant 
of officers, to the discharge of which they are absolutely 
bound, provi<led there is jurisdiction ; and though there be a 
total want of such jurisdiction, if it be not apparent on the face 
of the process, the law will not put them to inquire and judge 
of the case. In general ~hey ought not to look beyond the 
process, and in no case need they do so. • • " I take 
it that wherever there is jurisdiction of the process the law 
llleans to make the officer safe in yielding implicit obedience.'' 
In the case of Champaign Cowtty Bank v. William Sntith (7 
Ohio State Reports, 42), it is held that: "The rule in sucL 
cases is, that if a ministerial officer executes any process, 
upon the face of which it appears that the court which issued 
it had not jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the person 
against whom it is directed, such process will afl'ord him no 
protection for acts done under it. But if the subject-matter 
of a suit is within the jurisdiction of a court, but thete is a 
want of jurisdiction as to the person or place, the officer who 
executes process issued in such suit is no trespasser unless 
the want of jurisdiction appears by such process." 
In the case of the State v. Oar-roll (38 Conn., 449), there is 
a very learned and careful discussion of the subject, and the 
~ourt bolus that : " From a general review of the English 
and American authorities upon the point, it appears that a 
definition, in order to be sufficiently comprehensive and ac-
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curate as a general one, must be 'substantially as follows : 
An officer defacto is one whose acts, though not those of a 
lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, 
will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the 
public and third persons, where the duties of the officer were 
exercised: I. Without a known appointment or election, 
but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence 
as were calculated to induce people without inquiry to sub-
mit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he 
assumed to be. II. Under color of a known or valid ap-
pointment or election, but where the officer has failed to con-
form to some precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take 
an oath, give a bond, or the like. III. Under color of a 
known election or appointment, void because the officer was 
not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the 
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or 
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, 
or defect being unknown to the public. IV. Under color of 
an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public un-
constitntionallaw, before the same is adjudged to be such." 
The last-named case seems to carry the doctrine to the ex-
treme limit. But all the authorities above referred to, and 
many others of similar import that might be quoted, are 
based upon the ground that an office exists to which belong 
certain powers and duties, and that certain things are done 
under color of office. But it is another and different question 
where a person assumes to perform certain duties and exer-, 
cise certain powers, when as a matter of fact there is no such 
offic,~ in existence. 
This matter is considered and the distinction made clear 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Norton v. Shelby County (118 U. S. R., 426). 
By a law passed February, 1867, in the State of Tennessee, 
the county court of any county was authorized to subscribe 
to the capital stock of any railroad running through it. In 
March following a law was passed declaring that the powers 
vested in the quarterly court should be vested in a board of 
commissioners created by the act. The board was appointed 
and performed the functions of a county court, and while so 
acting it subscribed to the stock of the 1Iemphis River Rail-
road Company and issued bonds in payment therefor. This 
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board of commissioners so created and so subscribing stock 
and issuing bonds was afterwards declared to be an illegal 
body, and the law creating it was held unconstitutional. The 
question arose as to whether they were de facto officers, and 
as such their subscription to the railroad stock valid and 
binding upon the county. 
The court holds that there may be a de facto officer, but 
never a de facto office. 
Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, 
said: "There must be a legal office in existence, which is 
being improperly held, to give the acts of such incumbent 
the validity of an officer de facto. 
H Numerous cases are cited in which expressions are used 
which, read apart from the facts of the case, seemingly give 
support to the position of counsel. But when read in con-
nection with the facts, they will be seen to apply only to the 
invalidity or unconstitutionality of the mode by which the 
party was appointed or elected to a legally existing office. 
None of them sanctions the doctrine that there can be a de 
facto office under a constitutional government, and that the 
acts of the incumbent are entitled to consideration as valid 
acts of a de facto officer. * "" * None of the cases cited 
militates against the doctrine that, for the existence of a de 
(acto officer, there must be an office de jure, although tllere 
may be loose expressions in some of the opinions, not called 
for by the facts, seemingly against this view.· Where no 
office legally exists the pretended officer is merely a usurper, 
to whose acts no validity can be attached." 
Coming back to the matter under consideration, it follows 
that if there was no such office as that of commissioner in 
the Indian Territory, there could be no commissioner de facto, 
:and all proceedings of the commissioners were void, awl all 
writs issued were the same as if issued by a private citizen. 
They would neither protect the marshal for anything he 
might do under them, nor can he claim compensation for 
serving them. 
Both questions asked by you are therefore answered in the 
negative. 
Very respectfully, 
W. B. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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PAYMEN OF AWARD IN FAVOR OF SAMUEL STRONG. 
By a joint resolution passed July 10, 1888, Congress provided that the 
matters in controversy between S. and the District of Columbia should 
be submitted to the arbitration of three persons to be appointed by the 
President, whose award should be final and conclusive as to such mat-
ters, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury, m case the award 
should be in favor of S., "to pay said award," in the same manner 
that judgments against the District of Columbia are paid when ordered 
by the Court of Clai~s. Arbitrators were duly appointed, who 
awarded 8. the sum of $28,257.3tl with interest from November 10, 1874, 
and the costs of certain suits then pending. Sinee the a rd was made 
suits in equity have been brought against S. in the Supreme Court of 
the Di~:~trict of Columbia by parties claiming as assignees of his claim 
against the District, and injunctions have been issued in these suits 
enjoining him from receiving payment of the award. These suits being 
consolidated, and the court having appointed receivers with power to 
receive payment of the award, the latter now formally demand of th 
Secretary of the Treasury payment of the award to them; S. also de-
mands payment thereof to him ; and his assignees demand that their 
rights as such shall be respected by the Secretary in paying the award: 
.Advised that the Secretary can not properly pay the award to there-
ceivers (inasmuch as he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the said 
court with regard to the fund in question, ancl it is only when pay-
ment is made under the compulsion of an order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction that the party paying is relieved of liability as to the 
money paid); adt•isl'il further that it wonld be improper, under the cir-
cumstances of the cases, for the Secretary to pay it to S., but that be 
should hold on to the fund until the controversy over it between S. 
and his assignees, pending in said court, shall have been closed by a 
decree. 
The case of George H. Giddings (16 Opin., 367) distinguished from the 
present case. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 9, 1889. 
SIR: Your communication of October 7, 1889, asking an 
opinion upon certain questions of law growing out of the claim 
of Samuel Strong against the District of Columbia, brings to 
my attention the following facts: 
For some years lJefore the passage of the joint resolution, 
presently to be particularly referred to, Samuel Strong had 
been engaged in litigation with the District of Columbia, the 
object of which was to recover what Mr. Strong claimed to be 
due him by the District for work and labor done and mate-
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rials furnished by him in and about the construction of cer-
tain public works. 
Congress deeming it advisable to take this litigation out of 
the supreme court of the District, where it had· been and 
would continue to be a serious obstruction to justice as to tlJe 
other litigants in that court, owing to the large amount of 
the time and attention ot the court it required, on July 10, 
18·8, passed ajoint resolution (25 Stat., 1248) entitled" Joint . 
resolution to arbitrate and settle the questions at issue be-
tween the District of Columbia and Samuel Strong." After 
reciting that ''for many years there had been vexatious and 
expensive litigation between the District of Columbia and 
Samuel Strong that is likely to continue for many ~·ears to 
come, inYolving each year additional expense to the parties 
concerned," that "experience shows that matters of account 
so complicated and extensive consume the whole term of the 
court trying the same, to the delay of other causes," aull that 
the interests of the Government and the citizens require that 
such controversies should be ended as speedily and satisfac· 
torily as possible, the resolution goes on to declare (section 1) 
"that the matters in controversy, as shown hy the pleadings 
between the District of Columbia and Samuel Strong, known 
in the circuit court of the District of Columbia as causes at 
law numbered fourteen thousand seven hundred and six 
and fourteen thousand seven hundred and thirty-six, be sub-
mitted to the arbitration of three persons to be appointed by 
the President of the United States, and the award of said 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, shall be final and conclu-
sive as to the matters in iss~e between the parties under the 
pleadings in said causes, * * * and the Secretary of the 
Treasury is hereby directed, should .the award be in favor of 
the said Samuel Strong, to pay said award, when duly certi-
fied to him by the clerk of said court, in the same manner 
that judgments against the District of Columbia are paid 
when ordered by tbe Court of Claims." 
The third section of the resolution provides that before the 
President shall appoint the arbitrators Mr. Strong shall con-
sent in writing to their !1ppointment, and that any award 
made by them, or a majority of them, shall be conclusive, and 
that such consent shall be entered of record in the supreme 
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court in which the cases are pending and shall be certified 
by the clerk of said court to the President of the JJnited States. 
T.his is all of the resolution that seems to have any mate-
rial bearing on the questions submitted. 
The President appointed as arbitrators D. Cady Herrick, 
S. D. Halliday, and Joseph J. Darlington, who, on January 
· 11, 1889, awarded M·r. Strong the sum of $28,257.38, with 
interest from November 10, 1874, and the costs of the suits 
then pending. 
Various assignments of his claim against the District have 
been made by Mr. Strong from time to time, some before the 
date of the award and some since. Mr. Strong bas also 
attempted to revoke and annul all of these assignments and 
the powers coupled with them. 
In the view I take of this case it is quite unnecessary for 
me to wake more special reference to these assignments and 
powers. 
Since the date of the award several suits in equity have 
been brought against Strong and others by Benjamin F. 
Butler and others, claiming as assignees p~ts of Strong's 
claim against the District. Injunctions have been issued in 
these cases enjoining and restraining Strong from receiving 
payment of the award. These suits have been consolidated, 
and on March 2, 1889, the court appointed William F. Mat-
tingly and Andrew B. Duvall receivers with power to receive 
payment of the said award, and these gentlemen have filed 
authentic evidence that they have duly qualified by giving 
the security required by the order appointing them, and they 
formally demanded payment of the award of the Secretary of 
the Treasury on March 14, 1889. 
Strong has demand9d payment of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and his various assignees have also demanded that 
their rights as assignees shall be respected by the Secretary 
of the Treasury in paying the award. 
It is insisted in Mr. Strong's behalf that nothing short of 
paymerrt into his hands, regardless of the right of all others, 
whatever those rights may be, will be a valid discharge of 
the duty imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury by the 
joint resolution of July 10, 1888 (supra). 
It would be naturally supposed, from the position taken by 
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Mr. Strong, that the language of the law on which it is based 
was very special and peculiar. But so far from that being so, 
the law does not even say expressly that the amount awarded 
shall be paid to Strong; it says, "and the Secretary of the 
Treasury is hereby directed, should the award be in favor of 
the said Samuel Strong, to pay said award, when duly cer-
tified," etc., and the question at once suggests itself, whether 
payment of the award to anybody deriving title to it from 
Strong would not be a good payment under the law. Cer-
tainly the words of the law do not seem to me to have the 
€ffect of autl.wrizing payment to Strong and of forbidding 
payment to anybody else elaiming as his assignee, under 
nt:ver so clear a title. It would hardly be contended that if 
Strong were dead his personal representative could not re-
ceivP. payment, or that if he were prevented by some physi-
cal cause from going to the Treasury he might not receive 
payment from the Secretary by the hand of a properly con-
stituted attorney in fact. 
It would be a very unusual, if not unprecedented, thing for 
Congress, in providing a remedy for Mr. Strong against the 
District, to legislate in such a way as to require the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to ignore the rights of Strong's assignees, 
who, to the extent of their assignments, have a better right 
to payment than Strong himself. Congress in this matter 
was providing for the settlement of a controversy between 
Mr. Strong and the District of Columbia, not legislating to 
destroy the assignability or revoke the assignment of a chose 
in action. The language of a statute must be very clear, in-
deed, before such an effect can be given to it. 
I am satisfied that it would be unreasonable to put any 
such meaning on the joint resolution of July 10, 1888. It 
will be observed that this resolution provides for a with-
{ lrawal of the litigation between Strong and the District 
from the supreme court of the District, and establishes a 
special tribunal of arbitrators to determine the matters in 
difference between them. It limits the controversy thus re-
ferred to the special tribunal to Strong on the one part and 
the District on tile otliler, and thus makes it impossible for 
the several parties claiming as assignees of Strong to inter-
vene and become parties to the litigation for the purpose of 
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having the judgment of the arbitrators upon their preten-
sions as assignees of the claim in dispute. Now, I am unable 
to see that there is any show of reason for saying that Con-
gress intended that the Secretary of the Treasury should be 
absolutely bound to place the res in which these several as-
signees claim to be part ownerl3 with Strong in Strong's 
hands by a payment to him of the amount of the award, and 
thus turn their claim as part owners of a fund in the custody 
of the Government into a mere chose in action against Strong, 
to be enforced by an action for money had and received 
against him in any jurisdiction where they might be able to 
find him. If the claims of these assignees are valid, then 
Strong has no right whatever to receive so much of th.e fund 
as is covered by them, and I can not see how his receipt 
could be an acquittance to you to the extent of those claims. 
To hold, as a ground for executive action, that Congress 
intended anything so unjust as to put the property rights of 
these assignees at the mercy of Strong would be to impute a 
motive which would almost look like a reflection on the leg-
islative department of the Government. And it is especially 
incumbent on me to refuse to put this unreasonable inter-
pretation on the joint resolution, in view of the fact that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly declined 
to give full effect to the general language of Congress where 
it would have been harsh or unreasonable or inconvenient to 
do so. (United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. R.; Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. R., 536; Carlisle v. United States, 16 
Wall., 147, 153; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall., 482.) 
Indeed, I am of opinion that not only is it not your duty 
to pay the award to Strong, but that it would be improper 
in you to do so under the circumstances of this case. Suits 
in equity have, as we have seen, been brought against 
Strong by his several assignees, and Strong has been enjoined 
in such suits from receiving payment of the claim. There is 
no question about the jurisdiction of the court as to the vari-
ous property rights involved in the litigation, however it 
may be with regard to the fund itself. Indeed, the questions 
between Strong and his creditors are essentially judicial in 
their character, and can only be properly determined by a 
court of equity. It is manifest that the law has not provided 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 455 
Payment of Award In Favor of Samuel Strong. 
you with adequate means for dealing with any such compli-
cated state of things, and it would, moreover, be unreason-
ab'le, in view of the pending suits, to expect you to turn aside 
from your usual official duties to act as a chancellor for the 
settlement of the di~put es between Strong and his assignees. 
If, therefore, the rights of Strong and his assignees are to 
be adjusted, it can hardly be through you, but should be 
through the judicial depa:-tment of the Government; and, it 
seems to me, it is your duty to all parties concerned to await 
the action of that department in the suits now pending. The 
wilole matter is in tile possession of tile supreme court of 
the District, and your payment of the fund in dispute to 
Strong would not only make all the assignments illusory and 
frustrate the object of the suits, but it would be very much 
like an interference of the Exe utive with the powers of the 
judiciary; for I am unable to see how you could pay this 
money to Strong, when the court has said he silall not receive 
payment of it, without at the same time interfering with the 
undoubted powers of the court-doing what in the case of a 
private individual would amount to a contempt of court. 
Certainly it would seem reasonable that you should treat 
with as much respect tile injunction which binds Strong as 
a court of law would au injunction of a court of equity re-
straining a plainti1f' fromproeeding in au action at law. The 
court at law is no more subject to be restrained by a court of 
. equity than you are as the head of a Department ; but it 
nevertheless respects the injunction as the act of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in order to prevent a failure of jus-
tice in consequence of the inadequacy of its own powers; a 
ground which, as we have seen, may be well taken by you as 
a reason for not disregarding the injunction against Strong. 
The aforegoing observations are believed to be in harmony 
with the long-established usage of the Executive with refer-
ence to the payment of awards of commissioners appointed 
under treaty stipulations to adjudicate international claims, a 
species of tribunal bearing a close resemblance to that con-
stituted by the joint resolution of July 10, 1888. For the 
former, like the latter, being without power to hear and de-
termine questions as to ownership of the claims before them, 
it has always been the custom ofthe Executive, in cases of 
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dispute, to decline to pay sums awarded by these commis-
sions until a court of competent jurisdiction has decided the 
questions of ownership; such at least appears to have be~n 
the practice in cases like the present, where the parties at 
variance are actively litigating their pretensions; awl it is, 
perhaps a defect in our system that Oongre8s has not pro-
vided a way by which the Executive could force conflicting 
claimants to litigate their claims in a proper court, e\en 
though disinclined to do so, and thus avoid dealing with 
questions which it could hardly have intended that the ex· 
ecutiYe department should determine. 
What I have sa.id with regard to your duty to abide thn 
result of the litigation now on foot, seems to be entirel.r sup-
ported by the reasoning of 1\ir. Justice Story in the leading 
case of Comegys v. Vasse (l P. ters, 212) to show that the fact 
that the award of the commissioners, under a certain treaty 
with Spain, directed that the fund in controversy should be 
paid to Comegys & Pettit, tlie assignees in bankruptcy of 
Vasse, was not at all conclusive on Vasse. The learned 
judge said: 
"The object of the treaty was to in,est the commissioners 
with full power and authority to receive, examine and de-
cide upon the amount and ¥alidity of the asserted claims 
upon Spain, for damages and injuries. Their decision, with-
in the scope of this authority, is conclusive and final. If they 
pronounce the claim valid or invalid, if they ascertain the 
amount, their award in the premises is not re-examinable. 
The parties must abide by it, as the decree of a competent 
tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. A rejected claim can not 
be brought again under review, in any judicial tribunal; an 
amount once fixed is a final ascertainment of the damages or 
injury. This is the obvious purport of the language of the 
treaty . . But it does not neces5arily or naturally follow that 
this authority so delegated includes the authority to adju, t 
all conflicting rights of different citizens to the funds so 
awarded. The commissioner8 are to look to the original 
claim for damages and injuries against Spain itself, and it is 
wholly immaterial for this purpose upon whom it may in the 
intermedia· e time ha¥e devolved, or who was the original 
:!.egal, as contradistingaished from t e equitable owner, pro· 
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vi<led he was an American citizen. If the claim was to be 
allowed as against Spain, the present owncrsllip of it, whether 
ilr assignees or personal representati\Tes or bona fide purchas-
ers, was not necessary to be ascertained, in order to exercise 
tlleir functions in the fullest manner. Nor co,uld they be pre-
swned to possess the means of exercising such a broader jnrisdic-
tion ~vith due justice mul e.ffect. They had no authority to compel 
parties asserting conflicting interests to appear and litigate be· 
fore them,; nor to S'lMnmon witnesses to establish or repel such 
interests; and under such circnmstances it cctn not be presumed 
that it was the intention of either government to clothe them with 
an authority so summary and conclusive with means so little 
adapted io the attainment of the ends of a substantial justice. 
The validity and amount of the claim being once ascertained 
by their award, the fund might well be permitted to pass into 
the hands of any claimant; and his own rights, as well as 
those of all others who asserted a title to the fund, be left to the 
ordinary cou1·se of jn.tlicial proceedings in the established courts 
where redress could be adntinistered according to the nature and 
extent of the rights or equities of all the partits. We are there-
fore of opinion tllat the award of the commissioners, in what-
ever form made, presents no bar to the action, if the plain-
tiff' is entitled to tlle money awarded by the commissioners." 
(See also Phelps v. JJfcDonald, 99 U. S. R., 307.) 
Now all that is said here with reference to the want of 
power of the commissioners to adjust tlle conflicting claims 
of parties contending for an amount awarded by them, is di-
rectly applicable to the arbitrators appointed to determine 
the questions at issue between Strong and tlle District of 
Uolumbia. What the learned judge says about the unreason-
ableness of imputing to the parties to the treaty an intention 
to give the commissioners the power to adjudicate such con-
flicting claims, is entirely apposite to the question of the 
intention of Congress with reference to the arbitrators ap-
pointed under the joint resolution of July 10, 1888. 
In .1llilnorv. Metz (16 Peters~ 221) Cougress had passed an act 
''for the relief of Robert 1\Iilnor and John Thompson, order, 
ing the Secretary of the Treasury to pay to them $2, 757.23," 
being the amount of fees due them as gangers at the port of 
Philadelphia. 1\Hlnor applied to the Treasury for his half of 
the amount, and Metz claimed the same half as t:iluor' a -
signee un(lerthe insOl\ent law of Penn yl\""ania; but, as the 
oonrt $tates in its opinion, the department refused to exatniM 
the equities of the parties or look beyond the act of Congress. 
Metz filed his bill enjoining Milnor from receiving the money, 
~d had a decree for a perpetual injunction, and this decree 
of the court below (the circuit court of the District of Colum-
bia) w.as affirmed. 
This case is directly in point, because the perpetual in-
junction granted therein operated upon one of the very par-
ties to whom Congress directed the money appropriated to 
be paid, after determining for itself what was due them by 
the United States, and it may be added that in Phelps v. Mc-
Donald (supra) the court, in referring to this case, say, ''The 
Secretary refused to recognize the claim of either party, and 
left them to adjust the conflict by a judicial tktermination." 
In the :fifth vo1ume of 09neb's Circuit CburtReports will be 
found two cases determined by that court in 1836 and 1837, 
Ridgway v. Bars and Dutith's administf'ator v. Oouf't~ault. 
These eases were bills in equity to restitain ~rtain parties 
from reeE'iving from the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Treasurer of the United States sums of money awarded by 
the commissioners undt~r the treaty with France of July 4, 
1831. Both bills made the Secretary and Treasurer parties 
and prayed injunctions against them. In both cases these 
officers pleaded that they were not amenable to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, but, at the same time, stated in their an-
swers that the money in dh:pute was in · the Treasury of the 
'United States and would be paid "to the parties to whom it 
shall appear that the moneys so awarded are legally and 
equitably due," thus plainly leaving it to the court to say 
who was entitled to the fund in dispute. 
There have been many other similar cases, some of which 
are referred to in the case of Phelps v. McDonald (supra). The 
last case of this kind is Porter v. White, (127 U. S. 235), but 
perhaps the most important one is the case of Spain v. Ham-
ilton's Admr. (1 Wall., 604.) . 
It may then be very properly said that the practice of the 
Executive to lpok to the courts alone to settle dit~putes al-
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ready in litigation between parties claiming the same fund in 
the Treasury is too firmly settled to be shaken. 
My attention has been called by the counsel of ]\{r. Strong 
to the opinion of ~Ir. Attorney-General Devens of July 11, 
1879 (16 Opin., 367), in the case of George H. Giddings, which 
is claimed to be conclusive on the point that payment should 
he made to Strong. 
In that case Congress made an appropriation of a certain 
sum for one Giddings. Persons claiming part of this sum filed 
a bill in the supreme court of this District against Giddings 
and obtained an injunction and a receiver. The question be-
fore the Attorney-General was, whether the warrant for the 
money should be turned over to the receiver by the Post-
master-General, in whose hands it was. The Attorney-Gen-
eral held that the act of Congress was imperative, and left no 
alternative to handing over the warrant to Giddings. 
There are several answers to the argument based on this 
opinion, that it has become as much your duty to pay the 
award to Strong as it was the duty of the Pdstmaster-Gen-
eral to hand over the warrant to Giddings. 
In the first place Congress expressly directed the money to 
be paid to Giddings, whereas, in the case before me there is 
no express direction to p~y the award to Strong, but the di-
rection is to pay the award if it shou1d be in favor of Strong; 
language which, it is more than probable, was suggested by 
the fact that Strong had made assignn1ents of his claim and 
might not be entitled to receive the whole or any part of any 
award that might be made in his favor. 
In the second place the Attorney-General seems to have 
had sufficient before him to satisfy his mind that Congress 
had canvassed the whole subject involved . in · the bill in 
equity; and, by directing the money to be paid Giddings, 
had practically decided that he alone was entitled to the sum 
appropriated; for it must have been on that ground that the 
Attorney-General used the language that "this is already a 
res adjudicata by the body which had the control of granting 
or withholding the appropriation." 
In the third place it is stated in the opinion that '' un-
doubtedly instances can be imagined where it would be con-
venient to have the aid of the judicial system in order to test 
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the various a oonfiicting rights of parties who may have 
op sing claims ltefore a Department to the same fund, and 
cases may be conceived where it would be advisable to delay 
the decision of the Department until the views of the cou~ts 
were known as to legal questions; but it can not be ad-
itted as a principle that comity requires that Departmental 
oftleers should wait unti1 courts have made adjudications of 
those questions which are submitted by law to Departmental 
direction." 
Now, it may be reasonably assumed that cases of the 
complexity and difficulty of the one between Strong and the 
various persons claiming to be his assignees must have been 
among the cases the Attorney-General bad in view when he 
used the language just quoted. 
I may say, furthermore, that while it does not appear in 
what way the person contesting Gidding's right to receive 
the warrant set up an inte est in it, the claim represented by 
the warrant was ill its origin an unliquidated claim against 
the United tea and unassignable, and this fact may have 
had more or less weight tk the Attorney~General, although 
he says nothing about it. It can not, therefore, it eems to me, 
~ said that this opinion of my predecessor militates at all 
.,gainst the aforegoing reasoning to show that the questions 
between Strong and the other claimants of the fund should 
be left to the judicial department of the Government, where 
alone they can be aiisfactorily determined and justice can 
be done to the parties. 
There can be no doubt, as I have already said, that the 
jurisdiction of the supreme court of this District is complete 
over the questions and the parties involved as matters now 
stand. The fact that the fund in the Treasury is beyond the 
control of the conrt is immaterial. That jurisdiction over the 
res is not necessary to a determination by that court of the 
questions involved is shown in Phelps v. McDonald (supra) in 
which the court says: 
"Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity, 
it is immaterial that the ru of the controverey, whether it 
be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial juris-
diction of the tribunaL It has the power to compel the de-
fendant to do all things necessary according to the lex loci 
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rei sitce, which he could do \Oluntarily, to give full effect to 
the decree against him. Without regard to the situation of 
the subject-matter, such courts consider the equities between 
the parties, and decree in personam according to those equi-
ties, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in per-
sonam," citing authorities. 
~nd to show that what is thus laid down is in harmony with 
long-established practice in this District, I may refer to the 
following remark of ~fr. Justice Wylie in .Jicllianus v. Stand-
ish (1 Mackey, 152), which was atso a suit to settle disputes 
as to a fund in the Treasury, namely : · 
"I think, also, that our own practice-the practice of this 
court as far back as my memory goes-has been a 1tnifor1n 
course of decision in favor of the }'urisdiction of the court, 
where it had the parties before it, and beyond that point we 
need not go, and we do not propose to go, in this case." 
This disposes of all the questions submitted, so far as you 
are concerned, with exception of the one as to whether you 
can safely pay the award to the receivers, Messrs.l\fattingly 
and DuvalL' It is a cogent circumstance against the applica-
tion of the receivers that in none of the cases above cited was 
a receiver so much as asked for, and I do not think a case can 
be found where payment was made by the Treasury to a re-
ceiver. Nor is it remarkable that it should be so; for, as 
payment to a receiver is for the protection of the fund by 
delivering it from thH hazard of the debtor's insolvency, it 
is not easy to see how any such reason could operate where 
the United States is the debtor or the holder of the fund in 
dispute. As a general thing it would be the wish of litigants 
that the Government should hold the fund while the litiga-
tion over it is gomg on. In no other hands could it be so 
safe. 
I am of opinion that you could not properly pay the award 
to the receivers. To make payment to a recei-ver a protec-
tion, the debtor or stakeholder paying mm~t be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court under whose authority the receiver 
claims to act; otherwise the payment would he a purely 
voluntary one, for which the debtor or stakeholders might be 
held accountable by any person having an interest in the 
fund and not a party to the order under which the receiver 
462 HON. 0 W. CHAPMAN 
Payment of Award In Favor of Samuel Strong. 
accepted payment. It is only when payment is made nuder 
the compulsion of a decree or order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction that the party paying is relieved of further lia-
bility as to the money paid. 
But as you are not subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme 
court of this District with regard to the fund in question, as 
is conceded on all hands, it is clear to my mind that you can 
not pay this money to the receivers~ and thus, by your own 
voluntary act, devolve on others a trust which the law has 
committed to your hands alone. When Congress made it the 
duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the award, it 
meant that he should pay it to the party or parties to whom 
it belonged, and not otherwise. It would be to take a great 
liberty with the language of the joint resolution to hold that 
it authorized you to pay the award to any one but the party 
or parties ascertained to be the owners of it at the time of pay-
ment. 
It is impossibl~ for you to know whether the parties to the 
order under which the reaeivers mak~ their demand repre-
sent all the interests that will be claimed in the fund by the 
time the final decree shall have been entered, or whether, 
when payment shall be demanded hereafter, on the faith of 
such decree, the decree will be found to be binding on all the 
claimants on the fund. Without admitting, therefore, the 
right of the courts, either as matter of law or comity, to direct 
or at all interfere with the payments of money or the dis-
charge of other administratiVe duties imposed on you by law, 
my advice is that you hold on to the fund until the contro-
versy shall have been closed by a decree. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CUSTOMS SERVICE-SUSPENSION FROM DUTY A.ND PAY. 
K., a regularly appointed weigher in the customs sen·ice, was, on April 
4, 1889, suspended from duty and pay by the collector, under article 
1371 of General Regulations of 1884, pending the action of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury upon a recommendation of the collector for the 
removal of K. On May 23, 1889, the Secretary removed K., who re-
ceived notice thereof on May 29, 1889. K. claims compensation as 
weigher for the period fromApril4 to May 29. Advised, that payment 
of the claim be declined until it shall have been judicially det.ermined 
that he is entitled thereto. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 13, 1889. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a let-
ter from the Acting Secretary, under date of November 18, 
ultimo, inclosing two duplicate vouchers of T. B. Kennett, 
dated September 20, 1889; also letter from the collector of 
customs at San Francisco of the same date, to the Secretary 
of the Treasury; also a letter of the Commissioner of Cus-
toms under date of November 9, ultimo, with a request for 
an opinion upon several questions suggested. 
The only question presented by the papers that is not 
hypothetical arises upon the following statement of facts 
given by the Commis.sioner of Customs, to wit: 
" Mr. Kennett was on April 4, 1889, a regularly appointed 
weigher in the customs service at the port of San Francisco, 
·Cal., at an annual salary of $2,000 per annum. On that day 
the col1ector of customs, acting under article 1371 of the 
regulations of 1884, suspended him from duty and pay, pend-
ing his recommendation to the Secretary for Mr. Kennett's re-
moval. On May 23, 1889, the Secretary did remove him, 
and Mr. Kennett appears to have received notice of such re-
moval on the29thdayofl\fa.r, 1889. He now claims that there 
is due him $297.20 from April 5 to May 29, 1889, both in-
clusive." 
The 'l'reasury regulations specifically applying to thesub-
ject ''Vacation of office" are given on page547 ofthe General 
Regulations under the customs and navigation laws of 1884, 
and are as follows : 
"Art. 1367. Offices in the customs service are vacated by 
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resignation, removal, death, and expiration of t~rm of serv-
ice. (R. S 1767.) 
''Art. 1368. Principal officers of customs are removable by 
the President, with the consent of the Senate of the United 
States. (R. S., 1767.) 
"Art. 1369. Subordinate officers of customs are removable-
by the Secretary of the Treasury for cause. 
"Art. 1370. The names of subordinate officers whose re-
moval is deemed necessary or proper are to be reported to 
the Secretary of th~ Treasury with a full statement of the 
causes determining the removal. 
"Art. 1371. In cases of urgency a subordinate may be sus-
pended from duty and pay, pending the action of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury upon the recommendation for his ·re-
moval." 
The above article, No. 1371, was evidently intended to pro-
vide a prompt remedy in cases of insubordination or emer-
gency, which could not be acted upon immediately by the 
Secretary himself, and yet which required immediate action 
of some kind to be effective. It will readily be seen that in 
cases like that af the collector at San Francisco, so far away 
from the seat of Government, the power contemplated is im· 
portant, and, indeed, at times almost indispensable as a 
messure of discipline. Even, if rarely exercised, the mere 
possession of the power to suspend, upon infraction of duty, 
will exercise a wholesome restraining influence, and will nat-
urally tend to promote obedience, orderly administration, and 
such loyalty as is essential to an energetic and efficient Aerv-
ice. But, on the other hand, if the effect of such suspension 
is to relieve from service, and still give full pay, then a pre-
mium is offered npon disobedience and disloyalty. 
Whether this rule is so phrased as to accomplish the 
desired object may be a matter of some doubt, but I as~ume 
that Mr. Kennett accepted his place under this regulation 
with knowledge of its meaning and object, and there is no 
sufficient reason shown in the papers submitted why he 
should not be held to its provisions as having assented to its 
terms. It is quite possible that, upon any trial involving the 
right to recover pay during suspension, facts may be shown, 
independent of the rule, which will materially affect there-
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suit; but, in the absence of qualifying facts, the necessity for 
some such rule, especially if understood and assented to by 
an appointee, seems to furnish reasonable ground for believ-
ing that the courts will uphold it. 
My opinion, therefore, is that you should decline to pay 
i\Ir. Kennett's claim until the court, after taking cognizance 
of all the facts, shall have decided that he is entitled to it. 
I am induced to advise this course for the further reason 
that the question is one so important to the proper discipline 
in and efficient administration of your Department that its 
final judicial detArmination is exceedingly desirable. 
Your inclosures are herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. n·:a. MILLER. 
TIMBER CUT ON FOND DU LAC RESERVATION. 
The questions submitted being unaccompanied by a statement of the 
facts upon which they arise, no opinion is expressed thereon. 
DEP ART.MENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 23, 1889. 
SIR: I have e honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communi~atiou, with inclosures, under date of December 13, 
instant, in which you request an opinion upon the question 
"presented by the Com missioner as to the disposition" by 
your Department of certain timber referred to by the inclo~­
ures. The question is also asked, in case my opinion shall 
be that the timber can be disposed of by your Department, 
"whether the Indians can be compensated out of the pro-
ceeds thereof for the work of banking said timber." 
The question asked by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
is as follows : 
''Can the Indian Agent at the La Pointe Agency, Wiscon-
sin, under instructions fr~m the Indian Office or Department 
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of the Interior, dispose of and give a valid title to the pine 
timber cut on the Fond Du Lac Reservation, Minnesota, by 
Patrick Rynes and Andrew Gowan, or their agents or em-
ployes, during the season of1888-1889, and now lying in the 
woods or on skids, on said reservation, and not embraced in 
any suits now pending iJJ the courts between the United 
States and said parties, or either of them f" 
In reply thereto I would say that there is no statement of 
facts made, either in your letter or in ~he inclosures, upon 
which a legal opinion can be based. 
This Department has uniformly declined to find the facts. 
The facts must be stated by the Department asking for the 
opinion. This bas been the rule, at least, ever since the year 
1820. (See 1 Opin., 346; 3 Opin. 309; 5 Opin. 626; 10 Opin. 
267; 12 Opin. 206.) 
The question of law asked by the Cotnmissioner turns upon 
the question of fact, whether the United States is the owner 
and os e d of ihe 'mber referred to. The letter of the In-
dian agent, which yon inclose, assumes that the United 
States is the owner. The letter of the Commissioner asserts 
that that question is still in suit and undetermined. Your 
letter gives no statement of facts whatever, so that there is 
nothing to indicate exactly how the facts are. If the timber 
belongs to t.he United States, I see no reason why the offi-
cers of the United States have not the right to dispose of it, 
and to employ any proper agencies in aid of such disposition. 
I have, however, inclosed a copy of your papers to the 
United States attorney for the district of Minnesota, with 
a request that be furnish me at once a statement as to the 
condition of affair~ in connection with the matter, which, 
when received, will be sent to you. 
Very respectfully, 
0. W. CHAPMAN, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MffiLEB. 
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GREAT SIOUX RESERVATION. 
The appropriation made by section 25 of the act of March 2, 1889, chap-
ter 405, to be applied and used towards surveying the Jaucls therein 
described as being opened for settlement, does uot lJecome availalJle 
until acceptance lJy the different bands of Sioux Iuuiaus of the terms 
of that act as provided in the twenty-eighth section thereof. 
That act takes effect when, as matter of fa0t, the consent of the Indians 
thereto bas been obtained. The proclamation issued under the pro-
visions of section 28 of the act is only designed to be a public evidence 
of such consent. 
DEP .A.RTJI.fENT OF JUSTICE, 
J anua'ry 4, 1890. 
SIR: There have been submitted to me through Mr. As-
-sistant Attorney-General Shields for opinion two questions, 
as stated by you : 
First. ''Whether the money appropriated by section 25 
·of the act of :March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 893), can be used before 
the acceptance of the Indians is made known by procla-
mation by the President of the United States, a~ provided 
in section 28 of said act. 
Seconu. "Whether, if upon the report of the commission it 
appears that the acceptance and consent have been obtained 
of the Sioux Nation as provided, tlle act will take effect 
thereupon, or only upou proclamation of that fact; that is, 
whether the proclamation is essential to the act t<::Lking effect 
-aside from the fact being mentioned in the report." 
The twenty-fifth section of that act reads as follows: 
"That there is hereby appropriated the sum of one hun-
dred thousand dollars out of any money in the Treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, or so much thr.reof as may be 
necessary, to be applied and u~ed towards s1trveying the lands 
herein described as being open for settlement; said sum to be im-
mediately available; which sum ~:~hall not be deducted from 
the proceeds of lands disposed of under this act." 
Section ~8 reads as follows: 
"That this act shall take effect only upon the acceptance 
thereof and consent thereto by the different bands of the 
Sioux Nation of Indians, in manner and form prescribed by 
the twelfth article of the treaty between the U uited States and 
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said Sioux Indians, concluded April twenty-ninth, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-eight, which said acceptance and consent 
shall be made known by proclamation by the President of the 
United States, upon satisfactory proof presented to him that 
the same has been obtained in the manner and form required 
by said twelfth article of said treaty; which proof shall be 
presented to him within one year from the passage of this 
act ; and upon failure of such proof and proclamation this act 
becomes of no effect and null and void." 
Section 29 reads as follows : 
''That there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in 
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of twenty-
five thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be neces-
sary; which sum shall be expended under the direction of the 
Secretary of the Interior, for procuring the assent of the 
Sioux Indians to this act provided in section twenty-seven." 
It will be observed by the reading of section ~8 that the 
taking effect of the act generally is made to depend upon the 
assent of the Indians to the terms of the act, and that in the 
event of the failure of the negotiations to that end the act is 
to be null and void. This is the plain meaning of the twenty-
eighth section, and must be given effect, unless to do so 
would be to thwart the manifest purpose of the act. 
It is too clear for discussion that section 29 was designed 
~o be operative, notwithstanding these provil::iions of section 
28; for it would be absurd to suppose that Congress pre-
pared and passed this long act, and at the very end appro-
priated a sum of money for defraying the expenses of the 
negotiations necessary under the act, and yet by reason of 
earlier provisions in the act made that appropriation invalid. 
Indeed, upon the well known rule that where there are con-
flicting provisions in a statute the ast shall prevail (Whar-
ton's American Law, sec. 628), this twenty-ninth section 
would be operative, even were the reasons for supporting 
such construction less conclusive than they are. But the 
same considerations do not demand that the appropriation 
in section 25 shall be held to be available independently of 
the result of the negotiations. Indeed, from the reading of 
the act it does not appear to me that it was the purpose of 
Congress that the survey mentioned in section 25 should 
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be made unless the assent of the Indians to the act should be 
obtained. There are many reasons why, so long as these 
lands should remain in the occupation and control of the In-
dians as a part of their reservation, such surveys should not 
be made. The making of such surveys, and the fixing of the 
necessary monuments as landmarks, would naturally be re-
garded by the Indians as an evidence of the purpose on the 
part of the Government at no remote time to take possession 
of the lands, and would tend to excite bad feeling, if not 
actual hostility. Under such circumstances there would be 
no assurance that landmarks so established might not be 
changed or obliterated; and it is quite certain that the fact 
that surveys had been made by the Government would be 
regarded by lawless white men, always to be found in such 
localities, as an excuse for trespassing upon the Indian lands. 
Moreover, there was in the nature of the case no necessity 
for making such surveys before the assent of the Indians to 
the terms of the act should be obtained. 
It is suggested that Congress knew that upon proclama-
tion of the President these lands would be restored to the 
public domain and be opened for settlement, and that white 
settlers would rush in and take possession; and unless the 
JandE', herein described as being open for settlement were 
carefully designated by surveys, little heed would be paid to 
the proper boundaries of the several reservations contained 
in the act, and the result would be numerous conflicts betwee:d 
the whites and Indians, and complications would arise which 
would be detrimental to the peace and comfort of both In-
dians and whites. The answer to this suggestion is phin. 
It does not at all follow that these lands are to be- opened 
for settlement immediately after the proclamation referred 
to in section 28 shall be issued. 
A settler upon unsurveyed public lands acquires no rights 
therein (Buxton v. Traver, 130 U. S. R., 232). Moreover, it 
has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court that the 
President has the power to reserve and withhold any part of 
the public lands, even after survey, from settlement, and 
that such reservation by the President prevents any settler 
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man, 101 U. S. R., 759; Williams v. Baker, 17 Wall., 144; 
Walcott v. Des Moines Go., 5 Wall., 681.) 
Such being the law, I am unable to see that the issuing of 
the proclamation would afford any excuse for settlers enter-
ing upon these lands, and, therefore, I see no ground to ap-
prehend the evil consequences above sugge~ted as likely to 
result from a proclamation before a survey ; and I can not 
believe that it was the purpose of Congress to make this ap-
propriation of $100,000 a\·ailable, and to have the same ex-
pended in making surveys, before there was any assurance 
that the rights of the Indians in the land would be extin-
guished, and the full title acquired by the Government. 
I think it plain tuat it was the purpose of Congress 
that this act should take efl'ect when the negotiations pro-
vided for should result in the consent thereto by the differ-
ent bands of the Sioux "Nation of Indians. When such con-
sent should be obtained the contract would be complete. 
This act is the proposition tendered to the Sioux Indians by 
the Government of the United States; their consent is the 
acceptance of that proposition. When that consent is given 
the contract is binding upon both parties, and the procla-
mation is only to be issued as a public evidence of that con-
tract. The proclamation does not consummate the contract; 
it simply evidences it. The language is: "That ~aid accept-
ance and consent (of the Indians) shall be made known by 
p;oclamation of the President of the United States, upon 
satisfactory proof presented to him that the same has been 
obtained in the manner and form required by said twelfth 
article of said treaty." 
My opinion, therefore, is that the act takes efl:ect when, as 
matter of fact, the consent of the Indians to the act has been 
obtained, and that while the proclamation should be promptly 
issued upon the presentation of said proof, the vitality of the 
act is not suspended awaiting such proclamation. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
. 
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CASE OF PRIVATE JAMES BELL. 
B., while a private soldier, received a certificate of merit from the PreRi-
dent for distinguished services, which entitled him, under section 1285, 
Revised Statutes, to "additional pay at the rate of $2 per month." He 
was discharged as such private soldier, and thereupon enlisted as a 
"general service messenger," agreeably to the provisions of the act of 
Jnly 29, 1886, chapter 810: Held, that be is not entitled, as snch general 
service messenger, in addition to the compensation provided ::'or in that 
act, to the $2 per month provided for in said section 1285. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J amtary 8, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of December 24th last, wherein you ask my 
opinion whether nuder the act of Uongre~s approved July 
29, 1886 (24 Stat., 167), a private soldier, James Bell, who has 
become a "general servic~ messenger," is entitled to be paid, 
in addition to the monthly pay of $GO per month provided 
for in that act, the further sum of $2 per month additioual 
pay provided for in section 1285 of the Revised Statutes. 
The act of Congress above referred to, authorizing the ap-
pointment of "general service messengers," provides that 
such messengers "shall be paid at the rate of $60 per month; 
and all of such men shall be mustered for pay monthly the 
same as enlisted men, and shall receive no other compensation, 
pay, or allowance, except when on duty, when necessity re-
quires, they shall each be allowed for subsistence one ration 
in kind to be issued by the Commissary Department." 
Section 1285 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows : 
"A certificate of merit granted to a private soldier by' the 
President, for distinguished services, shall entitle him to ad-
ditional pay, at the rate of two dollars per month, while he 
remains continuously in the service; and such certificate of 
merit granted to a private soldier who served in the war with 
Mexico shall entitle him to such additional pay, although 
he may not have remained continuously in the service." 
I understand from your statement of facts that Private 
James Bell, prior to the time when he was appointed such 
''general service messenger," bad received the certificate of 
merit granted by the President, entitling him to such addi-
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tional pay of $2 per month; and that on the 31st day of uly, 
1886, be was discharged as such private soldier to enable him 
to enlist as a '' general service messenger." 
There is much force in the suggestion that we ought not 
to suppose that it was the purpose of Congress to take 
away from a private soldier the reward provided by statute 
for his distinguished services, and were the statute less clear 
and specific in its language I should be disposed to adopt 
this view ; but section 1285 characterizes this $2 per month 
as additional pay, and the act pro\iding for "general service 
messengers" says that such messengers shall receive no 
other compensation, pay, or allowance, except in the specific 
case named. It seems to me there is no room here for con-
struction, whatever may be thought of the wisdom or policy 
of the enactment depriving this soldier of the reward of his 
gallantry. It is sufficient for me, my duty being to intez:pret 
and not to make laws, that so the iltatute is written. In my 
opinion Private James Bell, having become a "general serv-
ice messenger," is not entitled to the additional pay pre-
scribed by section 1285. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL. 
Upon consideration of articles 24, 43, and 44 for the government of the 
Navy (sec. 1624, Rev. Stat.): Held, that there may be two arre8ts, 
namely, (1) an arrest in an emergency, or upon disco\·ery of the al-
leged wrongdoing, with a view to a preliminary examination, and, if 
necessary, the formulation and specification of charges; (2) an arrest 
for trial: held, further, that article 43 in the provision declaring that 
~' t~e person accused shall be furn is heel with a true copy of the charges, 
with the specifications, at the time he is put under arrest," bas refer-
ence to the arrest for trial, and not to the arrest in the first instance. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Janum·y 18, 1890. 
SIR: I have your communication of January 6, wherein 
you ask my opinion on the following question, namely: 
"Whether the provisions of articles 43 and 44: of section 
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162-!, Revised Statutes, contemplate that a person accused 
shall be furnished with a true copy of the charges, with the 
specifications, at the time of his apprehension or arrest as a 
preliminary to an investigation of the complaints against 
him, to determine whether or not there shall be a trial; or at 
the time when, after such preliminary investigation, the con-
vening authority, having decided to convene a general court-
martial for the trial of the case, places the accused under ar-
rest for trial." 
Section 1624 of the Revised Statutes provides: 
''The Navy of the United States shall be governed by the 
following articles." 
Thereupon follow sixt.y articles, including numbers 43 and 
44 referred to in your question. 
The matter under consideration in articles 43 and 44, as 
well as in the articles preceding and following, is the subje t 
.of naval courts-martial. 
Article 24 reads as follows : 
"No commander of a vessel shall inflict upon a commis-
sioned or warrant officer any other punishment than private 
reprimand, suspension from duty, arrest, or confinement~ and 
such suspension, arrest, or confinement shall not continue 
longer than ten days, unless a further period is necessary to 
bring the offender to trial by a court-martial; nor shall he 
inflict, or cause to be inflicted, upon any petty officer or per-
son of inferior rating, or marine, for a single offense, or at 
any one time, any other than one 'of the following punish-
ments." 
(Here follows a list of the punishments.) 
Articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 provide for the con-
vening~ organization, and conduct of general courts-martial. 
Then follows article 43, which reads as follows: 
"The person accused shall be furnished with a true copy 
of the charges, with the specifications, at the time he is put 
under arrest ; and no other charges than those so furnished 
shall be urged against him at the trial, unless it shall appear 
to the court that intelligence of such other charge bad not 
reached the officer ordering the court when the accused was 
put under arrest, or that some witness materia] to the sup-
port of such charge was at that time absent and can be pro-
474 RON. W. H. H. MILLER 
~aval Court-llartial. 
duced at the trial; in which case reasonable time shall be 
given to the accused to make his defense against such new 
charge." 
Article 44 reads as follows : 
"Every offic~"r who is arrested for trial shall deliver up his 
sword to his commanding officer and confine himself to the 
limits assigned him, on pain of dismissal from the senTice." 
Yo!Jr communication states that your question is asked 
with reference to the case of an officer who was tried before 
a naval general court-martial, upon charg~s of" disobedience 
to orders, disrespect toward the acting Secretary of theN avy ," 
and "disrespect to the Secretary of the Navy," found guilty, 
and dismissed from the service. You further state that when 
arraigned for trial he interposed as a plea to the jurisdiction 
of the court the fact that he had not been furnished with a 
copy of the charges aml specifications against him at the time 
of his original arrest; but I infer from your communication 
that they were furnished him at the time he was formally ar-
rested for trial, though he had been in confinement for some 
time previous to that time. 
In construing statutes, the purpose of their enactment and 
the evils to be remedied mr:st be considered. The general 
purpose of section 1624 was, by the enactment of proper reg-
ulations or articles of war, to promote the efficiency an<l dis-
cipline of the ~avy. 
It is a matter of most common information that it h; es-
sential to such efficiency ·and discipline that a comman(ling 
officer shall have the right and the power promptly, by ar-
rest and otherwise, to enforce obedience to orders and fidelity 
to duty. To this end article 24 recognizes the right of such 
commander to reprimand, suspend from duty, arrest, or con-
fine the delinquent inferior officer, and recognizing such right 
puts limitations thereon. That such a power in a command-
ing officer is essential is too plain for argument, and I do not 
understand that it is denied. It is, however, insisted that 
consistently with article 43 no person arrested under arti-
cle 24, even though it should be for disobedience of orders, 
cowardice, or any other breach of discipline in the face of 
the enemy, or in the midst of a battle, could afterward be 
tried for the offense for which such arrest was made, unless 
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''at the time" of such arrest he were furnished with a copy 
of the charges and specifications upon which it was after-
ward proposed to try him. To so hold would be to impute 
to the law-making power a purpose at variance with what 
we are bound to presume was in view in enacting this statute. 
Construing articles 24, 43, and 44 together, it is, in my opin-
ion, clear that there may be two arrests; :first, an arrest in an 
emergency, or upon the discovery of the alleged wrongdo-
ing, with a view to a preliminary examination, and if neces-
sary the formulation and specification of charges; and, sec-
ond, in the language of article 44, " an arrest for trial." I 
think it equally clear that article 43, providing that "the 
.verson accused shall be furnished with a true copy of the 
charges, with the specifications, at the time he is put under 
arrest," has reference to the second. and formal arrest for 
tri<tl, as referred to in article 44. This, moreover, is fortified 
by the reason which underlies the requirement that these 
charges and specifications be furnished . What is that rea-
son ~ It is the same which requires a defendant on trial, in 
a civil court, to be furnished with a copy of the indictment 
against him, namely, that he may know what charges he is 
required to meet, and may have an opportunity to make 
preparation. To this end it is in no way essential that he 
shall have a copy of the charges at the time of his original 
arrest, but it is essential that he shall have them a reason-
able time before he is put upon trial; and this right is se-
cured him by the construction which gives him the charges 
aud specifications when he is arrested for trial. Of course, 
should he show that the time intervening between the fur-
nishing of such charges and specifications and the time 
when he is called upon to plead has not been of reasonable 
length he would be entitled to a postponement; but that 
would be a question going to the fairness of the trial, and 
not to the jurisdiction of the court. 
The conclusion which has been reached is fortified by the 
language of article43. That language is not that the accuied 
shall be furnished with a copy or a statement of the com-
plaint against him, at the time of his arrest, but with a H true 
copy of the charges with the specifications "; using language 
which implies that the charges have been prepared with all 
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the care and formality of an indictment; language utterly 
inconsistent with the idea that the accused is entitled to them 
at the time of his original arrest. 
There is no more urgent reason why a naval officer put in 
arrest should, at the time, be given a copy of the charges and 
specifications against him than in the case of an army officer; 
yet article 71 of section 1242, Revised Statutes, provides that 
in case of an arrest of an army officer a copy of the charges 
shall be served upon him within eight days after his arrest. 
I have no doubt that both the spirit and the letter of the ar-
ticles for the government of the Navy require that a copy of 
such charges and specifications be furnished within a rea-
sonable time after the first arrest; and what would be such 
reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each 
case. Whether they were so furnished in this particular case, 
or whether the convening of the court-martial was too long 
delayed, are questions with which I have nothing to do. It 
would seem, however, that, in any event, those objections 
would go only to the regularity of the proceedings-not to 
the jurisdiction of the court. But, waiving that point, all I 
am called upon to decide is whether article 43 of section 1624 
is imperative in the requirement that the person accused 
shall be furnished with '' a true copy of the charges, with the 
specifications, at the time he is put under arrest " in the first 
instance, and that question, in my opinion, should be an-
swered in the negative. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MIL~ER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
PARDON. 
The President has power to grant a pardon to a prisoner undergoing 
punishment for a contempt of court. 
DEPARTME-NT OF JUSTICE, 
January 30, 1890. 
Sm : I have examined the question made by you as to your 
power to grant a pardon to a prisoner undergoing a sentence 
for contempt of court. I find that the existence of such a 
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power has been affirmed in opinions by several of my prede-
cessors, as follows: First, by ~Ir. Gilpin (3 Opiu., 622); sec-
ond, by J.Vlr. Mason (4 Opin., 458); third, by lVIr. Crittenden 
( 5 Opin., 579). 
I also find that the same thing has been adjudged by the 
United States circuit court (17 Blatchford, 230); also, by the 
supreme court of Mississippi in ex parte Hickey (12 Miss., 75). 
It bas been decided over and over again that contempt of 
court is an offense against the United States. 
I think, therefore, so far as the existence of your power is 
concerned, there need be no hesitation to act in the premises; 
indeed, I know beyond question that the power exists. 
I return you herewith the papers in the case. 
Respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
NO MAN'S LAND. 
Upou re-examination of the question whether the territory called'' No 
Man's Land" lies within the boundaries of any judicial district of the 
United States: Advised (1) that from January 6, 18tl3, to March 1,1889, 
said territory was inclndecl within the boundaries of the judicial dis-
trict for the northern district of Texas; (2) that since March 1, 1889, 
it has been and is included in the judicial district for the eastern dis-
trict of Texas; thus dissenting from the opinion of Attorney-Genera} 
Garland ofNovember 15,1887 (ante, p. 66). 
Violations oflaws of the United States committed within that territory 
are properly cognizable in the circuit and district courts of the United 
States for the eastern district of Texas. 
DEP ART:MENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 31, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of vour 
letter of January 7, 1890, inclosing a copy of a letter from the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a copy of a letter of De-
cember 30,1889, from N. F. Acers, collector of internal revenue 
for the district of Kansas, all relating to affairs in ''No Man's 
Land." I ~m requested to inform you whether it is now held 
that the United States courts have jurisdiction over "internal 
revenue" offenses committed in that land; also respecting a 
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decision by Judge Foster, affirmed by Judge Brewer, and 
referred to in Acer's letter. 
On the 15th day of November, 1887, my predecessor, in 
an opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury, advised that 
acts, elsewhere punishable as criminal by the Jaws of the 
United States, if perpetrated in " No l\fan's Land " could not 
be punished, because this land was not then included in a 
judicial district, the boundaries of which ''were previously 
ascertained by law." (Article VII, Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States.) A recent decision of the 
Federal court, in re Jackson, circuit court, district of Kansas 
(40 Federal Reporter, 372), having expressed a contrary 
opinion, I deem it proper to review the facts. 
The territory commonly known as" No Man's Land" is a 
strip about 175 mile~ in length and 35 miles in width; it is 
bounded northerly by the States of Colorado and Kansas, 
easterly by the one hundredth meridian west of Greenwich, 
southArly by the State of Texas, and westerly by New Mex-
ico. Originally thiM territory formed a part of Texas, whose 
boundary on the north, at the date of its admission to the 
Union in 1845, was what is now known as the southern line 
of Kansas and Colorado, and on the west by New Mexico, 
then Mexico. 
In 1850 the boundaries of Texas were established (9 Stat., 
446), by which act all its territory exterior to these bounda-
ries was ceded to the United States; this included "No 
Man's Land." From that time this strip became part of the 
public domain of the United States. 
Is this territory included in a judicial district the bounda-
ries of which are" ascertained bylaw~" December 29, 1845, 
while this strip belonged to Texa~, that State was organized 
into a United States judicial district called the district of 
Texas, with courts having the same jurisdiction as the United 
States circuit and district courts. On the establishment of 
the boundaries of Texas in 1850, as above, there was no pro-
vision in terms modifying the previous jurisdiction of the 
United States courts of this Territory. The same is true 
when, February 21, 1857 (11 8tats., 164), the State of Texas 
was divided into judicial districts. 
The effect of these acts was probably to place this land out-
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 479 
No llan•s Land. 
side of any judicial district whose boundaries were estab-
lished by law. It still formed a part of the public domain of 
the United States, and what was then its exact legal status 
is the question upon which the difference of opinion has arisen. 
If it was thereafter legally known as "Indian country," so 
that subsequent acts of Congress designating "Indian coun-
. try'' applied to it, then it will be found to be included in a 
judicial district of the United States, the boundaries of which 
"are ascertained by Ia w;" if the contrary, then it is 11ot so 
included. Upon the assumption that it was not legally des 
ignated as ''Indian country" or ':Indian territory" is based 
the opinion of my learned predecessor above referred to. 
While not free from doubt, I am inclined to the view that 
this strip is legally designated as " Indian countrJ'" or " In~ 
dian territory," using the word "territory" not in the sense 
of a political organization, but synonymously with'' country" 
or •'land." 
In an opinion given to the Secretary of War on August 12, 
1879 (14 Opin., 290), Attorney-General Williams said: 
"The question what is Indian country within the meaning 
of the Indian intercourse laws, is one of less easy solution. 
By the act of March 30, 1802 (2 Stat., 139), a boundary line 
between the territory then allotted or secured by treaty to 
the Indians (which is thPrein designated as • Indian country') 
and the other territory of the United States was definitely 
established by metes and bounds, with a proviso, however, 
that the same might thereafter be varied by treaties with 
the Indians. From the multiplicity of these treaties, it in 
the course of time became too difficult to ascertain precisely 
what were the limits of the Indian country. To remedy this 
inconvenience awl render those limits more obvious and cer-
tain, the act of June 30, 1834 ( 4 Stat., 729), in its firRt section 
provided' that all that part of the United States west of 
the Mississippi, and not within the States of Missouri and 
Louisiana or the Territory of Arkansas, and also that part 
of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not 
within any State, to which the Indian title has not been ex-
tinguished, for the purpose8 of this aot, be taken and deemed 
to be the Indian country.' 
"The understanding of the framers of the law of 1834 
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was, that the Indian country, as thereby defined, would em. 
brace, first, the whole of the territory of the United States 
west of the Mississippi, not within the States of Missouri and 
Loutsiana or the Territory of Arkansas; second, that part of 
the territory of the United States east of the Mississippi not 
within any State, to which the Indian title remains unex:-
tinguished (see report of the committee, Hou3e of Represen-
tatives, No.474, first session Twenty-third Congress,pp. 1, 10). 
In the report just cited it is remarked with reference to the 
Indian country, as defined in the first section of that act: 
'On the west side of the Mississippi its limits can only be 
changed by legislative act. On the east side of that river it 
will continue to embrace only those sections of country not 
within any State to which the Indian title shall not be ex-
tinguished. The effect of the extinguishment of the Indian 
title to any portion of' it (i.e., of the country east of the Mis-
sissippi) will be the exclusion of such portion from the In-
dian country.' • • • 
" From this legislation it would seem that in the view of Con-
gress, the Indian country west of the Mississippi, as defined 
in the act of 1834, was originally limited to the territory then 
belonging to the United States situated between that river 
and the Rocky Mountains, and not within the States of Mis-
souri and Louisiana or the T~rritory of Arkansas. Respect-
ing that part of the Indian country, it was the understanding 
of the framers of the act of 1834 that the limits thereof could 
only be changed by legislative enactment. I am not aware 
of the exjstence of any statute that, in direct terms, changes 
'those limits. But the course of legislation since the date of 
that act in opening up a great portion of that region to set-
tlement, in establishing Territorial governments there, and in 
the admission of new States formed therein, has doubtless 
the effect to alter the limits referred to, or at least to very 
much restrict the applicability of the Indian 'intercourse laws 
within the district of country thereby described." 
If the assumption that the limits of "Indian territory " 
might be reduced, but not enlarged, without Congressional 
action, is correct, then this opinion co_rroborates that of No-
vem ber 17, 1887, supra, for in 1834, when this act was passed, 
this strip was not a part of the pub!!c domain of the United 
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States. I am constrained, however, to adopt the reasouing 
of Brewer, J., now a justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, on this subject, as found in reJackson, supra, 
that while the definition of "Indian country" given in the 
act of June 30, 1834, was made ''for the purposes of that act," 
,yet" this original territorial boundary may, without any un-
due stretch vf language, be regardeu as a shifting boundary" 
as the territorial extension of the Uniteu States increases, or 
as a Territory was carved out of it for political organization." 
, The Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex pa-rte Grow 
Dog (109 U. S. R., 556), held that the definition of the term 
'Indian country,' contained in chapter 61, section 1, of the act 
of 1834 ( 4 Stat., 729), though not incorporated in the Revised 
Statutes, and though repealed simultaneously with their en-
actment, may be referred to in order to determine what is 
meant by the term when used in statutes, and that it applies 
to all the country to which the Indian title has not been extin-
guished within the limits of the United States, whether within 
a reservation or not, and whether acquired before or since the 
passage of that act. 
The United States, in 1865 (14 Stat., 717), entered into a 
treaty with the Comanche aud Kiowa tribes of ltl(lians. The 
treaty describes a tract embracing the land in question, au<l 
set apart the same ''for the absolute and undisturbed use 
and occupation of the tribes who are parties to this treaty, 
and of such other friendly tribes as have heretofore re:sided 
within the limits, or as they may from time to time agree to 
admit among them." Thus this strip, to all intents and pur-
poses, by Congressional action became "Indian countl'y." 
The act establishing the district court of the United States 
at Wichita, Kans., and for other purposes (22 Stat., 400, :sec. 
2) provided, •' That all that part of the Indian Territory 
lying north of the Uauadian River and east of Texas aud 
the one hundredth meridian, not set apart and occupied by 
the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Indian tribes, shall from 
and after the passage of this act be annexed to and consti-
tute a part of the United States judicial district of Kansas; 
and the United States district courts at \Vichita and Fort 
Scott, in the district of Kansas, shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction of all offenses committed within the limits of the 
274--VOL XIX----------31 
482 HOX. W. H. H. MiLLER 
~ o .\i a II ' s L a II d • 
territory hereby annexed to said district of Kansas against 
any of the laws of the United States now or that may here-
after be operative therein." Section 3 provided, " Tllat all 
that portion of Indian Territory not annexed to the district 
of Kansas by this act, and not set apart <lnd occupied by the 
Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Cllickasaw, and Seminole Indian 
tribes, shall, from and after the passage of tllis act, be an-
nexed to and constitute a part of th!3 United States judicial 
district known as the northern district of Texas; and the 
United States district court at Grabaw, iu said northern 
district of Texas, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of 
all offenses committed within the limits of the territory 
hereby annexed to said northern district of Texas against 
any of the laws of the United States now or that may here-
after be operative therein." 
The whole "Indian country" is thus embraced, and the 
land in question was within the limits of the judicial district 
of Texas. This act was passed January 6, 1883. Further 
legislation was had iu the act of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 183), 
entitled "An act to establish a United States court in the 
Indian Territory,and for other purposes." Sectionl describes 
the boundaries as follows: N ortll, by the State of Kansas; 
ea:-st, by the States of Missouri and Arkansas; south, by the 
State of Texas; west, by the State of Texas and the Territory 
of New Mexico. "No Man's Land" is thus included. in the 
boundaries. Section 17 declares the Indian Territory under 
the jurisdiction of the United States circuit aud district 
courts. It is divided into two parts~ one particularly de-
scribed and assigned to the district of Kansas, wllile the 
whole remaining portion is made subject to the jurisdiction 
of the eastern district of Texas. Were the matter merely in 
doubt I should be unwilling to conclude that Uongress Lad 
neglected to provide for the due execution of the laws of the 
United States in any public domain. 
My conclusions are: 
First. That from January 6, 1883, to March 1, 1889, this 
strip of land was included within the boundaries of a judicial 
district ''ascertained by law," viz, the judicial district for 
the northern district of Texas. 
Second. That since l\1arch 1, 1889, t llis Territory has been 
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11nd is included in the judicial district for the eastern district 
of Texas. 
Third. That violations of all laws of the United States 
committed within that boundary, whether criminal or relat-
ing to "internal revenue," are properly cognizable iu the 
circuit and district courts of the the United States for the 
eastern district of Texas established as above. 
The case referred to in Collector Acer's letter is that of the 
United States v. Soule et al. (30 Federal Reporter, 918). 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY-REVOCATION. 
A power of attorney given to collect a claim against the Government, 
with an agreement that the donee of the power shall receive "a sum 
equal to 50 per cent. of the amount allowed" on the claim, is not a 
power coupled with an interest, and is revocable. 
The power having been given to a firm, one of the members of which has 
Rince died, whereby the firm became dissolved, such power can not be 
executed by the ::mrviving members. 
Under the circumstances stated, the power should not be recognized. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
January 31, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of June 27, 1889. In it you ask-
" Whether power~ of attorney, coupled with an interest, and 
irrevocable in terms, given to a firm prior to the death of 
one of the parties, and since revoked by the principals, are 
null and void, or whether such powers still remain valid not-
withstanding the revocation by the principals~'~ 
This question is materially modified by the facts set forth 
in the'' detailed statement" of the Solicitor of the Treasury, 
to which you call my attention, and still more by the blank 
forms of contract and power of attorney inclosed in your let-
ter of July 6, 1889, which you give "a.~J representing the exact · 
nature of the powers and agreement in question." 
In the question you assume that the papers show a power 
coupled with an interest; but I do not think there is con-
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tained in this contract what the law recognizes as a "power 
coupled with an interest," such as would preveu t a principal 
from revoking his authority. By the contract, Riggs, Whitely 
& Co. agree to take charge and control of the second party's 
claim against the United States, and to prosecute the same, 
for which the second party agrees that the first party shall 
have ''a sum equal to 50 per cent" of the amount allowed 
on such claim. The power of attorney provides that the 
above second party appoints said Riggs, Whitely & Co. its 
at1torney irrevocable to collect sqch claim, in the name of said 
second party, that is, in the name of the principals, and gives 
the usual power to sue for, or settle and compromise, the same, 
give receipts, etc. 
I do· not find in the contract or power of attorney, either or 
both, that any inte1·est in such claim is given to Riggs, Whitely 
& Co. b~fore or everi after it shall ue allowed. The agree-
ment is that they shaH receive "a sum equal to 50 per cent. 
of the amount allowed." This is not sufficient to create a 
power coupled with an interest, under the authorities. 
"By the phrase 'coupled with an interest' is not meant an 
interest in the exercise of the power, but an interest in the 
property on which the power is to operate." (Hunt v. Rous-
manier's Administrator, R Wheat, 17 4.) 
" A mere interest in the results or proceeds of the exe-
cution of the authority, as by way of compensation, is not 
enough." (Mechem on Agency sections 207 and 24<!, and 
eases cited.) 
Nor is the word "irrevocable" in the power of attorney 
conclusive. It is the general rule that a principal can revoke 
the power. except in cases where the power is coupled with 
a sufficient interest, although the power be in express terms 
declared to be "exclusive" or "irrevocable." (Mechem on 
Agency, sections ~04, 207, and cases cited.) See also id., sec-
tion 209, as giving reasons for the rule. 
A power coupled with an interest may be executed in the 
name of the donee of the power, and hence may survive the 
death of the principal. (Hunt v1 Rousmanier's Administrator, 
supra.) 
If the above views are correct, there is nothing to prevent 
the principals from revoking their power of attorney. 
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But it further appears from the statement of the Solimtor 
of the Treasury, to which you refer, that one of the members 
of the firm of Riggs, Whitely & Co. has died. This materi-
ally affects the question. The death of one member of a firm 
operates immediately and inevitably as a dissolution. It is 
a general rule of the common law that an authority by a 
principal to two persons to do an act isjoint and (except in 
certain cases) the act must he concurred in by both. The prin-
cipal would not be bound by the act of a surviving member 
Df the firm, because he had never appointed him to act nor 
agreed to be representecl by is acts. This law of agency was 
laid down in JJfarine v. Intentational Life Insurance Oornpany 
(53 N.Y., 339~ 432, 344), and has application here in the ab-
sence, as before noted, of a power coupled with an interest. 
(See also Mechem on Agency, sections 221, 251, and 247.) 
But if this be true as to the survivors of the old firm, what 
~an be claimed by a new firm, composed of such survi"\""ors 
and a new member with whom the principal has had no 
dealings whate"\""er? 
What precedes has been upon the theory that Riggs, 
Whitely & Co. did not have an interest in the claims referred 
to. But if they did get an interest in them, under and by 
virtue of their contract and power of attorney, then I am at 
a loss to see why section 3477 of the Revised Statutes is not 
fatal to their position. 
It provides that: "All transfers :md assig·nments made of 
any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share 
thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, 
and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all 
powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving 
payment of any such claim, or of any part or share thereof~ 
shall be absolutely null and voitJ, unless they are freely 
made 1tnd executed in the presence of at least two attesting 
witnesses after the allowance of such a claim, or ascertain-
ment.of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the 
payment thereof." * * • (See 5 Opin., 85). 
It may be that Riggs, Whitely & Co., or their successors, 
may have a right of action against their principals for the 
amount agreed upon in one or many cases; but the Gov-
ernment has nothing to ilo with this, and can not be called 
486 RON. W. H. H. MILLER 
Immigration Act. 
upon to decide as to the relative rights of these parties under 
their contract. 
My opinion is, therefore, that the Governmeut officers are 
not compelled to recognize the power of attorney exhibited, 
under the circumstances detailed. 
I return the letter of the Solicitor of the Treasury, as re-
quested. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRE1'.ARY OF ':i"HE TREASURY. 
IMMIGRATION ACT. 
In carrying out the provisions of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, 
the Secretary of the Treasury is not restricted to the employmeut of 
the means and agencies mentioned in the second and fourth sections 
of that act, but may, in his discretion, have recourse to other appro-
priate means and agencies. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 8, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 
communication of January 27, 1890, calling my attention to 
section 2 of an act entitled'' An act to regulate immigration,'" 
and requesting my opinion "as to the power of the Secretary 
of the Treasury to execute the provisions of the act without 
entering 'into contracts with such State commission, board, 
or officers as may be designated for that purpose by the gov-
ernor of any State to take charge of the local affairs of im-
migration in the ports within such State.'" I h~we given the-
matter such attention as I was able and submit the fQJ.low-
ing: 
Section 1 of the act provides for a duty of 50 cents to be· 
levied on every passenger, etc., from a foreign port, not a 
citizen of the United States; the money being collected at 
the port of landing, and to be paid into the Treasury, and to 
be known as the "immigrant fund," and to be" used under the· 
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury to defray the ex-
pense of regulating immigration under this act, and for the 
care of immigrants arriving in the United States, for there-
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lief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes 
and expenses of carrying this act into effect." 
Section 2 provides " That the Secretary of the Treasury 
is hereby charged with tl::.e duty of executing the provisions 
of this act and with supervision over the business of immi-
gration to the United States, and for that purpose he shall 
have power to enter into contracts with snell State commis-
sion, board, or officers as may be designated for that purpose 
by the governor of' any State to take charge of the local 
affairs of immigration in the ports within said State, a~d 
to provide for the support and relief of such immigrants 
therein landing as may fall into distress or need public aid, 
under the rules and regulations to be prescribed by said Sec-
retary." 
Section 3 provides "That the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall establish such regulations and rules, and issue from time 
to time such instructions not inconsistent with law as he shall 
deem best calculatt>d to protect the United States an9. immi-
grants into the United States from fraud and loss, and for 
carrying out the provisions of this act and the immigration 
laws of tht> United States." 
By section 4, ''The Secretary of the Treasury may desig-
nate the State board of charities of any State in which such 
board shall exist by law, or any commission in any State 
whose duty it shall be to execute the provisions of this sec-
tion without compensation." · 
The question presented is, whether the Secretary of the 
Treasury is confined to the agencies mentioned in sections 2 and 
4, or may adopt any other appropriate means for the carry-
ing out the objects of the statute. 
Questions relating to the regulation of commerce have 
formed th.e subject of much discussion, especially as to the 
relative authority of the United States and the State govern-
ments. 
In the Passenger Oases (7 How., 283), a law of the State of 
New York, authorizing the collection '"from the master of 
every vessel arri"'ing in the port of New York from a foreign 
port $1.50 for each cabin passenger, etc.," was held by the Su-
preme Court "repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. and therefore void." The same determination 
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was reached by a unanimous court in Henderson 1 t al. -v. The 
MayorofNew Yorketal., in 92 U.S. R.,259. In the latter case 
the conclusion reached was that "such a statute of a State is 
a regulation of commerce, and when applied to passenger~ 
from foreig11 countries is a regulation of commerce with for· 
eign nations." Tile statutes in question were held void ''be-
eanse legislation on the subjects which they cover is confided 
exclusively to Congress by the clause of the Constitution 
which gives to that body the rigllt to regulate oommerce with 
forPign nations." 
WhateYer diYergencies of opinion had previously existed 
among the jndgesofthe Supreme Court, there can be no doubt 
that this decision authoritatively settled tllat question. 
The law under discussion was passed a few years subse· 
quent to this Ja~t decision and is to be construed in harmony 
wi~h the views therein expressed. 
As an officer of the United States and representing its 
sovereignty in this regard, this act places upon the Secretary 
of tile Treasury the pri1nary responsibility for the execution 
of its provisions. In the light of the historical evidence, it 
-can not be supposed that it ·was the intention of Congress to 
restrict the Secretary of the Treasury to agencies O\er which 
be has not original control, and which are held by the Supreme 
Court constitutionally incapable of acting in the premises. 
Tbe Secretary of the Treasury by this act "Rhall ha,·e 
power to enter into contracts with such State commission. 
board, or officers as may be designated for that purpose h:r 
the governor of any State." 
I know of no authority by which the United States can 
compel the States to provide a commission, board, or other 
officers such as is intended. Neither do I know of any pow<>r 
in the United States to compel the governors to designate 
such body, if it already exists. 
The creation and designation are matters of State concern 
alone. In any case the m~e of these agencies must be sn b-
ject to an agreement. 
Should such commission, board, or other officer exist by 
State law, it might happen that in the judgment of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury it would be unfit for the purposes 
mentioned either in its construction, its past action, or the 
known per~onal dew~ of its members. 
TO THE bECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 489 
Immigration Act. 
Many contingencies might arise whereby the harmony of 
views and action required in the execution of the law might 
not exist, and could work practically a discontinuance of the 
law. For in the event of such disagreement occasioning a 
breach of the contract, the Secretary of the Treasury would 
he obliged to discontinue the enforcement of the law; or, re-
ferring the matter to the political authority of the State, en-
dea\~or to reconstruct such commission or hoard -a process 
too uncertain and dilatory to be of practical use. 
I am unwilling to conclude that it was the intention of Con-
gress to make the execution of this act rest upon s~1ch pre-
carious means. The subject is one of national concern. It 
can not be assumed that all the States having ports subject 
to this act have such commissions or boards; while at least 
one State (Texas) has, by its constitution, prohibited such 
creation. Nor can it be assumed that if all such States now 
possess such commissions or boards, they will be continued. 
There can be no legal certainty that the States are or will 
continue in harmony with the National Government on these 
matters. The history of the constitutional enactment on 
which this power of Congress rests shows conclusively that 
it was designed to prevent diversity of action, to prevent one 
State making laws whieb would work harrlships to other 
States. If such di \·erse legislation by the State were per-
mitted, commerce with foreign countries would be hindered, 
not promoted. If the Secretary of the Treasury be confined 
to these State agencies, it is clearly within the power of one 
State to prevent the operation of the immigration law~, either 
by the legislature refusing to provide such commission or board 
or the Governor refusing to designate, or hy the commission 
or board refusing to make reasonable terms of contract or to 
act in harmony with the policy of the Secretary. To all in-
tents and purposes the General Government would be at the 
mercy of the ~tate; a condition of things never contemplated 
in relation to any right or duty constitutionally imposed on 
the United States. 
Whenever such commission or board exists there may be 
a propriety in its employment by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. In my opinion such propriety of use is to be deter-
mined by the Secretary as a matter of discretion only. 
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The act itself, section 1, in pro"\""iding that the duty h·Yied 
shall constitute a fund, etc., ''for the general purposes and 
expenses of carrying this act into effect," furnishes the Sec-
retary of the Treasury with the necessary pecuniary means 
of enforcing it. The construction of this act is clearly dis-
tinguishable from that of acts where a duty is placed upon a 
public officer towards some indh·idnal or class. In such case 
whatever may b~ the language it will generally be construed 
as mandatory. Here no duty rests upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury towards such commissions or boards. They ha\e 
no rights guarantied by the statute which it is his duty to 
protect. Whatever connection thf:'y can ha\e with the en-
forcement of the law, is one resting on mutual agreement.. 
This view is thus stated by a recent work on statutory con-
struction: 
"On the other hand the prescriptions of a statute often 
relate to the performance of a public duty. In such case 
they are said not to be of the essence or substance of the 
thing required, compliance being rather a matter of conven-
ience, and the direction being given with a Yiew simply to 
proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business; they seem to 
be gPnerally understood as mere instructions for the guidance 
and gov-ernment of those on whom the duty is imposed, or 
in other words, as directory only." (Endlich on the Interpre-
tation of Statutes, sec. 436.) 
Again the same author says: 
''In general, statutes directing the mode of proceeding by 
public officers are deemed advisory, and strict compliance 
with their detailed. proYisions is not indi~pensable to the 
validity of the proceediugs themselves unless a contrary in-
tention can be clearly gathered from the statute construed 
in the light of other rules of interpretation." (lb., sec. 437.) 
This view is strengthened by the language of the Ron. E. 
R. Roar, Attorney-General (13, Opin., 247,) which is as fol-
lows: 
" In many ports of the United States there are no port-
wardens, and a construction that would require certain things 
to be done by officers of a State, in administering the rev-
enue laws of the United States, when the provi~ion so con-
strued is not made to take effect on the condition that there 
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shall be such officers, and when in fact in most of the ports 
there are no such officers and there is no snch provision in 
the Statutes of the United States looking to the appointment 
of any ~:mc11 officers, must be avoided, if it can be done con-
sistently with the established rules for the construction of 
statutes." 
I am therefore of opinion that the Secretary is not re-
stricted in the carrying· out of the provisions of this act to 
the agenciAs mentioned in the second and fourth sections; 
that it is within his discretion whether he will use them or 
not. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SINKING FUND OF UNION AND CENTRAL PACIFIC. 
The power conferred on the Secretary of the Treasury by section 5 of the 
act of March 3, 1887, chaper 345, to re-invest the "sinking funds" men-
tioned in that section, extends as much to the United States bonds 
then held by b im as part of the sinking fund under the " Thurman 
Act,'' as to any money paid in from time to time for the purposes of 
that sinking fund. 
The United States bonds now in such sinking fund may be sold and the 
proeeeds thereof re-invested in the first-mortgage bonds of any of the 
railroad companies referred to in the said act of March~. 18i:l7, as hj;tv-
ing received aid from the Government in bonds. Opinion of Attorney-
General Garland, of March 31, 1887 (18 Opin., 59es), dissented from. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 13, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of October 14, 1889, submits for 
opinion certain questions growing out of an application by 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company to you as the officer 
designated by law to make and take charge of the invest-
ments required to be made from time to time by the act of 
May 7, 1878 (20 Stat., 56), commonly called the "Thurman 
Act," as a sinking fund, which th~ said act declares" shall be 
established in the Treasury of the United States" to secure 
the debts of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad 
Companies which are a lien on the property of said companies 
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prior to the lien thereon for the benefit of the United States, 
and also to. secure the United States to the extent that it 
may have a right to look to the said sinking fund for protec-
tion. 
The application of the Union Pacific Company is that you 
will exercise the authority supposed to be conferred on the 
Secretary of the Treasury by section 5 of the act of March 3, 
1887, amendatory of the ''Thurman Act," and proceed to sell 
the Government 5 per cent. bonds composing so much of the 
sinking fund under the '' Thurman Act" as appertained 
to the Union Pacific Company when the act of 1887 was 
passed, and to re-invest the proceeds in the :first-mortgage 
bonds of any or all of the railroads mentioned in the act of 
March 3, 1887 (.~;upra), the same being the railroads that have 
received aid from the Government in bonds. 
Section 5 of the act of 1\iarch 3, 1887 (supra), on which the 
application of the Union Pacific Company is based, is in the 
following words : 
" That the sinking funds which are or may be held in the 
Treasury for the security of the indebtedness of either or all 
of said railroad companies may, in ad lition to the invest-
ments now authorized by law, be invested in any bonds of 
the United States heretofore issued for the benefit of either 
or all of said companies, or in any of the :first-mortgage bonds 
of either of said companies which have been issued under the 
authority of any law of the United States and secured by 
mor.tgages of their roads and franchises, which by any law of 
the United States have been made prior and paramount to 
the mortgage, lien, or other security of the United States in 
respect of its advances to either of said companies as pro· 
vided by law." 
The questions submitted for opinion are as follows :' 
1. Whether ~he act of March 3, 1887, authorizes the sale 
of United States bonds now in the sinking fund and the re-
investment of the proceeds as authorized by that act. 
2. Whether the sinking funds can be invested in the first-
mortgage bonds of " any of the roads" that have received 
aid from the Government in bonds. 
Addressing .myself to the :first question, I am entirely clear 
that tbe power conferred on tbe Secretary of the Treasury by 
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section 5 to invest tile ~~sinking funds" wllich are held by 
him in the bonds mentioned in that section extends as mueh 
to the 5 per cent. bonds then held by him as part of the sink-
ing fund under the ''Thurman Act," of which section 5 is an 
. amendment, as to any money now paid in or to be paid in 
from time to time for the purpose of that sinking fund ; and, 
therefore, that the Secretary is empowered to sell the 5 per 
cent. bonds then constituting the sinking fund, if deemed ad-
visable, and invest the proceeds in the way authorized by 
section 5. · 
There does not seem to be any question that the term 
" sinking funds'' as used in section 5 includes money in hand 
for investment of the sinking fund. established by the "Thur-
man Act," it appearing both from the context of the law and 
the circumstances under which it was enacted, which circum-
stances will be particularly referred to hereafter, that Congress 
could not have intendell in section 5 to restrict ''sinking-
funds" to the usual sense of the term, that is, to designate 
only investments for accumulation to be eventually sunk in 
the payment of some debt, and which is the sense in which 
the term seems to be employed in the "Thurman Act." But 
I can not see any reason for holding that because Congress 
has used the term "sinking funds" in this liberal and un-
usual sense it intended to deuy to the term the usual and 
proper sense of designating investments for accumulation, 
especially when it is perfectly clear that the law can have a 
beueficial operation in both senses of the term, and that by 
refusing to give the term its usual and proper sense, the sink· 
ing fund, for reasous presently to be stated, will he seriously 
crippled. I say " usual and p-roper sense" not to criticise the 
language of Congress, but because in the absence of inten-
tion to use the term in the larger sense, which is apparent in 
the act, I should find it difficult to hold that money unin-
Yested and unproductive could be a sinking fund at all. 
Indeed, I think there is great reason for saying that Con-
gress intended, by the use of the plural H sinking funds 7' in 
section 5, to make more clear its purpose to em ploy the term 
in both of these senses; and it adds no little force to this 
view that Congress in the ''Thurman act," where, as we have 
said, it employs the term in its strict sense, invariably uses 
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the singular "sinking j1~;nd,'' although the fund is made up of 
.contributions from two companies, and is expressly declared 
to be dedicated to certain debts of both companies, "according 
to the interest and proportion of said companies, respectively, 
therein.'' (Section 8.) 
It would seem, then, that we can hardly account for the use 
.of the plural '"sinking-funds" in ~ectiou 5, bj· the fact that 
more than one company is interested in them, and no other 
reason than the one suggested has oceurred to me for this 
use of the singular in one act and the plural in the other. 
Whe-p. we look at the language of the statute in the light of 
the circumstances under which it was passed, as may always 
be done in expounding statutes (Platt v. Union Pacific Railroad, 
99 U.S. R., 64; Siemens v. Sellers, 123 U.S. R., 285; Smythe v. 
Fisk, 23 Wall, 380,) little room seems left for argument as to 
the meaning of Congress. 
The explanation in the Senate by Mr. Thurman of the bill 
which afterwards became the "Thurman act" shows that the 
,sinking-fund scheme for which it provided was based on the 
belief that the contemplated investments in United States 5 
per cent. l>Onds would produce a sum sufficient to pay the 
first mortgage debts of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific 
Companies at their maturity. 
But the plan of the ''Thurman act" failed to work success-
fully, owing to the fact that the unexpected rise in the price • 
of the 5 per cent. bonds so impaired the interest-bearing ca-
pacity of the sinking-fund investments as to make failure in 
the plan inevitable unless modified by some additional leg-
islation. 
Another cause that operated agaip.st the success of the 
sinking fund was its loss of the premiums baRed on the bonds 
that have been called in by the Government for redemption. 
This state of things caused anxiety for the security of the 
United States as a second mortgagee, and was complained of 
as an injustice by the railroad companies interested in the 
sinking fund, because it compelled them to suffer the losses 
of an improvident administration of the sinking fund which 
they were forced to maintain. 
To remedy these evils Secretaries of the Treasury have 
several times recommended that the "Thurman act" should 
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be changed so as to authorize investments in any Govern-
ment bonds and in the first mortgage bonds of the subsidized 
roads. 
Seeing, then, that the sinking fund as invested when the 
act of 1887 was pHssed was seriously crippled, can it be sup-
posed that Congress intended by section 5 of the act of 1887 
to keep the fund as then invested in its well-known crippled 
condition, and so confine the remedy provided by that law to 
investments thereafter to be made when it was manifest that 
to render the remedy effective it must be operative also as to 
the unprofitable investments which then represented the 
fund~ I can not bring myself to think that Congress meant 
to be so indifferent to the interests of the United States or so 
unjust to the railroad companies interested in the sinking 
fund. 
In coming to this conclusion I am cornpelled to differ from 
the opinion on this question of my predecessor, Mr. Attorney-
General Garland, dated March 31, 1887. I fail to see the 
force of his objection, that to hold that the Secretary of the 
Treasury has the power to sell the 5 per cent. bonds com-
prising the sinking fund on March 3, 1887, and reinvest the 
proceeds in the other bonds named in section 5, would expose 
the Rinking fund to losses by opening the door to the hazards 
of repeated changes in the investment of such proceeds, 
changes which, he says, might sometimes be made with a 
view to merely speculative profits; because, in my judgment, 
the power given by section 5 to sell and reinvest the bonds 
in question would, if duly exercised, be as completely ex-
hausted as the power to invest conferred by the" Thurman 
act." As already suggested, section 5 of the act of 1887 is 
purely remedial. The plain purpose of Congress was to re-
lieve the railroad companies and the United States Govern-
ment from a great financial loss, resulting from the enforced 
investment in securities whose net interest-bearing capacity 
had, by reason of unforeseen circumstances, become greatly 
reduced. This was the e-vil, and I am compelled to believe 
that the remedy was addressed to the whole evil, not merely 
to a less important part. The accumulations of nearly one 
half of the time provided for the growth of the sinking fund, 
amounting to something like $8,000,000, were so invested as to 
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bring a net interest of less than 22- per cent.; whereas, by re-· 
investing iu the first mortgage bonds of the railroad compa-
nies without any loss of security, the ·interest might, during 
the remaining years, be nearly doubled. Moreover, by sell-
ing the bonds already in the fund a premium of more thau 
$1,500,000 would be at once realized aud added to the fund, 
whereas if these bonds were held till maturity this premium 
would be lost. It is not reasonable to supiJose Oongress was 
entirely overlooking this vast fund of nearly $10,000,000, al-
ready accumulated as a principal, and was legislating solely 
with reference to the future accretions to the fund. Such a 
construction ought not to be given to the act, unless the lan-
guage used renders it imperative. In my judgment neither 
the discretionary nor the popular definitions of the term 
"sinking fund" nor the general scope of the legislation up-
holds, much less demands, such a construction. 
This 1Jrings me to the second question, which is "whether 
the sinkiilg fund can be invested in the first mortgage bonds 
of 'any of the roads' that have received aid from the Gov- / 
ernment in bonds." The primary object of the act of 1887 
was to authorize an investigation into " the working and 
financial management of all the railroads that have received 
aid from the Governme.nt in bonds." It appears that the 
companies to wllich Government subsidy bonds have been 
issued have availed themselves of the privilege, extended to 
them by law, of issuing bonds secured by mortgages which, 
it is provided, shall take precedence of the statutory lien for 
the security of the Government subsidy bonds, and which are 
the" first-mortgage bonds" referred to in section 5. 
This section, which is the concluding one of the act of 1887, 
declares that '' the sinking funds" then or thereafter held as 
security for the indebterlness "of either or ~II of said rail-
road companies'' may be invested "in any of the first-mort-
gage bonds of either of said companies," and, to my mind, 
there is no doubt that the "railroarl companies" referred to 
are those previously mentioned in the act as the companies 
whose affairs were to be investigated, and that the meaning 
is that the" sinking funds" may be invested in any of the 
first-mortgage bonds of any of the companies before men-
tioned in the act. 
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If said ''companies " means all the companies named be. 
fore, as I am clear it does, then I do not see how we cau 
avoid giving "either," in "either of said companies," the 
sense of any, a sense which it frequently has in acts of Con-
gress and other writings, and in which it is previously twice 
used in section 5, where reference is made to the'' sinking 
funds "held for the security "of either or all of said railroad 
companies,'' and where authority is given to in\est said funds 
in auy Government subsidy bonds theretofore issued for the 
benefit "of either or all of said companies." It sP.ems clear 
that in both these instances '' e~ther" must have the meaning 
of any. 
Nor does it seem to me of any significance that when Con-
gress refers to investment in first-mortgage bonds it drops the 
use of the word" all" in connection with the word "either," be. 
cause, as I understand the facts, no subsidy bonds have been 
issued for the benefit of" all" of said companies jointly, but 
for each severally, and the use of the word ''all" in the 
phrase " either or all" is mere surplusage. Again, it is to me 
incredible, if the person who drafted section 5 was attempting 
to use words with such grammatical accuracy as is implied in 
the assumption that the word "either," as used in the first 
two instances in said section, means one of several, but in its 
third use it was designed to be limited to one of two for the 
purpose of excluding the bon<ls of all other railroads except 
these two, that language less equivocal should not have been 
used. In other words, if the purpose in the mind of the 
writer of this section, and of Congress in passing it, was to 
limit the investment of the sinking funds to the first-mort-
gage bonds of one of two companies instead of any of the sub-
sidized companies, I can not believe it is possible that such a 
purpose would have been evinced only by such an ambiguous 
use of the word " either." The idea that such was the pur-
pose rests upon the assumption that particular attention 
was drawn to the subject, and that the change in the use of 
this word was for that purpose. It seems to me that the use 
of the word "either" in the sense of " any" and the use of 
''all" without any significance shows that -the legislative 
mind was not directed to the matter of grammatical accuracy 
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in framing this section, but rather that words were used iq 
the loose popular way. 
I have not overlooked the argument that there is an ap· 
parent impolicy in investing the funds of one railroad com-
pany in the mortgage bonds of another, but, except as it may 
throw light upon the proper construction of a statute, the ques· 
tion of policy is not one for this Department; and as the lan-
guage of section 5 seems to demand a construction authorizing 
such investment, and as the statute is not mandatory, but in 
the end leaves the question whether such investment shall be 
made to the discretion of the Secretary, this argument has 
not seemed to me to be controlling or of great force. 
Moreover, if the last use of the word '' either" in this sec-
tion is to be limited so as to mean one of two companies, we 
are met by the question, which two-a question which can not 
be answered by anything found in the act of 1887. By ref-
erence to the "Thurman act" and by extraneous testimony, 
we can, of course, learn what companies have sinking funds, 
but it does not seem to me that the case calls for a construc-
tion of this statute dependent upon facts derived from such 
.extraneous sources. 
I am therefore constrained reluctantly to differ from my 
learned predecessor upon this point also, and to conclude 
that the Secretary has a discretion to invest the sinking funds 
in question in the first-mortgage bonds of any of the railroad 
companies referred to in the act of March 3, 1887, as having 
received aid from the Government in bonds. " 
Respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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LEASES OF INDIAN LANDS. 
The Cherokee Nation of Indians can not make a valid lease of their lands 
without the consent of the Government. Opinion of Attorney-General 
Garland of July 21, 1885 (18 Opin., 235), reaffirmed. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Febntary 14, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of February 13, in which you say : 
"I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the 
Interior, dated the lOth instant, with an opinion of the As-
sis~ant Attorney-General of the Interior Department, under 
date of October 19 last, and a printed copy of a letter of 
the Secretary of the Interior addressed to General Lucius Fair-
child, chairman of the Cherokee Commission, under date of 
October 26 last, and beg to ask you for an early opinion 
upon the question whether the leases referred to in these 
communications, made by the Cherokee Nation of Indians to 
the Lh·e Stock Association, have any legal force or validity. 
"As I am anxious for an early answer to this communication, 
I will not ask you to do more than to state your conclusions." 
I have accordingly made such an examination of the ques-
tion as the limited time allowed has permitted. This exam-
ination has been greatly facilitated by the letter of the Sec-
retary of the Interior to General Fairchild, and by the 
opinion of ~fr. Assistant Attorney-General Shields; this 
opinion containing a reference to the statutes and decisions 
of the courts upon the subject. 
I find that on the 21st day of July, 1885, my immediate 
predecessor, 1\fr. Garland, gave an opinion to the Secretary 
of the Interior upon the precise question presented in your 
letter. His conclusion was: 
"Whatever the rig-ht or title may be (iu the lands in ques-
tion), each of these tribes or nations are precluded, by force 
and effect of the statute, from either alienating or leasing 
any part of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim 
in or to the same, without the consent of the Government of the 
United States. A lease of the land for grazing purposes is 
:as clearly within the statute as a lease for any other or for 
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general purposes, and the duration of the term is immaterial. 
One who enters with cattle or other live stock upon an Indian 
reservation under a lease of that description, made in violation 
of the statute, is an intruder, and may be removed there-
from as such, notwithstanding his entry is with consent of 
the tribe." 
In the opinion of Mr. A8sistant Attorney-General Shields, 
upon a most elaborate examination, the same conclusion is 
reached. Without hesitation or doubt I concur in this con-
clusion. 
I return herewith the letter of the Secretary of the Interior 
to General Fairchild, the opinion of Assistant Attorney-Gen-
eral Shields, and the letter of the Secretary of the Interior to 
the President dated February 10. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT. 
The vacancy in the office of Paymaster-General, created by the retire-
ment of General William B. Rochester, may be filled by an ad interim 
appointment under the provisions of section 179, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 15, 1890. 
SIR: I have looked at the order reciting the retirement of 
Paymaster-General William B. Rochester, and assigning 
Major Sniffen to the duties of that place temporarily.. The 
only question I have as to the validity of the order of assign-
ment arises from the fact that General Rochester has " re-
tired." It is not a case of death, resignation, absence, or 
sickness, in the ordinary use of those terms. Sections 177, 
178, and 179 of the Revised Statutes use only those terms. 
Still, section 1259 provides that " a retired officer shall not be 
assignable to any other duty" than at the Soldier's Borne; 
though he may by section 1260 be detailed at his own request 
as professor of a college. The question is whether a retired 
officer, though not strictly within the language, is within the 
general scope and purpose of section 179. I think it may 
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well be said that, in the eye of the law, a retired officer is 
absent, he being incapable of rendering the service required. 
If this construction may not be given to the act, it is clearly 
casm omissus. There would, in that event, be no power to 
provide for the duties of the office ad interim. 
I think the appointment is valid. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PBESIDENT. 
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL-CIVILIAN WITNESS. 
A naval court-martial, or judge advocate thereof, has no power to com-
pel a civilian who is not subject to the articleM for the government of 
the Navy to appear and testify before such court. 
Neither article 42 nor article 57 in section 1624, Revised Statutes, gives 
the power to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses. 
The provisions of section 1202, Revised Statutes, apply only to military 
(i.e. Army) -courts. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
• Februaf'y 26, 1890. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
oom~unication of February 17, in which yon ask my opinion 
upon the following question : 
"Have judge advocates of the general courts-martial or 
courts of inquiry organized under authority of articles 38 
and 55 of the articles for the government of the Navy, and 
convened within the United States, power to compel civilians 
not subject to the articles for the government of the Navy 
to appear and testify before such courts!" 
in answer to this question I have to say that in 1859 sub-
stantially the same question, with reference to Army courts-
martial, was submitted by the Secretary of War to my prede-
cessor, Attorney-Gener.al Black, and was answered by him 
in the negativ~. (9 Opin., 311.) 
In 1863 there was attached to the sundry civil appropria-
tion bill, among other items of general legislation, section 25, 
in the following language: 
"And be it further enacted, That every judge advocate of a 
court-martial or court of inquiry hereafter to be constituted, 
shall have power to issue the like process to compel witnesses 
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to appear and testify which courts of criminal jurisdiction 
within the State, .Territory, or district where such military 
courts shall be ordered to sit may lawfully issue." 
On the 2d of October, 1868, the Acting Attorney-General 
gave to the Secretary of vVar an opinion to the effect that 
the twenty-fifth section of the act of :March 3, 1863, author-
ized compulsory process to be issued for the attendance of 
civilians as witnesses before courts-martial. (12 Opin., 501.) 
Section 25 above is embodied, so far as courts-martial are 
concerned, in section 1202 of the Revised Statutes, but for 
some reason the part of the section referring to courts of in-
quiry is omitted in the revision. 
Were it not for the use ofthe word" military," in sections 
25 and 1202, above quoted, there would be nothing in that 
section to indicate that it was not designed to be equally ap· 
plicable to courts-martial in the Navy as in th~ Army; 
but the use of the expressien " military courts" seems to 
limit the effect of the act to courts-martial in the Army. 
Upon looking at Webster and Worcester, I find that neither 
of them gives the word'' military" a definition which would 
include naval service. It seems to be confined exclusively 
to the Army or land service. In this restricted sense it is 
evidently used by Congress in the second se0tion of the act 
of June 23, 1874, reorganizing the several staff corps of the 
Army (18 Stat., 244). It is evident also that in the compila-
tion of the Re\ised Statutes such was understood to be the 
meaning of the word; and this section 25 of the act of 1863 
is incorporated in the chapter relating to the Army, but not 
in the chapter relating to the Navy. 
I have examined the legislation subsequent to the Revised 
Statutes and find nothing upon this subject. To be sure, 
article 42 of section 16!!4, Revised Statutes, provides that, 
"Whenever any person refuses to give his evidence, or to 
give it in the manner provided hy these articles, or prevari-
cates, or behaves with contempt to the court, it shall be law-
ful for the court to imprison him for any time not ~xceeding 
two months." 
Article 57 provides that "courts of inquiry shall have 
power to summon witnesses, and administer oaths, and pun-
ish contempt in the same manner as courts-martial." 
TO THE SECRE~ARY OF THE NAVY. fi03 
Bureau Officers In tbe Navy Department. 
But in view of what has been already said, I think it clear 
that neither of these articles gives the power to summon 
and compel the attendance of civilian witnesses. It must 
be remembered that a, court-martial is a court of limited and 
special jurisdiction; that it only has such powers as are 
clearly conferred by statute. Nothing certainly in the way 
of control over civilians is to be taken in its favor by impli-
cation. 
Upon the whole, therefore, it. is my opinion that naval 
courts-martial or their judge·advocates have not the power 
to compel civilians not subject to the articles for the govern-
ment of the Navy to appear and testify before such courts. 
Upon that subject I think the law with reference to naval 
courts-martial is now the same as it was prior to the enact-
ment of section 25 of the statute of 1863 in reference to Army 
courts-martial. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
BUREAU OFFICERS IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
A naval officer assigned to duty as an assistant to the chief of a bureau 
in the Navy Department is not authorized by section 178, Revised 
Statutes, in case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the 
latter (where the President has not otherwise directed, as provided by 
sec. 179, Rev. Stat.), to perform the duties of such chief until his suc-
cessor is appointed or until his sickness br absence shall cease. 
The phrase "assistant or deputy of such chief,'' etc., in said section 178, 
is to be construed as including an assistant or deputy only whose ap-
pointment is specifically provided for by statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 5, 1890. 
Sm: You have submitted to the Attorney-General the 
question: 
"Whether an officer of the Navy, detailed and assigned to 
duty by the Secretary of the Navy as an assistant to the chief 
of a boreau, is as such assistant, in the event of the death, 
resignation, absence, or sickness of the chief of the bureau, 
and in case the President has not otherwise directed under 
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the provisions of section 179 of the Revised Statutes, author-
ized by section 178 to perform the duties of such chief until 
his successor is appointed or uutil such absence or sickness 
shaH cease t" 
Section 178 of the Revised Statutes provides that-
" In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of 
the chief of any bureau, or of any officer thereof, whose ap-
pointment is not vested iri the head of the Department, the 
assistant or deputy of such chief or of such officer, or if there 
be none, then the chief clerk of such bureau, shall, unless 
otherwise directed by the President, as provided by section 
one hundred and seventy-nine, perform the duties of such 
chief or of such officer until a successor is appointed or such 
absence or sickness shall cease.'' 
Section 416 of the Revised Statutes, which make.s pro-
vision for the appointment of officers in the bureaus of the 
Navy Department, makes no provision for the appointment 
of any assistants to chiefs of bureaus. The highest officers 
recognized by this section in such bureaus, after the chiefs 
thereof, are the chief clerks, except in the Bureau of Yards 
and Docks, where the appointment of a ciYil engineer is pro-
vided for. In my opinion, in order td determine who should 
act in the place of the chief of the bureau during his absence, 
section 178 is to be read in connection with section 416. 
Without making a question that the assignment of com-
missioned officers of the Navy to act as assistants to chiefs 
of bureaus may be within the general power of the Secretary 
of the Navy, I think that section 178, in the expression "the 
assistant or deputy of such chief or of such officer," can only 
refer to assistants or deputies whose appointment is specifi-
cally provided for by statute. There is no specific provision 
for the assignment of assistants to chiefs of bureaus from com-
missioned officers of the Navy. 
The question upon which an opinion has been requested 
should be answered in the negative. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
Approved: 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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CO-OPERATION OF REVENUE CUTTERS WITH THE NAVY. 
The revenue cutters employed in carrying out the order issued by Presi-
dent Lincoln to the Secretary of the Treasury, dated June 14, 1863 
(set forth in the opinion), were, while so employed, co-operating with 
the Navy by order of the. President; and if any of the officers or sea-
men thereof, during such employment, were wounded or disabled in 
the discharge of their duty, they became entitled to be placed on the 
Navy pension list at. the same rate of pension and under the same reg-
ulations and restrictions as are provided by law for the officers and 
seamen of the Navy. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 5, 1890. 
Sm: You have requested the opinion of the Attorney-
General upon the question whether an order issued by Presi-
dent Lincoln June 14, 1863, to the then Secretary of the 
Treasury, placed the revenue cutters of the Revenue-Marine 
Service in such co-operation with the Navy as is contem-
plated by section 2757 of the Revised Statutes, so that the 
officers and seamen of the revenue cutters became entitled 
to the benefits conferred by the pension laws, and to such 
other s:Pecial rights and.privileg~ as belong under the stat-
utes to the officers and seamen of the Navy during the war 
of the rebellion. 
The order of President Lincoln referred to is as follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MAN~ON, June 14, 1863. 
"Sm: Your note of this morning is received. Yon will 
co-operate by the revenue cutters under your direction with 
the Navy in arresting re9el depredations on American com-
merce and transportation, and In capturing rebels engaged 
therein. 
''ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
"The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY." 
Section 2757 of the Revised Statutes is as follows: 
"The revenue cutters shall, whenever the President so di-
rects, co-operate with the Navy, during whi~h time they shall 
be under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, and the 
expenses thereof shall be defrayed by theN avy Department." 
You state that the expenses of the r(lvenue cutters in ear-
ning out the above order were defrayed by the Treasury 
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Department, and not by the.Na\y Department. It may per-
haps be inferred also from the order of the President that 
the cutters continue to act under direction of the Secretary 
of the Tr~·asury. 
It is prodded by section4741 of the Revised Statutes that-
~' The officers and seamen of the revenue cutters of the 
United States, who have been or may be wounded or disa-
bled in the discharge of their duty while co-operating with 
the Navy by order of the President, shalJ be entitled to be 
placed on the Navy pension list at the same rate of pension 
and under the same regulations and restrictions as are pro-
vided by law for the officers and seamen of the Na\y." 
It seems clear that if any of the officers or seamen of the 
re,enue cutters of the United States were wounded or dis-
abled in the discharge of their duty in carrying out the order 
ofthePresidentcontainedabove, that is, in arrestingrebeldep-
redations on American commerce and tranlilportation, and in 
capturing rebels engaged therein, such wounds or {!isabilities 
would have been suffered while "they were co-operating with 
the Navy by order ofthe President," within the language of 
section 4741, and that they would be therefore entitled to the 
benefits conferred by that ~ection. I do not see how either 
the fact that the expenses of such co-operations were defrayed 
by the Treasury Department, or that the cutters continued 
to act under the Se~etary of the Treasury, can affect the 
question. That the law was not followed in tllese respects 
by the officers of the Go\ernment can not change the char-
acter of the service, the ultimate authority under which it 
was rendered, or the benefits to which those suffering dis-
a hill ties or wounds recei '7ed therein were entitled. Nor does 
the fact that the order is so general as to show that the re\-
enue cutters may have been engaged during the same period 
in protecting the collection of the revenue of the U nitcd 
States, and were only at intervals thereof co-operating with 
the Na\y of the United States in resisting attacks of the 
rebels upon .American commerce, prevent the latter service 
from being a co-operation with the Navy by order of the 
President. It is only necessary that the wounds or disabili-
ties should have been incurred because of service !n such co-
operation with the Navy, and while it was being rendered. 
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The privileges and benefits to which persons wounded in 
such service are entitled are stated in section 4741, namely, 
that they shall'' be placed on the Navy pension list at the 
same rate of pension and under the same regulations and re-
strictions as are provided by law for the officers and seamen 
of the Navy." If this covers all the benefits and privileges 
to which officers and seamen of the Navy are entitled, then 
the question put should be answered in the affirmative; if 
not, then it should be answered in the affirmative with the 
limitations suggested. 
Very respectfully, 
W~I. H. TAFT, 
Sol·icitor-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
CIVIL SERVICE-EMPLOYMENT OF SUBSTITUTES. 
The proposed amendment ofDepartmental Rule VII, and revocation of De-
partmental Rule II, of the regulations of the Civil Service Commission: 
(with a view to provide for the employment of substitutes for clerks, 
copyists, and other employes in the Departments, who are temporarily 
absent on account of sickness or other unavoidable cause, and for the 
selection ofsnch substitutes from persons regularly certified by the Civil 
Service Commission), considered in connection with section 4 of the act 
of Au~ust 5, 1882, chapter 389, and section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 12d, and advised that while the amendment proposed is not 
beyond the power of the Commission, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, to make, yetthat such amendment would be inoperative when-
ever it should become necessary to make an additional expenditure for 
the employment of the substitutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
jlfarch 6, 1890. 
SIR: In accordance with your request of January 30, 1890, 
to the Attorney-General for an opinion upon the power of 
the Civil Service Commission, with your approval, to adopt 
an amendment to Departmental Rule VII of the regulations 
of the Civil Service Commission, I have the honor to submit 
the folio wing : · 
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The amendment proposed is a prov-ision for the employ-
ment of substitutes for clerks, copyists, and employes of 
other grades in the service of the Departments who are tem-
porarily absent from sickness or other unavoidable cause, 
and for the selection of such substitutes from persons regu-
larly certified by the Civil Service Commission. The amend-
ment also revokeR Departmental Rule II, forbidding the em-
ployment of such substitutes. 
The question suggested by the Commission in their letter 
to you and which is now to be answered, is whether such 
regulation is in violation ofthat part of section 4 of the act 
of the 5th of August, 1882 (22 Stat., 255), which provides, 
"That no civil officer, clerk, draughtsman, copyist, messen-
ger, assistant messenger, mechanic, watchman, laborer, or 
other employe shall after the first day of October next be 
employed in any of the Executive Departments, or subordi-
nate bureaus or offices thereof, at the seat of government, 
except only at such rates and in such numbers, respectively, 
as may be specifically appropriated for by Congress for sueh 
clerical and other personal servicea for each fiscal year ; and 
no civil officer, clerk, draughtsman, copyist, messenger, 
assistant messenger, mechanic, watchman, laborer, or other 
employe shall hereafter be employed at the seat of govern-
ment in any Executive Department, or subordinate bureau or 
office thereof, or be paid from any appropriation malle for 
contingent expenses, or for any specific or general purpose, 
unless such employment is authorized and payment thereof 
specifically provided in the law granting the appropriation, 
and then only for services actually rendered in connection 
with and for the purposes of the appropriation from which 
payment is made, and at the rate of compensation usual and. 
proper for such services." 
While there is nothing in this section which denies the 
power of the Civil Service Commission, with your approval, 
to make the amendment proposed, in my opinion such amend-
ment would be inoperative wherev-er it should become neces-
sary to make an additional expenditure for the employment 
of the substitutes. Section 4 of the act of August 5, 1882, 
already quoted, forbids the employment of any officer, clerk, 
etc., except only at such rates and in such numbers -as may 
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be specifically appropriated for by Oongress, and no such 
officer, clerk, etc., is to be paid from any appropriation made 
for contingent expenses, unless such employmont is author-
ized and payment therefor specifically provided in the law 
granting the appropriation for contingent exptmses. There 
is no specific appropriation of a contingent fund for substi-
tutes. Moreover, section 3882 of the Revised Statutes ex-
pressly provides that no moneys for contingent, incidental, 
or miscellaneous purposes shall be expended or paid for offi-
cial or clerical compensation. Where, thArefore, in the em-
ployment of substitutes an additional expenditure is required, 
there would be no lawful means for the payment of such sub-
stitutes. 
By section 4 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 
563, 564), it is provided that "all absence from the Depart-. 
ments on the part of said clerks or other employes, in excess of 
such leave of absence as may be granted by the heads thereof, 
which shall not exceed thirty days in any one year, except in 
case of sickness, shall be without pay." It is necessarily im-
plied from this provision that pay for thirty days in any one 
year may be continued during the period of absence at the 
discretion of the head of the Department, and that, in case of 
sickness, pay may continue without any such limitation. It is 
apparent, therefore, that in nearly all cases of temporary ab-
sence, for sickness or other unavoidable cause, which are the 
cases covered by the amendment proposed, the pay of the ab-
sent clerk, employe, etc., would continue, and that a substi-
tute would impose upon the Government an additional ex-
penditure. This expense, as has been said, it would be 
beyond the power. of the heads of the Departments to incur. 
The result is that the amendment proposed is not beyond 
the power of the Civil Service Commission, with your ap-
proval, to make, but that, in the great majority of cases, to 
which by its present terms it would seem to apply, it would 
be by law inoperative. 
V:ery respectfully, 
. The PRESIDENT. 
Approved: 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General . 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
Chinese Exeluslon. 
CHINESE EXCLUSION. 
The certificate required of Chinese by section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884, 
chapter 220, in order to establish a right to land m the United States, 
can not be dispensed with. It is the sole evidence admissible to estab-
lish such right. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 8, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
communication of the Acting Secretary, dated March 6, em-
bracing a copy of a telegram from F. A. Ree, Chinese consul 
at San Francisco, to General John W. Foster, of this city. In 
this telegram, among other things, it is stated that two Chi-
nese merchants have arrived at the port of San Francisco, in 
the ship China, and desire to land; but that by reason of 
certain governmental regulations in China, they being resi-
dents of Hong-Kong, are unable to procure the certificate 
required by section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 
5, 1884 (23 Stat., 116). 
Yon ask my opinion whether, without the production of 
such certificate, these gentlemen nmy be permitted to land. 
I can not write an opinion that will be more plain than the 
statute on this subject. Section 6 is imperative in its re-
quirement of such certificate, and provides that it shall be 
the sole evidence permissible on the part of the person so pro-
ducing the same to establish a right of entry into the United 
States. This is the last expression of the law -making power of 
the United States on the subject, and if at variance with the 
provisions of the treaty with China, upon which question I 
express no opinion, it is still the law. (Botillerv. Dominguez, 
130 U. S. R., 238.) 
My answer to your question, therefore, is that without such 
certificate, consistently with the law, yon can not permit the 
landing of these gentlemen. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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INDIAN ALLOTTEES. 
It is the duty of the Government to protect the Indian allottees under 
the act of March 2, 18tl9, chapter 412, in the enJoyment of ~heir allot-
ments, and in the discharge of that duty the military forces of the 
United States may, if necessary, be employed by the President for 
their protection. 
DEP .A.RTMENT- OJ<' JUSTICE~ 
March 12, 1890. 
Sm: At your suggestion I have examined the opinion of 
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Shields upon the question 
whether, under the act of ?.larch 2, 1889 (~5 Stat., 998), it is 
competent to use the military forces in protecting the indi-
vidual rights of Indians to allotments outside of the reser-
vations, where such Indians are residing upon the lands and 
are being forced therefrom by trespassers; or whether, since 
the territory has come within th~ limits of South Dakota, the 
rights of the Indians under said State must be adjudicated 
by the courts; and if so, whether the United States courts will 
have jurisdiction. That opinion is transmitted herewith. 
It is needless for me to go into an elaborate statement of 
my views upon this question. I concur in the conclusions of 
this opinion, and in the main in the reasoning by which those 
conclusions are reached. 
On the 27th of July, 1888, Acting Atttorney-General Jenks 
gave to the Secretary of the Interior an opinion denying to 
the State the power to tax lands occupied by Indians as sep-
arate allotments under the then existing legislation. There 
is nothing in the act of March 2, 1889, that would lflad to a 
different conclusion, or that would make inapplicable the 
reasoning of that opinion. Of that opinion I hand you here-
with a printed copy. 
As will be seen by that opinion, the conclusions there 
reached rest largely upon the proposition that notwithstand-
ing the Indians, by taking separate allotments, have made 
a first and a long step toward ci'f'ilization and independent 
citizenship, yet they are still in a state of pupilage and under 
the guardianship of the General Government. Upon the same 
ground, I am clear that it has not been the intention of Con-
gress, in any legislation so far, to put these Indians, who 
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take such separate allotments, entirely upon their own re-
sources or to withdraw the Government's guardianship, su-
pervision, and protection. The fact, if there were no other, 
that their lands so allotted are made inalienable, that the al-
lottee has no power to cumber or charge the same with debt, 
would be a clear indication that Congress had not intended to 
remit him to courts of law for the protection of those lands; for 
it would be worse than idle to expect that a man so untutored, 
so improvident, so much of a child that he can not be trusted 
with a control over his property, would be able, without any 
power to charge that property for any purpose, to protect the 
same in a court of law. In other words, I am entirely clear 
that it is the duty of the Government to protect these Indian 
allottees in the enjoyment of their allotments. The only 
question is as to the manner of such protectioB. 
I think the opinion of Mr. Assistant Attorney-General 
Shields makes it entirely clear that the statute expressly 
authorizes the use of troops for the protection of such rights 
in "the Indian country." The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
decided that " Indian country" is all country to which the 
Indian title has not been extinguished. The Indian title to 
the lands allotted in these reservations under the act of 
March 2, 1889, is modified, but I do not think it can be said 
to be extinguished. In pursuance of treaties with the Indi-
ans the lands are partitioned in severalt · to the Indians, not 
because the ordinary Indian title has been totally extin-
guished, but because the Indians have consented to such ar-
rangement. This being so, and in view of the relation of 
guardianship the Government still bears, and the duty of 
protection it still owes to these Indians, I have no doubt of 
the right of the President to use the troops for the protec-
tion of these allotments. 
With reference to the other question, namely, the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts, in case appeal is made to the 
courts to settle the rights of the parties in the premises, I 
haYe no doubt these rights are derived from and ascertained 
by the statutes of the United States, and necessarily involve 
Federal questions. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
POSTAL CONVENTIONS WITH .FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
\ 
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Upon a review of the legislation passed by Congress, from the begin-
ning of the Government down to the present time, conferring upon 
the Postmaster-General powt.Jr to make postal arrangements and con-
ventions with foreign countries, and the praetice of the Government 
thereunder : ..:ldvised, that such legislation and practice sanction an 
interpretation of the Constitution different from that which might be 
reached Qy the ordinary rules of construction were tbe question a new 
one, and that the provisions of section :398, Revised Statutes, author-
izing the Postmaster-General, with the advice and consent of the 
President, to uegotiate and conclude postal treaties and conventions 
between the United States and foreign countries, are not in con.ftict 
with that part of section 2, Article II, of the Constitution, giving the 
President "power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
to make treaties," etc. 
Semble that the right of Congress to vest in the Postmaster-Gener l 
power to conclude conventions with foreign governments for the 
cheaper, safer, and more conveuient carriage of foreign mail::~ m:ty be 
derived from the authority given that body in the seventh clause of 
section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, to establish post-offices and 
post-roads. 
~s to the power of the Postmaster-General to enter into conventions 
with foreign governments touching the regulation of foreign parcels 
post, opinion of Attorney-General Garland of June 30, 1887 (alte, p. 
39), cited with approval. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
· .March 20, 1890. 
SIR: Yon have submitted to tbe Attorney-General the 
question whether section 398, Revised Statutes, providing 
that the Postmaster-General, by and with the advice and con-
sent of tbe President, may negotiate and conclude postal 
treaties or conventions between the United States and' for-
t:-ign countries, is in violation of that part of section 2, Arti-
cle II, of the Constitution of the United States which provides 
that the President "shall have power, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." · 
If this clause of the Constitution is exclusive, and takes 
from Congress the right to delegate to any one else power to 
conclude treaties with foreign governments, then section 398, 
quoted above, reposing such power in the Postmaster-Gen-
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eral with reference to postal treaties, would seem tu be in-
valid. Article II is a statement of the powers of the Execu. 
th·e, and the ordinaQ· rule of construction, in the absence of 
language to the contrary, would make the grant of a power 
within that article exclusi"'e. Such a construction, however, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has held rna~· be 
varied by the course of Congress in its l£>gislation and the 
practice of the Executh·e Departments since the adoption of 
the Constitution. 
In the case of The Laura (114 U. S. R., 411) a libel was 
filed by the plaintiff below against the steam-boat Laura to 
recover penalties fur the violation of a statute, which were 
made payable to an~· person suing for the same. The owner 
of the vessel, a corporation, intervened and answered, setting 
up in bar a warrant in due form by the Secretary of the 
Treasury remitting the penalties. It was claimed in the case 
that the warrant of remission was without legit.l effect, be-
cause the statute upon which it rested was in conflict with 
the clause of the Constitution investiug the President with 
power to grant reprieves and pardons for all offenses against 
the United States, except in cases of impeachment. This 
power to grant reprieves and pardons, it will be obser"'ed in 
passing, is iu the same section, and immediately precedes the 
-clause conferring power to make treaties. It was held by the 
Supreme Court, Justice Harlan delivering the opinion, that 
the practice in reference to remisswns of penalties by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and other officers, whicL had been 
()bserved and acquiesced in for nearly a centur~·, was an in-
terpretation of the Constitution too strong- and OU::itiuate to 
be shaken or controlled, and that, therefore, the assumption 
on the part of Congress of theright toinYest the Secretary of 
the Treasury with power to remit penalties in such cases was 
not invalid, and that, to this extent, the power reposed by the 
Constitution in. the President to grant reprieves and pardons 
was not exclusi \"e. 
In ll'are v. United States (4 "~all. 617) the question waR 
whether a post-office, which bad been discontinued by order 
of the Postmaster-General, was legally discontinued. By a 
clause in section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, Congress is 
given power to establish post-offices a!ld post-roads. The 
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{)rdinary rule of construction of governmental powers would 
have led to tl.Je conclusion that Congress, being charged with 
the duty of establishing post-offices and post-roads, could not 
delegate such duty to a branch of the executive department 
of the Go,·ernment. In the case cited, however, Mr. Justice 
Clifford, delivering the opinion of the court, says: 
'' Power to establish post-offices and post-roads is conferred 
upon Congress, but the policy of the Government from the 
time the General Post-Office was established has been to dele-
gate the power to designate the places where the mails shall 
be received and deliveved to the Postmaster-General." 
Having found that the power of the Postmaster-General to 
establish post-offices was justified by usage and the policy of 
the Government from its foundation, the court held that the 
power to discontinue post-offices was ine (lent to the power to 
establish them, and that, therefore, the discontinuance of the 
post-office by the Postmaster-General was legal,- notwith-
standing the fact that a postmaster had be~n appointed by 
the :?resident, by and with the advice and oonsent of the 
Senate, for a term of four years, which had not expired at the 
time of the discontinuance of the post-office. 
Another case which illustrates the same principle, although 
it involved only the construct on of a statute, is United States 
v. Hill (120 U.S. R., 169), where the question was whether 
the clerk should include fees in natm;alization proceedings 
in his returns of emoluments. It was shown to have been 
the custom in the United States courts in Massachusetts, 
from 1839 to 1884, to charge $3 as fees in such proceedings, 
and not to include them in the returns. It was held that the 
interpretation of the statute by judges, heads of Departments, 
and accounting officers, cotempora.neous with the passage of 
the law and continuous, was one on whieh the obligors in 
the bond of the clerk had a right to rely, and it not being 
clearly erroneous, would not now be overturned. 
It seems to me apparent, then, from the cases cited, that 
where long ll8age, dating back to a period cotemporary with 
the adoption of the Constitution, sanctions. an interpretation 
of that instrument different from that which would be reached 
by 'the ordinary rules of construction were the question a new 
one, the usage will be followed. It becomed important, there-
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fore, in determining the question here to be answered, to 
trace from the beginning of the Government, if possible, the 
course of legislation out of which section 398 was developed 
and the practice of the Post-office Department with reference 
to the subject-matter of that section. 
After the Declaration of Independence, the only reference 
we can find to foreign mails, and the practice in regard to 
them, is on page 47 of the sixth volume of the Journals of 
Congress, of May 5, 1780, in which it is provided that "all 
masters of packets and other vessels in the Continental 
service be and they are required to lodge whatever letters 
they bring from abroad in the po~t-office nearest to the port 
at which they arrive, and immediately after their arrival.'' 
I can find no trace of any arrangement with foreign govern-
ments by the Cong ess under the articles of confederation. 
From 1789, when the Constitution was adopted, until 1792, 
the post-office as it had been established under the articles 
of confederation continued without any legislation, except a 
simple provi ion that it should be conducted as it had been 
before the adoption of the Constitution. On February 20, 
1792, Congress passed an act (1 Stat., 231) establishing a 
Post-Office Department and vesting certain powers in the 
Postmaster-General. Section 26 of that act was as follows: 
"That it shall be lawful for the Postmaster. General to 
make provision where it may be necessary for the receipt of 
all letters and packets intended to be conveyed by any ship 
or vessel beyond sea, or from any port in the United States 
to another port therein ; and the letters so received shall be 
formed into a mail, sealed up, and directed to the postmaster 
of the vort to which such ship or vessel shall be bound, and 
for eYcry letter or packet so received there shall be paid at 
the time of its reception a postage of one cent, which shall 
be for the use of the postmasters respectively receiving the 
same. And the Postmaster-General may make arrangements 
with the postmasters in any foreign country for the recip-
rocal receipt and delivery of letters and packets through the 
post-offices." 
The act of 1792 expired by limitation in 1794, in which 
year, upon May 8, a permanent act was passed establishing 
the Post-Office Department, containing the same provision 
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quoted above, in its section 26 ( 1 Stat., 354). This last act 
continued in force until April30, 1810, when another act was 
passed for the organization of the Post-Office Department, 
which in section 32 (2 Stat., 603) contained the •same provis-
ion quoted abo,~e. This section was repeated in the act of 
March 3, 1825 ( 4 Stat., 112), and continued in force until the 
act of March 3, 1851. Before the repeal of the section quoted, 
however, by a joint resolution approved June 15, 1844 (5 
Stat., 718), Congress authorized the Postmaster-General-
" To make such arrangements as may be deemed expedient 
with the post office department of the British Government 
for the transmission of the British mail in its unbroken state 
or condition between Boston and Canada;" and 
"To enter into such arrangement or arrangements with 
the proper authorities in France and Germany~ and the own-
ers or agents of the vessels plying regularly between those 
oountries and the United States, whereby a safe and, as near 
as possible, a regular and direct mail communication, under 
official guaranty, between the United States and the conti-
nent of Europe, viz, the ports of Bremen in Germany, and 
Ha\re in France, and such other principal ports on said con. 
tinent as the Postmaster-General shall deem proper, shall be 
secured, so tha the entire inland and foreign postage on' let-
ters and all other mail matter sent over sea from and to the 
United States, to and from any port of France, and of the 
States comprehended within the German Customs Union, and 
of those countries of the continent between which and France 
and the said German States there exists a continued arrange-
ment of the like kind, may be paid at the place where they 
are respectively mailed or received.'' 
On December 15, 1848, a postal convention was concluded 
with Great Britain, which was signed by George Bancroft 
for the United States and Lord Palmerston for Great Brit-
ain, and was concurred in by the Senate. Ratifications were 
exchanged January 26,1849. (2 Stat., 966, 967.) It was pro-
vided that all measures of detail arising out of the stipula-
tions should be arranged by the post-office of the United 
States and the British post-office and should be modified 
whenever the two post-offices deemed it expedient. This 
postal convention between the United States and Great Brit-
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ain is the only one in the history of the country which has 
been concurred in by tile Senate. By the act of March 3, 
1851, already referred to, the section which had been in force 
since 1792, and which is quoted above, was repealed; and as 
part ofsection2 ofthat act was enacted the following (9 Stat., 
589): 
" And the Postmaster-General, by and with the ad vice and 
consent of the President of the United States, shall be and be 
hereby is authorized to reduce or enlarge from time tu time the 
rates of postage upon all letters and other mailable matter 
conveyed between the United States and any foreign country, 
for the purpose of making better postal arrangements with 
other governments, or counteracting any ad \?erse measures 
affecting our postal intercourse with foreign countrieb." 
The part ofthe section just quoted continued in force until 
the act of June 8, 1872, when by section 167 of that act (17 
Stat. 304) it was prqvided : 
''That for the purpose of making better postal arrange-
ments with foreigu countries, or to counteract their ad verse 
measure~ affecting our postal intercourse with them, the 
Postmaster-General, by and with the advice and consent of 
the President, may negotiate and conclude postal treaties or 
conventions, and may reduce or increase the' rates of post-
age on mail matter convey~ between the United States and 
foreign countries.'' 
By section 103 of the same act it was provided: 
"That the Postmaster-General may conclude arrangements 
with the post departments of foreign governments, with which 
postal conventions have been or may be concluded, for the 
exchange, by means of postal orders, of small sums of money 
not exceeding fifty dollars in amount, at such rates of ex-
change, and compensation to postma ters, and under such 
rules and regulations as he may deell! expedient; and the ex-
penses of establishing and conducting such system of ex-
change may be paid out of the proceeds of the money-order 
business." 
Section 273 of the same act authorized the Postmaster-
General, by and with the ad vice and consent of the President, 
to make any arrangem~nts which he deemed just and ex-
pedient with Canada, or any other country adjoining tbe 
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United States, by which each of the two contracting coun-
tries should have the right to carry mail over the other's 
territory, and carry the mail unbroken from one point in its 
own territory across the territory of the other back to a point 
in its own territory. · 
In 1873 section 167 of the act just quoted became section 
398 of the Revised Statutes, section103 became section 4028, 
and section 273 became section 4012, without change in their 
language, and ar~ to-day the law. 
It will be seen from the history of thes~ sections that by 
a process of evolution the power which was given to the Post-
master-General to make arrangements with foreign post-
masters with reference to the reciprocal receipt and delivery 
of mails grew into a power to conclude treaties upon postal 
matters, at least s far as fixing the rates of postage between 
two countries. 
I have not been able in an examination of the records at 
hand to find what arrangements were made between the 
Postmaster General of this country and foreign postmasters 
in the early years of the Government. That there were ar-
rangements must be presumed, and that they were observed 
as binding on the respective governments of the contracting 
postmasters there is no reason to doubt. 
It will be noted that until the act of June 8, 1872, the ar-
rangements between the Postmaster· General and the post-
office departments of other countries were not dignified by 
the name of "postal conventions" or "treaties." As the 
Statutes at Large include only treaties and conventions, the 
failure of the law to describe postal arrangements as such, 
with foreign countries, until 1872, expJains why there is no 
record of such arrangements in the Statutes at Large until 
the eighteenth volume, part 3, covering the treaties from 
December, 1873, to March, 1875. In that volume we find a 
record of a postal conventiOn between the United Sta.tes and 
Sweden and Norway, entered into by the Postmaster-Gen-
eral, with the ad vice and consent of the President, signed 
March 15, 1873. Also the record of what is called "A sec-
ond additional convention to the postal couvention of August 
21, 1867, between the United States and Belgium," signed 
by the Postmaster.General )lay 9, 1873, and approved by 
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the President May 12, 1873. This show:s that a postal con-
vention bad been entered into with Belgium in August, 1867, 
no record of which appears in the Statutes at Large. In the 
same volume (18 Statutes at Large) are recorded postal con-
ventions with other countries, which, by their terms, are modi-
fications of former postal conventiot'ls entered into by the 
Postmaster-General. 
It is fair to presume from the material at hand, therefore, 
that from the legislation of 1792 above given upon this sub-
ject down to the present time the Postmaster-General, by the 
authority conferred in the acts of Congress to which reference 
has been made, has exercised the treaty -making power of the 
Government in so far as it was necessary to the improve-
ment of the foreign mail service, and that, with the single 
exception of the postal treaty of 1848 bet een England and 
this country, to which reference has been made, the concur-
rence of the Senate has not been deemed necessary to tile 
Yalidity of such treaties. The powers of the Postma8ter. 
General in this regard under the present statutes are larger, 
and at the same time better defined, than they were in the act 
of 1792, but the general character of the power, that is, of 
binding the Government by a contract with a foreign nation 
with reference to interpostal conveniences, has not lJeen 
changed. 
From the foundation of the Government to the present day, 
then, the Constitution llas been interpreted to mean that the 
power vested in the President to make trtaties, with the con-
currence of two-thirds of the Senate, does not exclude the 
right of Congress to vest in the Postmaster-General power 
to conclude conventions with foreign governments for the 
cheaper, safer, and more con,·enient carriage of foreign mails. 
The existence of such a power in Uongress may, perhaps, l>e 
worked out from the authority given to that body in the seY-
enth clause of section 8, of Article!, of the Constitution, toe~· 
tablish post-offices and post-roads. This has alwa~-s been con-
strued to mean power to organize and carry on the Post-Off;ice 
Department. Foreign mail is so closely connected with a 
proper system of inland mail as that the power to orgamze 
and carry on a general post-office system would seem to im-
ply a power to organize. in connection therewith, a system of 
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 521 
Postal Guide. 
foreign mails, and, in the maintenance of such a system, a 
power to conclude contracts with the post-office departments 
of other countries. The delegation of these implied powers 
by Congress to the Postmaster-General, sanctioned by usage 
since the adoption of the Constitution, on the principles laid 
down in the case of Warev. United States, supra, has acquired 
constitutional validity. 
For the reasons given, I am of the opinion that sections 
398, 4012, and 4028, of the Revised Statutes, are constitu-
tional and valid. 
The further question, whether the power so conferred au-
thorizes the Postmaster-General to enter into conventions 
with foreign governments, by which in a foreign parcels post 
the limit of weight may be extended to pack ages of not more 
than 11 pounds, has alreads. been am~wered by Attorney-
General Garland in his opinion of June 30, 1887, and calls 
for no other response than a reference to that opinion, where 
the conclusion is stated that under section 398 the author-
ity conferred will justify the entering into a convention of 
the character above stated. 
Very respectfully, 




W. H. H. MILLER. 
POSTAL GUIDE. 
The determination of what shall be the contents of the Postal Guide 
rests entirely with the Postmaster-General. 
DEP ARTM~NT OF JUSTICE, 
March 22, 1890. 
Sm: In reply to your communication requesting an opin-
IOn as to whether you may legally publish the whole or any 
part of your annual report in the official publication called 
the Postal Guide, I beg to say that, in my opinion, it rests 
with you entirely, under the law, to determine what shall be 
• 
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the contents of that publication. Upon that matter your 
judgment is final, as a necessary consequence from your 
position as the head of the Post Office Department and from 
the absence-of any law regulating the subject. 
What has been already said makes, perhap~, the question 
contained in the concluding paragraph of your communica-
tion no longer of practical importance. If, however, I am 
mistaken in this and you still desire an expression of opinion 
on that question, I should thank you to lay before me the ex-
act state of facts to which the question applies, as I am 
limited by law to such questions of law as arise in the course 
of official administration. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
WISCONSIN RAILROAD LAND-GRANTS. 
The claim of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad 
Company (successor of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Com-
pany) to certain lands under the land-grants made to the State of 
Wisconsin by the acts of June 3, 1856, chapter 43, and 1\Iay 5, 1864, chap-
ter 80, considered. 
DEPART:\lENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 7, 1890. 
SIR : By the act of Congress approved June 3, 1856, it 
was provided, "That there be and is hereby granted to the 
State of Wisconsin, for the purpose of aiding in the construe. 
tion of a railroad from :\Iadison or Columbus, by way of 
Portage City, to the St. Croix River or lake, between town-
ships twenty-five and thirty-one, and from thence to the west 
end of Lake Superior, to Bayfield, every alternate ~ection," etc. 
By another act, approved J\Iay 5,1864, additional land was 
granted to the State of Wisconsin upon the same terms, for 
the purpose of extending the road from the St. Croix River 
to the west end of Lake Superior. 
It is further pro\ided that the said lands, thereby granted 
to the said State, shall be subject to the disposal of the legis-
lature thereof, for the purposes aforesaid and no other. 
By subsequent sections of these acts it is provided that if 
TO THE PRESIDENT. 523 
Wisconsin Railroad Land-grants. 
the said roads are not completed within ten years, no further 
sales shall be made, and the lands unsold shall revert to the 
United States. 
By an act of the legislature the State of Wisconsin ac-
cepted these grants and assumed the execution of the trust. 
The route of the road was surveyed and a map of its location 
was filed in the Land Office at Washington. 
A trespasser cut a large amount of logs upon these lands 
and had them in a boom, with other logs, at Stillwater, Minn. 
An agent of the State seized these logs,- claiming them as 
the property of the State. Schulenberg, who had cut and 
claimed to own the logs, brought replevin against Harriman, 
agent of the State, and the case is reported in 21 Wallace, 
at page 44. By that decision it is settled: 
First. That this was a grant in presenti, passing the title 
of the laud to the State so soon as the survey enabled a defi-
nite location to be made. 
Second. That the fact that no part of the road had been 
built was immaterial ; that the lands were granted upon a 
condition subsequent; and that until the Government, either 
by act of Congress or by a suit duly commenced, re-asserted 
its claim to the lands, the title to the State was good. As a 
consequence, it was held that the agent of the State was en-
titled to hold the logs. 
It is my understanding that it is under this grant that. the 
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Uompan,,-, tllrough the 
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad Com-
pany, is claiming the 42,000 acres of land which you are now 
asked to patent. 
This suit was decided in the Supreme Court in 187 4, nearly 
twenty years after the original grant. When the case was 
tried the road was still not constructed, but that was held to 
be immaterial. 
In the St. Lo'ltis, etc., Railway Oo. against J.l!cGee (115 U.S. 
R., 469) it is held that in order that an act of Congress should 
work a reversion to the United States for condition broken 
of lands granted by them to a State to aid in internal im-
provements, the legislation must directly, positively, and 
with freedom from all doubt or ambiguity, manifest the in-
tention of Congress to fe-assert title and resume possession. 
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In l'an "'iVyck against Knevals (106 U.S. R., 360)it is held: 
" Failure to complete a railroad according to the conditions 
of a grant of lands to· th~ company, which has already at-
tached, can be asserted as a forfeiture of the grant only by 
the grantor, the United States, through judicial proceedingR 
or through the action of Congress." 
In the St. Paul, etc., Railroad against the Winona, et_c., Rail-
road (112 U. S. R., 720) and in the Sioux Gity, etc., Railroad 
against the Chicago, etc., Railroad (117 U. S., 406) it is held : 
''In grants of lands to aid in lmilding railroads the title to 
the lands within the primary limits within which all the odd 
or even sections are granted relates, after the road is located 
according to law, to the date of the grant; and in cases 
where these limits, as between different roads, conflict or en-
croach on each other, priority of date of the act of Congress 
and not priority of location of the lines of road gives prior-
ity of title." 
In 1880, a controversy having arisen between a number of 
railroad companies claiming lands under these two grants 
of 1856 and 1864, the Madison and Portage Railroad Com-
pany filed its bill of complaint in the circuit court of the 
United States for the western district of Wisconsin against 
the several other railroad companies claiming such interests 
and the treasurer of the State of Wisconsin, for the purpose 
of settling the rights of the parties in the premises. A cross-
bill was filed by the Wisconsin Railroad and Farm 1\fortgage 
Company, another party claiming an interest, and still an-
other cross- ill by the West Wisconsin Railway Company. 
The principal matters in controversy in that suit appear to 
ha,-e been as to the rights of these various railroad com-
panies within the indemnity limits along the lines contem-
plated by the grants of 1856 and 1864. The United States 
Government was not a party to these proceedings, and of 
course no question was settled in the case as between the 
United States Government and any of these parties, but 
thr~ughout the litigation the validity of the grants and the 
right to have the lands patented and applied to the construc-
tion of the road, according to the terms of these grants, is 
assumed. A hearing was had in the case before Judges 
Harlan, Drummond, and Bunn, and decree made directing 
and adjudicating the rights of the v3rious parties to lands 
under these grants, upon the assumption of their validity. 
No question seems to have been made upon the point that 
the roads were not completed within the times limited in the 
granting acts. 
On March 3, 1887, Congress passed an act (24 Stat., 556) 
the first section of which reads as follows: 
''That the Secretary of the Interior be and he is hereby 
authorized and directed to immediately adjust, in accordance 
with the decisions of the Supreme Court, each of the rail-
road grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of 
railroads and heretofore unadjusted." 
The second section of the -act requires the Sl•cretary of the 
Interior, in any case where lands have been erroneously pat-
ented to aid in the construction of a railroad, to demand the 
relinquh;hment of the same, and upon a failure to obtain such 
relinquishment within ninety days it is made the duty of the 
.Attorney-General to commence and prosecute a suit to can-
cel such patents, certifications, or other evidences of title, etc. 
Section 4 of that act requires that where lands were erro-
neously certified or patented, having been sold by the rail-
road company to purchasers in good faith, patents shall issue 
from the United States to such purchasers, but the railroad 
company shall be liable to tile Government for such purchase 
money, and it is made the duty of the Attorney-General in 
case of neglect or refusal of the company to pay over the Rum 
to commence suits fdr such purchase money. 
This being the state of the law, on the 22d of March, 1887, 
nineteen days after the above act was approved, Sec'retary 
Lamar gave an opinion (5 Decisions of the Department of 
the Interior relating to public lands, p. 511) reversing the 
action of the Commissioner of the G~neral Land Office 
(Sparks) with relation to these lands. Commissioner Sparks, 
it seems, was denying the title of the railroad companies to 
these lands, and.was insisting that suits should be instituted 
by the Attorney-General against the railroad companies, 
their officers and agents, to restrain them from cutting or 
disposing of timber upon any lands selected or claimed as 
indemnity lands or being within withdrawn indemnity limits·; 
and further, to recover the value of timber cut, and that these 
526 HON. W. H. H MILLER 
Wlscon:-.ln Railroad Lann-grants. 
officers, agents, etc., be proceeded against criminall~·. The 
Secretary in reversing Commissioner Sparks's decision re-
cited a former decision of the Secretary, reversing a former 
decision of the Commissioner (5 L. D., 80), a11d states that 
the selections made by the Farm J\fortgage Company, the 
claimant in that former case, having since been approved, all 
question relating to the lands therein must be eliminated 
from the matter now under consideration. The Secretary 
thereupon recites the history of these land grants, citing the 
decision in Schulenburg against Harriman (supra) and his own 
former decision, and says: 
"I therefore decline to concur in your recommendations 
to the Attorney-General, hut, on the contrary, I have to di-
rect that you cause said railroad grant to be forth with adjusted, 
and transmit for my approval, in the customary form, proper 
lists of lands, subject to selection and selected by said com-
pany, within the indemnity limits of said grant." 
To save copying I bring you the book containing these 
demsions. 
I am advised that for many years this railroad company 
bas been operated as a land-grant railroad; that the Gon~ru­
ment has been adjusting its accounts with it as such; that 
while it was not com;tructed within the time limited in the 
original grant, the Government did not see fit, prior to the 
construction of the road, to take advantage of that fact, uor 
has it attempted to do so since. 
Under the circumstances, therefore, if there is any reason 
why these lands ought not to be patented to the railroad 
company, in pursuance of the ruling of the Secretary of the 
Interior, as above set forth, it has not been brought to my 
attention. 
If it be the fact, as it is represented, that the Government 
has been using this railroad as a land-grant road, and set-
tling its accounts for transportation over the same upon that 
basis, then, unless a rule directly at variance with that en-
forced between private parties is to prevail, the Government 
is estopped to insist upon forfeiture now (W.arville on Vend-
ors, 450; Ludlow against Xew rork and Harlem Railroad Com-
pany, 12 Barbour, 440; Kenner against American OontractOom-
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pany, 9 Bush, 202). But the Supreme Court has '"ery recently 
held that in matters of this kind "the rights of the Govern-
mentdepend upon the same general principles which would au-
thorize a private citizen to apply to a court of justice." (United 
States agai11st San Jacinto Tin Company, 125 U.S. R., 285.) 
I can not doubt, theref9re, unless I am misinformed as to 
the facts, that this railroad company bas the absolute right to 
these lands; and to withhold them is not only to violate the 
law, but the will of the law"making power as expressed in 
the statute above cited. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
CUSTOMS LAWS-CLASSIFICATION. 
Steel chains used for bicycle gearing should be classified for duty under 
paragraph 171 (not under paragraph 216) of the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE, 
April 8, 1890. 
SIR: In a letter of March 22, 1890, you have requested the 
opinion of the Attorney-General upon the questiou whether 
so-called steel chains (bicycle gearing), imported by William 
Read & Sons, should be classified unuer paragraph 171 or 
under paragraph 216 (T. I. new) of the tariff act of March 3, 
1b83. The inclosures which accompany your request show 
!:hat the question is pending before your Department on ap-
peal from the decision of the collector of customs at Boston 
by which he classified the articles in question under para-
graph 216 ''as manufactures, articles or wares, not specific-
ally enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly 
or in part of • • • steel." The protest and appeal of 
the importers, William Read & Sons, which is also inclosetl, 
is on the ground that the articles in question should have 
been classified under paragraph 171, which imposes a duty 
upon ''Chain or chains of all kinds, made of iron or 
steel, not less than three-fourths of one inch in diameter, 
one and three-quarter cents per pound ; less than three-
fourths of one inch and not less than three-eighths of one 
inch in d.ialne 1i, t o Qents per pound ; less than three-eigh hs 
of one db in diameter, two and one-half cents per pound." 
111 dltion to the protest a!ld appeal of William Read & 
request is accompanied with a letter from the col-
.· '18()mJr·m customs at Boston, an opinion by J. C. Bighu, assist-
.e.li app:rai1ser at the port of New York, a letter from Charles 
;¥CGlel1.an1d, special deputy collector at the custom-house, New 
York, a pamphlet containing the opinion of your Depart-
ment, No. 9673, with reference to the proper classification of 
the articles in question, apd a sample of the chain imported. 
n my opinion the appeal of the importers must be sus-
tained. 
Worcester de.fines a chain to be'' aserieRof connected links 
or rings." An examination of the sample of the gearing 
chain, which accompanies your request, shows beyond ques-
tion that it is a chain, within this definition. The opinion of 
your Department, o. 96't; in fJCribingthe article, says that 
the Jinks tb~epf hava no nifo.rm diameter, every ~~nd 
link · ~t, and tll& oa;Jler • k& bei.Dg :round at the en 
and iblt m t e mid<Ue; b t said lin}ts are joined bY, nts 
passing through the ends of the ftat links and the raund parts 
of the others, an,d that th,e links have been milled and riveted 
together subsequent to their being forged. This description 
does not take the artiele out of the definition given by Wor-
cester above, for, however the links a.re joined, they remain 
" a series of connected links." 
Assistant appraiser Bighu bases his decision that these 
articles can not be classified under paragraph 171 on the ground 
that the rate of duty therein imposed is de pendent on the 
diameter of the iron or steelconstitutingthe links; and tbat 
to come within the scope of this provision, therefore, the 
character of the links forming the chain should be of such uni 
form shape that in their measurement the diameter could be 
readily determined. 
It may be said, as conclusive of the fallacy of this argument, 
that paragraph 171 i~poses a. duty on ''chain or chains of all 
kinds," and that there is no limitation whatever with refer-
ence to the uniformity of size of the links, or the material com-
posing the links, or the manner in which they re connected. 
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The fact that the duty in paragraph 171 is made to vary in-
versely as the diameter of the chain may impose upon the 
appraising officer the solution of a difficult question with re-
spect to the rate to be assessed on certain kinds of chains, 
but such difficulty can not in my opinion form any ground 
whatever for excluding from so general a class as "chain or 
chains of all kinds" an article which is undoubtedly a chain. 
It is true that if evidence could be adduced to show that the 
article here in question was not known as a chain in trade or 
commerce, that fact would exclude the subject of this discus-
sion from paragraph 171; but in the absence of evidence to that 
effect the article must be classified under its ordinary, every-
day name. Instead of there being evidence to show that the 
article is not known a..; a chain, the letters and circulars which 
accompany the protest of the importers show beyond ques-
tion that the articles are known in trade and commerce as 
chains. 
I have the honor, therefore, to recommend that the appeal 
of William Read & Sons be sustained ; that the articles im-
ported be classified as chains, under paragraph 171 of the tariff 
act ; aud that the opinion, No. 9673, heretofore rendered by 
your Department, directing a different classification, be modi-
fied accordingly. 
The inclosures above referred to are herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES IN ARIZONA. 
Under the organic law of the Territory of Arizona and the statutes 
passed by the legislature thereof, the governor is not invested with 
power to assign to their respective districts the judges appointed for 
that Territory. 
The authority given the governor lly section 1873, Revised Statutes, was 
intended to be exercised only during that period which is embraced 
between the datA of the organization of the Territory and the time 
when legislative action was had upon the subject-matter referred to in 
that section. After such action by the legislature the authority ter-
minated and the operation of the section ceased. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 8, 1890. 
SIR : On February 18, 1890, you referred to the Attorney-
General for his opinion the question whether the governor 
of Arizona, under the organic law of that Territory and the 
statutes passed by its legislature, has the power to assign 
the supreme court judges of the Territory, who by law are 
required to act as judges of the district court, to their r~­
spective districts. Your request is accompanied by an opin· 
ion of Assistant Attorney-General Shields to the effect that 
such power is reposed in the governor by act of Congress. 
Sections 1873, 1913, and 1918 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States, part of the organic law of the Territory 
of Arizona, provide as follows : 
Section 1873: "Temporarily, and until otherwise provided 
by law, the governor of every Territory which may be here-
after established shall define by proclamation the judicial 
districts of such Territory, and assign the judges appointed 
for such Territory to the several districts, as well as fix the 
time and places for holding courts in the respective counties 
or subdivisions of each judicial district/' 
Section 1913: "The legislative assemblies of New Mexico, 
Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, and Wyoming Ter-
ritories, respectively, may organize, alter, or modify the sev-
eral judicial districts thereof in such manner as each legisla· 
tive assembly deems proper and convenient." 
Section 1918: ''The legislative assemblies of New Mexico, 
Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, and Wyoming Ter-
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ritories may assign the judges appointed for such Territories, 
respectively, to the several judicial districts thereof in such 
manner as each legislative assembly deems proper and con· 
venient." 
These sections of the Revised Statutes were deri,ed from 
section 16 of the act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat., 452), and 
were in force substantially in the same form at the time Ari-
zona became an organized Territorial government. 
Chapter 44 of the Compiled Laws of .Arizona (1877), page 
392, shows that after the organization of the Territory its 
legislature, in accordance with the powers conferred by the 
organic law ab0ve quoted, defined the three districts of the 
Territory in which district courts were to be held, and assigned 
a· district to each of the then judges of the supreme court by 
name. 
By the act approved December 30, 1865 (to be found in 
chapter 44 of the Com piled Laws of .Arizona, page 392), it 
was provided that-
"Whenever a district judge has been or shall be appointed 
to :fill a vacancy in this Territory, he is hereby assigned to the 
district of the judge in whose place he has been appointed." 
By the act of revision, which went into effect in 1887,chap-
ter 44 was repealed (Rev. Stat., 1887, pp. 567 and 588), and 
in the Revised Statutes now in force the only provision witll 
reference to the assignment of judges of the supreme court 
to the different districts is found in section 600, page 158 of 
the Revised Statutes of .Arizona, 1887, by which it was en-
acted: 
"That there shall be three district courts in this Territory, 
to be established by law; and a judge of the supreme court 
shall be assigned to and hold the courts in each of such dis-
tricts." 
Sections 623, 624, 625, and 626 rlefine the limits of the 
three judicial districts. Nowhere in the Revised Statutes is 
there any provision as to the way by which judges are to be 
assigned to districts. 
The question now to be answered is : Does the power to 
assign judges revert to the governor under section 1873 of 
the Revised Statutes of the United States, the same being 
part of the organic law of the Territory~ 
The ground upon which Mr. Assistant Attorney-General 
Shields rests his opinion that the governor now has the power 
of assignment is stated by him as follows : 
''As there is now no Territorial legislation regulating the 
matter of assignment, I am of the opinion that the authority 
to make the necessary assignment rests where it was placed 
by section 1873 of the United States Revised Statutes, 
namely, in the governor, to be exercised by him temporarily 
and no til otherwise provided by Ia w. 
" That an assignment shall be made is an essential pre-
requisite to the authority of the district judge (sec. 600, Ari-
zona Rev. Stat., 1887), and it is not to be presumed that the 
exercise of such judicial authority is· to remain suspended 
until a session of the Territorial legislature; nor can it be 
said that because the legislature at one time prescribed a 
rule by which the order of succession was declared, in case an 
appointment was made to fill a vacancy;-that such order is 
to be followed now, after the repeal of said legislative rule." 
I most respectfully dissent-from the conclnsien of Mr. As-
sistant Attomey.General Shields upon the question involved. 
Section 1873 of the Revised Statutes of the United States 
is in its terms a temporary provision, and one which is to 
have efl'ect only during that period which is em braced be 
tween the date of the organization of the Territory and the 
time when legislative action is had upon the ~ubject-matter 
referred to in the section. The expression '' until otherwise 
provided by law "seems to me manifestly to mean that after 
action by the legislature this section is to have no eftect. 
To have the meaning which is attributed to it by the A.s~st­
ant Attorney-General, it must be held equivalent to the ex-
pression "and when not otherwise provided by law." To 
make the two expressions equivalent is to do violence to the 
language used in the section, which no dilemma, however 
great, caused by a failure of the legislature to take necessary 
action, will justify. Section 1873 is a part of the rganic law 
governing the Territory of Arizona, and hJ'S close analogy, 
therefore, to the constitution of the State. (National Bank 
v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S., 129). Where a constitution 
is established, or a new constitution is adopted, it often be-
comes necessaey for the constitutional convention to make pro-
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vision for the interval between the time when the new con-
stitution g·oes into effect and the time when the legislature 
can enact the necessary laws to carry its provisions into effect. 
Such temporary provisions are ordinarily known as the Sched-
ule (State, ex rel. Attorney-General, v. Tayla,r, 15 0. S., 142.) 
When the legislature has acted, and the laws ha\e been passed 
putting into operation the new constitution, it would hardly 
_..,.,..- be claimed that the Schedule could be revived to make up 
for the failure of legislati\e action th,.reafter. In such a case 
the Schedule would have served its purpose in filling the hia-
tus caused by the adoption of the new constitution and the 
necessary delay in legislative action thereunder. After leg-
islative action it bas no force. Such is the case with section 
1873. It lost its force as part of the organic law of the Ter-
ritory of Arizona when the first legislature of Arizona took 
action upon the subject-matter which it embraced. It had 
then discharged its function and was of no force whatever 
so far as that Territory was concerned. 
The result is that the governor of ·Arizona has no power 
to make assignments for the judges. 
The papers you inclosed are herewith returned. 
Very reRpectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
CIVIL SERVICE-CERTIFICATE FOR RE-INSTATEMENT. 
A person who served as a contract surgeon, in the late war of the rebel-
lion, with troops in the field and in hospitals, and by completing his 
contract was honorably discharged the service, is within the proviso 
to Departmental Rule X of the Civil-Service Rules and Regulations, 
and entitled to the benefits thereby conferred. 
DEPA.RTME.NT OF JUSTICE, 
April 8, 1890. 
SIR: In a letter of February 27, 1890, at the instance of 
the Civil Service Commission, you requested the opinion of 
the Attorney-General upon the question "whether contract 
surgeons are entitled to the benefits contingently conferred 
up()n certain persons by the proriso to Departmental :Rule 
X of the Civil-Servil:e Rules and Regulations." Your letter 
~ accompanied by a correspondence between the Secretary 
of tn~ Interior and the Oivii Servioo Commission, in which 
the Secretary requests the necessary certifiQation, under this 
Rule X, for the re-instatem~nt of Dr. Harvey E. Bowles, as a 
clerk of Class 1 in tke Pension Office, said Bowles having 
been dismissed to take effect February 28, 1886, and no 
record of delinquency or mis_,onduct on his part appearing 
in the office. The request was based on the statemept of the 
Secretary that Bowles had served in the Union Army from 
April 21, 1864, to J~Iy 6, 1865, ten months in the hospital 
service, and the remainder of the time at Fort Whipple. 
The Civil Service CotnnilsSion requested a statement from 
the War DepaFtment of the military $ervice and hospital 
record of Dr. Bowie aiU1 wet~ i M~d by that Department 
that its records showed tliat dn ril 21, lJ:864:, Harvey E. 
Bo l 's eoutraet with the abver ~bent u~n an, 
and that it terminated on tllie 6th of JUly, 1865. :rn unswer 
to the request of the Commission to be informed '' whether 
this man's serviee is considered by the War Department as 
an army service, whether persons occupying the position of 
'contract surgeon' were considered a part of the military 
force of the United States during the late war," the War 
Department replied that contract surgeons were not con-
sidered as a part of the military forces of the United States 
during the late war. In consequence of this statement and 
opinion from the War Department the certificate requested 
by the SeCretary of the Interior was refused by the Civil 
Service Commission. On Decem '•er 20, 1889, Bowles re-
quested that the Civil Service Uommission be again asked to 
furuish the necessary certificate of his re-instatement, and 
accompanied that request with written orders issued to him 
as acting assistant surgeon of the United States Army, 
while he was fulfilling his contract as surgeon with the 
Government, as evidence in his behalf. 
Departmental ~hle X is as follows: 
"Upon requisition of the head of a Department, the Com-
mission shall certify for re-instatement in said Department, 
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in a grade requiring no higher examination than the one in 
which he was formerly employed, any person who, within 
one year next preceding the date of the request, has, through 
uo delinquency or miscon<luct, been separated from the cla~­
sified service of that De )artment: Provided, That certifica-
tion may be made, subject to the other conditions of this rule, 
for the re-instatement of any person who served in the mili-
tary or naval service of the United States, in the late war of 
the rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom, with-
out regard to the length of time he has been separated from 
the service." 
I am of the opinion that the question put by you should 
be answered in the affirmative~ and that Dr. Bowles is entitled 
to the benefits conferred by the proYiso in Departmental 
Rule X just quoted. A.u exam in ttion of Winthrop's Digest 
of the Opinions of the J uuge- Ad vocate-General, under the 
title "Acting Assistant" or "Contract" Surgeon, page 10~, 
shows that a contract surgeon was a physician un~er a spe-
cial contract for his personal service as a medical attendant 
to the troops; that contract surgeons were' employed because 
there were not enough medica1 officers of the Army to attend 
all the posts; that they were amenable to the milit~ry juris-
diction when employed with the Army in time of war, but 
that they were civilians without military rank atlcl status, 
and were not a part of the military establishment; and that 
when not serving with troops before the enemy they had no 
other relation to the military organization of the Govern-
ment than that ,established by the terms of their contracts. 
The orders issued to Dr. Bowles show beyond question that 
he was au acting assistant or "contract" surgron rendering 
service to the troops in the field before the enemy during the 
late war. 
It has already been decided in an opinion of the late Solicitor-
General Chapman, approved by Attorney-General Miller, of 
date November 19, 1889, that the proviso of Departmental 
Rule X, here in question, was not limited in its application to 
persons who served during the rebellion in the Army of the 
United States, within the statutory definition of that term 
given in section 1094 of the Revised Statutes, and it was there 
held that the clerks and employes on the public buildings in 
586 HON. WM. H. TAFT 
(Jtvll 8ervlee-(Jerttfleate for Re-Instatement. 
Washington who were organized into companies under the 
direction of General Wadsworth, and whQ served in what 
was known as the ''Quartermaster's Brigade," who were 
uniformed, armed, equipped, and drilled, and were employed 
in scouting and other duty, althoug not regularly enrolled 
and enlisted in the Army of the United States, and not hon-
orabl;y discharged from such enlistment within the technical 
meaning of that term as used with reference to the release 
of regularly enlisted soldiers in the Army of the United 
States, were nevertheless within the proviso of said Rule X, 
and must be held, within the language of that proviso, "to 
have served in the military service of tiJe United States in 
the late war of the rebellion," and to have been honorably 
discharged therefrom. 
It seems to me that it is not possible to distinguish in prin-
ciple the case of the quartermaster's volunteers from that 
of the contract surgep118, provided the latter, as was the case 
with BowlS$, took the place and performed the duties of regu-
larly eDIIOlled surgeons on the field and in the :military hos-
pitals. The proviso to Rule X is to be construed liberally, as 
a grateful recognition of patriotic service. If it had been 
the intention of the Oommissioners and the President who 
approved the proviso to have limited its operation to regu-
larly appointed officers and regularly enlisted soldiers of the 
Army of the United States, it would have been easy to have 
so framed its terms, ancl the conclusion would have then been 
reached which Attorney-General Devens found necessary in 
his opinion of September 22, 1878 (16 Opin., 147). Bowles 
served the Government of the United States as a surgeon 
from April, 1864, to July, 1866, and during that time there is 
no reason to suppose that his serrice was not as dangerous, 
his labor not as irksome, and the physical and mental strain 
upon him not as great as it was in the case of any regularly 
appointed surgeon of the Army engaged on the field of battle, 
in the military hospitals, or at military forts during the same 
period. · 
In the analogous case of pensions (for the principle upon 
which pensions are granted, and this proviso was inserted, 
is thcl same) we ftnd that a cgntract surgeon who was dis-
abled by any wound or injury received, or disease contracted 
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iu the line of duty, while actnally performing the duties of 
assistant surgeon, or acting as assistant surgeon with any mili-
tary force in the field, or in transitu, or in hospitals, is en-
titled to receive a pension as a beneficiary under the pension 
laws. (See Rev. Stat., sec. 4693.) By opinion of September, 
26, 1882, Acting Attorney -General Phillips decided that a 
contract surgeon who was making his preparations to leave 
St. Louis for Cairo, Ill., there to go on duty as a contract 
surgeon, and who died from typhoid fever, was "in transitu'' 
within the meaning of this provision. The same liberality of 
construction requires that Dr. Bowles should be held to hav-e 
served in the military service of the United States, and, b.v 
the completion of his contract with the Government, to have 
been honorably discharged from such service. 
Very respectfully, 
Wl\L H. T.AFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
CLAIM OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
The claim of the State of Massachusetts for re-imbursement of expenses. 
incurred in the payment of State militia called out by the governor, 
at the request of the military authorities of the United States, to aid 
in suppressing the "draft riots" in the city of Boston, is allowable 
under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1863, chapter 75, and the 
regulations prescribed by the President agreeably thereto, as an ex-
pense connected with the enrollment and draft authorized by that act. 
This claim is also within the scope of the act of July 27, 1861, chapter 
21, and the supplemental resolution of March 8, 1862 [No. 16], and may 
properly be examined and adjusted by the accounting officers of the 
Treasury under the provisions thereof. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April19, 1890. 
SIR: By letter of March 17, 1890, you have requested the 
opinion of the Attorney-General upon two inquiries pro-
pounded by the Second Comptroller of the Treasury, with 
reference to the adjustment and allowance of the claim of the 
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State of Massachusetts for re-imbur~ement by the Govern-
ment of the United States for expenses incurred by the State 
in payment of troops of the State militia ordered out by Gov-
ernor Andrew to suppress what were known as the ''draft 
riots" in Boston. Your letter is accompanied by a commu-
nication from the Second Comptroller, setting forth the facts 
and the questions to be answered. 
The questions are as follows: 
" First. Is the claim of the State thus presented, and ap-
proved at the War Department, within the scope of the acts 
of July 17 and 27, 1861, and one that may properly be exam-
ined and adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury 
under the provisions of said act t 
'' Second. Are the expenses incurred by the State as afore-
said now (by reason of their approval by the War Depart-
ment) re-imbursable under the act of :March 3, 1863, which 
provides (section 16) that expenses connected with the en-
forcement of the draft, when so approved, shall be paid out 
of the appropriation of said act; the account to be adjusted 
by the accounting officers and reported to Congress as a de-
ficiency '" 
The facts are briefly these: 
By the act of Congress approved .March 3, 1863, the Presi-
dent was authorized to make a draft for the re-enforcement 
of the armies of the United States in the field. The Presi-
dent put the law into operation. In New York City and 
·Boston armed mobs resisted its enforcement. In Boston the 
mobs were too powerful for the available Federal forces to 
suppress. At the provost-marshal's request (with the appro-
bation of General Wool, the commander of the United States 
forces in that department) the governor of Massachusetts 
ordered out the State militia to assist the Federal forces in 
suppressing these mobs. The claim of the State is for ex-
penses incurred solely in paying the State members of the 
militia their per diem for the time while they were so engaged. 
The whole amount of the claim is $27,224.44. 
By act of the 27th of July, 1861 (12 Stat., 276), it was pro- • 
vided that-
"The Secretary of the Treasury be, and be is hereby, di-
rected • • • to pay to the governor of any State • • • 
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the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by such 
State for enrolling • • • its troops employed in aiding 
to suppress the present insurrection against the United 
States, to be settled upon proper vouchers to be filed and 
passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the Treas-
ury." 
By act of March 8, 1862 (12 Stat. 615), it was provided that 
the foregoing act should "be construed to apply to expenses 
incurred as well after as before the day of the approval 
thereof." 
Section 16 of the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 734), which 
was the act giving the President power to enforce a draft, 
provides that-
" All expenses connected with the enrollment and draft, 
including subsistence while at the rendezvous, shall be paid 
from the appropriation for enrolling and drafting under such 
regulations as the President of the United States shall pre-
scribe; and all expenses connected with the arrest and return 
of deserters to their regiments, or such other duties as the 
provost-marshal shall be called upon to perform, shall be paid 
from the appropriation for arresting deserters, under such 
regulations as the President of the United States shall pre· 
scribe." 
Section 25 of the same act provides : ' 4 That if any person 
shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act into the 
service of the United States, or shall counsel or aid any per· 
son to resist any such draft; or shall assault or obstruct any 
officer in making such draft or in the performance of any 
service in relation thereto; or shall counsel any drafted men 
not to appear at the place of rendezvous, or wrongfully dis· 
suade them from the performance of military duty as reqqired 
by law, such person shall be subject to summary arrest by 
the provost-marshal" and upon conviction punished as therein 
provided. 
Paragraph 21 of the regulations of the War Department 
under this act, approved by the President, after quoting the 
foregoing section 25, proceeds as follows : 
"Provost-marshals are required to execute this duty with 
:firmness, but with prudence and good judgment and with-
out unnec'essary harshness." 
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Paragraph 25 of the same regulations provides that "to 
enable provost-marshals to discharge their duties efficiently, 
they are authorized to call upon the nearest. available mili-
tary force, or on citizens as posse cornitatus,or on United States 
marshals and deputy marshals ; and these and all other per-
sons are hereby enjoined to aid the provost-marshal in the 
execution of his lawful duties when called on so to do.~' 
Paragraph 114 provides that "expenditures must be con-
fined to items stated in these regulations. In an unforeseen 
emergency, requiring-a deviation from this rule, a full expla-
nation must be appended to the voucher for the expenditure." 
In the enumeration of proper expenses under the act, con-
tained in paragraph 115 of the regulation, is : " 9. Such 
other necessary expenses, not herein provided for, as may be 
deemed necessary to· the efficient execution of the duties of 
provost-marshal, subject to the decision of the provost-mar-
shal-general." 
Paragraph 13 provides that " all questions relating to the 
payment of expenses connected with the eurollment and 
draft, the arrest and return of deserters to their regiments, 
or such other duties as the provost-marshal shall be called 
upon to perform, shall be referred to the provost-marshal gen-
eral, whose decision thereon shall, so far as the 'Var Depart-
ment is concerned, be final." 
The claim was first presented in 1884. At that time the 
office of Provost-Marshal-General had long been abolished. 
The claim was approved, however, by the proper officers of 
the War Department, and transmitted to the Third Auditor 
under clause third of section 277, Re\. Stat. In 1885 the Third 
Auditor reported this as a proper claim, but recommended the 
allowance of only that part of it which was verified by the 
original vouchers, and the suspension of the remainder until 
original vouchers could be furnished in lieu of certified copies. 
This was concurred in by the then Comptroller. In 1886 the 
new Third Auditor (Williams) made a report adverse to the 
whole claim, on the ground that its payment was not author-
ized by law, and this was concurred in by Comptroller May-
nard. 
I think there can be no doubt that the expenses of putting 
down mobs, organized by the enemies of the Government for 
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the purpose of resisting the execution of the laws of the 
United States for the enrollment of troops and the re-enforce-
ment of its armies, were expenses connected with tlle enroll-
ment and draft provided by the act of :\larch 3. 1863. Such 
mobs were violating the peace of the United States, within 
the definition of that term laid down by Mr. Justice Bradley 
in Ex parte Siebold (100 U. S. R.) and 1\Ir. Justice :\!iller in 
Cunningham v. Neagle at the present term. It became the 
duty of the provost-marshal in the execution of the draft 
laws to keep the peace of the United States, and to put down 
the resistance to those laws, which was · a breach of it. By 
virtue of the regulation of the President quoted above, para-
graph 25, the provost-marshal was authorized to call upon 
the militia of the State of :\Iassachusetts as a posse comitatus 
to assist in keeping the peace of the United States in enforc-
ing its laws. It would seem clear that the provost-marshal 
had authority to incur, on behalf of the United States, an 
obligation to pay what the services of the persons making up 
the posse cmnitatus were reasonably worth. No reason is ap-
parent why a State, which pays the troops to make up the 
posse comitatus for services rendered by them as such, should 
not be as fully entitled to reimbursement as the troops them-
selves would have been had they acted directly on the call of 
the provost-marshal. Such expenses were manifestly '' neces-
sary for the efficient execution of the duties of the provost-
marshal" within clause 9, paragraph 115, of the regulations. 
They have been approved by the officers of the War Depart-
ment who, since the abolishment of the office of Pruvost-
:\Iarshal-General, perform similar duties. Like other expenses 
incurred in the War Department, they go properly to the 
'rhird Auditor for examination and adjustment under section 
277, Rev. Stat. 
This conclusion is based only on provisions of the act of 
:\larch 3, 1863; but in the act of July 27, 1861, as modified 
by the act of March 8, 1862, is also found legislative authority 
for the payment of the claim. The act provides for the re-
imbursement to the State of "charges and expenses properly 
incurred by such State for enrolling '* * * its troops em-
ployed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against 
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the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers to be 
filed and passed upon by thn proper accounting officers of 
the Treasury." 
As has been said, the suppression of the draft riots was a 
necessary expense in enrolling the troops drafted under that 
act. It may be argued that the words "its troops," used in 
the act, indicate that it was only meant to apply to expenses 
incurred in enrolling troops under the State's authority, and 
not troops enrolled under the authority of the United States. 
The history of the Federal army organization~ however, shows 
that the troops enrolled under the draft occupied exactly 
the same relation to the States as those who had been organ· 
ized through voluntary enlistment bJ- the governors of the 
States on the call of the President. They went to make up 
the quota of the State from w hicb they were drafted. They 
were incorporated in the same companies and regiments with 
men who had voluntarily enlisted, and were always regarded 
as troops of their State in the service of the United States. 
Independently of the supplemental act of 1\-Iarch 8, 1862, the 
present claim would probabl_y not be within the provisions of 
the act of July 27, 1861. The supplemental act, however, 
makes it applicable to all expenses of enrollment thereafter 
as well as theretofore incurred, and thus covers the claim in 
question. 
In my opinion, therefore, the questions propounded by the 
Second Oomptroller of ·the Treasury should be answered, 
each of them, in the affirmative. 
The papers transmitted with your letter are herewith re-
turned. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solioitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TRE.A.SURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. 
Where philosophical instruments were imported in boxes about 8 inches 
square, made of hard wood, stained and finely finished, each box having 
a sliding lid and a metal handle, and being of dimensions sufficient to 
hold one instrument: Adt'ised that these boxes were intended to fol-
low their contents into consumption, and to be used therewith both as a 
protection to them and as furnishing a convenient means of carrying 
them about, and therefore that they were "designed for use other-
wise than in the bona fide transportation" of their contents to the 
United States, and consequently are dutiable at 100 per cent. ad va-
lorem under the proviso of the seventh section of the act of March 3, 
1883, chapter 121. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 21, 1890. 
SIR: My opinion is asked upon the question whether the 
action of the collector of customs at Philadelphia is l~gal 
in assessing a duty of 100 per cent. a(: valorem on certain 
boxes containing philosophical instruments, which the im-
porters claim are exempt from duty under section 7 of the 
act of March 3, 1863. (22 Stat., 523.) 
These boxes are about 8 inches square, and made of liard 
wood, stained. and finely finished, each box having a sliding 
lid and a metal handle, for the purpose of convenience in car· 
rying, and being of sufficient dimensions to bold one instru-
ment. 
Section 7 of the act of 1883 repeals sections 2907 and 2908, 
Revised Statutes, and section 14 of the act of June 22, 187 4, 
and declares that" hereafter none of the charges imposed by 
said sections or any other provisions of existing law shall be 
estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to be imported, 
nor shall the value of the usual and necessary sacks, crates, 
boxes, or coverings of any kind be estimated as part of their 
value in dewrmining the amount of duties for which the~­
are liable: Provided, That if any packages, sacks, crates, 
boxes, or coverings of any kind shall be of any material or 
form designed to evade duties thereon, or designed for use 
otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to 
the United States, the same shall be subject to a duty of one 
hundred per centum ad '?alorem upon the actual value of the 
same." 
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The repealed section 2907, Revised Statutes, declares that 
"in determining the dutiable value of merchandise there 
should be added to the cost, or to the actual wholesale price 
or general market value at the time of exportation in the 
principal markets of the countries from whence the same has 
been imported into the United StatP-s * * * the value 
of the sack, box, or covering of any kind in which such mer-
chandise is contained, * * * and all other actual o1· usual 
charges for putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation 
or ship1nent." 
And sPction 14 of the act of June, 1874 (18 Stat., 189), 
modifying "!!omewhat the legislation contained in section 2907, 
Revised Statutes, in referring to the additions in the way of 
expenses required by the latter section to bP- added to the 
cost or market value of goods imported, mentions the "cost 
of packages, boxes, or otller articles containing such goods, 
wares, and merchandise, or any incidental expenses attending 
the packing, shipping, or exportation thereof from the country 
or place where purchased or manufactured." * * * 
Common experience tells us that the necessary tendency 
of this legislation, requiring all the actual and usual charges 
"for putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation 
or shipment" to be added to the cost or value of merchandise 
imported into this country, was to reduce as much as possible 
the cost of sacks, boxes, and coYerings of all kinds used for 
the protection of merchandise on which an ad valorem duty 
was laid. As the expenses of preparing the merchandise for 
transportation were reduced, so was the amount reduced on 
which the duty would be assessed. 
When, therefore, Congress provided by section 7 of the 
act of 1883 (supra) that the" value of the usual and necessctry 
sacks, crates, boxes, or covering of any kind" * * * 
should no longer be estimated as part of the value of goods 
imported, it would seem to have referred to the kinds of 
sacks, crates, boxes, and coverings which up to that time 
had been "usual and necessary; " and this seems to be placed 
beyond doubt by the proviso of the section, which says that 
"if any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any 
kind shall be of any material or form designed to evade duties 
thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide 
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transportation of goods to the Unitecl States, the same shall be 
subject to ctJ duty of one hundrerl per centu'm ad va,lorem upon 
the actual vahte of the same." 
I find myself unable to bold that the boxes described in 
your communication are such boxes as were in contemplation 
by Congress when it declared that " the value of the sack1 
hox, or covering of any kind" in which merchandise is con-
tained shall be free from duty where it is one of the ''actual 
or usual charges for putting up, preparing, and packing" such 
merchandise for transportation or shipment. It appears safe 
to say that when such charges formed part. of the dutiable 
value of merchandise imported,.it could hardly have been 
usual to import philosophical instruments in the expensive 
sort of boxes to which you refer. 
To my mind it is clear that these boxes were intended to 
follow their contents into consumption, and to be constantly 
used in immediate connection with those contents, both as a 
protection to them and as furnishing a more convenient way 
of carrying them about, and therefore that they were "de-
signed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation" 
of their contents to the United States, and were, conse-
quently, dutiable at 100 per cent. ad valorem under the pro-
viso of the seventh section. 
Upon the same ground Mr. Attorney-General Garland held, 
in an opinion dated November 17,1886, that the boxes in which 
parlor and safety matches were imported were liable to duty, 
because the surface on each box, for the purpose of producing 
ignition of the match, showed a design that the box should be 
used otherwise than for the bona fide transportation of its con-
tents. And the Attorney-General refused to follow the case 
of United States v. Tlmrl er (28 Fed. Rep., 56), where it 'vas 
laid down to the jury that the same kind of matt~h-boxes were 
not dutiable unless they found from the evidence that the 
boxes were intended to subserve "a substantial, material, and 
valuable ~lse;" thus, as the Attorney-General remarks, giving 
the statute a sense its language does not warrant, by putting 
a restriction on the sense of the word "use." 
In Rosenstein v. Magone (34 Fed. Rep., 120) the United 
States circuit court for the southern district of New York 
held, but apparently contrary to its own convictions, that 
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match· boxes of the kind mentioned were exempt from duty 
under what, it seems to me, was a mistakt·n view of Obe1·-
teuffer v.Robertson (116 U.S. R., 499); for when the language 
of the Supreme Court is applied to the facts of that case, 
where there was no pretense that the boxes or co,Terings in 
question could have heen designed for any other purpose 
than the bona fide transportation of their contents, it is quite 
evident that the case does not bear the construction placed 
on· it by the learned circuit judge. No question arose in that 
case as to any ulterior use of the boxes or coverings in con-
troversy, and I can not see that the mind of the court was 
directed to any such question. 
But, however it may be with reference to match·boxes of 
the sorts mentioned, it seems clear to my mind that such 
things as boxes or cases for philosophical instruments, made 
of expensive woods, with useful or ornamental mountings, 
were not intended to be free of duty. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
UNION RIVER LOGGING RAILROAD COMPANY. 
Upon the statement of facts submitted respecting the use by the Union 
River Logging Railroad Company (a corporation formecl nnder the 
law& of Washington Territory) of Government timber stancling along 
the line of it~> road: .A.dt"ised that such nse of the timber was wholly 
unauthorize<.l, and that proper steps should be taken to,.,ecure indem-
mty to the Gover::1ment, and to bring to justice the iudividuals who 
have been concerned in violating the law for the protection of its 
property. 
The grant made by the act of March 3, 1875, chapter lfi2, of a right of 
way through the public lands, with the necessary land· for stations, 
etc., was meant for railroad companies intending to operate roads as 
common carriers for the benefit and coqvenience of the public, and 
not for the benefit of the companies solely. 
Where a railroad made application to the Secretary of the Interior with 
a view to securing the benefit of the said act of 1875, and its articles of 
incorporation and map of definite location were approved by the Sec-
retary, but it afterwards app~ared that the action of the Secretary 
wa based upon a mistake of fact caused by the representation of the 
railroad company itself, and that the application was for a purpose 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 547 
fnion RiYer Logging Railroad Company. 
not within the statute: Held that it is competent to the Secretary 
to recall and annul his action approving the line of definite location 
of the road and entering the same on the public plats. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Muy 4,1890. 
SIR: I have duly considered your communication of the 
30th March, 1889, asking an opinion on the following ques-
ti.ons: 
(1) Whether judicial proceedings should not be taken by 
the United States against the Union River Logging Railroad 
I Company, to obtain indemnity for timber depredations com-
mitted by that company, and also against certain persons 
who are or have been officers of said company to punish them 
for violations of the law for the protection of Government 
timber. 
(2) Whether the action of the Department of the Interior 
approving the line of definite location of the said company and 
entering the same on the public plats under section 4 of the 
act of March 3, 1875, entitled'' An act granting to railroads 
the rightof way through the public lands of the United States ;; 
(18 Stat., 482) should not be set aside, and, if so, whether 
that can be done by the Department itself on the state of 
facts set forth in your communication, or whether a judicial 
proceeding would he more appropriate for the purpose of 
having it adjudged that the public lands through which the 
company's line of definite location passes are not subject to 
the right of way and other privileges and easements granted 
by the act of March 3, 187 5. 
As I am not at liberty, under the law, which requires the 
Attorney-General to give his opinion "upon questions of 
law" (Rev. Stat.§§ 354 to 357, inclusive), to make a find-
ing of facts, I lay aside the evidence submitted for my con-
sideration, and take as the case for opinion the statements 
contained in your communication. 
In 1883 a corporation styled the Union River Logging Com-
pany was formed under the laws of Washington Territory, for 
the purpose ''of building, equipping, running, maintaining, 
and operating a railroad for the transportation of saw-logs, 
piles, and other timber, and wood and lumber, and to charge 
/ 
548 HON. \V. H. H. MILLER 
Union River Logging Railroad Company. 
and receive compensation anu tolls therefor, the line of said 
road being intended to run from a point on tiue water in 
Lynch's Cove, at the head of Hood's Canal, in Mason County, 
and running thence in a general northeasterly direction a 
distance of about 10 miles to a point at or near the north-
east corner of township 24 north, range 1 west, Willamette 
meriuian." 
On the 17th of August, 1888, the railroad company filed 
"supplemental articles of incorporation" in the office of the 
secretary of the Terrri tory, in conformity to law, providing 
for'~ a line of road from a convenient point on tide water, i~ 
Lynch's Cove, at the head of Hood's Canal, in Mason County, 
and running thence in a general northeasterly direction to a 
convenient point on tide water in Dyes' Inlet, in the county 
of Kitsap, in said Territory; and also a branch from said 
line at some convenient point thereon between Lynch's Cove 
and Dyes' Inlet, and running thence in a general northerly 
direction to or near the town of Sea back, on Hood's Can'al, 
in the said county of Kitsap; and also a branch from some 
convenient point on the line of said road between said 
Lynch's Cove and Dyes' Inlet, and running in a general 
northeasterly direction to tide water at or near Port Orchard, 
in the county of Kitsap." 
The supplemental articles declareu that the object of the 
company was "to maintain and operate said railroad and 
branch to carry freight and passengers and to receive tolls 
therefor, and also to engage in and carry on the general log-
ging business, and provide for the cutting, hauling, trans· 
portation, buying, owning, acquiring, and selling all kinds of 
logs, spars, piles, lumber, and timber, as provided for in the 
original articles of incorporation." 
.After the filing of these supplemental article~S, to wit, in 
January, 1889, the railroad made application in due form to 
the Department of the Interior, with a view of securing the 
benefits of the act of March 3, 1875, and on the 29th of Jan-
uary, 1889, ''the articles of incorporation and maps of defi-
nite location of said Union River Logging Railroad Company 
were approved by the Department as being in conformity 
with the act." 
Between 1883, the year of its incorporation, and the pres-
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ent time the company has constructed only 5 miles of road, 
and it not only has used Government timber standing along 
the line of the road for the purposes of construction, but it 
has taken and appropriated that timber for other purposes· 
There can be no doubt that this use of the timber was 
wholly unauthorized, and that proper steps should be taken 
both to secure indemnity to the Government and to bring to 
justice the individuals who have b•een concerned in violations 
of the law for the protection of this valuable property, and 
when requested I shall promptly give the necessary instruc-
tions to begin the proper proceedings for the attainment of 
those objects. 
This disposes of the first question. 
The second question requires more consideratio:s. 
While the charter of the railroad company, particularly as 
amended, describes a corporation intended to exercise the 
public calling of a common carrier of passenger~ and freight 
as well as to carry on the logging business, as provided for 
in the original articles of incorporation, the fact is that the 
company is and has been exclusively occupied in the logging 
business, and that all the carrying it does or has been doing 
is for itself alone and the promotion of its own private busi-
ness; and it further appears that owing to the absence of 
population in the region where the road is located it is im-
possible for the company to do the business of a common 
carrier, because there is as yet no public there to furnish 
such business. 
There is no room for doubt, I think, that the privileg-es 
granted by the act of March 3, 1875, to any railroad com-
pany, duly organized under State, Territorial, or Federal 
authority, of a right of way of 200 feet in width through the 
public lands, with the necessary lands for stations, shops, 
etc., together with the right to take earth, stone, timber, and 
other material from the public lands adjacent to the line of 
the road of such company, were meant to be extended by 
Congress to railroad companies intending to operate roads 
for the benefit and convenience of the public as common 
carriers, and not for their own benefit, except in so far as 
that benefit represented a return for their public services. 
This view is placed beyond doubt by the third section of the 
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act of 1875, which gives the Territorial legislatures power to 
provide for the condemnation of "private lands and posses-
_sory claims on t.he public lands of the United States" for tlle 
benefit of the railroad companies entitled to claim the priYi-
leges of the act; and it is almost needles~ to add that Con-
gress can not be presumed to have had it in contemplation 
in this statute to authorize the right of eminent domain to 
be used for the benefit of a merely private or trading corpora· 
tion. This makes it quite unnecessary to inquire whether 
Congress could authorize the use of the power of eminent 
domain in any such case. 
It is unnecessary to consider whether the benefits of the 
act of 1875 are open to a railroad company that proposes to 
be at once a common carrier and a private business corpora-
tion, because it is to be taken by me as a fact, that, at the 
time of its application to the Department of the Interior, the 
Union River Logging Company had no other intention than 
that of operating its railroad for the purposes of its own pri-
vate business, as it had been doing previous to its applica-
tion. 
There can be no doubt that, for the benefit of settlers as 
well as its own, the Government has tbe right to have an 
authoritative declaration made that the public lands through 
which the line of the railroad in question runs are not subject 
to the burdens imposed by the act of 1875; and this brings me 
to the consideration of the question whether the Department 
of the Interior has the power to make such a declaration and 
so to annul or recall its action approving the line of definite 
location of the railroad and noting the same on the plats of 
the Land Office in supposed conformity to the fourth section 
of the act of 187 5. 
It is manifest that the action of the Department was upon 
a mistake of fact, caused by the deliberate representation of 
the railroad company itself, that it intende(l to engage in the 
business of a common carrier in reality, and not on paper 
merely; whereas, as subsequent inquiry has shown, the 
company not only did not but could not have reasonably had 
any such intention. 
It follows, then, that the application to the Department 
was for a purpose not authorized by law, and that the action 
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taken in granting the application was YOi<l, it being perfectly 
clear that no disposition can be made of any part of the pub-
lic domain without the authority of Congress. 
The effect of the action of the Department has been to 
raise a cloud upon t.he Government's title to the lands 
through which the line of the railroad runs, and thus to in-
terfere seriously so long as that action remains in force, with 
the Department's administration of so much of the public 
domain by practically withdrawing the same from entry. 
To hold that the Department can not in this case cancel 
its approval and erase the line of the railroad from the pu ulic 
plats, but that the United States must go into a court of 
equity for that purpose, would seem to urge the conclusive-
ness of executive action to an unreasonable extent. 
The principle of res judicata, while to some extent ap-
plicable to the action of executive officers, bas never been 
held to prevent an officer from reopening a matter on which 
he had acted on a mistake of fact, or where new and ad•ti-
tional evidence, which would justify a new trial or a rehear-
ing, has been adduced. 
If this were a case where a patent, though void, had been 
issued, it must be admitted that the Department would have 
no power to remove any resulting cloud or difficulty by com-
pelling the surrender and cancellation of the illegal patent, 
but would be required to resort to equity; whereas in the 
case before me it is entirely practicable for the Department 
to remove the line ofthe railroad from the public plats, both 
here and in the local land office, and thus effectually cancel 
the approval improvidently given. It is not necessary, in 
order to undo what bas been done, to compel the company to 
surrender any paper for cancellation, because it is the public 
plats alone that neeci to be changed, and these are under the 
entire control of the Department of the Interior. 
It is true that in the supposed case of the void patent the 
Department might afterwards iRsue a valid patent for the 
same land, but that would be inexpedient, as it would leave the 
void patent outstanding as a menace to the valid one, exer-
cising a depressing eff'ect on ·the value of the land involved. 
Still l\lr. A.ttorney-General Wirt held that where a patent is 
issued to an assignor, instead of his assignee, and the former 
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refuses to urrender the patent, another patent may issue, 
correcting the mistake and containing a proper recital to show 
why it was issued. (2 Opin., 41.) 
It would seem to be a useless circuity to have recourse to 
judicial proceedings to correct executive action in a case like 
the one in hand, where there is a concurrence of mistake of 
fact and want of power in the Departme~t, and where the 
void proceeding is an obstacle in the way of the Land Office. 
J\fr. Attorney-General Cushing seems to lay down the same 
doctrine, when, in declaring the principle of res jttrlicrda to be 
applicable to executive action, and stating the limitations of 
that doctrine, he says that "when a thing is decided and done 
hy the head of aDepartmentacting within the scope of hislaufttl 
authority, it can he rev-ised by his successor only on the ground 
of mistake in a matter of fact, or the discovery and p1·oduction. 
of material new testimony." (7 Opin., 701.) The same doctrine 
is laid down by the Supreme Court in f:nited States v. Bank 
of the 1l!etropolis. (15 Pet., 377, 401.) 
In a word, my opinion is that the Union River Logging Com-
pany and its officers are responsible as depredators and tres-
_,. passers on Government land; that the company is not entitled 
to enjoy the benefits ot the act of 1\farch 3, 1875; and that it 
is within the competency of the Department of the Interior 
to recall and annul its action approving the line of definite 
location of the railroad company and entering the same on 
the public piats. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. 1\fiLLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CIVIL BERVICE-C ERTIPICATE !!,OR REINSTATEMENT. 
H. served in the war of the rebellion, in a New York regiment, from May 
12, 1861, to May 1:3, 1863, when he was honorably discharged. On the 
latter date he enlisted in the'' general service" ofthe.A.rmy,for cleri-
cal duty at Headquarters, and was transferred to the Adjutant-Gen-
eral's office April1, 1864, in which he served on clerical duty until May 
13, 1868, when he was discharged through no delinquency or miscon-
duct on his part. Application being now made by him for reinstate-
ment under amended Departmental Rule X of the Civil-Service Regu-
lations. thA Renretary of \\Tar requests that he he certified by the Civil 
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Service Commission for reinstatement as a clerk in the War Depart-
ment under said rule: Held that H., during the period of his enlistment 
in the "general service" for clerical duty, as above, was not in the 
classified departmental service, and that (he not having been separated 
from the latter service) his case does not come within the provisions of 
said Rule X, and therefore that he can not be certified thereunder. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 9,1890. 
SIR: Your communication of March 12, 1890, submits for 
consideration and opinion the following case: 
On February 25, 1890, the Secretary of War addressed a 
communication to the United States Civil Service Commission, 
stating that John A. Hayward had made an application for 
reinstatement as a clerk in the War Department under 
amended Departmental Rule X, Civil-Service Rules: 
"Hayward was enlisted in the general service for clerical 
duty at the Headquarters of the Army, }lay 13, 1863, and 
was transferred to the Adjutant-General's office .April1, 1864, 
in which office he served until May 13, 1868, when he was 
discharged through no delinquency or misconduct on his 
part. 
''During the time mentioned the clerical force of the De-
partment was largely composed of what were known as gen-
eral-service clerks, who were duly authorized and enlisted 
expressly for clerical duty in the War Department and its 
bureaus, and were afterwards, by the legislative, executive, 
and judicial appropriation act of August 5, 1882, transferred 
to the regular list. 
" The records show that Mr. Hayward served in the war of 
the rebellion in Company B, Twenty-first New York Volul\-
teers, from May 12, 1861, to May 13, 1863, when he was bon· 
orably discharged." 
In view of these facts the Secretary of 'Var req nested that 
Hayward's name be certified for 1·einstatement to a clerkship 
in the War Department of class $1,000, a vacancy in which 
grade now exists. 
The Civil Service Commission being in doubt as to whether 
Hayward came under amended Departmental Rule X, Civil-
Service Rules, asked that the question be referred to the At-
torney -General for an opinion. 
• 
5fl4 lJl)~. W. H. H. ~HLLER 
CI\·II Servlce-Certltlcate for Retnstatcmrnt. 
-------------------- ------
The amended Departmental Rule X is in the following 
words: 
" "Upon requisition of the head of a Department, the Com-
mission shall certify for reinstatement in said Department, in 
a grade requiring no higher examination than the one in 
which he as formerly employed, any person who, within 
one year next preceding the date of the requisition, has, 
through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated from 
the classified service of that Department: Provided~ That 
certification may be made, subject to the other conditions of 
this rule, for the reinstatement of any person who served in 
the military or naval service of the United States in the late 
war of 'the rebellion and was honorably discharged there-
from, without regard to the length of time he has been sepa-
rated from the service." 
It will be observed that the reinstatf~ment contemplated 
by this rule is, first, that of any person who once belonge<l 
"to the classified service" of a Department, and who has been 
separated from that classified service ''through no delin-
quency or misconduct," and for whose reinstatement an ap-
plication has been made within one year next preceding the 
date of such application; and, secondly; that of any person 
who has sen·ed honorably in the war of the rebellion and 
been honorably discharged,'· without regard to the length of 
time he has been sepctmteclfrom the serdce," if otherwise qual-
ified under the rule. In either case the applicant may be 
reinstated in such J )epartment ''in a grade requiring no 
higher examination than the one in 'Which he 1rcts formerly 
employed." 
By section 3 of the act of ~larch 3, 1853 (10 Stat., 209), it 
was declared. that nfter June 30, 1853 "the clerks in the De-
partments of the Treasury, War, Navy, the Interior, and the 
Post-Office, shall b~ arranged into four classes, of which class 
number on9 shall receive an annual salary of nine hundred 
dollars each~ class number two an annual salary of one thou-
sand two hundred dollars .each, class number three an an-
nual salary of one thousand fiye hundred dollars each, and 
class number four an annual salary of one thousand eight 
hundred dollars each," and it was further declared by this 
law (p. 211) that "no clerk shall be appointed in either of 
the four classes until after he has been examined and found 
, 
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qualified by a board, to consist of three examiners," etc., and 
by section 4 of the act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat., 669), ibe 
above provisions were applied to the Department of State. 
This legislation now constitutes sections 163 and 164 of the 
Re\ised Statutes. 
This was the state of the law on May 13, 1868, when Hay-
ward was'' discharged" from the War Department. 
I do not think it can be said with any propr1ety that Hay-
ward, whose status was that of an enlisted .soldier, belonged 
to any '' grade" of the " classified departmental service," 
which was then composed of "clerks in the Departments" 
(Re\. Stat., 163), and was purely civil in character. It could 
only be entered after a successful examination (Rev. Stat., 
164); but it does not appear that Hayward was subjected to 
au examination before he was detailed for duty in the War 
Department, although it appears that he was enlisted for 
clerical duty only. 
Hayward being then a military person and receiving the 
pay of an enlisted soldier, and therefore not being a mem· 
ber of the " classified service," I am not able to see how he 
can be brought within the amended Departmental Rule X, 
which provides only for the reinstatement in the classified 
service of a Department of a person who has, from no fault 
of his own, been separated from that service. Having never 
belonged to the classified departmental service, it is impos-
sible for Hayward to be reinstated in that service. 
This view seems to be fully supported by the act of Au-
gust 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 242), which substituted for the "gen. 
eral service," or " detailed enlisted men from the Army" 
doing duty in the various offices and bureaus of the War 
Department, clerks in the classified service, and authorized 
the Secretary of vVar to put the enlisted men so employed 
into the classified service, which plainly shows that Congress 
did not understand that enlisted men detailed as clerks be-
longed to the classified service. 
It results, therefore, from the aforegoing that Hayward 
can not be certified under amended Departmental Rule X, as 
requested by the Secretary of War. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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The question whether a bond taken by the collector of a port from one 
of his subordinates, for his own protection, is valid in the absence of 
a statute authorizing it, not appearing to be a question in which the 
United States are concerned or one arising in the administration of a 
Department, the Attorney General declines to give an official opinion 
thereon. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
JJfay 12, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of April 18 ultimo, and the in· 
closures therein referred to, present the question whether 
bonds taken by the collector of customs of the port of New 
York from certain of his subordinates, for his own protection, 
are valid, in the absence of some law authorizing him tore-
quire such security. 
This question is understood to have been submitted at the 
instance of the collector, and appears to me to be one in 
which he, and not the United States, is interested. The col-
lector himself having given the United States tbe security 
required by law, it can not be said that the latter has any 
legal interest in the bare question whether the uonds referred 
to are valid or not. That being the case, it would seem that 
the question submitted is not a question of law arising in the 
administration of the Treasury Department, and therefore 
that it is not such a question of law as falls within section 356 
of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides 
that "The head of any Executive Department may require 
the opinion of the Attorney-General on any question of law 
arising in the administration of his Department." 
As was said by ~lr. Attorney-GE-neral Cushing, ''In re-
peated instances it has been decided by my prerlecessors in 
office that the Attorney-General of the United States has no 
right to give an official opinion except in those cases in 
which it is required of him by law" (6 Opin., 25); and as an-
other of my predecessors has said, "the Attorney-General has 
no warrant to act outside of the statutes which define his 
o.ffice." (15 Opin., 139.) 
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But for this limitation on my power it would afford me 
pleasure to comply with your request. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS. 
The first clause of section 36~2, Revised Stat~tes, which requires the ren-
dition of accounts monthly, is applicable to every officer who receives 
advances of public money to be disbursed, and also to every officer who 
collects and receives fees and revenues which it is his duty to account 
for. 
The requirement that officers render their accounts monthly is not sub-
ject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, exceptiug in 
extraordinary cases, where he shall be of opinion that the statutory 
period ought to be enlarged to meet the special circumstances of such 
· cases. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens of December 2, 1878 (16 
Opin., 222), concurred in. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 12, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of January 27,1890, submits for 
opinion three questions which have arisen in the. Treasury 
Department upon section 36~2, ,,evised Statutes, which sec-
tion is in the following language: # 
"Every officer or agent of the United States who receives 
public money which he is not authorized to retain as saiary, 
pay, or emolument, shall render his accounts monthly. Such 
accounts, with the vouchers necessary to the correct and 
prompt settlement thereof, shall be sent by mail, or other-
wise, to the bureau to which they pertain, within ten days 
after the expiration of each successive month, and, after ex-
. amination there, shall be passed to the proper accounting 
officer of the Treasury for settlement. Disbursing officers of 
the Navy shall, however, render their accounts and vouchers 
direct to the proper accounting officer of the Tr~asury. In 
case of the non-receipt at the Treasury or proper bureau of 
any accounts within a reasonable and proper time thereafter, 
the officer whose accounts are in default shall be required to 
furnish satisfactory evidence of having complied with the 
• 
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provisions of this section. The Secretary of the Treasury 
may, if in his opinion the circumstances of the case justify 
and require it, extend .the time hereinbefore prescribed for 
the rendition of accounts. Nothing herein contained shall, 
however, be construed to restrain the heads of au;y of the De-
partments from requiring such other returns or reports from 
the office or agent, subject to the control of such beads of 
Departments, as the public interest may require." 
The first question is in these words: "The first clause of 
the statute is as follows: ' Every officer or agent of the United 
States who receives public money which he is not authorized 
to retain as salary, pay, or emolument, shall render his ac-
counts monthly.' Does this clause require the rendition of 
monthly accounts by every officer or agent who receives ad-
vances of public money from the Treasury, to be disbursed 
under appropriations made by Congress, and also by every 
officer or agent who collects and receives fees and revenuP~. 
which he is by law required to account for and pay into the 
TreaRury t " 
This question I answer in the affirmative. I can see no 
reason why effect should not be given to the words of the stat-
ute according to their ordmary sense. 
The next questiOn is: "Does the clause in the statute which 
provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may extend the 
time prescribed for the rendition of accounts confer upon the 
Secretary authority to grant permission to any officer or agent 
coming within the provisions of the act to render his accounts 
fora longer period than a month (for example, to render quar-
terly instead of monthly accounts); or does said clause re. 
late to extending the limit of ten days within which the offi. 
cer or agent is required to transmit his accounts with the 
vouchers to the proper bureau or Department, after the ex-
piration of each successive month'" 
The same question was passed upon by Attorney-General ' 
Devens in his opinion of December 2,1878 (16 Opin., 222). He 
said that the law requiring disbursing officers to render their 
.accounts monthly was not subject to the discretion of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, except in extraordinary cases, as 
provided, where the Secretary of the Treasury should be of 
<>pinion that the statutory period of a month should be en-
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 559 
Indian Allottees under the Act of 18S7. 
larged to meet the special circumstances of such cases; such 
powers of the Secretary being intended to be exceptional in 
character, and not to authorize him ''to institute a newsy -
tern of rendering accounts." I concur in that view and in the 
reasoning by which it is supported. 
The next question is : "If the Secretary of the Treasury 
may lawfully authorize any officer or agent within the pro-
YiHions of the statute to render his accounts for a longer pe-
riod than a month (as by rendering them quarterly instead 
of monthly), is such authority limited to individual and ex-
ceptional cases, or may it be extended indefinitely to classes 
of accounts, so as to establish a system of rendering accounts 
continuously for longer periods than a month~" 
My answer to the second question, taken in connection 
with the opinion of Attorney-General Devens, also disposes 
.of this question. -
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
INDIAN ALLOTTEES UNDER THE ACT OF 1887. 
An Indian allottee under the act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119, may re-
move ~nd sell dead timber, standing or fallen, from his allotment. 
Such allottee can not lawfully lease or rent the whole or any part of his 
allotment, either with or without the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. 
Nor can he lawfully impart to a third person, by contract, the right to 
erect upon his allotment mills for the manufacture of lumber or other 
products. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
lJtay 21, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of March 24, 1890, requests an 
opinion as to the power of an Indian allottee, under the act 
of Congress of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), to sell and re-
move dead timber, standing or fallen, on the land allotted to 
him; to lease or rent, with or without the consent of the Sec-
retary of the Interior, the whole or any part of his allot-
ment; and to contr~ct for or permit the erection of mills for 
the manufacture of lumber, or other purposes, upon his allot-
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ment. It is also asked, what use may an allottee make of 
his allotment, otherwise than by occupa 'cy and cultivation, 
so as to make the same contribute to his support~ 
Before proceeding to answer the several questions sub-
mitted it will be necessary to understand precisely what re-
lation the allottee holds to his allotment under the act of 
February 8, 1887 (supra). 
That act provides (sec. 1) that the President of the United 
States may allot to any Indian of a tribe or band located on 
a reservation containing land "advantageous for agricult-
ural and grazing purposes" a definite amount of land, and 
prescribes (sees. 2 and 3) the quantity of land to be allotted 
and how the allotment shall be made. 
Section 4 provides for the allotment of land to any Indian, 
not re&iding on a reservation, or for whose tribe no reserva-
tion has been provided, and who has made settlement upon 
any surveyed or unsurveyed lands of tlle United States, not 
otherwise appropriated. 
Section 5 provides that "upon the approval of the allot-
ments provided for in this act by the Secretary of the In-
terior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name 
of the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect 
and declare, that the United States does and will hold the 
land thus allotted, for the period of twenty.:five years, in 
trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such 
allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, 
of his heirs~ according to the laws of the State or Territory 
where such land is located, and that at the expiration of 
said period the United States will convey the same by patent 
to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, ia fee, discharged 
of said trust, and free of all charge or incumbrance whatso-
ever: Provided, That the President of the United States 
may in any case in his discretion extend the period. And if 
any cdnveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and 
allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching 
the same, before the expiration of the time above mentioned, 
such conveyance or contract· shall be absolutely null and 
void." The act then goes on to declare that "the law of 
descent and partition in force in the State or Territory where 
such lands are situate shall apply thereto' after the execu-
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tion anll delivery of the patent, except that the law of de-
scent and partition of the State of Kansas shall apply to 
allotments of land in the Indian Territory. It is unneces-
sary to refer particularly to the rest of this section. 
Section 6 proYides that the allottees shall have the benefit 
of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the 
State or Territory in which they may reside, and that no 
Territory shall pass or enforce any law denying any such 
Indian within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. It then provides that "every Indian born within the 
territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily 
taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart 
from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits 
of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the 
United States, and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and 
immunities of such citizen, whether such Indian has been or 
not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians 
within the territorial limits of the United States, without in 
any manner impairing or otherwise affecting the right of 
any such Indian to tribal or other property." 
This d,ct together with the preceding acts of March 3, 1875 
(18 Stat., 420), January 18, 1881 (21 Stat., 315), and July 4t 
1884 (23 Stat., 96), mark, as was observed by Acting Attorney-
General Jenks in his opinion of July 27, 1888, " a new epoch 
in the history of the Indians, namely, that in which Congress 
has begun to deal with them as individuals, and not only as 
nations, tribes, or bands, as heretofore. It is dismemberment 
of the tribes or bands, and absorption, as citizens, of the in-
dividuals composing them by the States and Territories con-
taining the lands on which such individu~ls settle or may be 
settled, that is the policy of this new legislation. 
''But Congress has not deemed it safe, in making the Indian 
a freeholder, to give him at once the same control over the 
land as other freeholders enjoy. The legislation above men-
tioned deprives the Indian settler of the right of conveying 
or incumbering the land, in any way, for a period stated, or 
provides that it shall be held by the United States for a 
given time in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian, 
and, at the expiration of such time, be conveyed to him by 
patent." 
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The opinion then goes on to show that Congress has the 
power and is under a high duty to continue its guardian care 
over the individual Indian after he has assumed the relation 
of citizen of a State or Territory, and until he has been '' ed-
ucated to u~derstand the dignity and responsibilities tl1at 
belong to citizenship and the ownership of property," and that 
''it is to protect him while receiving this education that Con-
gress placed the above-mentioned restraints upon his prop-
~yri~~~ • 
The patent to be first issued to the Indian allottee, under. 
section 5 of the act of 1887, is not intended to conv(>y to him 
the title of the United States, but is in the nature of a decla· 
ration of a trust in the land or a covenant to stand seized of 
it to the use of the allottee and his heirs until the time shall 
han~ arrived when it shall be deemed proper to put an end 
to the trust by vesting the legal title in him or his heirs. 
The effect of the allotment and declaration of trust are to 
place the allottee in possession of the land allotted and give 
him a qualified ownership therein, and the extent to which 
the allottee is thus restricted as a proprietor remains now 
to be considered, in so far as necessary to answer the ques-
tions submitted. 
(1) And first as to timber: In an opinion of Attorney-Gen. 
eral Garland dated January 26, 1889, it was held to be waste 
for an allottee to cut timber standing on his allotment for the 
direct purpose of selling it, by which I understand him to 
mean timber that is live and growing. The question before 
me, however, namely, whether the allottee bas the right to 
sell and remove from his allotment dead timber, standing or 
fallen, is essentially difi'erent from that passed upon by my 
predecessor, and as I have reached the conclusion that ap-
propriating and selling dead timber of any kind is not waste 
at common law or by the law of Wisconsin, within the limits 
of which State the timber in question is situated, it is not 
necessary to reexamine the question whether an allottee is 
impeachable for waste. 
Lord Coke tells us that the cutting of deat.l wood, which 
he defines as trees that are dried up, dead, or hollow, not 
. being timber or bearing fruit or leaves in summer, is no 
waste (Co. Litt., 53a,, 53b). Indeed, this would seem to fol-
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low from the well known principle that to constitute waste 
~ome permanent injury must be done to the inheritance by 
the tenant of a particular estate, as, for example, a tenant 
for life or years, it being quite evident that the remoY"al of dead 
wood, particularly when standing and threatening the safety 
of trees near it and valuable for timber, seems more like a 
benefit than an injury of any kind. 
It would be entirely out ofharrnony with the more liberal 
American doctrine of waste, as applicable to timber, to hold 
that a tenant who is, by that doctrine, in many cases ,entitled 
to fell timber for the express purpose of opening the land to 
cultivation, is still not at liberty to use the dead wood on 
the land in addition to the estovers allowed him by law. The 
law ou this subject will Le found presented in the case of 
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (59 Wis., 561 ), Shine v. Wilcox (1 
Dev. & B. Eq., 631), King v. Miller (99 N. C., 594), Dorsey 
v. JJfoore (100 N. C., 44); and it appears by the decisions of 
the supreme court of Wisconsin that the injury called" waste" 
iS the same in that State as at common law (Lander v. Hall, 
G9 Wis., 331, and Handlow v. Thieme, 53 Wis., 57), supposing 
that a question of waste by an Indian allottee on land in 
Wisconsin is to be determined by the law of that State. 
This answers the first question. The remaining questions 
I proceed to dispose of in their order. 
(2) Can an allottee under said act lawfully lease or rent, 
either with or without the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior, the whole or any part of his allotment~ 
This question I answer in the negative. The act declares 
that any conveyance of the allotment or contract touching 
the "same," that is, the allotment, made before the expira-
tion of the probationary term, shall be" absolutely null and 
void." 
(3) Ifnot, can he lawfully contract for, or permit, the erec-
tion of mills for manufacture of lumber, or other purposes, 
upon his allotment~ 
I can not see how it is possible that any valid contract, giv-
ing a third person the right to use, for any such purpose, the 
land allotted, can be made, beyond a mere revocable license. 
The allottee can not incumber his land in any way during 
the term he is learning to adjust himself to his new relations 
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in life. To allow him to do so would in many instances en-
tirely defeat the object of the law. 
( 4) What use may an allottee lawfullJ make of his allotment, 
other than individual occupancy or cultivation, by which the 
property can be made to contribute to his support~ 
This question is purely abstract and hypothetical, and does 
not arise out of an actual case calling for official action. It 
is, therefore, beyond my competency to give an opinion on 
such a question under section 356, Revised Statutes. See 
also 11 Opin., 189. 
I have the honor to be yours, very respectfully, 
\V. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
RESERVATIO~ OF LANDS FOR IRRIGATION PURPOSES. 
The provision in the act of October 2, 1888, chapter 1069, resening from 
sale or entry lands designated or selected for reservoirs, ditches, or 
canals for irrigation purposes, and also lands made susceptible of irri-
gation by such reservoirs, ditches, or canals, operates as an iuuuediate 
withdrawal of the lands thus descri be(l from entry aud settlement. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Jllay 24, 1890. 
SIR: By a letter of April21, 1890, you submitted for the con-
sideration of the Attorney-General a letter from the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, raising the question: 
"Whether, under the act of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat .. 526), 
the reservation extends to such tracts as may be actually 
selected as sites, etc.-becoming operative only after such 
selection-or whether the reservation from disposal extends 
from the date of the act to the entire expanse of the arid 
region, as more particularly defined in the communication." 
Since your letter of April 21 yon have transmitted also 
the opinion of Mr. Assistant Attorney·General Shields, 
assigned to your Department, to whom you referred the 
question. After an examination of the law and of the con-
siderations presented by Mr. Shields in his opinion, I have 
to say that I fully. concur with him in his conclusions and the 
grounds stated therefor, and that, in view of the lucid opin-
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ion which he has rendered, it is unnecessary for me to give 
extended reasons for such concurrence. 
The section of the law ~hich presents the question of con-
struction referred by you to this Department is found in the 
sundry civil appropriation act of 1888, under the appropria-
tions for the United States Geological Survey. The subject is 
introduced by an appropriation of $100,000, or so much thereof 
as may be necessary, " for the purpose of investigating the 
extent to which the arid region of the United States can be 
redeemed by irrigation, and the segregation of the irrigable 
lands in such arid region, and for the selection of sites for 
reservoirs and other hydraulic works necessary for the storage 
and utilization of water for irrigation.~' The Director of the 
Geological Survey is then required to make a report to Con-
gress on the first Monday in December in each year, show-
ing how the money appropriated has been expended. Then 
follows the particular language, which is the subject for con-
struction: 
"And all the lands which may hereafter be designated or 
selected by such United States surveys for sites for reser-
voirs, ditches, <lr canals for irrigation purposes, and all the 
lands made susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, 
ditches, or canals, are from this time henceforth hereby re-
served from sale as the property of the United States, and 
shall not be subject after the passage of this act to entry, 
settlement, or occupation until further provided by law: 
Provided, That the President may at any time in his discre-
tion by proclamation open any portion or all of the lands 
reserved by this provision to settlement under the home-
stead laws." 
The object of the act is manifest. It was to prevent the 
entry upon, and the settlement and sale o_f, all that part of 
the arid region of the public lands of the United States 
which could be improved by general systems of irrigation, 
and all lands which might thereafter be designated or selected 
by the United States surveys as sites for the reservoirs, 
ditches, or canals in suchs.vstems. Unquestionably, it wonld 
seriously interfere with the operation and purpose of the 
act if the sites necessary for reservoirs i u such plan of irri-
gation could be entered upon by homestead settlers. So, 
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too, it would be obviously unjust if, pending the survey made 
with a view to their segregation for improvement by irriga-
tion, these lands could be entered upon and settled as arid 
lands of the United States. It was, therefore, the purpose 
of Congress by this act to suspend all rights of entry upon 
any lands which would come within the improving operation 
of the plans of irrigation to be reported by the Director of 
the Geological Survey under this act. Language could 
hardly be stronger than are the words of the act in express-
ing this intention : '~All the lands which may hereafter be desig-
nated or selected," etc., "are from this time henceforth hereby 
reserved from sale," etc., ''and shall not be subject after the 
passa,ge of this act to entry," etc., "until further provided by 
law." There can be no question that if an entry was made 
upon land which·was thereafter designated in a United States 
survey as a site for a reservoir, or which was by such re~:;er­
voir made susceptible of irrigation, the entry would be in valid, 
and the land so entered upon would remain the property of 
the United States, the reservation thereof dating back to the 
passage of this act. 
The far-reaching effect of this construction can not deprive 
the words of the act of their ordinary and necessary mean-
ing. The proviso that " the President may at any time in 
his discretion by proclamation open any portion or all of 
the lands" so reserved, was the legislative mode of modifying 
and avoiding the far-reaching effect of the act, whene\er it 
should appear to the Executive to have too wide an opera-
tion. Entries should not be permitted, therefore, upon any 
part ofthe arid regions which might possibly come within 
the operation of this act. 
All the papers accompanying your request, together with 
the opinion of Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Shields, are 
herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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RETAINED PAY OF SOLDIERS. 
The accounting officers of the Treasury should allow a paymaster of the 
Army credit for payment to a soldier of his retained pay under section 
1281, Revised Statutes, where the latter has received au honorable dis-
charge, although it may appear that after enlisting the soldier deserted, 
but was restored to duty without trial and served ont the full term of 
his enlistment. 
DEPART:VIENT OF JUSTICE, 
1llay 29, 1890. 
SIR: On the 2d of May, 1890, you submitted to the Attor-
ney-General for his opinion the question whether the account-
ing officers are authorized to give credit to paymasters of 
tlle Army for payments by them of the retained pay under 
section 1281, Revised Statutes, in cases where the record of 
the soldier shows that after enlistment he deserted, was ap-
prehended, was restored to duty without trial, and served out 
the full term of his enlistment, receiving an honorable dis-
charge. 
The question really involved is whether the action of the 
\Yar Department in giving to thH enlisted man an honorable 
discharge, which is in fact a certificate that his service has 
been honest and faithful untH the date of his dh;charge, is 
conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Treasury, or 
whether the latter officers may examine the record as pre-
sented, and then decide whether his service bas been honest 
and faithful. 
The question is not free from difficulty, but I do not find it 
necessary to go into a discussion of it at the present time in 
view of a recent decision by the Court of Claims. In the 
case of Kingsley v. The United States (2-! Ct. Cls. R., 219), it 
is l1eld that the retained pay given to soldiers at the time of 
their discharge for honest and faithful service by the Revised 
Statutes, section 1281, can not be forfeited in a collateral 
proceeding like that of the approval of accounts by the ac-
counting officers of the Treasury. In that case the claimant 
had been enlisted as a private in the ~Iarine Corps A.ugust 12, 
1882, at Brookl,yn, N.Y. He was discharged June 4, 1887, 
by order of the Secretary of the Navy as "unfit for service; 
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character bad." He sued to l'ecover pay under section 1281 
and transportation and subsistence under section 1290. His 
record showed a list of eight offenses, for one of which he 
had been tried by a summary court-martial and sentenced to 
thirty days' solitary confinement. It was contended by the 
United States that this was necessarily unfaithful service. 
The contention was not sustained. It was held by the Uourt 
of Claims that it was necessary that the forfeiture of the re-
tained pay should be considered and declared by the court-
martial or other military authority having jurisdiction in the 
premises. Says Schofield, .T udge, speaking of the official 
record of the claimant relied upon by the Government: 
"Whether or not this record exhibits the honest and faith-
ful service required by the statute is not a question to be 
tried in a collateral proceeding. The forfeiture, like the dis-
charge, should be considered and declared by the court-mar-
tial or other military authorities having jurisdiction in the 
premises. Forfeiture not having been imposed, paymasters, 
accounting officers, and courts are not required to reconsider 
the alleged misconduct and add to the penalty prescribed 
by the military authorities." 
It seems to me that this case is strong·er than the case now 
presented, because there the claimant had not an honorable 
discharge. It is quite true that desertion is a more serious 
offense than those which were sought tr) be made a ground 
for withholding pay in the case cited. But that can not 
affect the governing principle. If the accounting, officers 
have not the authority to decide upon the question whether 
the offenses named in Kingsley ,~. The United States rendered 
the service to the date of discharge other than honest and 
faithful, they certainly have not this authority in cases of 
desertion ; the difference is only one of degree. The case of 
Kingsley v-. The United States has been appealed to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, on the recommendation 
of the Secretary of the Treasury. Pending that appeal, the 
law must be held to be as laid down by the Court of Claims. 
The result is that the accounting officers should gi'e credit 
to the paymasters of the Army for payments made by them 
of the retained pay provided by section 1281, Revised Stat-
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utes, for honest and faithful service, to soldiers who have re-
cehTed an honorable discharge, although it appears that they 
deserted some time during the period of their enlistment, 
were restored to duty without trial, and served out the full 
time of their enlistment. 
Very respectfully, 
Wl\1. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
OKLAHOMA-INTERNAL REVENUE. 
The act of May 2, 1890, chap. 182, entitled "An act to provide a tem-
porary government for the Territory of Oklahoma," etc., having an 
established organill:ed government in that Territory, no reason now 
exists for making any distinction between it and any other organized 
territory with reference to the enforcement of the internal-revenue 
laws. 
DEPART1\1ENT OF ·JUSTICE, 
June 5, 1890. 
SIR: Your letter of 1\:fay 29, 1890, to the Attorney-General, 
inclosing a letter from the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue dated May 26, 1890, with reference to the enforcement 
of the internal-revenue laws in the Territory of Oklahoma, 
was duljT received. In accordance with the suggestion of 
the Commissioner, you request an expression of opinion from 
the Attorney-General as to the propriety and necessity of 
enforcing all the provisions of the internal-revenue laws in 
Oklahoma in the same manner and to the same extent as 
thes are executed and enforced in the States and the other 
Territories of the Union, and to this end of issuing special-
tax stamps through collectors of internal-revenue taxes, as in 
other parts of the country. 
In reply, I have the honor to say that, in "\"iew of the fact 
that the Territory of Oklahoma, under the law passed IJy 
the present Congress and approved May 2, 1890, is given a 
complete and organized government, there is no reason now 
for making a distinction between it and any other organized 
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Territory with reference to the enforcement of the internal-
revenue laws. Special-tax stamps should therefore be issueu, 
and other internal-revenue taxes collecteu, in Oklahoma, ex-




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS IN ENFORCING THE LAWS. 
The provision in section 15 of the act of June 18, 1878, chapter 263, for-
bidding the employment of the ~rrny as a posse comitatus for the pur-
pose of executing the laws, does not abridge the power to use any part 
of the land or naval forces, or militia, for the purposes set fwth in 
section 1989, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 6, 1890. 
SIR : You have asked. me whether, in my opinion, section 
1989 of the Revised Statutes, which rearls as follows: "It 
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, or 
such person as he may empower for that purpose, to em-
ploy such part of the land or naval forces of the United 
States, or of the militia, as may be necessary to aid in the exe-
cution of judicial process issued under any of the preceding 
provisions, or as shall be necessary to prevent tlle violation 
and enforce the due execution of the })rovisions of this title," 
is in conflict with and repealed by the section of the statute 
known as the posse comitatus act, which reads as follows: 
"From and after the passage of this act it shall not be law-
ful to employ any part of the Army of the United States as a 
posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the 
laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as 
such employment of said force may be expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money 
appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the ex-
penses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation 
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of this section." (Supplement to the Revised Statutes, page 
363, sec. 15.) 
In the first place, it will be observed thatsectionl989is much 
broader in its terms than section 15. Section 1989 provides 
for the employment of the land or naval forces of the United 
States or of the militia. Section 15 applies only to the Army. 
As applied to any other force than the Army, of course, 
there is no conflict between these sections. What consti-
tutes the Army is defined in title 14 of the Revised Stat-
utes. 
Second. But aside entirely from this technical consider-
ation of the question, I think it entirely clear that section 15 
was not intended to and does not repeal or preeent a conflict 
with section 1989. Section 1989 was enacted as part of the 
civil rig·hts bill in 1870, and section 15 was enacted in 1878. 
In my opinion, section 1989 is within the exception of section 
15. The language of the latter ~ection, "except in such cases 
and under such circumstances as such employment of said 
force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or 
by act of Congress," refers as well to constitutional provisions 
and statutes then existing as to such as should be thereafter 
enacted. That such should be the construction with refer-
ence to constitutional provisions no one would question, and 
the reason seems equally clear for applying it to statutory 
provisions, and such bas been the construction by this De-
partment. 
Sections 5298 and 5300 of the Revised Statutes were en-
acted in 1861, yet Mr. Attorney-General Devens held that 
they were within the exceptions named in section 15 as above ; 
and that the President, notwithstanding the enactment of 
section 15, and conceding its validity, was authorized under 
sections 5298 and 5300 to use the Army for the enforcement 
of the laws (16 Opin., 162), without expressing any opinion 
as to the validity of sedion 15, known.as the posse comitatus 
act. I am very clear that it does not at all abridge the power 
to use any part of the land or naval forces or militia for the 
purposes set forth in section 1989. 
Respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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LAND-GRANT ROAD-TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS. 
The transportation of an officer in the Corps of Engineers of the Army, 
while traveling in the discharg~ of duties connected with river and 
harbor improvements to which he has been assigned, comes within the 
provisions of the Michigan land-grant act of June 3, 1856, chapter 44, 
and of the act of July 3, 1866, chapter 158, supplementary thereto, re-
quiring the transportation of troops of the United States free from toll 
or other charge. 
DEP ARTl\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 9, 1890. 
SIR: On the 16th of December, 1889, you inclosed to me a 
letter from Col. 0. M. Poe, Corps of Engineers, dated Decem-
ber 6, with other papers, relative to Colonel Poe's transpor-
tation on official business over that portion of the Michigan 
Central Railway the construction of which was aided by 
grants of land from the United States under the act approved 
June 3, 1856 (11 Stat.~ 21), as amended and supplemented by 
the act of Congrbss of July 3, 1866 (14 Stat., 78). 
Colonel Poe was and is an officer in the Corps of Engineers 
of the Army of the United States, and was in charge of the 
work of improving the harbor at Sault Ste. M~arie, in 1\Iichi· 
gan, with his headquarters at Detroit. It was necessary in 
the discharge of the duty to which be was assigned that he 
should travel over the Michigan Central road between the 
places mentioned. He requested from the president of the 
rail way company free transportation over that part of the 
company's lines constructed with the aid of the Government 
grants under tbe acts referre(l to. His request was refused 
on the ground that the provisions of the acts of Congress for 
free transportation did not include an officer of the Corps of 
Engineers of the Army, traveling on business connected with 
the river and harbor improvements. Yon now ask tbe opin-
ion of the Attorney-General upon the question whether this 
refusal of the railway company was justifiable, and request 
that if this be answered in the negative the proper steps be 
taken to compel the company to comply with the terms of its 
grant. 
The act of Congress approved June 3, 1856, provided by its 
first section that there should be granted to the State of 
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:\Iichigau, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a 
railroad between the terminal points of the road now in ques-
tion, en~ry alternate section of land designated by odd num-
bers for six sections in width on each side of the said road. 
Section 3 provided: "That the said lands hereby granted 
to said State shall be subject to the disposal of the legisla-
ture thereof for the purposes aforesa,id, and no other; and 
the said railroads shall be and remain public highways for 
the use of the Government of the United States, free from 
toll or other charge upon the transportation of any property 
or troops of the United States." 
The act of Congress approved July 3, 1866 (14 Stat., 79), 
which was supplementary to the act just quoted from, con-
taineci the following as a pro\iso : 
" Provided, further, That the road mentioned in the first 
section of this act shall be and remain a public highway for 
the use of the Government of the Unit.ed States, and shall 
transport free from toll and other charge all property, troops, 
and munitions of war belonging to the same." 
The point to he considered in answering the question put 
is, whether the transportation of an officer of the Engineer 
Corps of the Army of the United States, necessary in the 
improvement by the Government of a river or harbor, is in-
cluded within the expression of the statute, "tra.nsportation 
* * * of troops." 
The claim is made on the part of the railway company 
that "transportation of troops," as used in the two sections 
quoted, means the transportation of troops of the United 
States fo_r military purposes, and not on business connected 
with river and harbor improvements, which is civil business. 
I can not agree with this contention. Both sections pro-
vide for the transportation of the property of the United 
States. There is no limitation upon the character or descrip-
tion of the property to be so transported. Indeed, the papers 
in this case show that it is conceded by the railway company 
that it is obliged to transport free of cost all material neces-
sary in the improvement of the harbor at Sault Ste. l\Iarie. 
The argument on behalf of the railway company derives no 
benefit from the maxim, Noscitur a sociis, as it might have 
done were the free transportation limited to munitions of 
, 
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war. We are remitted, therefore, to the simple question 
whether the word "troops'' as here used includes an officer 
of the Engineer Corps of the Army. I do not see any escape 
from the conclusion that it must do so. Troops of the United 
States are the military forces of the Cnited States, which 
necessarily include the Army of the United States. An offi. 
cer of the Engineer Corps is a member of that army, and is 
therefore within the more general expression of the statute. 
Your question in this case states that this officer was trav-
'eling upon business of the Government relating to improve-
ments of rh·ers and harbors; but it can not be conceded, 
when the Go,ernment asks for transportation for any part 
of the Army over a railroad, that the railroad company has 
a right to ask, or that the Government is bound to state, the 
purpose of such transportation. It is enough thaJ; the person 
proposed to be transported is a member of the Army, and is 
upon Government business. The theory of this refusal WQUld 
justify the railroad company in investi8'ating and determining 
for itself in every case, whether the officer or body of men 
sought to be transported were engaged in an employment 
properl3· assignable to" troops." The improvement of a riYer 
or a harbor may or may not be with a view to facilitating 
future military operations. That is a matter exclusively for 
Government determination, and about which the railroad 
cmopany has no right to inquire, and upon which public pol-
icy might forbid disclosure. Probably in time of war no one 
would pretend that members of the Engineer Corps of the 
Army would not be included under the name of "troops." 
Surely they are none the less " troops " in time of peace, nor 
are they any the less ' 4 troops" when professionally engaged in 
improving the navigation of a harbor than when constructing 
fortifications with a view to the protection of that harbor. 
If there were doubt as to the correctness of this construc-
tion it must be resolved in favor of the Government on the 
principle laid down in Slidell v. Grandejean (111 U. S., 437). 
Says Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court: 
''It is also a familiar rule of construction that where a 
statute operates as a grant of public property to an indi-
vidual, or the relinquishment of a public interest, and there 
is a doubt as to the meaning of its terms or as to its general 
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purpose, that construction should be adopted which will 
support the claim of the Government rather than that of the 
individual. Nothing can be inferred against the State. .As 
a reason for this rule it is often said that such acts are usu-
ally drawn by interested parties, and they are presumed to 
claim all they are entitled to." 
It follows that your first question must be answered in the 
negative. The president of the Michigan Central Railway 
Company was not justified in refusing free transportation to 
Colonel Poe over that part of his company's lines wllich llad 
been aided b.r Government grant under the acts of Congress 
above quoted. 
There remains to consider what action should be taken to 
compel the railroad com pan~· to comply with the requirements 
of its grant and to furnish the transportation requested of it. 
If it continues to refuse to comply with the law as above 
construed, it will be necessary to begin an action to forfeit the 
grant of the Government to the State of Miclligan, and by 
that State to the railway company, for a breach of the condi-
tion subsequent. Upon your recommendation in the prem-
ises, I will direct the filing of a bill in equity in the circuit 
court for the eastern district of Michigan to effect this end. 
The papers accompanying your request are herewith re-
turned. The delay in answering your request was caused 
by the fact that your original letter was mislaid and wa~ 
not found until the 23d of 1\Iay of this year. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
EXCHANGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GOLD COIN. 
The words" are hereby authorized," in the act of May 26, 1882, chap-
ter 190, providing for the exchange of gold bars for gold coin by the 
superintendents of the coinage mints and of the assay office at New 
York, are to be construed as mandatory upon those officers. 
It is not discretionary with the Secretary of the Treasury to refuse such 
exchange, nor can he lawfully direct those officers so to do. 
A charge for the preparation of the bars cannot be exacted on an ex-
change thereof for coin under said act. 
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DEP .A.RT:MENT OF JUSTICE, 
J'ltly 1, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of the 17th ultimo you invite the at-
tention of the Attorney-General to the provisions of the act 
of May 26, 1882, authorizing the receipt, by superintendents 
of the mints and the New York assay office, of United States 
gold coin in exchange for gold bars, and you request his 
opinion upon the following questions: 
"First. Does this act leave it discretionary with the Secre-
trary ':>f the Treasury to refuse to exchange gold bars for 
gold coin~ 
"Second. Would it be lawful under this act to impose the 
bar charge of 4 cents per $100 in value for gold bars paid to 
tlepositors in exchange for United States gold coin¥" 
You state that the exchange provided for in the act, by 
reducing the expense, facilitates the exportation of gold from 
this country, a movement which it is not considered desira-
ble to encourage. 
The act of l\1ay 26, 1882, provided as follows: "That the su-
perintendents of the coinage mints and of the United States 
assay office at ~ew York are hereby authorized to recehTe 
United States gold coin from any holder thereof in sums not 
less than five thousand dollars, and to pay and deliver in 
exchange therefor gold barR in \·i1lue equaling such coin so 
received." 
The first question to which you request an answer turns 
upon the construction of the words "are hereby authorized." 
Do they impose a duty¥ or do they give simply a discretion 
to the depositaries of the power¥ 
In the case of The Supervisors v. United tftates(4 Wall., 435), 
}lr. Justice Swayne, delivering the opinion of the court, 
stated the rule for the construction of statutory language, 
permissive or enabling in form, as follows: 
''The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is, that 
where power is given to public officers, in the language of 
the act before us, or in equivalent language-whenever the 
public interest or individual rights call for its exercise-the 
language used, tho_!Igh permissive in form, is in fact peremp-
tory. What they are empowered to do for a third person, the 
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law requires shall ue done. The power i.s given, not for tlleir 
benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depositary to meet 
the demands of right, and to prev:eut a failure of justice. It 
is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and 
who would otherwise be remediless. 
"In aU such cases it is held that the intent of the legis-
lature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discre-
tion, but to impose 'a positive and absolute duty."' 
This statement of the rule has full application to statutes 
concerning private rights, where power remedial in its char-
acter is conferred on officers. It is not in such a case to be 
presumed that the legislature intended to vest discretion in 
~1n officer by which he might withhold from a person what is 
'Dis due. 
But the rule is not of great assistance in statutes affecting 
public interests, as bas been shown by Attorney-General 
Cushing (8 Opin., 546). It is neither beyond the power of 
a legislature, nor is it unusual, to \est a discretion in an 
officer to exercise authority conferred; and it must be ad-
mitted that enabling words are apt for the purpose. There 
is no general presumption against the giving of such dis-
cretion. The whole subject is very fully considered in Julius 
v. The Lord Bishop of Oxford (Law Rep., 5 Ap. Cases, 214). 
The words there ~o be construed were "it sllall be lawful," 
and the rule by which their meaning was reached is thus 
stated by Lord Penzance: 
"The words, 'it shall bela wful,' are distinctly words of per-
mission only-they are enabling and empowering words. 
·They confer a legislative right and power ou the individual 
named to do a particular thing; and the true question is not 
whether they mean something different, but whether, regard 
being hall to the person so enabled-to the su~ject-matter, 
to the general objects of the statute, and to the person or 
class of persons for whose benefit the power may be intended 
to have been conferred-they do, or do not, create a duty in 
the person on whom it is conferred to exercise it." 
And, as was said by Lord Cairns in the same case: 
"The words 'it shall be lawful' being according to their 
natural meaning permis~ive or enabling words only, it lies 
upon those, as it seems to me, who contend that an obliga-
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tion exists to exercise this power, to show in the circum-
stances of the case something which, according to the prin-
ciples I have mentioned, creates this obligation.'' 
Following out the lines of inquiry suggested in the fore-
going, we come first to the object of the act in question, 
which sufficiently appears from the report of the House com-
mittee recommending its passage. Such a report may be 
considered as a preamble to the law in construing it. (See 
Opinion of Attorney-General Wirt, 1 Opin., 597, 59S.) This 
report (No. 862, Yol. 3. House Heports, first session Forty-
seventh Congress, 1881-'82) shows that by the export move-
ment and by the melting for manufacturing purposes gold 
coin of the United States was being reduced in amount each 
year by many millions of dollars. That which was exported 
was melted and recoined in foreign countries. This loss, it 
was stated, could be saved if jewelers and exporters could 
exchange gold coin for gold bars. The object of the act 
plainly was, therefore, to reduce the expenses of the Govern-
ment mints by reducing the amount of coinage necessary. 
The mode of accomplishing this was by the exchange of un-
coineu gold for gold coin. There is nothing in the report, 
and nothing in the debate, tending to show that Congress 
regarded it as a matter of public benefit to retard the ex-
porting of gold. On the contrary, it was apparent to the 
· legislature that unless the exchange c.lid facilitate the move-
ment of gold out of the country, the law would remain in-
operativ·e, for there would then be no inducement to any 
priYate owner to seek the exchange. Economy of public ex-
penditures, then, being the only ol>ject of the act, it il'i not to 
be presumed that discretion was intrusted to public officers 
to defeat it. 
But leaving the object of the act out of view, consider the 
position of the officers enabled bv its terms. The superin-
tendents of the mints and the New York assay office areuu(1er 
the supervision of the Director of the Mint (sees. 34:5, 3502, 
3503, and 3504,Rev. Stat.), and the Director of the Mint, by 
section 343, Revised Statutes, is subject to the general direc-
tion of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is not reasonable 
to suppose that Congress, in reposing such a discretion in a 
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public officer, would select one who was subject to the orders 
of a number of superiors. I ha,·e searched the statutes de-
fining the powers and duties of the superintendents of the 
mints and the New York assay office, and nowhere is a dis-
cretion of a similar kind intrusted to those officers. Where 
discretion with reference to the financial policy of the Gov-
ernment is vested in an officer, it is in the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
Again, if a discretion is conferred on the superintendents, 
then each may act as seems best to him, and the exchange of 
bars for coin may be made in Philadelphia and refused in 
New York or San Francisco. Certainly Congress could not 
have intended such a disjointed operation of the act. It may 
be said that the Secretary of the Treasury may bring about 
a uniform exercise of this discretion. That is to say, how-
ever, that by giving discretion to the superintendents of 
mints, Congress intended really to put it in the Secretary of 
theTreasnry. This is to imply a most awkward and unusual 
course in legislation. 
I tlo not attach, in construing this act, any importance to 
the privilege extended to exporters and manufacturers, be-
cause it must be conceded that the act had nothing whatever 
to do with private rights, except that by offering a bene-
fit to private owners of coin an exchange profitable for the 
Government was induced. Such persons, before the passage 
of the act, had no equitable right to the exchange, and can 
not, therefore, invoke the exercise of the power conferred by 
the act as a matter of justice to them. 
The construction of this act as mandatory upon the sup-
erintendents of the mints and the New York assay office is 
founded not upon private rights at all, but is based upon the 
grounds: 
First. That the act was intended to confer a public benefit, 
namely, economy in public expenditures. . 
Second. That if Congress had intended to vest a discretion 
it would have selected the Secretary of the 'freasury instead 
of the subordinate officers named in the act as the deposi-
tory. 
Third. That it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress 
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intended the disjointed operation of the act which would re-
sult if discretion is thereby conferred on subordinate officer8 
in different cities. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, therefore, can not direct 
the superintendents of the mint and assa.Y office to refuse to 
exchange gold bars for gold coin under this act, and your 
first question must be answered in the negative. 
As to your second question, I am of the opinion that you 
can not impose a charge of 4 cents a hundred, or any other 
sum, for the exchange of gold bars for coin. Section 3524, 
Revised Statutes, provided that the charges for the prepara-
tion of bars shall be fixed from time to time by the Director 
of the Mint, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, so ~s to equal but not exceed, in their judgment, 
the actual average cost to each mint and assay office of the 
material, labor, wastage, and use of machinery employed in 
such case. That section, as ena.cted, referred to the exchange 
of bullion for coin or bars. The bullion was a cruder form 
of the metal, and a cha.nge of that into either coin or bars 
imposed upon the Government expense of manufacture. 
Where the Government receives coin for bars, however, the 
exchange results in a saving of expense of coinage to t!Je 
Government. This was the object of the act. The imposi-
tion of such a charge would defeat that object by taking 
away from owners of coin the inducement to seek the ex-
change. In the absence of express enactment, therefore, the 
power to make the charge is not to be inferred. 
Your second question must also be answered in the nega. 
tive. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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PENSION AGENTS. 
The provision in the act of June 30, 1890, chap. 639, entitlecl "An act 
making appropriations for the payment of invalid and other pensions," 
etc., requiring a new bond ''from all pension agents now in office," is 
mandatory, and applies to all pension agents then in office, without 
any exception whatever. 
DEP .A.RTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
July 5, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of the 1st in~tant you ask for an opin-
ion of the Attorney-General upon the question whether, under 
the act "for the payment of invalid and other pensions of 
the United States for the fiscal year ending J u.J.e 30, 1891,' 
new bonds must be tak~n from all pension agents, or only 
from those availing themselves of the provision of the act 
which enables an agent, with the app1·oval of the Secretary 
of the Interior, to delegate his powers as agent temporarily 
to his chief or other clerk. You accompany your request 
with a letter from the Commissio11er of Pensions, and with 
an opinion of F. L. Campbell, chief law. clerk in your De-
partment. 1\'Ir. Campbell is of thA opimon that it is your 
duty under the law to require new bonds from all the pension 
agents. I fully concur with Mr. Campbell. 
The provision in the act on which the question arises 
(which I take from Mr. Campbell's written opinion) is as fol-
lows: 
"For salaries of eighteen agents for the payment of pen-
sions, at four thousand dollars each, seventy-two thousand 
dollars. In case of the sickness or unavoidable absence of 
any pension agent from his office, he may, with the approval 
of the Secretary of the Interior, authorize the chief clerk, or 
some other clerk employed therein, to act in his place. to sign 
official checks, and to dispose of all other duties required by 
law of such pension agent; and, with like approval, any pen-
sion agent may designate and authorize a clerk to sign the 
name of the pension agent to official checks. The official 
bond given by the principal of the office shall be held to 
cover and apply to the case of the person appointed to act in 
his place in such cases, and a new bond shall be required from 
all pension agents now in office. Such acting officer shall, 
moreover, for the time being, be subject to all the liabilities 
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and penalties prescribed by law for the official misconduct, 
in like cases, of the pension agent for whom he acts.'' 
The suggestion of the Commissioner of Pensions seems to 
be that this act confers upon pension agents tlle personal 
privilege of delegating their powers to a subordinate; that 
a new bond is required to cover the additional risk incurred 
by the agent's new responsibility for his deputy; that so long 
as a pension agent does not avail himself of tlle privilege, a 
new bond is unnecessary; that Congress is not to be pre-
sumed to intend a useless requirement! and that therefore 
the provision is to be construed as applicable only to agents 
exercising the privilege. 
I do not think this provision was enacted for the benefit 
of the pension agents only. It is more reasonable to suppose 
that it was passed to benefit the pensioners, and to prevent 
delays in payments to them, by reason of the temporary in-
capacity of the agent to act. 
It is entirely consistent with and promotive of such an ob-
ject that all agents shall give a bond at once which will make 
it possible at any time, and without delay when a contin-
gency shall arhe making it necessary, for any one of the 
agents to designate a subordinate to act in his stead. 
But whether I arn correct in this Yiew of the object of the 
act or not, it is sufficient to say that the language requiring 
new bonds is mandatory, and in express terms applies to "all 
pension agents now in office." What Lord Coleridge sard of 
acts of Parliament is equally true of acts of Congress, that it 
is better 4 ' to suppose that Parliament meant what Parliament 
has really said, and not to limit plain words in an act of Par-
liament by considerations of policy, if it be policy, as to which 
minds may differ, and as to which decisions may vary." 
( Ooxhead v. Mullis, L. R., 3 0. P. D., 442.) 
In my opinion new bonds should at once be required of all 
pension agents now in office. 
The inclosures a.re herewith returned. 
Respectfully, 
W~I. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor· General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. 1\flLLER .. 
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APPOINTMENTS IN RAILWAY :MAIL SERVICE. 
Upon the facts submittefl (which are set forth in the opinion): Adrised 
that the appointment of certain railway transfer clerks, who had not 
been examined and certified for appointment by the Civil Service Com-
mission, was not within the amendment of clause 5 of Rail way Rule 
·II, adopted August 19, 1889, which excepts from examination clerks 
in the Rail way Mail Service who are "employed exclusively as porters 
in handling mail matter in bulk, in sacks, or pouches, and not other-
wise." 
Section 1019 of the Postal Regulations (edition of 1887) can not prevail 
over, but must yield to the subsequently adopted amendment of sai<l 
clause 5, which should be strictly confined to the class of transfer clerks 
therein mentioned. 
DEPART1IEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
July 8, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of June 3 ultimo, with the 
papers therein referred to, bas receiYed my consideration. 
The question presented grows out of the appointment of 
three railway transfer clerks at Albany, N. Y., who bad not, 
been examined and certified for appointment by the Civil 
Service Commission. 
The Civil Strvice Commission hold that these appoint-
ments were illegally made, because the appointees had not 
been examined as requirtd by the ch·il service rules; while, 
on the other hand, the Superintendent of the Railway ::\fail 
Service contends that they were valid, as coming within tbe 
amendment of clause 5 of Railway Rule II, which was adopted 
August 19, 1889, and some months before the appointments 
were made. 
The amendment of clause 5 excepts ~' from examination in 
the classified Railway Mail Service" ''clerks employed ex-
clusively as porters in handling mail matter in bulk, in sacks, 
or pouches, and not other~vise." 
The facts found on the spot by Civil Service Commissioner 
Lyman are that the duties of the transfer clerks in question 
were to "handle mail pouches and sacks, look after their safe-
keeping, and transfer them between trains and between the 
post officR and the trains ; transfer !'egistered matter in 
pouehes or sacks between the depot and post· office; take 
letters from the station letter boxes and assort them for the 
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out-going trains, ddi\ering them to the railway mail clerks 
on the cars according to their proper destination. In tram; 
ferring registered matter, the transfer clerk receiving it, 
whether at the train or at the post-office, is obliged to receipt 
for it, enter the packages in detail in a book kept by him, 
and obtain a receipt for them in this book from the party to 
whom they are deli,ered. The handling and transfer of 
open registered matter and the handling and assorting of 
letters taken from the depot boxes are as constant awl ha-
bitual with these clerks as arA the handling and transfer of 
closed sacks and pouches." 
These facts were ascertained and communicated to thr 
Civil Ser\ice Commission by Commissioner Lyman in obedi-
ence to instructions from the Commission to him, as appear~. 
by his letter of April 4, 1890, a copy of which is among the 
inclosures of your communication of June 3 ultimo, and do 
not seem to be controverted an:rwhere in the correspondence 
referred to me. I therefore assume them to be what they 
purport to be, rather than return the papers to you with the 
request that the Civil Service Commission be asked to maktl 
a statement of the facts in\ol\ed, in conformit~~ with tht' 
settled practice of this Department. 
It is also stated that persons .dbcharging the duties which 
the appointees in question have been performing are legal!.) 
known and designated as clerks, and this we also assume a~; 
a fact in the case. 
In view of these facts it is perfectly clear that the transfer 
clerks in question do not come under the amendment of 
clause 5 of Railway Rule II, which applies only to clerks" em-
ployed exclusively as porters in handling mail matter in bulk, 
or sacks, or pouches, and not othencise," and, consequently, I 
am of the opinion that these clerks should ha\e been, ex-
amined, ahd that, not ha,ing been, they were appointed in 
violation of the rules lawfully established for the benefit of 
the civil service of the Go\ernment. 
I am aware that section 1019 of the Postal Regulations 
(edition 1887, p. 367) pro\ides that" division superintendents 
may, with approval of the General Superintendent, detail 
clerks at certain important junctions to look after the hand-
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ling of mails at railroad depots, and to pe1jonn su:;h othe1· 
dutiespertaintng to the Railway .11fctil Se'rvice as may be requirred. 
They will be entirely under the supervision of their di\ision. 
superintendent, and will look to him only for all instructions." 
This regulation, however, can not pre\ail O\er, but must 
yield to the subsequently adopted amendment of clause 5, 
which should be strictly confined to the class of transfer clerks 
therein mentioned. 
As to the question stated bJ· Commissioner Lyman with 
regaru to the legality of the payments of the salaries of the 
appointees, it is not properly before me, anu therefore noth-
ing herein is to be construed as an assent to the proposition 
that the money paid to these de facto clerks ought to be dis-
allowed. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
OKLAHOMA-NATIONAL BANKS 
In view of the provisions of the act of May 2, 1890, chap. 182, entitled 
"An act to provide a temporary government for the Territory of Okla-
homa/' etc.: Advised, that there no longer exists any obstacle to the 
establishment of national-banking associations in the Indian Terri-
tory. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 0, 1890. 
SIR: Your letter of June 24, 1890, asks an opinion ''as to 
whether it is now lawful to establish national banks in In-
dian Territory, in view of the recent act of Congress, ap-
proved l\fay 2,1890 (Public, No. 100), to provide a temporary 
government for the Territory of Oklahoma, to enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the United States courts in the Indian Terri-
tory, and for other purposes." 
I am of opimon that national banks may now be estab-
lished in the Indian Territory. 
The previously existing obstacle to holding this view has 
been remo\·ed by the above-mentioned act of Congress of 
M~y 2,1890. 
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The twenty ninth section of that act expressly provide~ 
that" The Constitution of the United States and all general 
Jaws of the United States which prohibit crimes and misde-
meanors in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States, except in the District of Columbia, 
and all laws relctting to national· banking associcttions, shall have 
the same force and e.ffect in the Indian Te'rritory as elsewl!ere 
in the United Stntes," * * * and that section also makes 
operative in the Indian Territory a large part of the general 
laws of the State of Arkansas; and the effect of this legis-
lation is to extend over that Territory a system of laws ade-
quate for the protection of life and property, and distinct 
from the laws in force by virtue of the right of self-govern-
ment secured to the five civilized tribes inhabiting said Ter-
ritory. 
That Congress had power to legislate in that manner can 
not be questioned at this late day. (See United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S., 375, where the previous cases on the 
subject are considered.) 
In view of all this, there can hardly be a doubt that it is 
the duty of your Department to gh·e effect to the will of 
Congress that ''all laws relating to national-banking asso· 
::~iations shalllu1ve the same force aiHl effect in the Indian 
Territory as elsewhere in the United States." 
I am, very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PENSION-DEPENDENT PARENT. 
The first section of the act of June 27, 1890, chap. 6:~4, entitled ''An act 
granting pensions to soldiers and sailors who are incapacitated for 
the performance ofmanuallabor," etc., is to be regarded as an amend-
ment of section 4707 Revised Statutes; and, so regarded, the word 
"soldier" employed therein should be construed to comprehend also 
sailor and marine-the term being used as a short expression to embrace 
aU the persons under section 4707 whose death entitled their parents 
to a pension. 
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Pen !don-D epen dent Parent. 
DEP ART:MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 10, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of the 1st instant you request that 
the Attorney-General advise you whether in the first section 
of the pension act appro,ed June 27, 1890, a copy of which 
you inclose, the word "soldier" should be construed to in-
clude sailor and marine. 
I think this is the necessary construction. The language 
of the section is as follows : 
"That in considering the pension claims of dependent par-
ents, the fact of the soldier's death by reason of any wound, 
injury, casualty, or disease, which, under the conditions and 
limitations of existing laws, would have entitled him to an 
invalid pension, and the fact that the soldier left no widow 
or minor children ha\ing been shown as required by law, it 
shall be necessary only to show by competent and sufficient 
evidence that such parent or parents are without other pres-
ent means of support than their own manual labor, or the 
contributions of others not legally bound for their support: 
Provided, That all pensions allowed to dependent parents 
under this act shall commence from the date of the filing of 
the application hereunder) and shall continue no longer than 
the existence of the dependence." 
In the other sections of the act there is no provision for the 
payment of pension claims of dependent parents, and we are 
obliged, therefore, in seeking the law undt>r which such 
parents are to be paid, to look into statutes in force when 
the act in question became a law. Dependent parents have 
been heretofore provided for in section 4707, of the Revised 
Statutes, and in the act approved March 19, 1886. The lat-
ter act simply increased the amount of the pension, but did 
not change the requirements with reference to parents. The 
first section of the act of June 27, 1890, is to be regarded 
therefore as an amendment to section 4 707, and should b~ 
considered with that section to give it a proper construction. 
The effect of the amendment is simply to render it unnec-
essary for parents of the person whose service is the cause 
of the pension to show that they had before been dependent 
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on such person, or that he had recognized an obligation to 
support them-facts which were required by the original sec-
tion 4707. Section 4707 applies to the parents of any person 
embraced wthin the provisions of section 46!)3 who has died 
since March 4, 1861, or shall thereafter die. There are several 
classes of persons described in section 4693, the first of wb1cb 
is as follows : 
~'Any officer of the Army, including regulars, volunteers, 
and militia, or any officer in the Navy or ·l\larine Corps, or any 
enlisted man, however employed ii;t the military or na\al 
service of the United States, or in its Marine Corps," etc., and 
this class, with the others, is by reference to be included in 
section 4707. 
The first section of the act of June 27, 1890, inasmuch as it 
is an amendment to section 4707, might be properly changed 
to read as follows: "That in considering the pension claims 
of dependent parents under section 4707, the fact of the 
soldier's death," etc. 
With such an interpolation it becomes evident that the 
word " soldier " in this connection was used as a short expres-
sion to embrace ~11 the persons under section 4707 whose death 
entitled their parents to a pension. It could not have been 
intended by the incidental use of the word "soldier" to have 
thus discriminated between parents of soldiers aud those of 
sailors and marines, when nowhere in previous pension laws 
bas any such distinction ever been made. There is no reason 
for such distinction. If Congress bad intended to make it, 
it would certainly have left no doubt of its meaning. 
The title of the act is ''An act granting pensions to sol-
diers and sailors who are incapacitated for the performance of 
manual labor, and providing for pensions to widows, minor 
children, and dependent parents." If it had been intended 
by the act to affect only the dependent parents of soldiers, 
such distinction would naturally have appeared in the title. 
In section 2 and in section 3 the beneficial provisions of 
the present act are extended to all persons who served ninety 
days or more in the military or naval service of the United 
States in the late war of the rebellion and who have been 
honorably discharged therefrom. The first three sections are 
in pari ma.teria, and in the absence of some express statement 
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of an intention of Congress to make the distinction between 
soldiers and sailors and marines, I do not think the meaning 
of " soldier" can be limited to men engaged in the military 
service of the United States, but must be held to include at 
least the three-soldiers, sailors, and marines. 
Very respectfully, 
W11. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
ADMIRAL'S SECRETARY-APPOINTMENT OF. 
The appointment of t e secretary allowed the Admiral of the Navy by 
section 1367, Revised Statutes, does not belong to the President, with 
the advice and con!lent of the Senate, but devolves upon the Admiral 
as one personal 'to himself; and the contemporaneous continuation of 
the statute and uniform practice thereunder by the executive branch 
of the Government have accorded with this view. 
DEPARTl\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 10, 1890. 
SIR: Byl~tterof the 26th of May last you submitted for the 
consideration of the Attorney-General the question whether 
Mr. Alden, the present secretary of the Admiral, should be 
commissioned as such, with the rank of lieutenant, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. You inclosed in 
your letter a copy of correspondence had between Admiral 
Porter, then Vice-Admiral, to the Secretary of the Navy, in 
August, 1866, in which the Vice-Admiral nominated Mr. 
Alden as his secretary, and the Secretary of the Navy ap-
proved the same. .A. letter from Mr. Alden, approved by the 
Admiral, and inclosed by you, refers to acts of Congress pro-
viding for a ~ecretary, and cites an opinion of Attorney-
General Cushing (6 Opin., 1) as authority for asking that a 
commission now issue to him as requested. 
In my opinion Mr. Alden can not be commissioned by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
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Section 1367,Revised Statutes, under which Mr. Alden was 
appointed, is as follows: 
"The Admiral and Vice-Admiral shall each be allowed a 
secretary, who shall be entitled to the rank and allowance of 
a lieutenant in the navy." 
This section emboaies, without substantial change, an act 
of May 16, 1866 (14 Stat., 48), and the Rixth section of an act 
approved July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 222), as ameuded by the act 
of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 516.) 
Attorney-Generd Cushing, in his opinion (6 Opin., 1) cited 
by Mr. Alden, held that the appointment of any officer of the 
lJ'nited States belongs to the President of the United States, 
by and with the ad \ice and consent of the Senate, unless 
t.bere be an enactment to the contrary applicable to the ex-
cepted place. Undoubtedly this is a correct statement of the 
law. The only question to be solved here is, whether there 
is provision for the appointment of a secretary to the Admiral 
by some one other than by the President, by and with the 
.advice and consent of the Senate. • 
The expression of the statute is that the Admiral '' shall 
be allowed" a secretary. That, on its face, indicates that 
the appointment is to be personal to the Admiral, and so sug-
gests that be is to make the selection. 
The contention by 1\Ir. Alden is, in effect, that the office of 
secretary to the Admiral is an independent office, to be filled 
without regard to the Admiral's nomination, and for a life 
term, like that of a lieutenant of the line. The language of 
the section creating the office seems to me to entirely refute 
such a claim. By sectiOn 1362 it is provided that when the 
office of Admiral becomes vacant, the grade shall cease to 
exist. If 1vir. Alden's contention is correct, and he survives 
the Admiral, we shall have a secretary to the Admiral with-
out an Admiral. It will then be a puzzling question to de-
fine the scope of his official duties. Congress could not have 
intended such an anomalous state of affairs. 
But we are not left in doubt as to the necessary meaning 
of the words, "shall be allowed." When Congress gave the 
Admiral and Vice-Admiral secretaries, it had been the estab-
lished practice in the Navy Department for forty years to 
allow commanders of fleets, squadrons, and divisions to ap-
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point secretaries to serve them while in command. (See 
Regulations 1865, sections 249 and 1811; Regulations 1832, 
chapter 25, section 32, page 30; Circular of Secretary Ban-
croft, November 24, 1845). And such secretaries were staff 
officers, with the relati\·e rank of lieutenant. (See sections 
5 and 21, Regulations 1865). Without any legislation, there-
fore, the Admiral and Vice Admiral, while in command on the 
sea, would have been allowed secretaries on their own apvoint-
ment. The statutory provision under discussion simply ex-
tended the privilege of a secretary to these lligh officers of 
tile .NaY y for tlleir shore service also. TheN a val Regulations 
are recognized by Congress in section 154 7, and those in force 
when this statute was passed may properly be considered 
in construing it, because the presumption is that CongTess 
enacted the law with the knowledge of and in the light of 
such regulations. lt is fairly to be inferred, therefore, that 
in allowing secretaries to the Admiral and Vice-Admiral, Con-
gress had in mind, and had no intention of changing, the 
long-established regulation and practice under which naval 
officers appointed their own secretaries. It can not be sup-
posed, in the absence of express provision, that Congress 
wished to deprive the Admiral and Vice-Admiral of the im-
portant privilege of selecting their confidential assistants, 
especially when such a privilege had always been accorded 
to officers inferior to them in rank. 
It is hardly necessary to say that a nomination or appoint-
ment by the Admiral wholly negatives the possibility of an 
appointment by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Appointments by the President are 
not made on the nomination of any one. 
The concluswn reached is borne out by the practice under 
the law, now twenty years old. The secretaries were ap-
pointed by the Admiral and Vice-Admiral, respecti,·ely, 
shortly after the law was passed, with the approval of the 
~ecretary of the Navy, and no President has ever since nom-
inated them to the Senate. This is a contemporary construc-
tion of the act by the executive officers of the Government, 
which, under the decisioqs of the Supreme Court, is en-
titled to great weight. (See United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 
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R., 169; Same v. Johnston, 124 U. S. R., 236; Robertson v. 
Downing, 127 U. S. R., 607.) 
The same result follows from the language of section 1410, 
Revised Statutes, which provides : 
"That all officers not holding commissions or warrants, or 
who are not entitled to them, except such as are temporarily 
appointed to the duties of a commissioned or warrant officer, 
and except secretaries and clerks, shall be deemed petty offi-
cers," etc. 
The necessary implication of this section is that secretaries 
are officers not holding commissions or warrants, aud are 
not entitled to them. The only secretaries named in the 
statutes are the secretaries to the Admiral and Vice-Admiral 
and commanders of squadrons (see sec. 1556, p. !!67, Rev. 
Stat). If secretaries do not hold commissions, and are not 
entitled to them, it follows that they are not appointed by 
the President, because appointments by the President are 
always evidenced by a commission. 
For the reasons given, in my opinion the request of Mr. 
Alden should be denied. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
Approved: 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
MAIL PRIVILEGES OF CONGRESSMEN. 
Where the seat of a member of the House, as Representative from a cer. 
tain Congressional district, was contested, and the contestant, not the 
then sittmg member, was adjudged by the House to ave been elected 
a Representative from that district, and therefore entit1ed to the seat, 
whereupon he qualified and took his seat as such Representative: Held 
that the unseated member had no right thereafter to send public docu-
ments through the mail free of postage, under the proviso in the first 
section of the act of March 3, lt;79, chapter 180. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 11, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of June 23, ultimo, and the in-
closures therein referred to, present for m opinion the fol-
lowing case : 
• 
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The Ron. George D. Wise took his seat as a member of 
the House of Representatives for the present Congress by 
virtue of credentials which stated that he had been elected a 
Representative for the Third Congressional district of the 
State of Virginia. 
The right of Mr. Wise to the seat was contested before the 
House of Representatives by Mr. Edmund Waddill, jr., and 
the result of the contest was that in April last Mr. Waddill 
was adjudged and declared by the House to be entitled to 
the seat, and thereupon qualified and took his seat for the 
said district. 
Notwithstanding that decision, Mr. Wise still claims the 
right to send public documents through the mail free of post-
age, and this is the question before me for opinion. 
The law regulating the subject is to be found in a proviso 
of tLe first section of the act of 1\Iarch 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 35G), 
entitled" Au act making appropuations for the service of the 
Post-Office Department for the fiscal year ending June thir-
tieth, eighteen hundred and eighty." The proviso is as fol-
lows: 
'~Provided further, That from and after the passage of this 
act Senators, Representatives and Delegates in Congress, the 
Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Repre--
sentatives, may send and receive through the mail, free, all 
public documents printed by order of Congress; and the 
name of each Senator, Representative, Delegate, Secretary 
of the Senate, and Clerk of the House shall be written thereon 
with the proper designation of the office he holds, and the 
provisions of this section shall apply to each of the persons 
named herein until the first .Monday of December, following 
the expiration of their respective tt·rms·of office." 
It is difficult to see any legal basis for Mr. Wise's claim. 
The issue between him and his contestant was, which of the 
two was the 'luly-elected Representative for the said distl'ict, 
and that issue was decided by the House against 1\Ir. Wise; 
so that it stands adjudged that he was not elected a mem-
ber of the Fifty-first Congress, but that Mr. Waddill was. 
It is true that Mr. Wise had prima facie right to the seat 
owing to the fact that the certificate was in hiR favor, and 
that he was a de facto member of the House until that prima 
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facie right was overthrown by the ju<lgrnent of that bo<ly; 
but now that that prima facie rlg·ht is overthrown, Mr. Wise 
must be treated and considered in disposing of the question 
before me as never hav-ing ha<l a right to a seat in the Fifty-
first Congress. As a consequence, therefore, 1\Ir. Wise can 
not enjoy a privilege belonging to a member of the House 
when he is not a member. 
It 'must be remembered that the decision of the Rouse 
against 1\fr. \Vise relates back to the very beginning of the 
term which was the subject of contest, so that 1\lr. V\Taddill 
became entitled to receive pay for all that part of the term 
during which l\1r. Wise was the defacto incumbent. 
The judgment of the House must nl:!cessarily have that 
rPtruacti,·e effect, because the right to the seat is gi,Teu by the 
election aud not by the judgment, which merely <leclares 
which party 'leas elected. At the sam~ time, as the intruder 
was admitted to a seat on a color of title thereto, his acts 
ha•e validity so long as his de facto incumbency existed; but 
it would hardly be in accordance with reason to allow a mem-
ber, after being unseated, to go on exercising any privilege 
of membership when he is not even a de facto member. Mr. 
Wise, the unseated member, and l\1r. Waddill, the seated 
member, can not both have the privilege in question as Rep-
resentatives from the same Congressional district. 
It results, therefore, that, in my opiniou, .Mr. 'Viae has no 
right to the free use of the mail upon the facts presented. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. 1\IILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
EXCHANGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GOLD COIN 
Opinion of July 1, 18~0 (ante, p. 576), construing the act of May 26, 1882, 
chapter 190, with respect to the exchange of gold bars for gold coin, 
re-affirmed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 14, 1890. 
SIR: As requested, I ha-ve carefully examined the opinion 
given to you by Acting Attorney-General Taft, under date of 
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July 1 instant, in relation to the questiou whether the statute 
of .May 26, 1882, authorizing the receipt by superintendents of 
mints and the New York assay office of United States gold 
coin in exchange for gold bars is rnandatorJ· or only enabling 
in its character. I find myself constrained to concur in the 
opinion of the Acting Attorney-General. It is hardly worth 
while to go into a further statement of the rea:sons upon which 
this conclusion is based; suffice it to say that if this statute 
confers a discretion, such discretion is conferred upon suo-
ordinate officers, and is broader than any discretion as to the 
same subject-matter conferred upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
By the act of June22, 1874 (18 Stat., 202), the Secretary'was 
.authorized to transfer to the office of the assistant treasurer at 
New York, from the bullion fund of the assay office at New 
York, refined gold bars bearing United States stamp of fine-
ness, weight, and value, or bars from an:r melt of foreign gold 
coin or bullion of standard value to or above that of the United 
States, and apply the same to the redemption of coin certifi-
cates, m· in exchange for gold coin at less than par and not less 
than the market value, subject to such regulations as he may 
prescribe. Here was a discretion vested in the Secretary, to be 
exercised at the office of assistant treasur~r at New York, 
to exchange bars for coin. The act of 1882 authorizes these 
subordinate officers, namely, the superintendents of the coin-
age mints and of the United States assay office at New York, 
to make the exchange at their respective places. It may be 
doubtful whether the act of 1882 does not operate as are-
peal of the act of 187 4, so far as affects this question of 
exchanging bars for coin; but if it does not work such re-
peal, if it gives a discretion at all, it gives to at least one of 
these subordinate officers, namel,y, the superintendent of the 
assay office in New York, a discretion which might seriously 
conflict with that of the Secretary. As stated in the opinion 
of the Acting Attorney-General, this is a discretion which 
each of the officers to whom it is granted might exercise in 
a different way, if it be a discretion; and also a discretion in 
each officer not subject to the control of the Secretary. It 
is difficult to believe Congress ever intended such a state of 
things to exist. It is much more in harmony with the plain 
b96 RON. W. H. H. )1ILLER 
Directions on .Uail llatter. 
purpose of the act, namely, the avoidance of the expense of 
coinage, to treat the act as mandatory. 
Second. As to the question whether 4 cents a hundred 
dollars, the supposed expense of making the bars, can be 
charged, my conclusion also concurs with that of the Acting 
Attorney-General. .As I understand it, in ascertaining- tbe 
value of these gold bars the unbroken practice of the Gov-
ernment has been to fix the same solely by the amount of 
gold they contained, and without·reference to the expense of 
making the bars. This being so, it is hardly to be supposed 
that Congress intended that another element should be con-
sidered in ascertaining the value for the purpose of this 
exchange. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DIRECTIOXS ON MAIL MATTER. 
The following words printed upon the wrapper of a newspaper sent by 
mail, namely, "Sample copy; if not called for by party to whom ad-
dressed postmaster please deliver to some local teacher,'' held to be a 
direction for delivery within the meaning of section 1 of the act of 
January 20, 1888, chapter 2, and therefore permissible. 
DEP ART)IENT OF JUSTICE, 
J 'ztly 17, 1890. 
SIR: I have examined the question submitted by your 
letter of July 8 instant, whether the Penman's Journal, a 
newspaper printed in the city of New York, can lawfully 
print upon the wrappers inclosing its "'sample copies" an in-
struction to postmasters in the following words, to wit : 
"Sample copy. If not called for by party to whom ad-
dressed postmaster please deliver to some local teacher." 
In a supplemental note of July 11 the acting Postmaster-
General advised me that the Penman's Journal is rated as 
second-class matter. The statute upon this subject is found 
in volume 25, United States Statutes at Large, page 1, and is 
as follows: 
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''}failable matter of the second class shall contain no writ-
ing, print, or sign thereon in addition to the original print, 
except as herein provided, to wit: The name and address of 
the person to whom the matter shall be sent, index figures of 
subscription book either printed or written, the pripted title 
of the publication and the place of its publication, the printed 
or written name and address without addition of advertise-
ment of the publisher or sender, or both, aud written or 
printed words or figures, or both, indicating the date on 
which the subscription to such matter will end, the correc-
tion of any typographical error, a mark except by written or 
printed words, to designate a work or passage to which it i~ 
desired to call attention, the words' sample copy' when the 
matter is sent as such, the words 'marked copy' when the 
matter contains a marked item or article, and publishers or 
news agents may inclose in their publications, bills, receipts, 
.and orders for subscriptions thereto, but the same shall he in 
such form as to convey no other information than the name, 
place of publication, subscription price of the publication to 
which they refer and the subscription due thereon.'' 
Then follow provisions with reference to third and fourth 
class matter, and the section concludes as follows: 
'~In all cases directions for transmit, delivery, forwarding, 
or return shall be deemed part of the address; and the 
Postmaster-General shall prescribe suitable regulations for 
-carrying this section into effect.'' 
It is clear, I think, that if the words to which your ques-
tion is directed are permissible at all, it is by reason of the 
portion of the section last quoted-
~~ ln all cases directions for transmit, delivery, forwarding, 
or return shall be deemed part of the address." * * * 
It would not be questioned that a direction that in case of 
non-delivery the postmaster should return to the sender, giv-
ing his name, would be lawful; neither do I suppose that it 
would be questioned if the direction were, in case ofnon-de-
livery to the original address, that it should be delivered to 
some second person named, such direction would be lawful. 
The only difference in the case under consideration is that 
the direction to the postmaster is to deliver to some one of a 
class. I am unable to see that in this fact there lurks any 
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violation of law. It is a direction for deli\ery, as I think, 
within the meaning of the language of the statute, and in 
my judgment, therefore, is lawful. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours~ 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The PosTMASTER-GENERAL. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
It is not within the province of the Attorney-General to consider ques-
tions looking to changes in maritime law to be accomplished by treaty 
with foreign Governments. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 17, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of :\lay 20 ultimo, inviting my 
attention to a letter from the Belgian minister at this capi-
tal, and certain propositions from His :Majesty the King of 
the Belgians, looking to various changes in maritime law, to 
be accomplished by treaty, has received my attention. 
I regret that it does not fall within the duties of the Attor-
ney-General to enter upon a discussion of the interesting 
questions you have laid before me. 
As you will see by section 356 o~ the Revised Statutes, 
"the head of any Executive D<.'partment may require the 
opinion of the .Attorney -General on any q uestious of law a'l'is-
ing in the administration of his Department." This provision, 
as repeatedly construed by my predecessors, limits the func-
tion of the AttorneJT·General, in the matter of opinions re-
quested by the heads of Departments, to questions arising out 
of the law as it is, and does not seem to call upon him to give 
his views and opinions upon the advisability of making 
changes, by treaty, in any department of jurisprudence. 
The proposals of His :Majesty the King of the Belgians are 
addressed, necessarily, to the treaty-making power of the 
United States, and involve international considerations which 
I do not think come within the province of the Department 
of Justice. At the same time, should negotiations be opened 
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upon these proposals, and any question of law arise in the 
course of them upon which you shoul(l desire my opinion, 
it will be my duty, as it will be my pleasure, to give it. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H . .)!ILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
The bridge ov~r the :\Iuskingum River at Taylorsville, Ohio, is a nui-
sance to navigation which ought to be abated. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 19, 1890. 
SIR : I have carefully considered your communications and 
their inclosures with reference to the obstruction of the 
.:\Iuskingum River by a bridge at Taylorsville, Ohio, and am 
of opinion that the bridge is a nuisance to navigation which 
may be abated. · 
I would give my reasons for the conclusions reached but 
for the fact that Congress has, by sections 9 and 10 of the 
act of August 11, 1888 (25 Stat., 424, 425), referred such 
questions to the judicial department of the Government. 
It seems to me, therefore, that I am going quite far enough 
when I say that the case falls within the sections referred to, 
and that, if legal proceedings under them should be neces-
sary, I will, when requested by you, promptly institute them. 
I return the tracing, as requested. 
I have the honor to be yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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EMPLOYMENT OP ARMY OFFICERS ON CIVIL WORKS, ETC. 
The detail ofan officerofthe Army to report to the President of the ·world's 
Columbian Commission, with a view to his assignment by the latter 
to the duties of an engineer in the preparation an<l constructiou of build-
ings, grounds, etc., for the Columbian Exposition, is withiu the prohi-
bitionofsectiou 1224,H.eYised Statutes, provided that the performance of 
such duties require the officer to be separated from his company, regi-
ment, or corps, or interfere with the discharge of his military duties. 
Semhle that where a leave of absence is .asked by an Army officer, for 
the very purpose of enabling him to undertake the employments pro-
hibiteu by said section, the granting of such leave would be an evasion 
of the statute and be unwarranted. 
DEPARTMENT OF t.TUSTICE, 
J ,uzy 19, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of July 18 you submit for my opinion 
"the application of the restrictive provisions of sections 
1222 and 1224, Revised Statutes, in the following cases : 
" ~,irst. Hon. T. vY. Palmer, president of the \\7 orld's Colum-
bian Commission, submits a copy of a resolution of the Com-
mission requesting the Secretary of War to detail Col. H. C. 
Corbin, U. S. Army, to report to its president with a view to 
his assignment to such duties as he, the president, should 
determine. Mr. Palmer asks that Colonel Corbin's order be 
made to read in addition to his other duties, with the under-
standing that later on he will ue for duty with the Commis-
sion altogether, should the Commission so request. 
"Second. The other case is that of Capt. George W. Davis, 
who asks for a year's leave of absence without stating the 
purpose for which it is requested, hut its basis as orally made 
known to me is au intention to enter the service of the Nica-
ragua Canal Company." 
Section 1222 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows: 
''No officer of the Army on the active liRt shall bold any 
civil office, whether by election or appointment, and ever~ 
such officer who accepts or exercises the functions of a civil 
office shall thereby cease to be an officer of the Army, and 
his Commission shall be thereby vacated." 
An examination of the act of Congres~ apprO\Pd April 
25, 1890, providing for the organization of the \Vorld'sColum-
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bmn Commission, does not disclose that any "civil office" is 
created by that act, such as the requested assignment ofCol-
ouel Corbin seems designed to :fill; but, for the purpose of 
answering your questions, it is necessary to determine whether 
the place for which this assignment is desired is to be reg-arded 
as a ~• civil office" or not. If it is, the acceptance of the same 
would, nuder section 1222, clearly terminate Colonel Corbin's 
conuection with the Army. If it is not a "ci Yil office,'' then the 
case of Colonel Corbin would, as to the law applicable thereto, 
stand upon the same footing as that of Captain Davis; and 
the questions as to both can be answered together. 
Section 1224 of the Hevised Statutes reads as followt~: 
"No officer of the Army shall be employed on ch·il works 
or internal imvrovements, or be allowed to engage in the serv-
ice of any incorporated company, or be employed as acting 
paymaster or disbursing agent of the Indian Department, 
if such extra employment requires that he shall be separated 
from his company, regiment, or corps, or if it shall otherwise 
interfere with the performance of the military duties proper." 
That the employment for which Colonel Corbin and Cap-
tain Davis are desired is within the language of section 1224 
is too clear for doubt. The duties of an engineer in the prep-
aration and construction of buildings, grounds, etc., for the 
Columbian Exposition is manifestly included under the llead 
~' ch~il works," as used in sectiou1224, aml a detail of Colonel 
Corbin for such duties would contravene the statute, pro-
vided" such extra employment requires that he shall be sepa-
rated from his company, regiment, or corps, or if it shall 
{)therwise interfere with the performance of the military du-
ties proper." W].:lether or not Colonel Corbin can perform 
these additional duties without interfenmce with his military 
duties or separation from his corps is a question of fact with 
which this Department has nothing to do. 
With reference to Captain Dads, the request is for a year's 
leave of absence, the request for leave not naming the pur-
pose, but you state, as a fact, that it is for the purpose of tak-
ing employment during· that time with the Nicaragua Canal 
Company. You also state that '~the practice has prevailed 
in this Department to permit officers on leave to engage in 
the employment of private parties and corporations, in the 
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view that their separation from their regiment or corps 
flowed from their lea Yes and not from tlle nature of their em-
ployment after their leave has been granted." If, in tlle ex-
ercise of the discretion vested in the proper authorities of the 
"'\Var Department, a leave of absence is granted upon satis-
factory cause shown and for proper military reasons, and tlle 
officer to whom the leave is granted during the term of such 
leave engages in any of the em ploy men ts spoken of in section 
1224, that section is not violated; but if, as stated in this case, 
the leave is asked for the very purpose of enabling tlle officer 
to undertake the employments prohibited in that section, then 
a granting of such leave is a clear evasion of the statute, an 
attempt to do by indirection what the law forbids to be done 
directly, and is unwarranted. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
COLLECTION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Merchandise which is in bond, or on shi board within the limits of a 
port of entry, on August 1, 1890, is not subject to duty npon a valua-
tion that includes the costs and charges mentioned in section 19 of the 
act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, entitled "An act to simplify the 
laws in relation to the collection of the revenues." As to such mer-
ch~ndise the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, by which the co:sts aud 
charges referred to are excluded as au element of dutiable Yahw, re-
mains in force and determines the duty thereon. 
Commissions on im11orted merchandise which do not grow out of the 
costs, chargeR, and expenses mentioned in said section HJ of the act, of 
June 10, 1bUO, form no part of the dutiable value of merchandise under 
that act. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 22, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of July 8, instant, received at 
this Department on July 14, instant, presents for my consid-
eration the following questions, arising upon the act of Con-
gress of June 10, 1890, entitled "An act to simplify the laws 
in relation to the collection of revenues; " that is to say : 
(1) "Whether goods which may be in bond, or on ship-
boc.ud within the limits of a port of entry, at the time such 
act takes efl:'ect, viz, the 1st of August, 1890, shall be subject 
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to the increased Ciuties prescribed by section 19 of the said 
act; that is to sa~y' whether duties shall be taken, in addition 
to the regular duties prescribed by the law now existing, on 
the value of cartons, cases, crates, boxes, casks, coverings, 
and other charges specified in said section ~" and 
(2) "Whether, under the provisions of said section, duties 
shall be levied on 'commissions,' whether paid by the im-
porters or not on such goods, and also on go0ds which may 
be imported subsequently tJ the said 1st of August next~" 
Section 19 of the said act is as follows: 
"Tha.t whenever imported merchandise is subject to an ad 
valorem rate of duty, or to a duty based upon or regulated 
in aily manner by the Yalue thereof, the duty shall be as-
sesseu upon the actual market value or wholesale price of 
such merchanJise as bought and sold in usual wholesale 
quantities, at the time of exportation to the United States, 
in the principal markets of the country from whence im-
ported, and in the condition in which such merchandise is 
there bought and sold for exportation to the United States, 
or consigned to the United States for sale, including the 
value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks, and cover-
ings of any kind, and all other costs, charges, and expenses 
incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed 
ready for shipment to the United States, and if there be used 
tor covering or holding imported merchandise, whether duti-
able or free, any unusual artide or form designed for use 
otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of such mer-
chandise to the United States, additional duty shall be levied 
and collected upon such material or article at the rate to 
which the same would be subject if separately imported. 
That the words 'value' or 'actual market value' whenev-er 
used in this act or in arry law relating to the appraisement 
of imported merchandise shall be construed to mean the 
actual market value or wholesale priee as defined in this 
section." 
By section 30 of the act it is provided "that this act shall 
take efl'ect on the first day of August, eighteen hundred and 
ninety, except so much of section 12 as provides for the ap-
pointment of nine general appraisers, which shall take effect 
immediately." 
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One of the results of this act's going into efl:'ect will be the 
repeal of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 523), 
which provides as follows : 
"That sections twenty-nine hundred and seven and twenty-
nine hundred and eight of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States, and section fourteen of the act entitled 'An act to 
amend the customs, revenue laws, and to repeal moieties, 
approved June twenty-second, eighteen hundred and seventJ-
four, be, and the same are hereby, repealed, and hereafter 
none of the charges imposed by said sections or any other 
provisions of existing law shall be estimated in ascertaining 
the value of goods to be imported, nor shall the value of the 
usual and necessary sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any 
kind be estimated as part of their value in determining the 
amount of duties for which they are liable': Pmvided, That 
if any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, or co,Terings of any 
kind shall be of any material or form designed to evade du-
ties thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in the bona 
fide transportation of goods to the United States, the same 
shall be subject to a duty of one hnp.dred per centum ad 
valorem upon the actual value of the same." 
The question for solution is, did Congress intend that mer-
chandise subject to an ad valorem duty and imported before 
the 1st day of August, 1890, and which shall be in bond or 
on shipboard on tnat da~·, should be dutiable on a valuation 
including the costs and chargt·s named in section 19 of the 
new law~ 
It seems to me that Congress did not ictend that the new 
law should have so harsh an operation. This, I think, is mani-
fest from the following saving provisions of section 29 of the 
act: "But the repeal of existing laws or modifications thereof 
embraced in this act shall not affect any act done or any right 
accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or com-
menced in any civil cause, before the said repeal or modifica-
tions; but all rights and liabilities under said laws shall con-
tinue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal 
or modifications had not been made." 
When merchandise arrives within the limits of a port of 
entry it is said to be imported, and thereupon the Go,·ern-
ment on the one band has the right to demand the duties 
TO THE SECRETA.RY OF THE TREA.SURY. 605 
Collection of Customs Duties. 
leviable thereon at the time of importation, and the importer) 
on the other, has the right to take possession of the mer-
chandise on paying the duties leviable at that time. (United 
Sta,tes v. Howell, 5 Cr., 368; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cr., 
104.) 
This right of the importer in the case supposed is, I 
think, a right that may be said to have accrued to him, and 
that continues and is enforceable, in the sense of the law, to 
the same extent as though the new legislation had not taken 
place. We are bound to take this view in order to prevent 
the inequitable result of subjecting the merchandise to a 
higher rate of duty when entered for consumption than jt 
bore when imported; it being a familiar rule that laws should 
not be read in a retrospective sense to the prejudice of indi-
viduals, where it is possible to gh·e them a prospective opera-
tion without doing violence to their language. 
It was in furtherance of this rule that the Supreme Court 
held that merchandise on shipboard, and in the custody of cus-
toms officers, was within the provision of the act of March 3, 
1883, which declares that~' all imported goods, wares, and 
merchandise which may be in the public stores or bonded ware-
houses on the day and the year when this act shall go into 
effect, except as otherwise provided in this act, shall be sub-
jected to no other duty upon the entry thereof for consumption 
than if the same were imported, respectively, after that day." 
(Hartranft v. Oliver, 125 U. S. R., 525.) 
It is the duty of the customs officers to take charge of mer-
chandise ou shipboard immediately on arrival, under sections 
2875 and 2876, Revised Statutes, as was done in the case 
last cited, and I must presume that this duty was performed 
in the case before me. 
0 
It results, then, that merchandise in bond, or on shipboard 
in a port of entry, on August 1, 1890, is dutiable on a valua-
tion which must not include the cost and charges mentioned 
in section 19 of the new act; in other words, the act of 1883 ° 
excluding such charges will remain in force after August 1, 
1890, as to such merchandise. 
I come now to the second question, as to commissions as 
an element of dutiable value, whether paid by the importer 
or not, with regard to merchandise in bond, or on ~hipboard 
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in a port of entry, on .August 1, 1890, or imported after-
wards. 
I do not see how commissions can properly form au element 
of dutiable value either under the act of 1883 or the act of 
J nne 10, 1890, unless they grow out of the costs, charges, 
and expenses mentioned in section 19 of the latter act, in 
"hich case they "oulcl, by force of the words ''all other 
costs, charges, and expenses,'' etc., of the section, necessarily 
constitute a part "of the costs, charges, and expenses inci-
dent to placing the merchandise in condition packed ready 
for shipment to the United States." 
Commissions of no sort can enter into valuation under the 
act of March 3, 1883, because that act (sec. 7) expressly re-
peals sections 2907 and 2908 of the Revised Statutes and 
section 14 of the act of June 22, 1~74 (18 Stat., 189), which 
made commissions an element of dutiable value, and declares 
that'' none of the charges imposed by said sections or any 
other provisions of existing law shall be estimated in ascer-
taining the value of goods to be imported." 
The act of J nne 10, 1890, restores the legislation repealed 
by section 7 of the act of 1883, to the extent only of requir-
ing ''the costs, cllarges, and expenses incident to placing the 
merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the 
United States," to be added to'' the actual market value or 
wholesale price" of such merchandise. This partial return 
to the old law was caused by the impossibility of executing 
satisfactorily section 7 of the act of 1883, as iu terpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Oberteuffer v. Robertson (116 U.S. R., 49D), 
it qeing the case that the" costs, charges, and expenses men-
tioned in section 19 of the act of 1890 are in the majority 
of instances too intimately blended with the actual market 
value or wholsale price of merchandise to be separable from 
it. In audition to this, the law now about to expire, exclud-
ing such costs, charges, and expenses from valuation, opened 
the door for the fraudulent undervaluation of merchandise by 
means of the overvaluation of the receptacles, coverings, and 
appliances by which it was put in condition for market and 
exportation. 
All this is very clearly presented in the report of the Com-
mittee of Ways and l\feans of the House of Representatives 
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accompanying and recommending for passage the bill now 
become the act of June 10, 1890. 
The act of 1890 having prevented the possibility of any 
more than a partial return to the provisions of law repealed 
by section 7 of the act of 1883, by again 'i·epealing those same 
provision:;, 1 do not see how it can be said that commis-
sions, as generally understood, and not growing out of the 
costs, charges, and expenses named in section 19 of the act 
of 1890, will form an element of dutiable value under that 
act. This is made still clearer 1Jy the report j u~";t referred to, 
which says of section 19: " While it returns to the former 
legislation and will accomplish the desired purpose, it does 
not include as dutiable items charges for inland transporta-
tion, shipment, transshipment, commissions, brokerage, in-
surance, export duties, etc., as provided in sections 2907 and 
2908, Revisetl Statutes." 
It follows, then, that my answer to the second question is 
in the negative. 
I have the honor to be your ouedient servant, 
W. H. H .. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
EXPENSES 01:<' COLLECTING CUSTOMS REVENUE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized to employ any part of 
the appropriation for collecting the revenue from customs in the erec-
tion of a temporary structure at a collectiOn port for the purposes of 
the customs service. 
No building, even of a temporary character, to be used for storage pur-
poses, can be erected at the public expense without special authority 
from Congress. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J'lJ.ly 23, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of July 7, instant, and July ~1, 
ill!~tant, and the inclosures referrerl to in the latter, have re-
ceived my consideration. 
The question submitted in them for opinion is whether it 
is competent for the Secretary of the Treasury " to authorize 
the expenditure of a comparatively small amount, say a sum 
not exceeding a few hundred or a few thousand dollars, from 
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the appropriation for 'collecting the revenue from customs,' 
for erecting a temporary structure at a customs collection 
port or subport, say Cleveland, Ohio, rendered immediately 
necessary by the exigencies and needs, and for the purposes 
of the customs service, and to secure a compliance with the 
general law pertaining to the customs service, but not such 
a structure as would in any way be such a permanent public 
building as Congress by special acts and appropriations from 
time to time authorizes the erection of for the use and ac-
commodation of the public sen·ice at different cities; for in-
stance, not such a public building as the one authorized by 
the specific act of Congress appro\ed June 6, 1886 (24 Stat.t 
107), to be erected in El Paso, Tex." 
Section 3687, Revised Statutes of the United States, makes 
a permanent annual appropriation of $2,750,000 "for the ex-
penses of collecting the revenue from customs for each half 
year, in addition to such sums as may be recei\ed from fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures connected with the customs, and 
from fees paid into the Treasury by customs officers, and 
from storage, cartage, drayage, labor, and services." 
It seems to me that I am enabled, by Congress itself, to 
answer your question, without entering upon the difficult 
task of determining the limitations which arc to be placed 
upon the general words " for the expenses of collecting the 
revenue." 
By section 2954, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the 
Treasury is authorized, at his discretion, to "lease such 
warehouses as be deems necessary for the storage of un-
claimed goods, or goods which for any other reason are re-
~uired by law to be stored by the Government," and section 
2955 (ibid.) makes a further provision on the same subject. 
It needs but to run over the \arious appropriation bills that 
have been made from time to time to see that Congress has 
been always particular to make special appropriations for the 
repairs and preservation and furnishing of custom-houses 
and other buildings nuder the control of the Treasury De-
partment. It would be tedious and useless to cite the various 
instances. 
The inference to be deduced from this action of Congress 
is, that it has never deemed expenditures for the purposes 
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mentioned to come within the meaning of the appropriation 
for the " expenses of collecting the revenue." 
It would seem that if anything could be intimately con-
nected with the collection of the revenue it would be the 
leasing of warehouses for the storage of imported goods, and 
yet Congress has made that matter the subject of special 
enactment. · 
If, then, buildings for such purposes are leased by special 
authority, if the repairing and preserving and furnishing of 
custom-houses owned by the Government are allowed only by 
special authority, I do not see that the conclusion ean be easily 
resisted that no building, even of a temporary character, to be 
used for storage purposes, ean be erected without the special 
authority of Congress. To hold otherwise would open up to 
the Secretary a field of discretion in expenditures wider and 
more uncertain in its limitt:i than any existing legisl~tion 
seems to justify. ' 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CASE OF CAPT. ADAM BADEAU. 
B., a first lieutenant in the Army, having been appointed a.;;sistant secre-
tary of legation at London, accepted the appointment on May 19, 1869,. 
and entered upon the duties of the office on the 31st of same monthr 
On the 25th of same month he was placed on the retired list as a cap-
tain, to date from :May 18, 186~, on account of disability. He resigned 
the office of assistant secretary of legation December 6, 18ti9, and on 
April 28, 1870, was appointed consul-general at London, which office 
he held until September 16, 1881. His name was borne on the retired 
list continuously from the 25th of May, 1869, until May 7, 1878, when 
he was dropped from the Army, in conformity with an opinion of the 
Attorney-General, under section 1223, Revised Statutes. But his name 
was restored to the retired list July 3, 1878, by an order of the Secre-
tary of War (on the assumption that his case was within the first 
proviso to section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 178), and is 
still borne thereon: Held (1) that when B. accepted the appointment 
to and assumetl the duties of secretary of legation at London he 
thereby, by force and effect of section 2 of the act of March 30, 1868, 
chapter 38, ceased to be an officer of the Army, and his place as such 
officer became vacant; (2) that neither tho said act of March 3, 1875, 
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nor the action of the Secretary of War above referred to, operated to 
reinstate him as such officer; and (3) that his name is not lawfully 
borne on the retired list of the Army. 
The act of March 30, 1861:!, applied to officers on the retired as well as on 
the active list, and it made the acceptance of the diplomatic vacate 
the military office eo instanti; the vacancy thus created necessarily 
continuing until filled in the usual way. 
The act of March 3, 1875, should be construed to have a prospective 
effect only. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 29, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of July 25 you ask my opinion as to 
the status of Adam Badeau with reference to the Army, upon 
the following state of facts: 
"'Adam Badeau, of the Army, then a first lieutenant, was 
appointed April 21, 1869, assistant secretary of legation at 
London. He accepted the office May 19 following, and as-
sumed his duties on the 31st of the same month. On the 
25th of the same month he wa::; placed upon the retir,3d list 
as a captain, to date from May 18, on account of disability. 
He resigned the office of assistant secretary of legation De-
cember 6 of the same year, and was placed on duty in Wash-
ington. On the 28th of April, 1870, he was appointed consul-
general at London, England, and continued in that office until 
September 16, 1881. His name was borne on the retired list 
untill\fay 7,1878, when be was 'dropped' 'in conformity with 
section 1223, Re·dsed Statutes, and opinion of Attorney· 
General, dated December 11, 1887, to date from l\Iay 19, 
1869.' His name was restored to the retired list July 3, 1878, 
by the Secretary of "'\Var, in an order reciting that his case 
came clearly within the proviso to section 2, act of March 3, 
1875, relating to retired officers then borne on the list. It is 
now held by the Second Comptroller that Captain Badeau's 
connection with the Army entirely ceased May 19, 1869. 
From this ·dew the Acting Judge· Advocate-General dissents. 
Reports from these officers and other papers relating to the 
case are herewith inclosed, from which it will be seen that 
Captain Badeau's military statuR has been a question before 
the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The question, then, to be determined, and upon 
which your opinion is desired, is, has Captain Badeau the 
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legal right to have his name borne on the retired list of the 
Army!" 
On the 19th day of May, 1869, when Lieutenant Badeau 
accepted the position of ass is tan t secretary of legation at 
London, the following statute, enacted on the 30th of March, 
18G8 (15 Stat., 56), was in force: 
''Any officer of the Army or Navy of the United States 
. w 110 shall after the passage of this act accept or hold any 
appointment in the diplomatic or consular service of the 
Government shall be considered as having resigned his said 
office, and the place held by him in the military or naval 
service shall be deemed and taken to be vacant, and shall 
be filled as if the said officer had resigned the same." 
This statute is carried into the revision as section 1223, 
and continued in force without ~ssential modification during 
the time Lieutenant Badeau held the place of assistant sec-
r~tary of legation, and during a large part of the time he 
held the position of consul-general at London. The solution 
of the question you ask, therefore, depends upon the effect of 
Lieutenant Badeau's acceptance and tenure of this position in 
the diplomatic service pending that statute. If the accept-
ance of the diplomatic office vacated his military office, then, 
so far as he is concerned, the military office is still vacant, 
unless be has been re-appointed to the Army in the constitu-
tional method. 
This question seems to have been mooted for many years, 
and an attempt has been made to have it adjudicated in the 
courts, but no such adjudication has been reached. In Ba-
deau v. the C"nited States (130 U.S. R., 439), the court expressly 
declines to decide the question as not being necessarily in-
volved in the case, using the following language: 
"Whether by order of the Secretary of War, July 3, 1878, 
the claimant's name was properly restored to the retired list 
we are not called upon to determine in this case, because, 
even were that so, we do not think that his petition can be 
sustained." 
The court did, however, in that case decide that the act 
of 1868, now embodied in section 1223, applies to officers upon 
the retired as well as upon the active list, saying: 
"No officer, whether on the active or retired list, could ac-
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cept appointment in the latter" [diplomatic or eonsular service] 
" and remain an officer, but that rule was not applied to 
retired officers in the matter of holding a ci vii office." 
This is practically a declaration by the highest court in 
the land, that prior to 1875 an officer upon the retired list of 
the ArmJ'~, who accepted an appointment in the diplomatic 
or consular service, thereby vacated his military office; and, 
consistently with the language of the statute, I do not see 
how any other position is tenable. The language of section 
2 of the act of 1868 (sec. 1223) is expressed to the same 
effect. It says the acceptance of the diplomatic or consular 
office shall operate as a resignation and the military office 
thereby be made vacant. Vacant when' Manifestly im-
mediately upon the acceptance of the other office. By the 
statutes, the holding of the two places in the same person is 
made inconsistent and impossible. The election to take one 
is ipso facto the relinquishment of the other. It is a complete 
resignation. The military 9fficer goes into civil life; the 
military office is vacant, and may be filled by another ap-
pointment at once. It is a statutory resignation, yet it bas 
all the essentials of an ordinary resignation. The officer, by 
accepting the civil office, tenders his resignation; the Presi-
dent, by appointinghim toaciviloffice,consentstoandaccepts 
his resignation of the military office. This being so, Lieuten-
ant Badeau, having elected to take the diplomatic office, was 
as completely out of the Army as if he had resi~ned in the 
ordinary way, been dismissed from the service, or died. If, 
prior to the pretended order of restoration by the Secretary of 
War, in 1878, this vacancy bad been filled, will any one question 
that such action would have been valid' Yet certainly the 
question whether there is a vacancy is in no way dependent 
upon whether the proper authorities do or do not within any 
given time fill that vacancy. The point is that the statute 
makes the acceptance of the diplomatic office vacate the 
military office, and it vacates it eo instanti, and the vacancy 
thus made necessarily continues until it is filled in the ordi-
nary way. 
Thus, in Barber v. Overman (18 How., 137), the statute of 
Arkansas required the sheriff, as assessor, to file his oath 
within a certain time: '' And if any sheriff shall neglect to 
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file such oath within the time prescribed in the preceding 
section, his office shall be deemed vacant, and it shall be the 
duty of the clerk of the county court, without delay, to notify 
the ¥overnor of such vacancy." 
On page 142 the court says: "The record shows that Pey-
ton S. Bethel, the then sheriff of the county of Dallas, did not 
file his oath as assessor on or before the lOth of January, as 
required by law. He did file an oath on the 15th of March, 
but this was not a compliance with the law, and conferred no 
power on him to act as assessor. On the contrary, by his . 
neglect to comply with the law his office of sheriff became 1].Jso 
facto vacated, and any assessment made by him in that year 
was void and could not be the foundation for a legal sale." 
So, in Oregon v. Jennings (119 U.S. R., 74), at page 90, it is 
held that a justice of the peace having resigned, his office is 
vacant and he has no further standing as such officer. 
But it is needless to cite further authorities to the proposi-
tion that by this statute the action of Lieutenant Badeau, in 
.accepting a diplomatic office, vacated his military office and 
put him out of the Army. The fact that his name remained 
<>n the rolls has no significance. It is simply evidence of a 
mistake of law in making those rolls. 
It is claimed, however, that section 2 of the act of ~March 
3, 1875, relieves this case from the effect of the act of 1868 
above cited, and keeps this officer in the Army. That section, 
among· other things, provides that " every such officer [one 
who has a Jeg or an arm permanently disabled by reason of 
resection] now borne on the retired list shall be continued 
thereon notwithstanding the provisions of section 2, chapter 
38, act of l\farch 30, 1868." 
But it must be remembered that Lieutenant Badeau, as 
the result of his statutory resignation, had been out of the 
Army and his place therein vacant almost six years before 
the act of 1875 was passed. The act of 1875, when speaking 
of names on the retired list, meant names there legally, not 
by mistake either of law or fact. . 
The questian is not whether the act of 1875 could retain a 
r~tired officer, within its provisions, in the Army, but whether 
it could put a man who had resigned and been six years a 
.civilian back in the Army. 
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Has anything since done restored him to the Army' The 
second subdivision of section 2, Article II, of the Constitution 
of the United States provides that-
'' The President shall nominate, and. by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate shall appoint emba~sadors, 
other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other office1·s of the United States ~vlwse ap-
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by law. But Congress may by law vest 
the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper 
in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads. 
of Departments." 
It will not be claimed that by any legislation the appoint-
ment of Army officers has been \ested either in the President 
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments. 
Such officers are and always ha\e been appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
In .Jlfimmack v. The United States (97 U. S. R., 437) an offi-
cer had placed his resignation, without date, in the hands of 
his commanding officer, to be acted upon in case he should 
again become intoxicated. It was so acted upon, sent to the 
President, accepted, and notice of such acceptance sent to 
the officer. A few months afterwards, on the application of 
the officer, the President attempted to annul the resignation 
and restore the officer to the Army. 
The Supreme Court, on page 426, says: "Prior to the act 
of the 13th of July, 1866, the President could dismiss an offi-
cer in the military or naval service without the concurrence 
of the Senate, but he never could nominate and appoint one 
without the ad\ice and consent of the Senate, as required 
by the Constitution. Since the passage of that act the Presi-
dent can not dismiss such an officer in time of peace, and 
certainly no vacancy in such an office can be filled without 
the advice and consent of the Senate; from which it follows. 
that the opinion of the Attorney-General that the subse-
quent action of the President did not restore the petitioner 
to the military service is correct." 
So in Blake v. The United States (103 U. S. R., 227), it i" 
held that the President may remove an officer of the Army 
by an appointment of his successor by and with the advice 
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and consent of the Senate, and on page 237 th~ court sa~·s 
of such removed officer: "Having ceased to be an officer in 
the Army, he could not again become post chaplain except 
upon a new appointment by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate." 
So in United States v. Oorson tl14 U. S. R., 619), it was held 
that an officer of volunteers in the Army dismissed from the 
service during the recent civil war by order of the Presi-
dent could not be restored to his position merely by a sub-
sequent revocation of that order. 
The court says (page 62~): ''The ·death of the incumbent 
could not more certainly have made a vacancy than was cre-
ated by President Lincoln's order of dismissal from the serv-
ice. And such vacancy could only have been fill«:!d by a new 
and original appointment, to which, by the Constitution, the 
advice and consent of the Senate were necessary, unless the 
vacancy occurred in the recess of that body, in which case the 
President could have granted a commission to expire at the 
end of its next succeeding session. 
,; It results that. as the appellee was dismissed from the 
Army during the recent war by a valid order of the Presi . 
dent, and as he was not reappointed in the mode prescribed 
by law, he was not entitled as au officer of the Army to the 
pay allowed by statute for the period in question." 
Nor will it do to say that by consenting to the act of 1875 
the President and Senate have consented to the appointment 
of Lieutenant Badeau as one of a class. First, it is a non 
sequitur and the President has consented to a statute. Acts 
of Congress may, and often do, become operative as laws 
without his consent and over his veto. 
Again, the President and the Senate.cannot make appoint-
ments by c~asses and general legislation. The Constitution 
contemplates that an appointment shall be made ,upon the 
separate consideration first by the President and afterward 
by the. Senate of each individual case by name, and upon 
its own merits; and this constitutional requirement is in no 
way met by a law which would induct men into office by 
classes. To hold otherwise would enable a two-thirds 
majority of each House of Congress, acting together, to legis. 
late any nuruber of men by name or by a class into office 
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without the consent of the President at all. Of course 
such legislation would be absolutely \Oid. 
Coming to the case in hand, if the language of the act of 
1875 were such as to restore to office in the Army any officer 
who had vacated such office, it would be clearly unconstitu-
tional and invalid; but such is not its neces~ary reading. 
When, giving legislation a retroacth·e effect, it is invalid, 
but giving it a prospecti\e effect it is valid, all rules of con-
struction require that it shall be given a prospecti-ve effect 
only; and such is the rule which is and should be applied to 
this act of 1875. 
My conclusion is, therefore, 
(1) That when Lieutenant Badeau accepted and assumed 
the duties ~f the office of secretary of legation at London 
be thereby ipso facto ceased to be au officer of the Army, 
and his place as such officer became vacant. 
(2) That neither the act of 1875 nor any of the executive 
acts referred to in your letter has restored him to the ArlllJ~; 
and he has, therefore, no legal right to have his name borne 
on the retired list of the Army. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
"'T· H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
ENLISTED MEN OF THE MARINE CORPS. 
The act of February 9, 1889, chapter 119, "to provide for the deposit of 
the savings of seamen of the United States Navy," does not extend to 
enlisted men of the Marine Corps. 
The provisions of section 1 of the act of June 16, 1890, entitled "An act 
to prevent desertions from the Army, and for other purposes," ar"" ap-
plicable to enlisted men of the Marine Corps by force and effect of 
sections 1612, Revtsed Statutes; but those of sections 2, 3, and 4 of that 
act are inapplicable thereto. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
J'll.ly 31, 1890. 
SIR: In your communication of July 21, instant, you re· 
quest an opinion, first, as to whether enlisted men of the 
Marine Corps serving on shipboard or on naval stations on 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 617 
Enlisted Alen of the i'Uarlne Corps. 
land are entitled to the benefit of the act of February 9, 
1889 (25 Stat., 657), entitled ''A act to provide for the de-
posit of the savings of seamen of the United States :Navy;" 
and, secondly, as to whether sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the act 
of June 16,1890, entitled ''An act to prevent desertions from 
the Army and for other purposes," are to be construed as 
applicable to the enlisted men of the :Marine Corps. 
As to the first q uest.ion, section ] of the act of February 
9, 1889 (sup-ra), provides as follows: 
"That any enlisted man or appointed petty officer of the 
Navy may deposit his savings, in sums not less than five dol-
lars, with the paymaster upon whose books his account is 
borne; and be shall be furnished with a deposit-book, in 
which the said paymaster shall note, over his signature, the 
amount, date, and place of such deposit. The money so de-
posited shall be accounted for in the same manner as other 
public funds, and shall pass to the credit of the appropria-
tion for' Pay for the Navy,' and shall not be subject to for-
feiture by sentence of court-martial, but shall be forfeited by 
desertion, and shall not be permitted to be paid until final 
payment on discharge, or to the heirs or representatives of a 
deceased sailor, and that such deposit be exempt from liability 
for such sailor's debts: P-rovided, That the Gm·ernment shall 
be liable for the amount deposited to the person so deposit-
ing the same." 
Section 2 relates to interest on the deposits provided for in 
section 1, and section 3 confers power on the Secretary of 
the Navy to make regulations for carrying the act into effect. 
This law does not refer to the l\Iarine Corps by name, but 
in its title mentions "seamen" as the persons for whose 
benefit it, was made, while section 1 extends the benefit of 
the act to " any enlisted man o-r appointed petty officer of the 
Navy." It also provides that "the money so deposited" shall 
pass to the credit of the appropriation for "Pay for the 
Navy," and "shall not be permitted to be paid until final 
payment on discharge, or to the heirs or representatives of a 
deceased sailor, and that such deposit be exempt from lia-
bility for such sailor's debts;" and section 2 prescribes the 
eonditions on which the sailor shall be paid interest on such 
deposit on his final discharge. In its literal sense it would 
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seem that this law does not embrace any branch of the serv-
ice but the Navy proper. 
But the literal sense of the law is not necessarily its true 
sense, for if, by taking the law by its four corners or by look-
ing at it in the light of the circum:stances in which it was 
passed, or by doing both, it appears that its meaning should 
he restricted or enlarged in order to carry out the intention 
of the legislature, it is the duty of the expounder to limit or 
amplify that meaning, as the case may require. 
It therefore becomes necessary to consider whether, with-
out violation of the well-settled rules of interpretation, it may 
be held that enlisted men of the l\larine Corps, serving on 
board ship or-at naval stations on land, are entitled to par-
ticipate in the benefit of the act of February 9, 1889. 
The military establishment of the United States consists 
of three principal organizations, the Army, the Navy, and 
the Marine Corps. Each bas an organization distinct from 
that of the others, as plainly appears in the Revised Stat-
utes, anrl each is the object of a distinct annual appropria-
tion by Congress. 
The organization of the Marine Corps is assimilated to that 
of the Army, but its sphere of duty is mostly on board ship 
or at naval stations on land, and it may be called the police of 
the Navy; while, on the other band, it is always liable to be 
ordered to sen-e in conjuction with the Army, and it is sub-
ject to the articles of war or the articles for the government 
of the Navy, according as it serves with the one or the other 
of these branches of the service. 
That the Marine Corps has a closer affinity with the Navy 
than with the Army is manifest both fro m its desigmJ,tion 
and from section 1621 of the Revised Statutes, which declares 
that this corps "shall at all times be subject to the laws and 
regulations established for the government of the Navy, ex-
cept when detached for service with the Army by order of the 
President; and when so detached they shall be · subject to 
the rules and articles of war prescribed for the government 
of the Army." 
According to this provision, the service of the Marine 
Corps with the Navy is its usual and reg~da~· service, while that 
with the Army is unusual and exceptionaL This view was 
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substantially adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v .. 
Dunn (120 U. S. R., 249). After a careful survey of all the leg-
islation on the subject, the court says~ "It seems to us that 
these provisions of the Revised Statutes, bringing together 
the enactments of Congress on the subject of the Marine 
Corps, show that the primary position of that body in the 
military service is that of a part of the Navy, and its chief 
control is placed under the Secretary of the Navy, there being 
exceptions, when it may, by order of the President or some 
one having proper authority, be placed more immediately, 
for temporary duty, with the Army, and under the command 
of the superior army officers." The same view was taken in 
the case of Wilkes v. Dinsman (7 How., 89). 
In view, then, of this peculiar and irregular position of the 
Marine Corps in the public service, it is not at all surprising 
that instances occur where legislation in terms confined to 
the Army and Navy has been held to include the officers and 
men of the l\iarine Corps. 
The above cited case of United States v. Dunn is one of 
these instances. The question in that case was whether a. 
gunner in the Navy was, as a warrant officer, entitled to have 
credit for the time he had previously served as an enliste(l 
man in the Marine Corps under the following provision of 
the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 473), namely: 
''And all officers of the Navy shall be credited with the 
actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men 
in the regular or volunteer army or navy, or both, and shall 
receive all the benefits of such actual service in all respects 
in the same manner as if all said service had been continu-
ous and in the regular navy in the lowest grade having 
graduated pay held by such officer since last entering the-
service." 
The accountin~ officers of the Treasury had refused to 
allow the credit asked for, on the ground that service in the 
Marine Corps was not service in the Army or Navy; but the 
Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Court of 
Claims, held that service as a marine on board ship or at 
naval stations on land was service in the Navy, and that, in 
so far as such service was with the Army, it was also service 
in the Army, within the meaning of the law. It will be ob-
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served that the court held that service as an enlisted marine 
was entitled to be credited as service as an enlisted man in 
the Navy. 
The equity of the applicant for the credit was strong, and 
the general term, "enlisted man," used in the statute en-
abled the court to give effect to that equity. 
Turning now to the act on which the question in hand 
arises, it does not s·eem to me that the considerations and 
arguments relied on by the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Dunn and Wilkes v. Dinsman (supra,) have any application 
to that act, because jt extends the deposit system to seamen 
and sailors, and uses the term'' enlisted men of the Navy" 
Qnly once, and then only, I am constrained to think, as syn-
onymous with seaman or sailor. The use of these terms, so 
inapplicable to marines, and the requirement that money de-
posited under the act shall pass to the credit of tile appro-
priation for "pay for the Navy," seem to sllow that marines 
were not in contemplation. There being annually an appro-
priation for pay for the Marine Corps, sepa.rate and distinct 
from that for the Navy, I see no l'eason why deposits made 
by marines were not directed to be passed to the credit of 
that appropriation, if it had been intended to embrace that 
branch of the service. 
Another reason that operates with me against straining the 
language of the act of February 9, 1889, is that in nearly all 
~ases where Congress intends to legislate with reference to 
the Marine Corps it designates it especially, even in cases 
where it might properly be held to be included by the term 
navy; as, for example, in the pension laws and the law.:s 
establishing hospitals for the Navy; which shows, I think, 
that Congress has not always regarded the term navy as a 
sufficiently clear designation for the Marine Corps. 
Therefore, in disposing of the question before me, it seems 
better to keep clearly within the rules of interpretation, by 
taking the words of the law in their ordinary sense and as 
applicable to seamen or sailors and not marines, and to leave 
it to Congress, by additional legislation, to extend the bene-
fit of the law to the Marine Corps, if it should think proper 
to do so. 
If this act stood alone on the use of the term "enlisted 
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man" in the first section, the Dunn case might properly be 
accepted as conclusive. But the use of the word "seamen" in 
the title and "sailor" in ~everal other places in the act seems 
to show that Congress was legislating only in regard to sea-
men proper, and therefore the Dunn case is not in point . 
.As sufficiently appears already, my opinion is that the act 
of February 9, 1889, does not embrace enlisted men in the 
:aranne Corps. 
This brings me to the consideration of the second ques-
tion, namely' whether sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the act of 
June 16, 1890, entitled ".An act to prevent desertions from 
the .Army, and for other purposes," are to be construed asap-
plicable to the enlisted men of the Marine Corps. 
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the act of June 16, 1890, are in 
the following words : 
"SEC. 1. That from and after the first day of July, eigh-
teen hundred and ninety, there shall be retained from tlJe 
pay of each enlisted man of the .Army tlle sum of four dol-
lars per month of his monthly pay for the first year of his en-
listment, which said sum shall not be paid him until his dis-
charge from the service, and shall be forfeited unless be 
servei I honestly and faithfully to the date of disch::.rge : 
Provided, That the Secretary of War shall determine what 
misconduct shall constitute a failure to render honest and 
faithful service within the meaning of this act; l.mt no sol-
dier who has deserted at any time during the term of an en-
listment ~hall be deemed to have served such term honestly 
and faithfully; Provided, also, That the sums !'etained from 
the monthly pay of enlisted men, in accordance with section 
one of this act and sections twelve hundred and eighty-one 
and twelve hundred and eighty-two of the Revised Statutes, 
shall be treated as deposits, upon which interest shall be paid 
as provided in sections thirteen hundred and five, thirteen 
hundred and six, thirteen hundred and seven, and thirteen 
hundred and eight of the Revised Statutes, the said sums to 
bear interest from the end of the year of the soldier's enlist-
ment in which they shall have accrued. 
''SEC. 2. That enlistments shall continue to be made for 
five years, as now pro ·ided by law: Provided, That at the 
end of three years from the date of his enlistment every sol-
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dier whose antecedent service has been faithful shall be 
entitled to recei \"e a furlough for three months, and that in 
time of peace he shall at the end of such furlough be entitled 
to receive his discharge upon his own application: Pro-
vided, further, That soldiers discharged under the provisions 
of this section shall not be entitled to the allowance8 pro-
vided in section twelve hundred and ninety of the Revised 
Statutes. 
''SEC. 3. That United States marshals and their deputies, 
sheriffs and their deputies, constables, and police officers of 
towns and cities are hereby authorized to apprehend, arrest, 
and receive the surrender of any deserter from the Army for 
the purpose of delivering him to any person in the military 
service authorized to receive him. 
" SEc. 4. That in time of peace the President ma.s, in his 
discretion, and under such rules and upon such conditions 
.as he shall prescribe, permit any enlisted man to purchase 
his discharge from the Army. The purchase money to be 
paid under this section shall be paid to a paymaster of the 
Army and be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of one 
<>r more of the current appropriations for the support of tbe 
Army, to be indicated by the Secretary of War, and be avail-
able for the payment of expenses incurred during the fiscal 
year in which the discharge is made." 
By section 1612, Revised Statutes, it is provided that the 
<>fficers of the Marine Corps shall receive the same pay and 
allowances and the enlisted men of the corps shall receive 
the same pay and bounty for re-enlisting " as are or may be 
provided by or in pursuance of law for the officers and en-
listed men of' like grades in the infantry of the Army." This 
section is made up of section 3 of the act of June 30, 1834 (4 
Stat. 713), and a provision of section 1 of the act of August 
5, 1854 (10 Stat., 586 ). 
As section 1 of the act of June 16, 1890, is, in effect, amend-
atory of sections 1281 and 1283, and refers to them and relates 
to the same subject-matter, it follows that that section, like 
the others, is made applicable to the Marine Corps by sec-
tion 1612, which was intended to operate upon future as well 
as existing legislation on pay, allowances, and bounty in the 
Army. 
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It may be said, furthermore, that Congress must be pre-
sumed to have known the long standing practice hereafter 
referred to, of treating sections 1281, 1282, and 1290 as appli-
-cable to the Marine Corps, and may well be supposed to have 
contemplated that section 1 of the act of 1890 would be held 
also applicable to the corps. 
Moreover, in your communication submitting the question 
under consideration, you inform me that "it is the practice 
·of this Department and of the accounting officers of the 
Treasury to apply to the enlisted men in the :l\Iarine Corps, 
in regulating the pay and increase thereof on account of serv-
ice, the retention of pay until the expiration of enlistments, 
and allowances for transportation from the place of discharge 
to the place of enlistment, the provisions of sections 1281, 
1282, and 1290 of the Revised Statutes." 
· The sections referred to by you, in the passage just quoted, 
form part of the legislation regulating the pay of enlisted 
men in the Army, and are, I think, applicable to the :Marine 
Corps by force of section 1612. It is to be remembered that 
the legislation embodied in those sections has been substan-
tially the law for many years, and that the Navy Depart-
ment and the accounting officers of the Treasury have been 
used to regard it as applicable to the Marine Corps. This 
practice I would consider as settling the question, if I had 
any doubt on the subject, as great deference is due to the 
practical construction put on a doubtful law by the officers· 
who apply it to its subject-matter (United States v. Hill, 120 
U. S. R., 169). 
It remains to consider the other sections of the act of J nne 
16,1890. 
In such consideration the proposition, settled in the Dunn 
case (supra), that the Marine Corps, except when otherwise 
specially provided, is classified rather as a part of the Navy 
than of the Army, must Le kept in mind. 
Section 2 declares that enlistments shall be made for five 
years, and provides that at the end of th~ee years from the 
date of his enlistment every soldier shall be entitled to a fur-
lough for three months, and in time of peace may be dis-
charged at the expiration of the furlough on his own appli-
cation, and it further provides that the soldier so discharged 
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shall not receive the allowances given by section 1290, Re-
vised Statutes. 
So far as I am able to discover, there is no provision of law, 
certainly no such provision is among the several references 
kindly furnished by you, under which this section can be 
held applicable to the lVIarine Corps. Its main object is to 
allow furloughs under certain conditions, and its reference to 
section 1290 is incidental to that subject only. 
And I am equally at a loss as to any statute under which 
it may be held that sections 3 and 4 are applicable to the 
l\.farine Corps. You point to no such legislation, and I can 
find none. Section 3 empowers certain civii officers to arrest 
deserters, and section 4 provides for the purchasing of his 
discharge by any enlisted man in the Army. 
As there is neither statute nor departmental usage modify-
ing the ordinary meaning of the language of these three sec-
tions as applicable to the Army only, it results that, in my 
opinion, sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act of June 16, 1890, were 
not intended to embrace the Marine Corps. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
CIVIL SERVICE-APPLICATION FOR EXA~IINATION. 
The words ''departmental sen·ice" and "the service," as used in the 
proviao in that part of the legislative, exec uti ve1 and judicial appro-
priation act of July 11, 1890, chap. 667, which relates to the Civil Serv-
ice Commission, mean the classified civil service as established by sec-
tion 163, Revised Statutes, and section 6 of the act of January 16, 1883, 
chapter 27. 
'fhe words in the same proviso, viz, "promotion or appointment in other 
branches of the Government," signify promotion or appointment in the 
classified service of some other Department than that to which the ap-
plicant may belong. 
Semble that an application for a transfer is not within the exception of 
the proviso. 
Congress not having designated in the proviso any particular county 
officer or officers who may make the certificMe required to accompany 
the application, this matter must be presumed to have been left as a 
subject for regulation by the Civil Service Commission. 
TO THE PRESIDENT. 625 
Civil Service-Application for Examination. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 2, 1890. 
SIR : Your communication of the 29th of July ultimo sub-
mits for opinion a series of questions arising upon the follow-
ing proviso contained in the legislative, executive, and judicial 
appropriation act approved .July 11, 1890, in connection with 
the appropriations for the Civil Service Commission ; that is 
to say: "Provided, That hereafter every application for ex-
amination before the Civil Service Commission for appoint-
ment in the departmental service in the District of Columbia 
shall be accompanied by a certificate of an officer, with his 
official seal attached, of the county and State of which·the 
applicant claims to be a citizen, that such applicant was at 
the time of making such application an actual bona fifle resi-
dent of said county, and had been such resident for a period 
of not lAss than six months next preceding; but this provis-
ion shall not apply to persons who may be in the service and 
seek promotion or appointment in any other branches of the 
Government." 
(1) The first question is, ''whether the word 'service,' iu 
the last clause of the proviso, can be held to mean 'clas~ified 
departmental service,' in view of the fact that the proviso 
relates to applications for examination for that service otily; 
or, if not, then to what the word does apply." 
The proviso in question is appended to the following clause 
or item in the said act, namely: "For necessary traveling ex-
penses, including those of examiners acting under the direc-
tion of the Commission, an<l for expenses of examinations and 
investigations held otherwise than at Washington, five thou-
sand two hundred and fifty dollars." 
It is observed, furthermore, that this clause and its proviso 
are to be found in a division of the act which is entitled 
"' Civil Service Commission." 
The word "service" occurs three times in the proviso. 
First, as a part of the legal designation of the Commission, a 
use of the word which calls for no further notice in this dis-
cussion; secondly, in confining the proviso to applications 
for examination" for appointment in the departmental service 
in the District of Columbia;" and, thirdly, in excepting from 
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the operation of the proviso "persons who tnay be in the sen·-
ice and seek promotion or appointment in other branches of 
the Government.'' 
I am quite satisfied that the words" departmental service" 
and H the service" as used in the proviso mean one and the 
same thing, namely, the classified civil service, as established 
by section 163 of the Revised Statutes and paragraph 3 of 
section 6 of the civil sen·ice act of January 16, 1883. This 
seems free from doubt, when we construe the languag-e of the 
proviso with direct reference to its subject-matter, which is 
the limitation within which the words of the law-giver are to 
~Je con fined. 
To make this answer complete, however, it remains to be 
Rllid that the full meaning of tlie words "who may be in the 
tiervice and seek promotion or appointment in any other 
branch of the Government" is as though expressed in the 
following language, namely: who may be in the classified 
civil service in any Department and seek promotion or ap-
pointment in any other Department of the Government. To 
belong to the classified departmental civil service at all means, 
undoubtedly, to be 1n that service in some one Departntent. I 
would add that there seems to be a good reason for the ex-
ception in favor of applicants from outside the District of 
·Columbia, already in the service, for promotion or appoint-
ment, namely, that their continued residence in the District 
might render it difficult for them to obtain the required cer-
tificate. It was for this reason, no doubt, deemed uujust b_v 
Congress to make this stringent legislation applicable ~o such 
cases. 
{~) The second question is, "whether the words' promotion 
o0r appointme in other branches of the Government,' can be 
held to mean pr motion or appointment in other branches of 
the classified departmental service of the Government, and 
be thus limited in their application; or, if not, then what 
their meaning and limitation are." 
My opinion is, as already stated, that the · vords " pro-
motion or appointment in any other branches of the Gov-
ernment" mean promotion or appointment to the classified 
civil service of some other Department than that to which 
the applicant may belong. I am not called on to consider 
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whether there can be a promotion from the service in one 
Department to that in another, as there can be an appoint-
ment, and, consequently, do not consider that question. 
(3) The third question is, "whether the persons whose cases 
are stated above must comply with the requirement of the 
proviso, or are exempted from such compliance under the 
last clause thereon ,; 
What has been said already will enable the Civil Service 
Commission to dispose of each case m~ntioned by them, with-
out difficulty. I would add, however, with reference to the 
case of Thomas P. Kingsbury, that it is not entirely clear 
whether the application IS tor transfer or promotion or ap-
pointment. If it is for a transfer merely, it does not fall 
within the exception of the proviso. 
(4) The next question is, "what officers may make the ((er-
tificate required." 
The law says that every application for examination 
"shall be accompanied by a certificate of an officer, with his 
official seal attached, of the county and State of which the 
applicant claims to be a citizen, that such applicant was,', 
and so forth. 
C0ngress bas not seen fit to designate any particular count;~ 
officer, and therefore must be presumed to have left it to tht> 
Civil Service Commission to make that matter the subject of 
a regulation. It was, no doubt, wise in Congress to stop with 
the requirement that the certificate shall be made by some 
officer of the county and State of which the applicant claims 
to be a resident, for the designation by Congress of an offi-
~er or officers might have led to difficulty, in VIew of the 
differences in the particular of county organizat10n in some 
Df the States, and the changes in that particular that are 
going on pretty much all the time. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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FORI' SELDEN, NKW ~fEXICO. 
Where application was made to the Secretary of War for license to con-
struct and maintain an irrigating ditch through the military reserva-
tion at Fort Selden, N. Mex., the licensee to furnish free to the United 
States all water required for military purposes: .Adt•ised that, in view 
of the benefits to be derived by the fort from the use of the water and 
other considerations, such license may properly be granted under well 
considered restrictions and revocable at the will and pleasure of the 
Secretary. 
DEP.A.RTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE, 
A.ugu,st 4, 1890. 
SIR: Before considering the questions submitted for opin-
ion by your communication of February 20, ultimo, I beg to 
say that it would have received earlier attention but for one 
of those accidents (the mislaying of the papers) which may 
occur in any well-regulated sen·ice. 
The questions_ for consideration are: 
(1) Has the Secretary of War the legal authority to grant 
a license, revocable at the pleasure of the Secretary of War. 
to construct and maintain an irrigating ditch through a 
United States military reservation 1 
(2) If the Secretary of War has such authority, what con-
ditions should be imposed in the case under consideration~ 
As the second question is not one of law, and is therefore 
beyond the competency of this Department, I will proceed 
to consider the first question only. 
This question I must confine to the actual case which was 
before you for action, namely, an application to you by one 
W. H. H. ~lewellyn for a revocable license to enter upon the 
military reservation at Fort Selden, N.Mex., and construct 
and maintain thereon an irrigating ditch 30 feet wide and 5 
feet deep along a specified route, upon condition that no 
right, no claim shall arise against the United States in con-
sequence thereof, and that the licensee shall furmsh free to 
the United States all water required for military purposes. 
It has been the practice for many years for the Secretary 
of War, and sometimes the President, as the files of your 
Department will no doubt show, to grant revocable licenses 
to individuals to enter upon military reservations and prose-
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cute undertakings there which may be beneficial to the mili-
tary branch of the public service as well as advalitageous to 
the licensees. 
For many years a part of the tracks of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad Company was laid by a revocable license on 
a part of the land at Harper's Ferry used by the United 
States for a manufactory of arms. Under a similar license 
a part of the land belonging to the fort at Old Point Comfort 
was allowed to be used as a site for a hotel, and in 1864: Presi-
dent Lincoln gave a license of this kind to a railroad com-
pany to use a part of the Go,ernment land at Sandy Book, 
and in 1869 another license was granted to said company to 
use part of the same land "so long as it may be considered 
expedient and for the public interest by the Secretary of War, ' 
or other proper officer of the Gm·ernment, in charge of the 
United States lands at Sandy Hook." (See 16 Upin., 212.) 
In this case the license applied for relates to a military res· 
ervation situated in an arid region, and therefore, in view of 
the advantage to Fort Selden of the use of this water, and in 
view of the frequent exercise of a similar power by granting 
uch licenses as occasions have arisen througll so many years, 
it seems clear that such license may be granted, the same to 
be under well considered restrictions and revocable at the 
will and pleasure of the Secretary of War. 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DEPUTY SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS. 
There is no statutory provision authorizing the appointment of more 
than one deputy surevyor of customs, at the same time, at each of the 
ports named in section 2722, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTl\IENT OF JUSTICE, 
4ugust 5, 1890. 
SIR: Your note of the 30th ultimo, asking an opinion as 
to whether the Treasury Department has power, under the 
provisions of section 27~2, Revised Statutes, to appoint more 
'than one deputy surn·~·or of customs at eacll of the ports 
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named therein, is _!eceived. That section is a~ follows : 
"The deputy surveyors at New York, Boston, Portland, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and Portland, in 
~Iaine, sliall receive a salary of two thousand fi..-e hundred 
dollars a year each, payable out of the appropriation for ex-
penses of collecting the re\enue from customs." 
I am unable to find any statute authorizing the Secretary 
of the Treasury to appoint a deputy surveyor of customs. 
By section 2630 it is provided that "every collector of 
customs shall have authority, with the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, to employ withm his district such 
number of proper persons as deputy collectors of the customs 
as he shall deem necessary; and such deputies are declared to 
be officers of the customs. And in cases of occasional and 
necessary absence, or of sickness, any collector may exercise 
his powers and perform his duties by deputy, duly consti-
tuted under his band and seal, and he shall be answerable 
for the acts of such deputy in the execution of such trust." 
It will be noticed that here is a provision for the appoint-
ment of a discretionary number of deputy collectors who are 
declared to be Go,ernment officers. 
With reference to surveyors, however, I find no such pro-
Yision; on the other hand, section 2632 reads: "Every naval 
officer and surveyor, in cases of occasional and necessary ab-
sence, or of sickness, and not otherwise, may respectively exer-
cise and perform his functions, powers, and duties by deputy, 
duly constituted under their hands and seals respectiYely, 
for whom, in the execution of their trust, they shall respect-
ively be answerable." 
This seems to limit the power to the appointment of a sin-
gle deputy, and that for a special i'urpose. Sections 2630 
and 2632 were both parts of the same act passed in 1799. 
Section 263± reads as follows : " The Secretary of the 
Treasury may, from time to time, except in cases otherwise 
provided, limit and fix the number and compens.ation of the 
clerks to be employed by any collector, naval officer, or sur-
veyor, and may limit and fix the compensation of any deputy 
of any such collector, naval officer, or surveyor." 
It is noticeable that in this section the Secretaty is given 
the power to limit and fix the number and compensation of 
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clerks; but only the compensation, not the number, of depu-
ties. :No authority in this section, therefore, can be found 
for an increase in the number of deputy surv-eyors. 
The legal status of the matter, then, seems to be, that of 
the tbree officers originally authorized to act by deputy, only 
one has been granted an increase in the number of deputies~ 
Section 27:22, it is true, uses the term "deputy surv-eyors" in 
the plural; but this is accounted for by tlle fact that the 
legislation is applicable to each of the different cities consti-
tuting a class. No implication, therefore, in favor of the 
power in question arises from the language of this section; 
on the other hand, I think section 2721 and section 2723 are 
of some significance as against the existence of such a power. 
Those sections read as follows : 
Section 27~1 ·'The deputy surveyor at San Francisco 
shall receiv-e a salary of three tlwusand dollars a year." 
Section 2723. The deputy surveyor at Savannah shall re-
ceive as salary not more than one thousand five hundred dol-
lars a year." 
The sole purpose of section 2722, in my judgment, was to 
fix the salary of the deputy in each of the cities named, but 
just as in section 2721 the salary of the deputy sun·eyor, 
ev-idently only one, at San Francisco is fixed at $3,000, and in 
section 2723 the salary of the deputy surveyor at Savannah 
is fixed at not more than $1,500. 
It is true that the language of section 27 46, which reads 
as follows: "An additional compensation of twenty-five per 
centum shall be continued to the appraisers (deputy collec-
tors, deputy surve,yors, and deputy naval officers), and 
weighers, at the port of San Francisco," seems to contem-
plate a plurality of deputy surveyorR; but a reference to tl1e 
original act, of which section 27 46 is ~-;up posed to be the ex-
pression in the revision, shows that no such plurality is jus-
tified t y the language of that act. I also observe that in an 
opinion by Attorney-General Devens (15 Opin., 356) he as-
sumes that there may be more deputies than one, but he 
cites no statute to that effect, and I can find none. 
l\Iy conclusion, therefore, is that there is statutory author-
ity for the surveyor to have one, and only one, deputy at the 
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same time, but that the Secretary may give to such surveyor 
such number of clerks as, in his judgment, the exigencies of 
the service may require. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
INSPECTORS OF STEAM-VESSELS. 
An applicant for appointment as an inspector of boilers, un<ler section 
4415, Revised Statutes, should have not only the ttJchnical knowledge, 
but the actual professional experience of a practical engineer on a 
steam-vessel. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 11, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of July 30, asking an opinion on the construction of 
section 4415, Revised Statutes, relating to the method of 
selecting local inspectors of steam-vessels. 
That section requires that the board selecting such inspect-
ors shall, "when designating an inspector of boiler~, select 
a person of good character and suitable qualifications and 
attainments to perform the services required of inspectors of 
boilers, who, from his knowledge and experience of the duties 
of an engineer employed in navigating vessels by steam, and 
also of the construction and use of boilers, and machiilery 
and appurtenances therewith connected, is able to form a 
reliable opinion of the strength, form, workmanship, and 
suitableness of boilers and machinery to be employed without 
hazard to life, from imperfection in the material, workman-
ship, or arrangement of any part of such apparatus for 
st(laming." 
You ask, "Is it necessary that an applicant for appoint-
ment as a local inspector should have the actual experience 
in the manipulation of steam machinery of a professional 
engineer on a steam-boat or steam-ship~" 
It seems to me that the language of the statute impera-
tively requires an affirmative answer. It says that the board 
f'hall select a person "who from his knowledge and expm·ience 
of the duties of an engineer emplo:ved in navigating -vessels 
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by steam," etc., "is liable to form a reliable opinion of the 
strength, form, workmanship and suitableness of boilers and 
machinery,'' etc. How is he to obtain the knowledge and 
experience of the duties of an engineer, except by actual 
practice 0? It is clear to my mind that the law requires a man 
not only with the technical knowledge but with the actual 
professional experience of a practical engineer. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. 1 MILLER. 
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS. 
The expenses of proceedings instituted by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency for the forfeiture of the charter of a national banking association, 
including the fee of the United States attorney for his services in such 
proceedings, should be defrayed out of the funds or asgets of the asso-
ciation. 
'What would be a reasonable fee for the services of the district attorney 
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. 
DEPARTMENT OF .JUSTICE, 
August 11, 1890. 
SIR: By your letter of August 1 you ask my opinion-
(1) As to whether it is the duty of a district attorney to 
institute proceeding~ for the forfeiture of the charter of a 
national bank which has incurred a liability to such forfeiture, 
without charge for his services against the assets of the bank. 
(2) If the trust fund is chargeable for the services of the 
district attorney. what would be a reasonable fee 0? 
Section 5239 reads as follows : " If the directors of any 
national banking association shall knowingly violate, or 
knowingly permit any of the officers, agents, or servants of 
the association to violate, any of the provisions of this title, 
all the rights, privileges, and franchises of the association 
shall be thereby forfeited. Such violation shall, however, be 
determined and adjudged by a proper circuit, district, or 
Territorial court of the United States, in a suit brought for 
that purpose by the Comptroller of the Currency, in his own 
name, before the association shall be declared dissolved. And 
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in cases of such violation every director who participated in 
or assented to the same shall be held liable in his personal 
and indi,·idual capacity for all damages which the associa-
tion, its shareholders, or any other person shall have sus-
tained in consequence of such violation." 
Section 380, Revised Statutes, reads as follows: "All suits 
and proceedings arising out of the provisions of the law gov-
erning national banking associations, in which the United 
States or any of its officers or agents shall be parties, shall 
be conducted by the district attorneys of the several districts 
under the direction and supervision of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury." 
In my opinion section 5239 does not contemplate that 
proceedings for forfeiture shall be commenced and a forfeiture 
decreed in every case in which the directors of a national 
bankiug association knowingly violate or knowingly permit 
any of its officers, agents, or servants of the association to 
violate· the banking law. On the contrary, it seems to me 
that in the matter of instituting proceedings for a forfeiture 
on account of such violation, the Comptroller is invested with 
a discretion. In many cases such violatiotts may occur, and 
still neither public polics nor private interests require the 
enforcement of the forfeitur~. In such cases, such proceed-
ings would involve a useless expense. In my opinion, it was 
the purpose of Congress, in this section, to leave the question 
whether such forfeiture should be enforced to the Comp-
troller, as a matter pertaining to the administration of the 
affairs of the bank. 
Section 5238, Revised Statutes, reads as follows: "All fees 
for-protesting the notes issued by any national banking asso-
ciation shall be paid by the person procuring the protest to 
be made, and such association shall be liable therefor; but 
no part of the bonds deposited by such association shall be 
applied to the payment of such fees. All expenses of any 
preliminary or other examinations into the condition of any 
association shall be paid by such association. All expenses 
of any receivership shall be paid out of the assets of such 
association before distribution of the proceeds thereof." 
The policy of this section seems to be that all expenses 
incurred in the administration of the affairs of the bank 
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~hall ·be paid out of the assets of the bank. As the charter 
was granted for the purpose of private gain, it would 
seem that the cost of the forfeiture, in case such forfeiture 
has been made necessary by the malfeasance of its officers, 
should be paid out of the funds {)f the bank. This would 
seem to be in harmony with the last-quoted section, which 
puts all expenses of any receivership and of all examinations 
into the condition of the bank upon the funds of the bank. 
Moreover, the Government, as such, has no direct interest 
in the forfeiture of the. charter of the bank. If it had, and if 
it were the purpose of this legislation to impose the expense 
of such forfeiture upon the Government as a public charge, 
it would have been more in accordance with propriety and 
usage that the proceeding to that end should be in the name 
of the United States, instead of the name of the Comp-
troller. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that the expense of such pro-
ceeding for forfeiture should be paid out of the funds of the 
bank. 
As to the second question, it is impossible to give an 
answer. Indeed, it is not a question of law at all, but a 
question of fact, depending upon the circumstances of each 
particular case. 
Yours, truly, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
NORTH AND SOUTH DAKOTA LAND GRANT. 
Under the provisions of section 14 of the act of ~,ebruary 2~, 1889, chap-
ter 1RO, the States of North Dakota and South Dakota take each seventy-
two sections of land for university purposes. 
Lands which were selected for the Territory of Dakota under the act of 
February Hl, 1881, chapter 61, and which lie within· the State of South 
Dakota, should be certified to that State. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 11, 1890. 
SIR: Yom: communication of August 4, relative to the 
construction of section 14 of the act of' February 22, 1889, 
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providing for the admission of the States of North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, is received. 
In this communication you state two questions: 
(1) ''By this act is there a grant of seventy-two sections 
of land to the State of North Dakota and seventy-two sec-
tions to the State of South Dakota, or does each State take 
under the grant only thirty-six sections~" 
(2) "Shall the lands which were selected for the Territory 
and which lie wholly within the State of South Dakota be 
certified by this office to that State, or shall they be certified 
to both North Dakota and South Dakota jointly~" 
Section 14, so far as it pertains to this question, reads as 
follows: · 
"That the lands granted to the Territories of Dakota and 
Moncana by the act of February 18, 1881, entitled 'An act to 
grant. lands to Dakota, Montana, Arizona, Idaho, and Wyom-
ing,for university purposes,' are hereby vested in the States of 
South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana, respecth·ely, 1f 
such States are admitted into the U niou, as provided in this 
act, to the extent of the full quantity of seventy-two sections 
to each of said States, and any portion of said lands that 
may not have been selected by either of said Territories of 
Dakota or Montana may be selected by the respecti ,.e States 
aforesaid, * * * and such quantity of the lands author-
ized by the fourth section of the act of July 17, 185!, to be 
reserved for university purposes in the Territory of Wash-
ington as, together with the lands confirmed to the vendees 
of the Territory by the act of March 14, 1864, will make the 
full quantity of seve:1ty-two entire sections, are hereby 
granted in like manner to the State of Washington for the 
purposes of a university in said State. * * * 
''The section of land granted by the act of June 16, 1880, 
to the Territory- of Dakota, for an asylum for the insane, 
will, upon the admission of said State of South Dakota into 
the nion, become the property of said State." 
An examination of this entire act shows a purpose on the 
part of Congress, in making the grant of lands to the four 
new States, to place them upon an equality; that is, that 
each new State, counting what bas already been granted, 
shall receive under this act such a quantity of lands, for the 
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various purposes named, as will make the eudowment for 
such purposes. equal to that of each of the other new States. 
It is true that the act· of February 18, 1~1 (21 Stat., 326), 
granted only seventy-two sections of lands to the entire Ter-
ritory of Dakota; so that by a strict construction of the lan-
guage of section 14, under consideration, " That the lands 
granted to the Territori~s of Dakota and Montana by the 
act of February 18, 1881, entitled 'An act to grant lands to 
Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, for university pur-
poses,' are hereby vested in the States of North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Montana, respectively," this would carry 
a title to only seventy-two sections of land for both of the 
Dakotas; but taking this in connection with what immedi-
ately follows, that the lands so granted " are hereby vested 
in the States of South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana, 
respectively, if such States are admitted into the Union, as 
provided. in this act, to the extent of the full quantity of seventy-
two sections to each of said States, and any portion of said lands 
that may not have been selected by either of said Territories 
of Dakota and Montana may be selected by the respective 
States aforesaid," leaves no doubt in my mind that it was 
the purpose of Congress that each of the States of North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana should have the full 
seventy-two sections of land within its limits for university 
pu.rposes. The act of 1889 enlarges the grant of the act of 
1~81 so as to give each of the two Dakotas seventy-two sec-
tions. This view is confirmed by the provision further along 
in the same section, which grants to the State of Washington 
such a quantity of land as, with what it bas already received, 
makes an equal number of sections. This conclusion finds 
further confirmation in the organic acts of Idaho and Wyo-
ming, whereby seventy-two sections of land are granted to 
each of t1:wse new States for the same purpose. 
We ought not to impute to Congress a purpose to discrim-
inate against North and South Dakota, unless the language 
used compels such conclusion. In my judgment such is not 
1 he legal effect of this legislation. 
The answer to your first question, therefore, is that each 
of the Dakotas takes seventy-two instead of thirty-six sec-
tions. 
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The second question I think is practically answered in the 
answer to the first. Congress was dealing with each of these 
proposed States as distinct and independent sovereigntie~. 
Never, so far as I know, in the history of the country, has a 
grant been made of this character jointly to t"·o States. 
Such a grant would be not only without precedent, but would 
result in the greatest inconvenience. In my judgment, tlte 
proper construction of this section requires that the lands 
shall be certified to these States separately, and to each of 
lands only within its own boundaries. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
PAYMENT 0]' DRAWBACK ON EXPORTS. 
Upon consideratiott of the provisions of section 3019 Revised Statutes, 
allowing a drawback on all articles wholly manufactured of imported 
materials on which duties have been paid: Advised that the person en-
titled to the drawback under that section is the exporter of the goods 
-i. e., the owner and shipper or consignor thereof to the foreign port-
and he may collect it by his duly authorized agent. 
Where the shipper acts only as the agent of the owner, the drawback 
belongs to the latter; and if the shipper is without authority from 
the owner to receive the drawback, it should be paid to the owner. 
The power to make regulations for the ascertainment of the person to 
whom the drawback is payable, conferred upon the Secretary of the 
Treasury by said section, is a power to declare the rules of evidence 
upon which the Government officers will act in determining who that 
person is ; and the only limitation upon it is that its exercise shall be 
reasonable. 
It would be a reasonable regulation to declare that the shipper (the 
consignor in the bill of lading), in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, will be regarded as the ownP.r or exporter of the goods and 
as entitled to the drawback. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 1~ 1890. 
SIR: By letter of the 6th ultimo, addressed to the Attorney-
General, you request a construction of section 3019 of the 
Revised Statutes. You state that under this section experi-
ence shows that. there are several classes of persons who claim 
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to be entitled to the drawback therein authorized to be paid, 
namely, the importer of the material, who has paid the duty 
thereon; tlte manufacturer of the article exported, in which 
such material is incorporated; the owner and shipper of the 
article, to whom the bill of lading has been issued; the holder 
of the bill of lading, to whom the same has been delivered 
after indorsement in blank; the holder of a copy of the bill 
of lading, upon which the shipper has indorsed authority to 
receive the drawback; and the per:5on who makes the entry 
for export. You ask, first, to which of these classes of per-
sons your Department should make payment of the drawback; 
second, whether, by virtue of section 3019 and section 3057, 
the Secretary of the Treasury has authority arbitrarily to de-
termine, and by regulations to declare, to which of the classes 
payment of the drawback shall be made. 
Before answering these questions, it is necessary, with ref-
erence to a subject-matter involving so many different in-
terests, to limit the meaning of certain terms used in your 
letter as they are understood in the following discussion. 
No doubt can arise in regard to the person described as 
importer or as manufacturer. The description, '(owner and 
shipper of the article to whom the bill of lading has been 
issued," however, does need some limitation. The shipment 
for which the bill of lading has been issued must be under- • 
stood to be a shipment under a contract for continuous car-
riage from some point in this country to some point in a 
foreign country, in the course of which export is obviously 
necessary. A shipment from ail inland point to a border 
port, for reshipment there by new bill of lading, is not mate-
rial here. The last shipment only is referred to in this dis-
cussion. The '' owner'' is understood to be the owner of the 
article just before final shipment. If the consignment is 
made by the vendor directly to the foreign veudee-=a case 
of frequent occurrence-then by delivery to the carrier for 
shipment and export the title passes to the consignee, and 
strictly speaking the owner of the article " when exported " 
is th~ foreign consignee. But "owner," as used in your let-
ter, is understood to be the owner of the goods who delivers 
them to the carrier for shipment and export-the vendor in 
the case just supposed-and is to be taken as equivalent to 
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"shipper." Of course it may be that the bill of lading i~ 
made to the order of the consignor, in which case, as the 
consignor and consignee are the same person, the title does 
not change by the shipment, and no controversy can arise. 
But for clearness in discussion the subject must be treated 
as if each different interest involved were represented by a 
different person. The bill of lading is understood to be a 
foreign bill of lading, i. e., evidence of a contract of contin-
uous carriage to a foreign point. The indorsee of the bill of 
lading is understood to be the person who by virtue of such 
indorsement can demand the delivery of the goods to him 
by the cauier at their foreign destination. The copy of the 
bill of lading is understood to be a duplicate bill for custom-
house purposes, indorsed by the shipper, with authority to 
the holder to collect the drawback. The person who makes 
the entry for export it:) understood to be the person who, as 
owner of the goods or on his behalf, signs the entry required, 
under the existing regulations of the Treasury, to be filed 
with the collector of the port six hours before the shipment 
of the goods, in order to give time for inspection by Govern-
ment officers. (Customs Regulations, art. 967.) 
Coming now to section 3019 Revised Statutes, its language 
is as follows : 
"There shall be allowed 011 all articles wholly manufactured 
of materials imported on which duties have been paid when 
exported a drawback equal in amount to the duty paid on 
such materials, and no more, to be ascertained under such 
regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury." 
The sectwn, it will be observed, does not mention the per-
son to whom the drawback is to be paid. This must be de-
termined, therefore, by considering the intention of Congress 
in ths enactment of the section, and the plan adopted to 
carry it out-
The manifest purpose of Congress was to foRter the manu-
factures of this country by giving to the domestic manufact-
urer, in his competition in foreign markets, the benefit of free 
imported materials, and at the same time to prevent compe-
tition with such materials in the home market. To allow 
materials in the first instance to come in free of duty for this 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 641 
Payment of Drawback on Export!il. 
purpose would have required cumbrons and expensive Gov-
ernment inspection to prevent fraud. A drawback equal in 
amount to the original duty and payable at the time of ex-
port was, therefore, provided to operate as an inducement to 
this manufacture for foreign markets. The owner of the 
goods just before they were delivered for export, and. who 
consigned and shipped them to a for~ign port, was the one 
who ultimately decided that they were to be disposed of in 
a foreign market. His control over the goods ended when 
they were delivered for export to the carrier. The consignee's 
control began on their arrival at their foreign destination. 
The transitus was the export. The shipper was, therefore, the 
exporter, because he caused the export by putting them in 
transit'lt. It was upon his mind that a reward for exporting the 
goods would most effectively operate to that end. Of course, 
the drawback, to be effective, must operate as an induce-
ment to the importer to import the materials, and to the 
manufacturer to manufactur~ them, as well as to the exporter 
to export them. To give the importer the drawback, however, 
after he had sold the materials to the manufacturer, woul1l 
offer no special inducement to the manufacturer to manufact-
ure them, or -to the exporter to export them. Payment to 
the manufacturer would be equally ineffective with the ex-
vorter. On the other hand, payment to the exporter would 
directly induce the export, while it would justify both the 
manufacturer in asking of t.he exporter a better price for the-
manufactured article, and the importer in asking of the manu-
facturer a better price for the materials. In this way pay-
ment to the exporter would work a benefit to all three, and 
would be, therefore, an inducement to all of them to carry out 
the purpose of the statute. 
The language of the section is very apt for the purpose of 
conforming the operation of the law to the foregoing consid-
erations, which must have presented themselves to Congress 
when framing this law. The allowance is described as made 
on the articles themselves. The words ''when exported," 
although not separated by a comma from the words imme-
diately preceding, as they should be, necessarily qualify' the 
verb "shall be allowed," and fix the allowance as of the. time 
when the manufactured goods are exported. The right to 
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the drawback is at first inchoate and contingent, attaching 
to the materials after they have come into the country, but 
ripens into an absolute right of present enjoyment upon 
their export in manufactured form. The owner of the goods, 
when the drawback ceases to be contingent and becomes ab 
solute, would seem, therefore, to be the person to whom it is 
payable. The shipper-the exporter-is that owner, for the 
contingency ~eases when the goods are delivered for export, 
and so he is entitled to the drawback. Thus the reason and 
the language of the section lead to the same result. 
The right to drawback can not be said to accompany the 
goods after they are in transitu to a foreign port. As soon 
as it becomes absolute the beneficiary is fixed and the right 
becomes a chose in action, personal to the shipper, and no 
longer attached to the goods. The law plainly intended to 
reward the person causing the export, who is the shipper. 
To hold that the drawback follows the title to the goods to 
foreign shores is to give the section extra-territorial effect, 
and is to continue the regulation between the drawback and 
the goods after the object of creating the relation has been ac-
complished. Such a construction is therefore not reasonable. 
It follows from the foregoing that the person entitled to 
the drawback, under section 3019 ofthe Revised StatutE:>s, is 
the exporter, and that the exporter is the owner of the goods 
who intrusts them to a carrier, under a contract for delivery 
at a foreign port; in other words, the shipper, tlle consignor 
in the bill of lading. 
Neither the importer as such, nor the manufacturer as 
such, is entitled to the drawback. The bolder and indorsee 
of a foreign bill of lading, as such, is not entitled to tlle 
drawback. If the title to the goods thereby passes to him, 
it is tlle title to goods to be delivered at a foreign port, and 
potentially in a foreign manner. But, as bas been said, the 
.. right to drawback is separated from the title to the good~ 
the moment the goods are delivered for export and tlw bill 
of lading is issued. The transfer of the bill of lading, even 
though that transfer takes place in this country, therefore, 
gives the bolder, as such, no right to the drawback. 
The proper person to enter the goods for export is the 
shipper; for it is be whom the Government should recognize 
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.as entitled to make the entry. If such is not the practice, 
.and another than the shipper makes the entry, then, as be-
tween their contending claims, the shipper is entitled to the 
drawback. 
Whether the shipper may by a simple indorsement on a 
duplicate bill of lading authorize anoth_er person ~ receive 
the drawback on his behalf, or whether the authority must 
be executed in accordance with section 3477, Revised Stat-
utes is a question not distinctly raised in your letter, and 
whi~h until raised, need not be answered. It is sufficient 
to sa; that the owner anll shipper to the foreign port, i. e., 
the exporter, ma~· collect the drawback, d.nd he may collect 
it by his duly authorized agent. . 
Coming now to the second question of your letter, it may 
be said that the Secretary of the Treasury, under section 
3019, has the power by regulation to declare that the shipper 
of the article, by whom the foreign bill of lading has been 
issued, is the exporter and is the person to whom the draw-
back will be paid, in the absence of contending claimants. 
It is conceivable that the shipper of the article may not 
be, in fact, the owner at the time of shipment, but acts only 
.as the agent of the owner. In such case, of course, the 
drawback belongs to the real owner of the goods on whose 
account they were shipped, and if the shipper has no actual 
.authority from the owner to receive the drawback, it would 
be the duty of the collector, upon notice of such want of au-
thority, to pay it to the real owner. The power to make re-g-
ulations for the ascertainment of the person to whom the 
drawback is payable, conferred by section 3019, is a power 
to declare the rules of evidence upon wliich the Government 
officers will act in determining who is the real owner of the 
goods when delivered for shipment and export. The only 
limitation upon such a power is that its exercise shall be 
reasonable.. (Oampbell v. United States, 107 U. S., 410.) Its 
exercise is certain!~· reasonable where the rules laid down 
are in accordance with the ordinary presumptions of the law 
of evidence. The shipper-the consignor in the bill of 
lading-is necessarily in possession of the goocls up to the 
time of the consignment. The presumption of law from pos-
session is ownership. It would be a reasonable regnlationl' 
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therefore, for the Secretary to declare that the shipper-that 
is, the consig-nor in the bill of lading-in the abseuee of any 
evidence to the contrary, will be regarded by the Govern. 
ment as the owner of the goods-as the exporter-and as en-
titled to the drawback. If, before the drawl.Jack is paid, a 
claimant appears as the real owner of the goods, iu opposi-
tion to the person in whose name, as consignor, they are 
shipped, then it would l.Je the duty of the collector to decidt>, 
on the evidence adduced, the merits of the claim iu accoru-
ance with the foregoing construction of section 3019. If 
such a claim is made subsequent to payment of the draw. 
back to the shipper, in accordance with the suggested regu-
lation, the claimant will be estopped by the apparent title 
to the drawback with which unuer such regulation he must 
be held to have clothed the shipper. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE HIGH SEAS. 
No constitutional objection is perceived to a provision iu the proposed 
consular con veutiou between the United States and Great Britain, 
conferring upon the courts of each country jurisdiction of offenses 
committed on vessels of the other on the high seas. 
DEPAR'l'MEN'J' OF JUSTICE, 
September 4, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 29th ultimo, in reference to the provision in a· 
proposed consular convention between the United States of 
.America and Great Britain. 
You say: "The precise point intended to be stated in the 
Department's letter of the 24th ultimo is whether it would be 
competent for Congress to confer upon the courts of the United 
States jurisdiction of offenses committed on British vessels on 
the high seas. The proposal made by Great Britain for a 
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eonv~ntion in 1883 has been renewed with the provision, con-
tained in the draft convention of that year, for the assump-
tion by the courts of each country of jurisdiction of offenses 
committed on the vessels of the other on the high seas. 
It is in respect to this particular provision, again put for-
ward by the British Government, that the Department has 
been led to entertain doubts on constitutional grounds." 
The question proposed is still qmte indefinite, because it is 
not known what particular form a treaty and legislation with 
a view to the end proposed might take. At the same time 
I am free to say that no reason occurs to me now why such 
treaty and legislation might not be valid. It is not uncom. 
mon for one nation to cede to another jurisdiction within its 
territorial limits for certain purposes, such as for coaling 
.stations, etc. It is also quite common, by treaty, for one na-
tion to concede to another jurisdiction of offenses committed 
within the boundaries of the nation making such cession ; as, 
for instance, offenses committed upon the decks of foreign 
ships in port. The United States have made concessions of 
this character. (See Wildenshaus' Case, 12 U.S. R., 1.) 
So it is common for one nation to grant another rights of 
transit across its territory. Congress has just passed a Ia; 
giving to the Federal courts sitting upon the Great Lakes 
jurisdiction over offenses committed upon vessels registered 
or enrolled under the laws ofthe United States, at any point 
upon the Great Lakes and their connecting waters. It was 
· ,settled as long ago as the purchase of Louisiana that the 
United States Government might by treaty acquire territory 
from a foreign nation. If it may acquire the title and supreme 
control over territory, I see no reason why it may not acquire 
limited rights in foreign territory which may be reasonably 
necessary for the general welfare . 
.LUI of these suggestions, which are made without much ex-
amination, because I do not think the question is one calling 
for a formal opinion, point to the conclusion indicated in the 
beginning, that such legislation as you suggest might be 
valid. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
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REFUND OF MONEYS EXACTED BY CUSTO~IS OFFICERS. 
Moneys improperly exacted from and paid by vessels proceeding under 
section 29 of the act of June 26, 1~84, chapter 121, to unlade at places 
other than a port of entry, may be refunded by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, without formal protest by the applicant, in cases where 
application has been made within one year from such payment. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 10, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of July 7th, with application of 
owners and consignees for the refunding of moneys paid as 
salaries to officers of the customs while they were super-
intending the unlading of vessels in the collection district of 
San Francisco at places other than the port of entry, has. 
been received and duly considered. 
By section 29 of the shipping act of June 26,1884, it is pro-
vided "that vessels arriving at a port of entry • * * may 
proceed to places within that collection di~t.rict * • * 
under the superintendence of customs officers, at the expense 
of the parties interested," for the purpose of unlading. 
It appears that it was the practice in the collection district 
of San Francisco to exact, from vessels proceeding to unlade 
at places other than the port of entry, a deposit sufficient to 
cover the salaries for the time being, as well as the incidental 
and. personal expenses, of the officers detailed to superintend 
this unlading. By a decision of the Treasury Department, 
made April 22, 1890 (Syn. 9982), it is held that the expenses 
of the customs officers intended to be paid do not include the 
pay of the officers, but only their personal expenses. 
Upon the receipt of this decision the exaction as to salaries 
ceased. 
By the opinion of Acting Attorney-General Phillips, dated 
September 19, 1884, it is held that the omission in section 26 
of the provision to require a protest by the applicant as a 
foundation for the refund is deliberate, and that no such prv-
test is necessary. This opinion has been formally acquiesced 
in by the Treasury Department (Decision No. 6721). 
Although section 2032, Revised Statutes, if considered 
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alone, might preclude the refunding of the moneys claimed, 
without formal protest and appeal, it is deemed proper to con-
sider that section not only as modified by section 3013. but 
as subjected to an exception created by seetion 26 of the 
shipping act~ 
This application for refunding is considered as limited to 
cases falling under said section 26, which provid~s " that 
whenever any • • • exaction has been paid to any col-
lector of customs or consular officer, and application has been 
made within one year from such payment for the refunding or 
remission of the same, the Secretary of the Treasury," as 
provided, shall have power to refund so much thereof as he 
may think proper. 
The decisions above referred to, and now accepted, render 
the conclusion necessary that the charges complained of 
were improperly imposed. 
The opinion given by the Attorney·General under date of 
June 12, 1885, has beei considered in this connection. That 
opinion relates to tonnage duties, and is not understood to 
cover the question now under consideration. 
In response to the inquiry presented, I answer that it seems 
to be clear that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
to repay the moneys received from consignees and owners of 
vessels, in so far as such moneys covered salaries of the dis-
charging officers, in cases where applications have been made 
for the refunding of the same within one year from such pay-
ment. 
I return herewith the papers which accompanied your let-
ter. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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INSPECTORS OF STEAM VESSELS. 
The notice for convening the " board of designators, " provided for in 
section 4415, Revised Statutes, should be such as to give each member 
a reasonable time to be present at the meeting aud a knowledge of 
its object; and though such notice is not required by the statute to be 
in writing, it would be advisable to require written notice by regula-
tion. 
The members should meet together as a board, organize as a board, and 
act as a board, in making the designation to fill tlle vacant or new in-
spectorship. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JlJSTICE, 
September 16, 1890. 
SIR: By letter of the 9th instant you ask an opinion upon 
the construction of section 4±15 of the Revised Statutes by 
an answer to the following questions : 
"First. :Must the notification of the supervising inspector 
to the collector and district court judge convening the board 
of designators, provided in said se ion, be formal and iu 
writing~ 
"Second. Must the board, when notified, actually meet to-
gether and organize as a board, to make a designation legal; 
or may the supervising inspector without previous notice 
call on and confer with the collector of customs at his office 
or residence, and agree with him as to the candidate, and 
then upon the district judge at his residence or place of 
business in the same or another city, and so agree upon a 
candinate for designation, thus in each case having a major-
ity of the board at a meeting, but of different personality, 
excepting the supervising inspector himself¥" 
The part of the section referred to in tllese questions is as 
follows: 
"Whenever any vacancy occurs in any local board of in-
spectors, or whenever local inspectors are to be appointed 
for a new district, the supervising inspectors shall notify the 
collector, or other chief officers of the customs of the district, 
and the judge of the district court for the district in which 
Ruch appointment is to be made, who, together with the 
supervising inspector, shall meet together as a board of desig-
nators, and fill the vacant or new inspectorship.'' 
The answer to your first question is that the notice for con-
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vening the board of design~tors, to the persons who by law 
are required to act as members thereof, should be such as to 
give each one a reasonable time to be present at the meeting, 
and a knowledge of its object. The fact that such notice is 
not in writing would not invalidate the proceedings of the 
meeting; but it would be much better, it seems to me, by 
regulation to require written notice. 
The answer to your second inquiry is that the law requires 
the persons designated in the section to meet together as a 
board, and to take action as such. The action of the board 
is presumed to be and should be the result of joint consulta-
tion between its members. Joint consultation as a board can 
not be had without a meeting of the board, of which all the 
members shall have received legal notice. The members of 
the board should organize as a board and should act as a 
board. The informal conferences between different members 
of the board, without previous notice, when the members of 
the board taking part are not all present at the same time, 
is not a meeting of the board, and is not a compliance with 
the statute. 
Very respectfully, 
WAf. H. TAFT~ 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ALTERATION OF ENGINEER'S LICENSE. 
The alteration of a license issued under section 4441, Revised Statutes, 
is not an offense within sections 5418, 5479, or 542:3, Revised Statutes. 
Revocation of the license, under section 4450, Revised Statutes, seems 
to be the only punishment provided by law for such case. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 17, 1890. 
SIR : Answering your letter of the 13th instant, in which 
you ask whether the alteration of a license to an engineer, is· 
sued under section 444:1 of the Revised Statutes, so as to give 
the licensee the appearance of a higher class than that for 
which the license was actually issued, is a forging of a public 
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record for the purpose of defrauding the United States, under 
section 5418 or section 5479 of the Revised Statutes, I have 
the honor to say that in my opinion such alteration is not 
within the sections mentioned, uor within section 54:23, the 
crime described in which is more closely allied to the mis-
conduct stated in your letter. So far as I have been able to 
investigate the statutes, the only possible punishment pro-
vided by law is the revocation of the license under sectiou 
4450. I agree with you that the importance of the subject 
demands that Congress should be asked to supply the omis-
sion in the statutes, and provide a punishment for such mis-
conduct. 
Very respectfully, 
Wl\1. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
USE OF TELEGRAPH IN THE POSTAL SERVICE. 
The Post-Office Department has no power, under existing laws, to 
make contracts for the transmission of intelligence by telegraph, for 
the general public, as a part or branch of the postal service. 
Mail matter, as defined by statute, does not include telegraphic corre-
spondence, as such; nor does the power given the Postmaster-General 
to contract for carrying the mail include authority to contract for 
sending meRsages by telegraph for the benefit of the people at large. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 20, 1890. 
SIR: The question presented by your communimttiou of 
the 4th instant, as to whether the Post-Office Department has 
the power, under existing laws, to make contracts with tele-
graph companies for the transmission of messages after the 
manner in which contracts are now made by the Department 
with transportation companies for carrying the mails, has 
been examined, and the following answer is respectfully sub-
mitted: 
It appears that in organizing the postal service of the 
country the purposes of the legislators were expressed in 
very comprehensive terms. It was stated that the po~t-office 
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under the confederation in 1775 was, in terms, established 
"for conveying letters and intelligence through this conti-
nent;" and the purpose is further indicated by the resolntion 
passed May 29,1775, providing '~that ways and means shonhl 
be devised for the speedy and secure conveyance of intelli-
gence from one end of the continent to the other," and ap-
pointing" a committee to consider the best means of estab-
lishing post for conveying letters and intelligence through 
this continent." 
Tile ordinance regulating the post-office, passed October 
18, 178:3, is grounded upon a preamble presenting similar 
views of the objects to be attained by the postal organiza-
tion, and recites as follows: 
"Whereas the communication of intelligence with regular-
ity and dispatch from one part to another of these United 
States is essentially requisite to the safety as well as the 
commercial interest thereof," etc. 
It is fair to infer that _the makers of the Constitution, in-
tending to ''promote the general welfare,'' when granting to 
Congress the power "to establi!lh post-offices and post-roads" 
and" to regulate commerce," and to make all laws necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in 
the Government or in any department or officer thereof, had 
iu mind the comprehensive view which regarded post-offices 
and post-roads as iustrumen ts for the transmission of intelli-
gence, and that such transmission was the purpose of the 
grant of power. 
The facts are well known that by act of March 3, 1843, the 
sum of $30,000 was appropriated by Congress for testing the 
capacity and usefulness of the telegraph for the use of the 
Government, and that in pursuance of this legislative act 
the pioneer line of the new system of transmitting intelli-
gence was constructed and put in operation between Wash-
ington and Baltimore, and that by a clause in the civil and 
diplomatir appropriation bill, passed 1\'Iarch 3,184:5, the sum 
of $8,000 was provided to meet the expense of this telegraph 
for the year ending February 1, 1846, the said sum to be dis-
bursed under the direction and superintendence of the Post-
master- General. 
Under this legislation the telegraph was transferred to the 
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Post-Office Department, and regulations were adopted to 
bring it into constant service as a means of transmitting in-
telligence accessible to all; rates of postage were prescribed 
and paid upon dispatches transmitted, and the same were 
delivered, as occasion required, by the penny post. 
Thus it appears that the comprehensive idea of "general 
transmission of intelligence" in connection with the post 
office, expressed in 1775, was, under the authority of Congress, 
applied to and employed in connecti01i with the telegraph 
by tlle Post-Office Department in 1845-'46. 
The Government failed to continue appropriations for op-
erating the new system of communication under its depart-
ment and the transmission of correspondence by telegraph 
was allowed to be conducted by others. 
In 1877, in the case of Pensacola TelegYaph Company vs. 
lVestern Union TelegTaph Company (961J. S. R., 1), 1\Ir. Chief-
Justice Waite, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 
"Post-offices and post-roads are established to facilitate the 
transmission of intelligence." 
The fact of governmental aid to telegraph companies in 
granting rights of way over public lauds, and military and 
post roads, and across navigable streams, in grants of timber 
and other material, in subsidies, and in other legislative 
assistance, may properly be considered in this connection. 
It is manifest that the object of the establishment of pos-
tal facilities was the transmission of intelligence for the 
uses and benefit of the people at large. This purpose was 
primary and creative, and the methods of communication 
were subordinate and subject to opportunity and conven-
ience. 
When Congress was authorized to establish post-offices 
and post-roads it was authorized to establish and control 
such facilities as should be found valuable to the public for 
tbe general transmission of intelligence. The purpose of 
the grant, by implication, extends the authority granted so 
as to include all facilities of v~lue in accomplishing such 
purpose. 
Provision for transmitting telegrams, placing them in 
postal custody aml conveying and delivering them according 
to the address, may be held to constitute the communication 
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transmitted by wire correspondence, and the message, mail 
matter. 
But no statute is found which authorizes the Post-Office 
Department to employ or establish telegraphic appliances 
for the general transmission of correspondence. 
Were electrical communimitions a new discovery placed 
before the Government for adoption under its postal Depart-
ment as an additional means of transmitting intelligence, to 
be developed and employed by the Department, the question 
of the power of the Department would be presente<l in a 
different light. 
But when the history of the development of our telegraphic 
system is recalled, when it is remembere<l that the use of the 
telegraph as employed by the Postmaster-General iu1845-'±6 
under authority of Congress was <liscontinueJ. becau~e Con-
gress made no provision for its further use, when we con-
sider the number, variety,and importance of the communica-
tions transmitted by its use, and when it is taken into account 
that private persons and corporations have been allowed for 
a long period to develop, extenJ., and control this instrumen-
tality, t~e conclusion seems to be beyond argument that Con-
gress, in clothing the Department with its existing powers, 
can not be held to have granted, without specifying it, the 
power to provide for a telegraphic system of correspondence 
for the public at large. 
Subdivision 7 of section 9, of the Constitution, declares that 
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in con-
sequence of appropriations made by law." 
Sections S679 and 3732, Revised Statutes, are as follows : 
" SEC. 3679. No Department of the Government shall ex-
pend, in any one :fiscal year., any sum in excess of appropria-
tions made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the 
Government in any contract for the future payment of money 
in excess of such appropriations. 
"SEC. 3732. No contract or purchase on behalf of the 
United States shall be made, unless the same is authorized 
by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfill-
ment, except in the w·ar and ~a\y Departments, for cloth-
ing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, 
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which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current 
~·ear." 
No special prO\~isions relating to the Post-Office Depart-
ment are known to exist that will except the power in ques-
tion from the general rule established by the law cited. 
No law that specifically or by natural inference authorizes 
the making of the contract is found. 
The first clause of section 3732 applies to direct authority 
to contract granted by statute; the second clause covers an 
implied authority arising out of the appropriation of means 
to fulfill. The two sections cited are held to be construed 
together. If public· moneys are involved an appropriation 
may give power to contract. lf public moneys are not in-
volved the Dl•partment is prohibited from making the con-
tract "unless the same is authorized. by law." 
In 9 Opinions, 18, l\ir. Attorney-General Black, considering 
the latter statute in discussing executive contracts, says: 
"The meaning of the provision i~ v-ery plain. It declares 
that the Department shall have power to bind the Govern-
ment by contract only in two cases: (1) where the contract 
is expressly authorized by law; (2) where there is an appro-
priation already made large enough to fulfill it. • • • 
This statute ought to be so construed as to carry out its wise 
and beneficial object. I incline, therefore, to think that a 
contract made in violation of it is utterly void. • • • 
Certainly, if it be made without a law and without any ap-
propriation, the contractor can take nothing by it." 
In the Floyd acceptances ( 7 Wall., 666) the court say : 
"Our statute books are filled with acts authorizing the mak-
ing of contracts with the Government through its various 
officers aud departments, but in every instance the person 
entering into such a contract must look to the statute under 
which it is made, and see for himself that his contract comes 
within the terms of the law." 
:\lr. Attorney-General Devens (15 Opin., 240) says: "In 
order that a contract should be authorized by law it must 
appear either that express authority was given to make such 
contract, or that it was necessarily to be inferred from some 
duty imposed upon, or from some authority given to, the 
person assuming to contract on behalf of the United States." 
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Mail matter, as defined by statute, does not include tele-
graphic correspondence as such. 
The authority given by statute to the Postmaster-General 
for contracting for carrying the mail does not include the 
sending of messages by telegraph. 
Telegraphic correspondence under the management of the 
Post Office Department, for the general public, has not been 
carried on since 1846, and the law authorizing that use gave 
no authority for contracting for a general public service. 
However desirable and important the end in view may be, 
it would seem to be an unallthorized exercise of the execu-
tive power, therefore, to provide for and take charge of a 
portion of the telegraphic service and make the same an ad-
junct of the postal service under a contract to be made with 
the companies concerned, because it would be without statu-
tory authority, and thus in contravention of \he inhibition of 
section 3732. 
Although it were made clear that the Government would 
receive more money than it would pay out, thus profiting by 
the connection while affording valuable additional facilities 
of correspondence to the people, yet the comprehensive pro-
hibition of section 3732 would still render the contract void. 
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Post Office Depart-




WM. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
COLLECTION 01!' CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
The statement of the manufacturer of merchandise consigned by him or 
on his account for sale in the United States, declaring the cost of the 
production of such merchandise, which is required by section 8 of th~ 
act of June 10, 1890, chapter 40i, entitled "An act to simplify the laws 
in relation to the collection of the revenue," to be presented t9 the col-
lector at the time of the entry of the merchandise, should be signed by 
the manufacturer himself. The signing of such statement by an 
agent is insufficient. 
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It is not necessary for the manufacturer to appear in person before the 
proper consular officer and sign the statement in his presence, in order 
that it may reeeive the attestation of such officer, as required by the 
same section. Should the consular officer certify that it has been sat-
isfactorily shown to him that the statement is, as it purports to be, the 
act of the manufacturer, this would be an attestation of the statement, 
and meet the requirement of the statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September ~3, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of September 8, instant, sub-
mits for opinion the question, '' whether, under section 8 of 
the act of June 10, 1890, entitled 'An act to simplify the laws 
in relation to the collection of the revenue,' the statement of 
the manufacturer of merchandise consigned for sale in the 
United States must be signed by the manufacturer in person, 
or whether it may be signed by his agent, who is authorized 
under section 3 of the same act to sign the declaration on the 
invoice required by said section 3." 
Section 8 is as follows: 
"That when merchandise entered for customs duty bas 
been consigned for sale by or on account of the manufacturer 
thereof, to a person, agent, partner, or consignee in the 
United States, such person, agent, partner, or consignee 
shall, at the time of the entry of such merchandise. present 
to the collector of customs at the port where such entry is 
made, as a part of such entry, and in addition to the certified 
invoice or statement in the form of an invoice required by 
law, a statement signed by such manufacturer, rleclaring the 
cost ofproduction of such merchandise, such cost to include 
all the elements of cost, as staterl in section eleven of this 
act. When merchandise entered for customs duty bas been 
consigned for sale by or on account of a person other than 
the manufacturer of such merchandise, to a person, ag-ent, 
partner, or consignee in the United States, such person, 
agent, partner, or consignee shall, at the time of the entry of 
such merchandise, present to the collector of customs at the 
port where such entry is made, as a part of such entry, a state-
ment signed by the consignor thereof~ declaring that the mer-
chandise was actually purchased by him, or for his account, 
and showing the time when, the place where, and from whom 
he purchased the merchandise, and in detail the price be paid 
for the same: Pro'Dided, That the statements r~quired by this 
section shall be made in triplicate, and shall bear the attesta-
tion of the consular officer of the United State" resident 
within the consular district wherein the merchanclise was 
manufactured, if consigned by the manufacturer or for his 
account, or from whence it was importe9 when consigned by 
a person other than tlie manufacturer, one copy thereof to be 
delivered to the person making the statement, one copy to be 
transmitted with the triplicate invoice of the merchandise to 
the collector of the port in the United States to which the 
merchandise is consigned, and the remaining copy to be filed 
in the consulate." 
Looking at other sections of the law, which also regulate 
the entry of imported merchandise, we find that what is re-
quired in them to be done may be performed indifferently by 
the owner of the merchandi~e imported or any other person 
representing him. Thus the invoice on which entry is made 
may be signed by the owner or his agent (sec. 2); the declara-
tion required to be made on the invoice before shipment of 
the merchandise therein described may be signed "by the 
purchaser, manufacturer, owner, or agent'' (sec. 3); the affi-
davit required to show the impracticability of producing an 
jnvoice, as required by law, may be made'~ by the owner, im-
porter, or consignee," and "the owner, importer, consignee,. 
or agent" desiring to make entry in such cases may depose 
to the facts necessary to be established before entry without 
invoice can be permitted (sec. 4); the declaration required to 
be made at the time of entry on invoice may be made by the 
u owner, importer, consignee, or agent" {sec. 5); and the ad-
Jition allowed to be made to t.he invoice ;value of merchan-
dise acquired by purchase, in order to raise it to the market 
~alue or actual wholesale price of the merchandise at the 
time of exportation, may be made by the "owner, consignee, 
or agent" (sec. 7). 
Congress having been thus particular to. say in these sec-
tions that what is therein required may be done by an agent,. 
I do not think it would be proper to imply that Congress 
meant that the statement required by section 8 to be made 
by the manufacturer or other owner of merchandise con-
272-voL XIX--42 
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signed to this country may be made just as well by his 
agent. The fact that Congress does not say that such state-
ment may be made by an agent appears quite conclusive 
that it did not intend to authorize a statement so made. It 
is hardly possible that Congress would have left to implica-
tion in this section a matter about which, as we have seen, 
it is explicit in the other sections regulating the entry of 
imported merchandise, and, I think, the law itself is its own 
best interpreter, in this particular. 
This view is strongly confirmed by what the Committee on 
Ways and Means say of section 8 in reporting the bill to 
the Honse, namely : 
"s~ction 8 is new, and is intended to furnish appraising 
officers with additional means of ascertaining the value of 
goods consigned for sale on foreign account, in appraisment 
of which the customs officers find the greatest difficulty. It 
is believed that this section, together with other provisions 
of the bill, will tend to discourage nnden?aluatiuns." 
Does it not seem clear, then, that to allow the statement 
of an agent to be a compliance with section 8 would frus-
trate the intention, as declared by the committee, to estab-
lish a new protection against the evil of undervaluation by 
requiring original evidence as to value from the manufac-
turer or other owner himself, and not merely the evidence of 
agents or consignees, as heretofore f 
I do not think this interpretation of the law will produce 
the inconvenience mentioned m the letter of the Assistant 
Secretary of State, inclosed in your letter, of compelling the 
manufacturer, living at a distance from the place where the 
consulate is located. to go there to make his statement. 
It is true section 8 provides that the manufacturer's state-
ment'' shall bear the attestation of the consular officer oft he 
United States resident within the consular district whereiu 
the merchandise was manufactured," • • • but I do not 
perceive that this necessarily requires that the manufacture1 · 
shall appear in person before the consular officer and sign ' 
the statement. 
Undoubtedly it would be an ''attestation,, of the state-
ment, within the meaning of the law, if the consular officer 
should append to a certificate that it was· signed and ac-
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knowledged by the manufacturer in his presence. But, in 
my judgment, it would be also an " attestation" of the state-
ment if the consular officer should certify that it had been 
satisfactorily shown to him that the statement was, as it pur-
potts to be, the act of the manufacturer or otht'r owner. 
This must be so, if we accept as authority one of the.defini-
tions of " attestation" given by Webster and adopted by the 
Engli~h Imperial Dictionary, namely, that it is "a solemn 
-or official declaration, verbal or written, in support of a fact." 
· I do not understand that, according to this definition, the 
person making this "solemn or official declaration" must 
have had original knowledge of what the declaration con-
tains. Indeed, we know that in many e.ases such declara-
tions are not made on original knowledge, as, for instance, 
where the governor of a State certifies that a land-grant road 
bas been built in accordance with the grant, or a consular 
-officer certifies to the identity of persons acknowledging in-
struments before him. 
Indeed, the consular regulations require consuls to record 
bills of sale of ships in their offices, and "authorize their 
exeoution" by a certificate, which is, of course, founded on 
the testimony of witnesses who depose to the genuineness of 
the instrument authenticated. (Consular Regulations, pages 
106, 582, ed. 1888.) And where the Secretary of State of 
the United States attests the correctness of a copy of an 
act of Congress, no one supposes that the officer has, him-
self, compared the copy with the original, and so certifies to 
what is within his knowledge. · 
If we deny to " attestation " this further sense we go far 
towards making of littl~ or no practical value the provision 
-of section 3 of the act whicli authorizes the manufacturer's 
agent to make the declaration on the invoice required by 
. that section ; because, if the owner must appear before the 
consul to make the statement called for by section 8, he might 
as well, and no doubt would, in most cases, make the declara-
tion on the invoice at the same timtl, himself, and not through 
an agent. But if we hold that the consul may make the 
attestation required by section 8 without having the manu. 
facturer before him, we at the same time allow section 3 to 
have a practical beneficial effect, in the abo,·e particular, and 
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conform to the well-known rule which prefers the construc-
tion that permits all parts of a statute to ha\e due operation. 
Again, if we hold that there is no compliance with section 
8 unless the manufacturer, consigning goods to this country 
for sale, makes the required statement before the proper con-
sular officer in person, it seems to me that we cause tbe law, 
which· has in view the double end of re,~enue and protection, 
to operate to the detriment of the revenue by making it un-
necessarily burdensome to manufacturers to seek markets in 
this country. I therefore think it my duty to give section 8 
that meaning which does not involve detriment to the public 
good, and so to avoid imputing to Congress, on certain 
g-rounds, the intention to produce a public inconvenience. 
In short, in my opinion, the word ''attestation" is used in 
this section in the sense of authentication of the whole in-
strument and not merely of the signature. 
It results, then, in my opinion, the manufacturer is notre-
quired to make or sign the statement called for by secti n 8 
in tile presence of the consul, and is entitled to have his 
statement authenticate~! by the consular attestation when it 
is made to appear to the satisfaction of that officer that the 
statement is in fact the act of the person wbose act it pur-
ports to be. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
REFUND OF HEAD TAX AND TONNAGE TAX. 
Where a claim was made for a refund of ''head tax" alleged to have been 
illegally exacted in August, 1890, by the collector at Baltimore in the 
case of the steamship Russia, under the provisions of the act of August 
3, 181:i2, chapter :m5: Advised, that the Secretary of the Treasury is au-
thorized by section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to refund 
the head tax thus exacted, or so much thereof as he may think proper, 
if, on investigation, he finds that the same was illegally, improperly, 01 
excessively imposed. 
And where a claim was made for a refund of "tonnage t.ax" alleged to 
have been illegally exacted from the steamer Cnba in August, lt:l90, by 
the collector at Philadelphia: Advised, also, that the Secretary of the 
Treasury may, under said section 26, refund such tonnage tax if he 
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finds that it was illegally, improperly, or excessively imposed, and m 
case the Commissioner of Navigation shall have first decided, under 
section 3 of the act of July 5, 18~4, chapter 221, that such tax was erro-
neously or illegally exacted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 26, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of the 18th instant is before me. 
You state that a claim has been presented to the Treasury 
Department "for a refund of certain ' head tax' illegally 
levied by the collector of customs at Baltimore, Md., August 
9, 1890, in the case of the steamship Russia, under the provi-
sions of the 'Act to regulate,' etc., approved August 3, 1882, 
and that a claim is also made for a refund of certain tonnage 
tax illegally imposed August 4, 1890, by the collector of cus-
toms at Philadelphia, Pa., on the steamer Ouba. 
"Referring to the provisions of sections 14, 24, and 29 of 
the act of June 10, 1890, 'to simplify,' ete., I will thank you 
to state whether in your opinion the provisions of section 26 
of the act of June 26, 1884, 'to remove,' etc., authorize the 
Secretary of the Treasury to refund such dues and tax, if, on 
'nvestigation, he finds that they were 'illegally, improperly, 
or excessively imposed,' and if the Commissioner of Naviga-
tion shall have first decided, under section 3, act of July 5, 
1884, in the case of any such tonnage tax, that it was erro-
neously or illegally exacted." 
In relation to the matter first referred to, I beg to answer 
that the duty to be paid for immigrant passengers under the 
act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), is to be paid by the 
owner, agent, or consignee of the vessel, and is made a lien 
upon the vessel as well as a debt against the owner thereof. 
The moneys collected constitute the i~migrant fund, and the 
disposition thereof has no relation to imported merchandise, 
or to customs duties or the collection thereof. 
This ''head tax" is not subject to the provisions of the act 
of June 10, 1890, any further than it may be affected by the 
repeals contained in section 29. Neither section 14 nor sec-
tion 24 covers or includes this duty. 
Section 14 of the act 1890 provides ''that the decision of 
the collector as to the rat~ and amount of duties chargeable 
upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and 
/ 
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charges, and as to all fees and exactions of whatever charac-
ter (except duties on tonnage), shall be final and conclusive 
against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, im· 
porter, consignee, or agent of such merchandise, or the per-
son paying such fees, charges, and exactions other than du-
ties, shall • • • give notice in writing," etc. 
This phraseology, separately considered, might be under-
stood to include head taxes and the like, but an examination 
of the several provisions of the act precludes such a conclu-
sion. The purpose of the customs administrative act is to 
simplify the collection of duties levied upon imported mer-
chandise, to secure uniform appraisement, and to establish 
plain and comprehensive methods of reappraisement, review, 
and appeal, in connection with such collection. 
The scope of the act is practically confined to dutiable 
merchandise and to the duties placed thereon by statute and 
the cost8, charges, fees, and exactions which are connected 
therewith and which go to make up the moneys to be paid 
by the importer (or com~ignee) as such, upon merchandise 
coming to him through the custom house. 
The introductory and limiting W{)rds of the first five sec-
tions of the act, respectively, limit the provisions of those 
sections to imported merchandise, and the same may be said 
of sections 7, 8, and 9. 
Under section 12 the general appraisers are to perform gen-
eral duties and "such other supervision over appraisement 
and classifications, for duty, of imported merchandise as may 
be needful," etc. 
Section 13 is devoted to "merchandise and the dutiable 
costs and charges thereon." 
The provisions comprised in section 15 for review by the 
circuit court, and by the Supreme Court, do not reach be-
yond imported merchandise, the classification thereof, and 
the rate of duty imposed thereon under such clasRification; 
and section 25 IS plainly upon the same theory. 
Nothing appears in the act to controvert the conclusion 
that its general purpose is limited to merchandise, the duties 
thereon, and the costs, charges, fees, and exactions paid 
thereon by the importer a~ snch. 
The noting of the excluE"~ion of duties on tonnage in section 
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14 is indicative of caution to avoid exactions not connected 
with customs or their collection, rather than of any purpose 
to indude under said section charges of the nature of the im-
migrant tax. 
As sections 2932 and 3013 of the Revised 8tates were re-
pealed before the date of the exaction mHler consideration, it 
does not appear that any power to refund'the money illegally 
exacted exists, except under section 26of tue act of June 26, 
1884. (23 Stat., 59.) Assuming that this money was illegally 
levied and is unlawfully withheld from the rightful owner, a 
construction that will do justice should l>e adopted if it can 
be done in accordance with existing statutes. 
It can hardly be argued that Congress intended to provide 
that the Government should keep moneys not belonging to 
it by law, and leave those who have been injureu by the er-
roneous and unauthorizeu exactions of its officials without a 
remedy. .As the language of said section 26 properly admits 
of such a construction, it is fair to infer that in enacting the 
repealing clauses of section 29 of the act of June 10, 1800, 
Cougress conteruplateu that the proper refund of'' head tax" 
improperly exactetl and paid might be made under section 
26 of the shipping act. 
Acceptiug this view, I submit the opinion that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury is authorized to refund the head tax 
levied in the case of the steamship Russia, or so much thereof 
as he may think proper, if on investigation he finds that the 
exactiou thereof was illegally, improperly, or excessively im-
posed. 
Second. In relation to thetonnage tax imposed .August 4, 
1890, upon the steamer Cuba, I answer that section 14 of 
the act of June 10, 1890, expressly excepts duties on ton-
nage from its operation, and section 21 relates to a rule of 
evidence only. 
The views above expressed, as to the scope, purpose, and 
construction of the act, apply with equal force to the propo-
sition to refund tonnage duties under said act. 
Section 24, in providing for a refund of overpayment of 
"unascertained or estimateu duties or payments made upon 
appeal," does not provide for a refund of tonnage tax. 
The" unascertained or estimated duties" intended are du-
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ties levied upon merchandise, the precise amount of which 
had not been determined. 
"Payments made upon appeal " are payments made upon 
the appeals authorized under sections 14 and 15 of the act, 
and referred to in section 25 thereof, and can not be held to 
cover head tax or tonnage tax; consequently, although sec-
tion 29 of the act repeals sections 2931, 2932, 3012~, and 3013 
of the Revised Statutes, said act makes no provision for the 
repaymP.nt of a tonnage tax improperly or illegally exacted. 
It is submitted that the concluding portion of section 24, 
which provided for a detailed statement of moneys refuuded 
by the Secretary of the Treasury under " the provisions of 
this act or of any other act of Congress relating to the reve-
nue" may have been intended to include section 26 of the 
shipping act. 
The tonnage duty has been held to be a charge upon the 
vessel itself. Under act of July 5, 1884: (23 Stat. 119), the 
Commissioner of Navigation has general superintendence of 
the com mercia! marine. 
Section 3 of said act reads as follows : 
"That the Commissioner of Navigation shall be charged 
with the supervision of the laws relating to the admeasure-
ment of vessels, and the assigning of signal letters thereto, 
and of designating their officialnumb('r; and on all questions 
of interpretation growing out of the execution of the laws 
relating to these subjects, and relating to the collection of 
tonnage tax, and to the refund of such tax when collected 
erroneously or illegally, his decision shall be final." 
The acting Attorney-General, under date of September 2, 
1884, advises the refund under section 26 of the shipping aet 
of a tonnage tax illegally assessed against the Bessie 1llay. 
In an opinion dated the 19th of said month (18 Opin. 63) he 
confirms and elaborates the same views~ and the Department 
refunded such tonnage dues. 
The Attorney-General in an opinion dated June 12, 1885 
(18 Opin. 197), seems to q uestiou the construction accepted 
in the Bessie ]fay case, but makes no reference to the opin-
ions given in relation thereto. He holds, however, that the 
decision of the Commissioner of Navigation is made final 
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"as to all questions relating to the refund of the tonnag~ 
tax when erroneously or illegally collected." 
As Congress has by section 29 repealed those sections of 
the Revised Statutes above noted without providing for the 
refund of a tonnage tax illegally and improp~rly exacted, it 
may be concluded that Congress intended to leave the ques-
tion of the refund of the tax so exacted to the final decision 
-of the Commissioner of Navigation, under section 3 of the 
navigation act, and the payment thereof to the Secretary of 
the Treasury under section 26 of the shipping act, in case he 
shall think proper to make such refund. 
While this constructionis not so necessary and unanswer-
able as to precJude question, it is, in m;r judgment, fairly 
warranted by the language of these sections. 
I am of the opinion that the provisions of section 26 of the 
.act of June 26, 1884, authorize the Secretary of the Treasury 
to repay the tonnage tax imposed on the steamer Cuba, if, . 
on investigation, he finds that it was "illegall~, improperly, 
or excessively imposed," and if the Commissioner of N aviga-
tion shall have first decided under section 3, act of July 5, 
1884, that such tax was erroneously or illegally exacted. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE. 
Where, at the instance of the importer, a reappraisal of certain items of 
the invoice by the general appraiser was ord6red under the provisions 
of section 13 of the act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, entitled" An 
act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenue;'' 
and the importer being dissatisfied with the reappraisal of such items 
thereupon made, the matter was referred to a board of three general 
appraisers, under the provisions of the same section, who not only re-
appraised the items on which the appeal to them was taken, but re· 
appraised and advanced in value other items of the invoice as to 
which there was no appeal: Held that, under said section, it was not 
within the competency of the board of general appraisers to pass upon 
any items which were not .,mbraced in the case submitted for their 
examination and decision, and that the board should have confined 
itself to those items only which were covered by the importer's appeal. 
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DEPARTMENT 01<' JUSTICE, 
September 27, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of September 13, instant, and 
the inclosures therein referreci to, present the following case: 
One Assad Munyer imported a number of packages of 
merchandise into the port of New York by the steamer La 
Bretagne. At the importer's instance, a reappraisal by the 
general appraiser in charge was ordered on the ground 
that certain items of the invoice were improperly advance<i. 
in value. The importer being dissatisfied with the reap· 
praisal of these items thus made, the matter was referred to 
the board of three general appraisers, who not only reap-
praised the items on which the appeal to them was taken, 
but reappraised and advanced in value other items as to which 
the importer did not appeal. 
It appears, furthermore, by the letter of the special de·p-
uty collector of the port of New York, that your request for 
an opinion as to the propriety of the action of the board of 
general appraisers in reappraising items on which the im-
porttr did not appeal to them is at the suggestion of tile 
board of appraisers. 
The question for solution turns on the meaning of section 
13 of the act of June 10, 1890, entitled "An act to simplify 
the law in relation to the collection of the revenue.'' 
That secti.on provides that if the collector H shall deem the 
appraisement of any imported merchandise too low he may 
order a reappraisement, which shall be made by one of the 
general appraisers," or that ''if the importer, owner, agent, 
or consignee of such merchandise shall be dissatisfied with 
the appraisement thereof * • * be may, within two days 
thereafter, give notice to the collector, in writing, of such 
(lissatisfaction, on receipt of which the collector shall at once 
direct a reappraisement of s1.wh merchandise by one of the 
general appraisers.'' It then providPS that the decision of 
such appraiser "shall be final and conclusive as to the du-
tiable value of s1.wh 'merchandise," unless ''the importer, 
owner, consignee, or agent of the merchandise," or the col-
lector, shall be dissatisfied with such decisio11, in which ca~e 
provision is made for the transmission by the collector of the 
. 
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invoice and all papers appertaining thereto to the board of 
three general appraisers, wlJich shall be on duty at the port 
of New York, or to any other board of three general ap-
praisers designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for such 
duty at said port or any other port, "which board shall ex-
amine the case thus submitted," and that their decision " as to 
the dutiable value of such merchandise" shall be conclusive 
''against all parties interested therein," and that the collector 
shall " ascertain, fix, and liquidate the rate and amount of 
duties to be paid on such merchandise, and the ~utiable costs 
and charges thereon according to law." 
It seems to me that according to this section the board of 
general appraisers should have confined themselves to the 
item$ with whose appraisement the importer was dissatisfied, 
those items constituting "stwh merchandise'' whose dutiable 
value was in question, and" the case thus submitted" for exami-
nation and decision by the board. In other words, I think 
the board had no origiQal jurisdiction as to the items not 
complained of by t.he importer, but had appellate jurisdic-
tion only as to the items covered by the importer's appeal. 
Very respectfully yours, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
EXCLUSION FROM THE MAILS. 
Where a certain book was excluded from the WiUs on the ground of in-
decency, by an order of the Postmaster-General issued under the act 
of Septembt·r 26, 1888, chapter 1039, and it appeared that certain news-
papers were republishing the same book in installments or parts: Ad-
vised, that the said order would not justify the exclusion from the mails 
of every copy of such newspapers, as some of the parts or in '3ta.llmen ts 
of the book appearing therein may be unobjectionable. 
DEP ARTMEN?-' OF JUSTICE, 
September 29, 1890. 
Sm: It appears by your communication of September 9, 
instant, that, by an order issued by the Pm~tmaster-Generalt 
the book kuown as Tolstoi's Kreutzer Sonata has been exa 
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eluded from the mails on the ground of indecency, under the 
act of September 26, 1888 (25 Stat., 496). 
It also appears that certain newspapers, regularly admitted 
to the mails as second-class matter, are printing the entire 
story of Kreutzer Sonata in instalments or parts, and the 
question submitted is, whether the newspapers thus engaged 
are excluded from the majls by virtue of the said order of the 
Postmaster-General excluding the story in book form. 
I do not think the order in question is sufficient to justify 
the exclusion of every copy of the newspaper in question, 
because I do not see that it necessarily follows that every 
instalment of the story thus published is obscene, because the 
story as a whole is declared to be so. It may be, indeed, that 
one or more chapters of this story are entirely unexception-
able in character. If so, the exclusion, as unma~ble, of 
newspapers containing them might involve seridtts conse-
quences to yourself. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
COLLECTION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES. 
Where the date of original importation of merchandise in bond was 
more than one year prior to August I, 1890 (when the act of June 10, 
1890, chapter 407, entitled "An act to simplify the laws in relation to 
the collection of the revenue," went into effect): Advised that such 
merchandise is subject to the" additional duty of 111 per centum" im-
posed by section 2970, Revised Statutes, by virtue of the saving clause 
in section 29 of said act of June 10, 1890, which saves to the Govern-
ment all rights that existed in its behalf when that act took effect. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 8, 1890. 
Sm: Your inquiry under date of September 9, with in-
closure, is received. • 
The question presented is, whether under section 26 of the 
customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, merchandise 
which had been entered more than one year prior to August 
1, 1890 (when that act went into efl'ect), should be charged 
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with the" additional duty of 10 per centum" required by the 
last subdivision of section 2970, Revised Statutes. This sec-
tion reads as follows : 
"Any merchandise deposited in bond in any public or pri-
vate bonded warehouse may be withdrawn for consumption 
within one year from the date of original importation on pay-
ment of the duties. and charges to which it may be subject by 
law -at the time of such withdrawal; and after the expiration 
of one year from the date of original importation, and until 
the expiration of three years from such date, any ·merchan. 
dise in bond may be withdrawn for consumption on payment 
of the duties assessed on the original eutry and charges, and 
an additional duty of ten per centum of the amount of such 
duties and charges." 
Section 20 of the act of June 10 provides that" Any mer-
chandise deposited in any public or private bonded ware-
bouse may be withdrawn for consumption witilin three years 
from the date of original importation on payment of the 
duties and charges to which it may be subject by la.w at the 
time of such withdrawal : Provided, That nothing herein 
shall affect or impair existing provisions of law in regard to 
the disposal of perishable or explosive articles." 
By section 54: of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, the words 
"in bond" are inserted in the first line of section 20 after the 
word " deposited." 
While section 2970 is repealed or essentially modified by 
the provision of the act of June 10, section 29 thereof con-
tains the saving clause that ''the repeal of existing laws or 
modifications thereof embraced in this act shall not affect 
any act done or any right accruing or accrued, or any suit 
or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before 
the said repeal or modifications; but all rights and liabilities 
under said laws shall continue and may be enforced in the 
same manner as if said repeal or modifications had not been 
made." 
That construction should be given to the statute that will 
best give effect to all its parts. The reserving clause of sec-
tion 29, as applied to section 20, if given full effect, saves to 
the Government all rights that existed in its behalf when the 
law took effect. 
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It will be noticed that the 10 per cent. is made in terms 
"an additional duty." Upon the expiration of one year from 
the entry the sum to be paid as then fixed by law comprises 
the duty assessed, the charges, and the additional duty of 10 
per cent. No authorit~- appears for itemizing the amount 
.and remitting the last item. 
The amount to be paid is practically established upon the 
entry at a sum specified in case the property is taken out 
within the year, and at that sum, plus the 10 per cent. addi-
tional, if allowed to remain more than the year. No act re-
mains to he performed on the part of the Government; mere 
lapse of time ripens the whole i to duty. 
It is for the importer to obtain his mer~handise upon pay-
ment of the lesser sum by taking the prescribed action. He 
omits to act, and by the expiration of the period the whole 
duty becomes ested in the Government and is an accrned 
-debt against the importer. Therefore, in the case stated, the 
10 per centum additional duty in question should be charged 
.and collected. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
It is deemed inexpedient by the Attorney-General, for reasons stated, to 
give an opinion upon the question whether an express company, in re-
ceiving from a lottery company letters and packages declared unmail-
able by section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember.19, 1890, chapter 908, and forwarding them along the ordinary 
mail routes, violates section 3982, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 8, 1890. 
SIR: In your letter of October 2 you state that the Louisi. 
CJ.na Lottery Company has its headquarters in New Orleans; 
that up to the passage of the act of September 19, 1890, ''to 
amend certain sections of the Revised Statutes relating to 
lotteries and for other purposes," the lottery company was 
• 
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in the habit of using the mails for the transaction of itR lot-
tery business; that this company, since the approval of the 
act referred to, has ad \ertised that it will use the express 
companies for the conduct of its business; that your De-
partment is in possession of information from its officers and 
employes that it is using the express companies, and is send-
ing letters and packets concerning lotteries and containing 
lists of its drawings at the lotteries and containing lottery 
• tickets by the Southern Express Company and the United 
States Express Company ; and that such letters and packets 
are made unmailable by section 3894, as amended by the act 
of September 19, 1890. 
U"pon this state of facts you ask my opinion as to whether 
the express companies, in receiving from the lottery company 
such letters and packets thus declared unmailable and for-
warding them along the ordinary mail routes, violates sec-
tion 3982. 
In answer I have to say that your question is essentially 
judicial in character, and one which must ultimately be de-
cided by the judicial de rtmentofthe Government. Whether 
or not, in carrying this matter, the express company or its 
agents commit a criine for which the statutes impose a pen-
alty, it seems unnecessary and inexpedient for me to decide, 
further than to say that the facts stated by you seem to make 
a prima facie case of a violation of said section, and to render 
it proper that you should direct a prosecution of the guilty 
parties. Such prosecution will result in a judicial construc-
tion of the law. 
Yours truly, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
Th~ POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
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Where the consideration of questions of law submitted for his opinion 
involved an examination of evidence and the settling of questions of 
fact, the Attorney-General declined to enter upon such examination . 
for the reason that it did not fall within his pruvince, ~nd accordingly 
expressed no opinion on the questiona submitted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 21, 1890. 
SIR: I have examined the opinion of Assistant Attorney-
General Shields, referred to in and inclosed with your com-
munication of October 7, 1890, requesting that I would give 
an opinion upon the questions covered by it. 
·The Assistant Attorney-General states that the questions 
submitted to him are as follows: 
"First. As to whether the action taken by the Commis-
sioner of Indian Aft"airs in his letter of March 5, 1889, to the 
United States Indian agent was with proper authority and 
operates as remanding the case for roceedings de novo be-
fore the Choctaw authorities; and, if not, 
''Second. As to whether upon the record presented, which 
was discussed in office report of October 4, 1887, before re-
ferred to, the claimants, Glenn, Tucker et al., have estab-
lished their rights to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation." 
I do not think that I could reach any satisfactory conclu-
sion as to these questions, or the important question of Choc-
taw citizenship, discussed in the opinion of the Assistant 
Attorney-General, without considering all the evidence that 
was before him. An effort to do so would be like an attempt 
by an appellate court to review the action of a~other court, 
having only the opinion of that court as the basis of such re-
view. It may be that, while there was no formal adoption as 
citizens of the persons called " intruders" by the legislative 
authority of the Choctaw Nation, the evidence would show a 
state of things from which the adoption of the so-called in-
truders as citizens by the legislativ·e authority might be rea-
sonably and properly implied, in accordance with well-settled 
principle. Congress has been frequently held to have sanc-
tioned by implication various practices in different depart-
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ments of the Government, notably the practice of the Presi-
dent to reserve from sale, a.t his discretion, any part of the 
public doruain for some public purpose (Grisar '·McDowell, 
6 Wall., 381), and I do not see why the same principle should 
not be applicable to the legislative authority of the Ohoctaw 
Nation. 
The existence, then, of this necessity to look into evidence 
and form a conclusion as~ to facts places the subject matter 
on which an opinion is desired outside of my power under the 
law. 
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes provides that "the 
bead of any Executive Department may require the opinion 
of the Attorney-General on any questions of law arising in the 
administration of his Department," and it has been repeat-
edly held by my predecessors that the Attorney-General can-
not be called upon to form an opinion on a question of fact. 
(See 7 Opin., 494:; 14 Opin., 367, 368, and 54:1; 10 Opin., 
267; 11 Opin., 189; 18 Opin. 487-489.) 
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK. 
The provisions of the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 806, entitled "An 
act to establish a National Military Park at the battle-field of Chicka-
mauga," do not authorize the acquisition of the lands described there-
in, which are to constitute the proposed national park, in any other 
mode than by condemnation proceedings instituted under the act of 
August 1, 1~88, chapter 728. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 22, 1890. 
SIR: In a communication of Mr. A~sistant Secretary of 
War Grant to the Attorney-General, of the 6th instant, a 
letter from the secretary of the Chickamauga and Chatta-
l'.ooga Military Park Commission was inclosed requesting 
instructions as to its powers and duties, under your author-
ity, to negotiate for the purchase of land within the limits of 
the proposed National Military Park, without condemnation, 
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under the act of Congress approved August 19, 1890. The 
request of the Assistant Secretary for an answer to the sec-
ond clause of the letter from the commissi9n is construed 
to be a request for an opinion upon the powers of the Secre· 
tary of War to negotiate for the purchase of land under thL· 
above-mentioned. act. If the question covered 011ly the 
powers and duties of the park commissiou, the Attorney-
General would be constrained to decline to express an opin-
ion. While the commission is properly to be regarded as 
within the War Department. the questions which the Attor-
ney-General is required to answer are only those the decis-
ion of which is needed to govern the action of the heaJ of a 
Department in cases actually arising therein. So much is 
said to show that this opinion is notintended to be a depar-
ture from the rule stated, and thus far rigidly followeu, with 
respect to the character of the questions that the Attorney-
General will answer. 
The only provision in the act of August 19, 1890, for the 
acquiring, by the Government, of title to the land therein 
described, is found in section 3, which is as follows: 
" That the said Chickamauga and Chattanooga National 
Park, and the approaches thereto, shall be nuder the con-
trol of the Secretary of War, and it shall be his dutJ, imme-
diately after the passage of this act, to notify the Attorne_y-
General of the purpose of the United States to acquire title 
to the roads and lands described in the previous Sl'ctions of 
this act, under the provisions of the act of August first, 
eighteen hundred and eighty-eight; and the said Secretary, 
upon receiving notice from the Attorney-General of the 
Unitetl States ~hat perfect titles have been secured t~ the 
said lands and roads, shall at once proceed to establish and 
substantially mark the boundaries of the said park." 
The act of August 1, 1888, chap. 728, (25 Stat., 357), enti-
tled ~'An act to authorize condemnation of lands for sites of 
public buildings~ and for other purposes," provides in its 
first section that-
H In every case •in which the Secretary of the Treasury or 
any other officer of the Government has been, or hereafter 
shall be, authorized to procure real estate for the erection of 
public building or for other public use, he shall be, and 
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hereby is, authorize(! to vrocure the same for the Uuited 
States by condemnation, under judicial process, whene\er in 
his opinion it is necessary or alh·antageous to the Govern-
ment to do so, and the G nited States circuit or district courts 
of the district wherein such real estate is located, shall bave 
j uris<liction of proceedings for such condemnation, and it 
shall be the duty of the Attorney-General of the United 
States, upon every application of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, under this act, or such other officer, to cause proceedings 
to be com me need for condemnation, within thirty days from 
the receipt of the application at the Department of Justice." 
The second and only other section of the act refers to the 
form of proceeding in such condemnation cases. 
Section 3 of the act of 1890, above quoted, shows, beyond 
question, that the duty of the S€cretai:)" of War is to notify 
the Attorney-General immediately after the passage of the 
act to acquire title under the pro\isions of the act of August 
• 1, 1888. 
No time, therefore, is given by the act of 1890 to any one 
to negotiate for the purchase of the land before inYolving 
the action of the .Attorney-General under tlle act of 1888. 
That act confers no power on any one to negotiate for the pur-
chase of land. It only provides that where an officer is 
authorized otherwise to purchase, he may purchase by con-
demnation. The duty of the Attorney-General under the act 
is confined to instituting and supervising the judicial pro-
~eeding for condemnation. The necessary effect of the two 
statutes read together is, therefore, to exclude the existence 
of authority in the Secretary of War, or any one else, to ac-
quire title to the lands in question, for the United States, in 
any way except by condemnation. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
Approved: 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 
The cas~ of the county bridge over the :M:uskingum River at Taylors-
ville, Ohio, ou which an opinion of the Attorney General was given 
July 19, 1890, (ante, p. 599), distinguisherl from the case of the bridge 
of the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company across the 
same river at Marietta, Ohio, subsequently presented, and that opinion 
shown to be inapplicable to the latter case by reason of recent stat-
utory amendments affecting it. 
DEP .A.R1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 23, 1890. 
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of September 8, with inclosures, in relation to the rail-
road bridge at 1\'Iarietta, Ohio. In this letter you call my 
attention. to the opinion given by this Department on July 19, 
1890, holding that the county bridge over the same river 
Muskingum, at Taylorsville, Ohio, was a nuisance, and state 
that the two cases were regarded as identical, and that one 
opinion would serve in both; that accordingly, after the · 
receipt of the opinion in reference to the Taylorsville bridge, 
notice was Rerved upon the parties interested in both bridges. 
under sections 9 and 10 of the act of August 11, 1888. 
Yon further state: HThe Baltimore and Ohio Southwest-
ern Railway Company, the owners of the bridge at Marietta, 
now claim that their case difl:ers from that at Taylorsville in 
that the Government is constructing at Marietta what they 
call an ' ice harbor.' 
"It will be seen that the improvement at Marietta is abso-
lutely necessary to the navigation of the Muskingum River, 
and that all improvements as well as all navigation above 
there depends entirely upon this, it being near the confluence 
of the Muskingum with the Ohio. The construction of the ice 
harbor is in the interest of the navigation of the river, as it is 
simply to afford a safe harbor in the winter for the craft navi-
g-ating the Muskingum, and also for such of the Ohio River 
boats as may see fit to go into it for a wint~r harbor. It is 
not seen how the fact of this winter harbor can in anywise 
take the case out of the law governing the case of the bridge 
at Taylorsville." 
You do not in your communication formulate any question 
to which you desire an answer. From the whole tenor of 
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your communication, owever, I infer that you desire my 
opinion as to whether any legal distinction exists which might 
make the opinion given with reference to the Taylorsville 
bridge inapplicable to the railroad bridge at Marietta. In 
answer, I have to say that since the opinion was given in ref-
erence to the Taylorsville bridge the law upon this subject 
bas been very materially changed by act of Congress. Sec-
tion 4 of the act known as the "river and harbor bill" ap-
proved September 19, 1890, amends section 9 of the "river 
and harbor" act of August 11, 1888, in a very materittl w~, 
as you will see by a comparison of the two sections. 
In the first place, before the word '' obstruction," in the 
fourth line of that section, the word "unreasonable" is in-
serted, thereby, as it seems to me, clearly presenting a ques-
tion of fact, which can not be determined by this Depart-
ment, which can and must be determined in the first in-
stance by you, but in regard to which your determination is 
probably subject to review in the court . With reference to 
the T{).ylorsville case no such question wus presented. Upon 
the facts of that c~se, even bad the law been the same, per-
haps the same question would not have arisen ; but as the 
law then was, it certainly was not presented in the same as-
pect. Upon the whole, then, I think this case is not covered 
by the opinion in the Taylorsville case, and I can not under-
take to advise as matter of law whether this bridge presents 
an "unreasonable" obstruction or whether its maintenance 
is in violation of the statutes. To determine that question 
in~olves an exammatiou of all the facts, circumstances, and 
equities surrounding the caRe, which are by no means all on 
the side of the Government. 
I call your attention also to the change of the same section 
of the statute further along, requiring you to specify the 
changes required to be made and to refer the matter to the 
district attorney instead of to the Attorney-General, in case 
proceedings are desired. Some changes are also made in 
section 10, but I need not go into these. 
I return herewith the papers sent with your letters. 
Very respectfully, 
. W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SEORETARY OF WAR. 
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ALASKA-NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATION. 
The laws relating to national banking associations are, by virtue of the 
act of May 18, 18~4, chapter 53, in force in the Territory of Alaska, and 
such associations may be lawfully organized in that Territory. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Octobe-r ~4, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of October 3, instant, requests 
an opinion on the question "whether it is lawful for national 
banking associations to be organized in the Territory of 
Alaska." 
By the act of May 18, 1884 (23 Stat., ~4 ), a civil govern-
ment is established for the Territory of Alaska which is 
made ''a civil and judicial district." By that act, secti 9, 
the laws of the United States not loca11y inapplicable, or in-
consistent with the act, are extended to that Territory, and 
it is, furthermore, provided (sec. 7) ''That the general Jaws 
of the State of Oregon now in force are hereby declared to 
be the law of said district, so far as the same may be appli-
cable and not in conflict with the provisions of this act or 
the laws of the United States," etc. And by the same sec-
tion, the distdct court established for t.he district of Alaska 
by section 3 is empowered to e~ercise jurisdiction over com-
mon law and equity cases. ' 
Section 5134 of the Revised Statutes provides that "the 
persons uniting to form such an tnational banking] associa-
tion shall, under their hands, make an organization certifi-
cate, which shall specifically state: • • • 
''Second. The place where its operations of discount and 
deposit are to be carried on, designating the State, Territory, 
or district, and the particular county and city, town, or vil-
lage." • • • 
There appears to be no goorl reason for saying that the laws 
establishing and regulating national banks are not in force 
in the Territory of Alaska by virtue of the general provision 
of the act of May 18, 1884, already referred to, and in view 
of the fact that the last-m.entioned act bas provided the Ter-
ritory with a system of laws and a court for their enforce-
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ment, it would seem to follow that national banking associ-
ations may be safely anfl properly organized there. Your 
question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
\V. H. B. ~!ILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ADVERTISEMENT OF PRIZES FOR GUESSES. 
·where a newspaper contained an advertisement offering in good faith a 
certain sum of money to the sender of thfl first "guess" giving the 
correct or nearest number of votes which each of two opposing candi-
dates, of different political ·parties, for a designated State office, shall 
receive at the next ensuing election, the guessing period to end with 
the day on which the election takes place: Held, that the scheme thus 
advertised is not one offering a prize "dependent upon lot or chance," 
within the meaning of section 3894, Revisetl Statutes, as amended by 
the act of September 19, 1890, chapter 908, and that the newspaper 
containing the advertisement is not, by the provisions of said section, 
excluded from the mail. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 31, 1890. 
SIR: In response to tlle inquiries made under date of the 
6th instant as to whether advertisements in newspapers of 
the "guessing contest," in its various phases, are in viola-
tion of section 3894 of the Re-;iRed Statutes, as amended by 
the act of September 19, 1890, I submit this answer. 
With other inclosures you transmit the advertisement of 
the Cincinnati Enquirer setting forth one of these projects in 
detail, and as this exhibit presents the material question quite 
distinctly I will make use ofit for the purposes of this answer. 
The scheme or "enterprise" advertised by the Enquirer is 
that it will give to the sender of the first "guess" giving the 
correct or nearest correct number of voteR of the Democratic 
and of the Republican candidates, respectively, for the office 
of secretary of state for the State of Ohio at the next elec-
tion, $100 each ; and to the sender of the second correct or 
nearest correct guess (if no correct guesses are received) of 
the vote of either candidate, $50 each; and to the sender of 
the third correct guess or nearest correct guess (if no correct 
680 RON. W. H. H. MILLER 
Advertlsemeu t of Prizes for Guesse!l. 
guesses are received), $25 tor each candidate; and $5 each 
to the senders of the next fifteen correct or nearest correct 
guesses (if no correct guesses are received) on each candidate; 
thus offering to give the amount of $500 to thirty-six persons. 
A blank form set forth provides for the writing in of the 
number of votes that the person competing shall see fit to 
designate, and for entering his name and residence. ThP 
designating period is to end with the day upon which the 
elec>tion is held. The caption of the advertisement is 
"Thousands in it," and it is announced that'' if no correct 
guesses are received the nearest correct guess will be entitled 
to tbe prize." 
The scheme of this newspaper requires that all" guesses" 
shall be upon blanks cut from copies of its issues, and the 
guess must be sent in within a limited time. 
It is provided that any person may guess, and that each 
may guess every day and as many times each day as the 
person shall see fit to do so. 
If this offer were not made in good faith it would be a 
scheme devised for obtaining money under false pretenses. 
Being made in good faith, the gifts are doubtless offered 
with the purpose of increasing directly as well as indirectly 
the sale of the i~sues of the newspapers and of rendering its 
bu~iness of increased value to' those who offer the prizes. 
The statute reads as follows: 
"No letter, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery, 
so-call~d gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering 
prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or concerning schemes 
devised fbr the purpose of obtaining money or property under 
false pretenses, and no list of the drawings at any lottery or 
similar scheme, and no lottery ticket or part thereof, and no 
check, draft, bill, money, postal note, or money order for the 
purchase of any ticket, tickets, or part thereof, or of any 
share or any chance in any such lottery or gift enterprise, 
shall be carried in the mail or delivered at or through an~~ 
post office or branch thereof, or by any letter carrier ; nor 
shall any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication o'f 
any kind containing any advertisement of any lottery or gift 
enterprise of any kind offering prizes dependent upon lot or 
chance, or containing any list ofprizesawardedat thedraw-
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ings of any such lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list 
is of any part or of all of the drawings, be carried in the mail 
or delivered by any postmaster or letter carrier." 
The prohibition directly material to this inquiry is: 
"Nor shall any newspaper • • • or publication • • • 
containing any advertisement of any lottery or gift enter-
prise of any kind offering prizes dependent upon lot or 
chance • • • be carried in the mail or delivered by any 
postmaster or letter carrier.'' 
In construing this law it is not to be forgotten that it is 
not only penal, but that it is in der·ogation of the right or 
privilege usually accorded to citizens in the use of the mails. 
It is, therefore, to be strictly construed as against the Gov-
ernment. It is clear that the statute is directed against only 
such enterprises as are "dependent upon lot or chance." It 
will hardly be contended that the enterprise under consider-
ation was dependent upon lot. Was it dependent upon 
chanctj within the meaning of the statute' It seems to me 
this question must be answered in the negative. In a cer-
tain sense and in a certain degree, perhaps, any prediction as 
to human action may be said to be dependent upon chance; 
that is to say, it is in some measure dependent upon circum-
stances, the happening of which can not be anticipated or 
foretold with any degree of certainty. But, at the same time, 
it can not be said that a prediction that a man who bas lived 
a life of uprightness for fifty years wil1 during the remainder 
of his life continue so to live, or-that a man who has been a 
successful business man for fifty years will so continue, or 
that a man who has maintained certain opinions, religious, 
political, or economical, will conti11ue in the same line, is 
dependent upon chance. It is, of course, quite possible that 
such man may utterly change his habits of life, business, or 
opinions, but such change will not be purely matter of chance. 
So with regard to the case in hand. A student of statistics 
might know approximately the number of Republican votes 
and the number of Democratic votes in the State of Ohio; he 
might approximate the ratio in which one and the other might 
increase or decrease in a given year. It is quite likely that 
his estimates would often be wide of the mark, but it would 
not he by reason of chance but by reason of causes in regard 
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to which he had formed erroneous estimates. It would hard1y 
do to say that a child or a school boy could form as correct 
an estimate in the matter as an experienced politician who 
had been giving weeks and months of steady attention to 
the consideration of the quest,ion. But, without further 
elaboration, I am quite clear that estimates made upon the 
proba.ble political action of the people in a given State in a 
pending election can not be said to be dependent upon chance, 
within the meaning of this statute, and that, therefore, this 
enterprise was no infraction of the lottery law in question. 
In conclusion it may not be improper to say· that this 
law was framed with a view to the suppression of certain 
well known and wide spread agencies for evil; and it is cer-
tainly not wise to embarrass its execution by a strained or 
unnatural construction, in reaching after practices not 
thought of as a motive for its enactment. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
OKLAHOMA-TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE. 
When the legislature of Oklahoma Territory, at its first session, took a. 
recess for one or more days on account of an approaching election : .Ad-
vised, that the period covere(l by the recess should he counted aR part 
of the one hundred and twenty days limited for such session, by section 
4 of the (organic) act of May 2, 1890, chapter 182. 
DEP ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
N overnber 8, 1890. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a note 
from Executive Clerk Tibbott, under date November 6, 
instant, inclosing a letter of Governor Steele, of Oklahoma, 
in which he makes the following statement: 
"The legislature has taken a recess until November 5, on 
account of the coming election, and has stated in a joint reso-
lution that it is not to count in the one hundred and twenty 
days that is provided in the organic act this body may hold 
session.'' 
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The Governor thereupon desires my opinion as to whether 
the time cvvered by such adjournment must be counted as a 
part of the session; that is, a part of the one hundred and 
twenty days. 
The provision of the organic act, in section 4, is as follows: 
"The session of the legislative assembly shall be biennial, 
and shall be limited to sixty days duration, Provided, how-
ever, That the duration of the first session of said legislative 
assembly may continue one hundred and twenty days." 
On the 16th day of March, 1889, I gave to the honorable 
the Secretary of the Interior, an opinion as follows: 
[Here follows the opinion referred to, which relates to the 
Arizona legislature, and will be found on page 260, ante.] 
The law as to Oklahoma seems to be not different from that 
applicable to Arizona. 
I see no reason to change the view there expressed. On 
the contrary, many reasons reinforcing that opinion occur to 
me. If the legislature may adjourn once and exclude the 
time of adjournment from the time limited for its session, it 
may adjourn twice, or any number of times. It may prac-
tically continue its session from time to time throughout the 
year. I can not believe that such was the purpose of Con-
gress. Such adjournments would necessarily add greatly to 
the expense of the session, and would interfere with the or-
derly transaction of the business which under th'e law is 
devolved upon the legislature. 
It seems to me, therefore, that the legislature should con-
clude its business within one hundred and twenty days from 
the commencement of its session. 
I return Governor Steele's letter. 
Respectfully yours, 
W H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
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SWAMP-LAND GRANT. 
A bill in equity will not lie against the State of Minnesota for the pur-
pose of vacating a patent i8sued to that State under the swamp-land 
grant, on the mere ground that the land thus patented was not in fact 
swamp land. 
DEPARTMENT OF ~TUSTICE, 
November 10, 1890. 
Sm: I have considered your letter of September 22, 1890, 
asking an opinion as to whether a suit will lie against the 
State of Minnesota by the United States for the purpose of 
vacating a patent issued by the United States to that State 
under the swamp-land grant, on the ground that the lands 
covered by the patent were not swamp lands and therefore 
were not within the grant. 
After a careful consideration of your communication I have 
reached the conclusion that a bill will not lie for the tmrpose 
of cancelling the patent on tbe mere ground that the land in 
question was not swamp lanfl. 
For the purposes of the swamp-land act the Secretnry of 
the Interior was made by law the tribunal to decide what 
lands in Minnesota were swamp, and his decision of that 
question must be regarded as final everywhere, unless im-
peachable on grounds on which the decisions of other tribu-
nals may be set aside in equity. It may be that patents 
will be annulled in equity at the suit of the United States for 
the game reasons that ordinary deeds and instruments are 
vacated by the courts; but, in my judgment, the determi-
nation of the Secretary of the Interior as to what lands are 
swamp stands on much higher ground than the ordinar.)-. pro-
ceeding of issuing a patent on an ex parte bearing. The fact 
determinefl is necessarily the basis of a great number of 
titles, and it can not be supposed that Oongress intended 
that this great fundamental fact should be retried so often as 
anybody saw fit to make a question about it. Such a con-
struction of the law would have a direct tendency to impair 
the value of the swamp-land grant and discourage persons 
from dealing in titles originating in a swamp-land patent. 
In French v. Fyan (93 U. S. R., 169) and Wright v. Rose-
berry (121 U. S. R., 488) the Supreme Court speak of the 
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Secretary of the Interior as the tribunal to decide what lands 
are swamp. In the former case the court uses this strong 
language (p. 171) : • 
" We are of opinion that this section [section 2 of the 
swamp-land act] devolved upon the Secretary, as the head of 
the Department which administered the affairs of the public 
lands, the duty, and conferred on him the power, of determin-
ing what lauds were of the description granted by that act, 
and made his office the tribunal whose decision on that sub-
ject was to be controlling." 
Then, to emphasize the position, the court makes a quota-
tion from Johnson v. Towsley (13 Wall., 72) to the effect that 
the decisions of special tribunals on matters referred to them 
by law must be upheld. . 
There is but one conclusio to be drawn from this, and it 
is that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior as to 
swamp lands is analagous to a judgment in a suit inter partes, 
and can only be impeached in equity on the grounds stated 
in the Supreme Court in United States v. Throckmorton (08 
0. S. R., 61.) 
I return the papers herewith. They could have been of 
no use to me, because I must confine myself to the case 
stated for an opinion, and am not authorized to look into 
evidence. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
Power of the President considered with reference to the administration 
of the eight-hour law. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 12, 1890. 
SIR: I have looked at the m~morial presented to you by 
Thomas S. Denham, president of the Federation of Labor 
Unions of the District of Columbia, with reference to the 
eight-hour law, and am quite clear you have no power to 
issue such an order as is asked. 
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In the first place, as is decided in United States v. Martin 
{ 4 Otto, 400), the act of Congress of June 25, 1868, pro-
viding that ''Eight, hours shall constitute a day's work for 
all laborers, workmen and mechanics now employed, or who 
shall hereafter be employed, by or on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the United States,'' simply pre:scribes a unit of 
measure for a day's work in the absence ol any specific con-
tract. It is no more and no less, in legal effect, than if 
Congress should provide that in all contracts for the pur-
chase of coal by officers of the Unite~l States Government 
2,000 pounds should constitute a ton. Surely no lawyer 
would claim that such a statute, either directly or by impli-
cation, would forbid an officer to pay more for 2,24.0 than 
for 2,000 pounds of coal. 
In the next place it is undeniable that there are many 
branches of the Government service in which, without the 
greatest inconvenience, the day can not he limited to eight 
consecutive hours, as for instance post-office clerks~ letter 
carriers, route agents upon railroads, etc. So it will often 
happen that the public service may and will require the wo1 k-
ing of extra hours in order that public exigencies may be 
met. 
Again sections 3709, etc., require contracts for supplies or 
services on behalf of the Go\ernment, except for prisoners' 
services, to be made with the lowest responsible bidder, after 
due advertisement. These statutes make no provision for the 
length of the day's work by the employes of such contractors, 
and a public officer who should let a contract for a larger sum 
than would be otherwise necessary by reason of a condition 
that a contractor's employes should only work eight hours a 
day would directly violate the law. 
In short, the statutes do not contain any such provision as 
would authorize or justify the President in making such an 
order as is asked. Nor does any such authority inhere in the 
Executive office. The President bas, under the Constitution 
and laws, certain duties to perform, among tllese being to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that is, that 
the other executiYe and administrative officers of the Gov-
ernment faithfully perform their duties; but the statutes reg-
ulate and prescribe these duties, and he bas no more power 
to add to, or substract from, the duties imposed upon su · 
ordinate executive and administrative officers by the law, 
than those officers have to add or snbstract from his dutie . 
The relief asked in this matter can, In my judgment, come 
only through additional legislation. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The PRESIDENT. 
BITUMINOUS COAL-DR.A. WB.A.CK. 
The provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, allowing a draw-
back on bituminous coal imported into the Umted States, wh1ch is 
afterwards used for fuel on steam vessels of the United States enp;aged 
m the coasting or foreign trade, is repealed by the act of October 1, 
1890, chapter 1244. 
&mble that the term "supplies," as employed m section 16 of the act of 
J nne 26, 1884, chapter 121, includes coal. 
DEPART~NT OF JUSTICE, 
N ot1ember 17, 1890. 
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
commpnication of the 4th instant, requesting an opinion 
whether the provisiOn for drawback upon bituminous co l 
(22 Stat., 511) is repealed by section 55 of the act of October 
1, 1890, entitled ''An act to reduce the revenue and equalize 
duties on imports and for other purposes." 
A brief review of the legislation on this subject di$closes 
the fo1lowing facts : 
Section 2504, schedule M, sundries (Rev. Stat., 1874, p. 
474), provides a duty upon imported coal in the following 
language: ''Slack coal or culm, such as will pass through a 
half-inch screen, forty cents per ton of twenty-eight bushels, 
eighty pounds to the bushel ; bituminous coal, and shale, 
seventy-five cents per ton of twenty-eight bushels, eighty 
pounds to the bushel." 
In the revision of the tariff act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 
511 ), section 2502, RChedule N, sundries, a drawback was pro-
vided upon bituminous coal. As found in the Revised Stat· 
utes the provisions both tor " slack coal or culm," and "bitu-
minous coal," are provided form a single pRragraph. In the 
688 HON. W. H. H. MILLER 
Bituminous Coal-Drawback. 
1aw of March 3, 1883, supra., the pr~v-ision for duty upon coalr 
slack or culm, and bituminous, are separated, each having 
its appropriate paragraph. The duty upon bituminous coal 
is thus provided: ''Coal, bituminous and shale, seventy-fh-e 
cents per ton of twenty-eight bushels, eighty pounds to the 
bushel. A drawback of seventy-five cents per ton shall be 
allowed on all bituminous coal imported into the United 
States which is afterwards used for fuel on bo:trd of vessels 
propelled by steam which are engaged in the coasting trade 
of the United States, or in the trade with foreign countries, 
to be allowed and paid under such regulations as the Secre-
tary of the Treasury shall prescribe." To this act Congress 
gave a legislative construction by section 10 of an act entitled 
"An act to abolish certain fees for official services to Ameri-
can vessels, and to amend the laws relating to shipping com-
missioners, seamen, and owners of vessels, and for other pur-
poses." (24 Stat., 8L) By the provisions of this last section 
the right to drawback was to be construed to apply ''only to 
vessels of the United States." 
The law stood thus until the passage ofth-3 act of October 
1, 1890. 
It will be noted in Schedule N," Sundries," of the last named 
act, that Congres~ reversed the relative position of the para-
grapus relating to coal, bituminous and shale, and slack or 
culm, making them stand as follows: ''Coal, bituminous and 
shale, ~eventy-five cents per ton of twenty-eight bushels, 
eighty pounds to the bushel; coal, slack or culm, such as will 
pass through a half-inch screen, thirty cents per ton of 
twenty-eight bushels, eighty pounds to the bushel," and also 
omitted the provision for drawback upon bituminous coal as 
found in the act of March 3, 1883. 
An examination of the act of October 1, 1890, discloses no 
clause directly repealing this drawback, unless it be fonnd in 
section 55, ''that all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with 
this act are hereby repealed." 
Evidence from the internal construction of the act, as well 
as the history of its enactment, leads irresistibly to the con-
clusion that "the tariff part of the bill contemplates and pro-
poses a complete revisiOn. It not only changes the rate of 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 689 
Bituminous Coal-Drawback. 
duty, but modifies the general provisions of law relating to 
the questions of duty." 
It may be contended with force that the provisions of the 
law of 1883, contained in a separate paragraph, providing 
for the duty and the drawback, are to be considered and con-
strued collectively, and that when the aet of October 1, 1890, 
provided for a duty and omitted tb.c drawback that such pro-
vision is in terms inconsistent with the prior law and thus re-
peals the former duty. 
However this may be, it is settled that "if a subsequent 
statute be not repugnant in all its provisions to a prwr one, 
yet if the later statute equally intends to prescribe the only 
rule which shall govern it repeals the prior one." (State'· 
Stoll, 17 Wall., 425; Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 Howard, 630; 
Uniterl States'· Claflin, 97 U.S., 546; Cook County Natwnal 
Bank v. The United States, 107 U. S., 445.) 
Another rule of construction equally well settled is that a 
statute IS impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute making 
new prodsions plainly intended as a substitute for it. (United 
Sta,tes v. Henderson~ 11 Wall., 652; Wood v. United States, 
16 Pet., 34~; Fabbri v. lffurphy, 95 U.S., 191.) 
That the attention of Congress must have been called to 
the fact of the omission of the clause relating to drawback 
is evident, because the provision formed a part of the ori. 
ginallaw, and because of the change in the relative positiOns 
of the paragraphs relating to coal, slack or culm, and coal,. 
bituminous and shale, referred to above. 
It will be seen also that the act of October 1, 1890, in re-
-opect to duties upon other articles concerning which draw-
backs were previously allowed, retains the same provision as 
:in the prior existing law. Thus section 25, relating to im-
ported materials on which duties have been paid, used in the 
manufacture of articles manufactured or produced in the 
United States, provides that H the drawback on any article 
allowed under existing law shall be continued at the rate 
herein provided." 
So also the drawback mentione<l in Schedule U, metals 
and manufactures of, iron aml steel, paragraph 143, and that 
on salt, agricultural products, etc., paragraph 322. It can 
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not be assumed that Congress thus deliberately omitted a 
clause relating to a drawback in a general revision of the 
subject of duties without intending so to do. 
1 am, therefore, of the opinion that so much of the act of 
March 3, 1883, Schedule N, ''Sundries," as relates to the draw· 
back upon coal, bituminous and shale, is repealed b~· tlle 
act of October 1, 1890 
You will note that my opinion thus f,u answers the specific 
question asked. I deem it my duty to call your attention to 
section 16 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121. This 
section is as follows : 
"Sec. 16. All articles of foreign production needed, antl 
actually withdrawn from bonded warehouses, for supplies 
not including equipment of vessels of the United States eu· 
gaged in the foreign trade, including the trade between the 
Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States, may be so 
\Yitlldrawn free from duty, under such regulations as the 
Seeretary of the Treasury may prescribe." 
It would seem to admit of little doubt that ''supplies" in· 
.elude coal. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
'The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTY ON LEAD ORE. 
Under paragraph 199 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, im-
ported lead ore IS dutiable at the rate of 1t cents a pound, irrespective 
of the quantity of lead whiCh the ore may contain. 
The ~ords 11 all other ores," as used in the proviso of that. paragraph, 
mean all ores other than those known commercially as lead ores. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
November 19, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of the 8th instant calling my 
attention to paragrap'l l99 of Schedule C of the tariff act of 
October l, 1890, and to the letter of Assistant Secretary 
Spaulding, of date of the 30th ultimo, to the collector of cus-
toms at El Paso, Tex., and to other inclosures, and to decis-
ions of the Treasury Department (Synopsis 4391, 7327, 7543, 
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.and 9662), and requesting my opinion as to the eonstru.ction 
()f said paragraph, was duly reeeived. 
Availing myself of the references and ggestions sub-
mitted, I have the honor to answer: 
The tariff law of June 30, 1864, (13Stat., 206), ·mposes a 
duty as follows: "On lead i)re, one and a balf eents per 
pound." 
The act of March 3, 1888, (~2 Stat., 500), in Schedule C, im-
poses a duty as follows : " Lead ore and lead dross, one and 
()De half ~nts per pon d." 
Paragraph 199, of the act of October l, 1890, provides that 
there shall be levied, t--ollected, and pai-d upon imported •'le~d 
()re and lead dross, one and one half cents per pound: Pro-
vided, That silver ore and all other ores containing lead shall 
pay a duty of one and one-half cents per pound on the lead 
contained therein, according to sample an<l assay at the port 
of entry." 
The meaning most obviously sngg~steti by a consideration 
()f the language used is that a duty of li cents per pound 
shall be paid upon the commodity kno D as lead ore, and 
that a similar duty shall be paid upon that known as lead 
dross; while upon ores that are not known eommercially as 
lead ores, and which yet contain lead of w ppreciable value, 
a duty of li cents per pound shall be paid, not upon these 
ores, but upon the lead which sample and assay shall show 
them to contain. 
A construction which makes'' all other ores" in the pro-
viso cover " lead ore " of the first line would render the first 
line meaningless as to lea.d ore, or would place the same rate 
of duty upon lead twice in the paragraph. 
Under the law ()f 1883 lead ore as neb bore the same duty 
as dross as such. If only the lead which may be extracted 
from this ore is now dutiable, then it follows that lead ore and 
dross have been separated without an expressed purpose to 
do so, or that it is only the lead which the dross contains 
that is dutiable. 
In order to discover the intent of Congress in this enact-
ment it may be instructive to consider the ralings of your 
Depat-tment in relation to the subject-matter. 
Undt'r date of January 14, 1880 (Synopsis, 4891), it is de-
I 
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cided as to certain ores claimed to be' entitled to free entry 
from Mexico as silver ore, that" The value of the silver con-
tained in the ore being largely in excess of the value of the 
iron, the Department is of the opinion that the ore is entitled 
to entry free of duty as' silver ore."' 
No one denies that Congress, by said act of March 3, 1883, 
placed a duty of 1~ cents per pound on lead ore and lead dross. 
Under date of January 25, 1886 (Synopsis, 7327), the As-
sistant Secretary decides-
" That when silver in any ore predominates in value it is 
considered to be silver ore, and, as such, is exempt from duty 
under the special provisions in the free list for ores of gold 
and silver. Where, however, lead predominates in value 
the ore is considered as a lead ore, and is subjected to a duty 
at the rate of 1~ cents per pound under the special provi-
sions in the tariff act for ' lead ore and lead dross.'" 
Under date of May 27, 1886 (Synopsis, 7543), the Acting 
Secretary of the Treasury decides-
'' That ores composed of silver and lead and iron, or silver 
and lead, or silver and other base metals of which silver is 
the component material of chief value, would, under the rul-
ing of January 25, 1886 (Synopsis, 7327), be exempt from 
duty under the provision in the free list (T. I., new, 752) for 
'ores of • • • silver.' 
" It is immaterial in the entry and classification of such 
ores whether the ores are imported for use as flnxes in the 
fusion of other metals, or on account of the metals them-
selves." 
Your circular of October 18, 1889 (Synopsis, 9662), reviews 
and approves these rulings and holds that ores known com-
mercially as ores of silver, although containing lead in appre-
ciable or considerable quantity, are not dutiable under the 
law of 1883, and that it must be assumed that the rulings 
and practice of the Department were known to Congress 
when it passed that act; and that it must be held that the 
designation of lead ore and silver ore in the tariff, in the ab-
sence of legislative definition, was that of existing decisions. 
In view of these instances of official construction Congress 
enacted the provisions of the act of 1890, above quoted. It 
is not reasonable to suppose that, without employing words 
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clearly indicating a purpose to do so, the classification was 
changed from "lead ore" to "ores containing lead," while 
reenacting in the leading portion of the paragraph the words 
of the provision of the act of 1883. 
Nor can it fairly be inferred, without words plainly show-
ing such an intention, that the duty was dropped from 1! 
cents per pound on lead ore down to the same rate on the 
~ead contained in the ore. 
The language which Congress has deemed it proper to em-
ploy where it intended to place a duty only upon the metal 
that an ore contains is shown in the paragraph relatine-
to copper, where the following words are used (par. 191): 
"Copper imported in the form of ores, one-half of one cent 
per pound on each pound of fine copper contained therein." 
The rules of statutory construction forbid the conclusion 
that it was the legislative design to make lead ore dutiable 
only upon the lead contained therein without the use of the 
same or equivalent language. 
In my opinion it is manifest that the words '' all other 
.ores," as used in the proviso of . paragraph 199, mean all ores 
other than those designated by the words" lead ores," con-
strued according to commercial usage and Departmental de-
-cision. 
I therefore hold that imported lead ore is dutiable at the 
rate of 1! cents per pound without regard to the amount of 
lead which the ore may contain. 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PROPERTY LOST IN THE MILITARY SERVICE. 
'The duty of the Secretary of War in the case of a claim under the act of 
March 3, 1885, chapter 335, is limited to the determination of whether 
the property for the loss of which indemnity is claimed was "reason-
able, useful, necessary, and proper" for the claimant. 
Whether the loss happened under the circumstances described in the 
statute, and come~:~ within t·he provisions thereof, is a question for 
~he determination of the proper accounting officers of the Treasury, 
and so does not appertain to the administration of the War Depart-
ment. 
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DEP .A.RT:MENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication (No. 2300) asks an opinion on 
the following questions: 
(1) .As to whether a cavalry officer can recover under this 
statute for the loss of a horse by disease or killed in conse-
quence of disease. .And, under this head, whether the extra 
pay allowed to a cavalry officer does not cover the risk and 
expense of his horse. 
(2) What the duties of the Secretary of War are under 
this statute. 
These questiom~ arise upon the act of Congress of March 
3, 1885 (23 Stat., 350), entitled ''An act to provide for t.he 
settlement of the claims of officers and enlisted men of the 
.Army for the loss of private property destroyed in the mili-
tary service of the Unit~d States." 
The act authorizes and directs "the proper accounting· 
officers of the Treasury" "to inquire into, ascertain, and de-
termine the value of the private property belonging to offi-
cers and enlisted men in the military service under the fol-
lowing circumstances.'' It then goes on to state three con-
ditions of fact under which indemnity may be paid for the 
loss of private property, and provides that such indemnity 
"shall be limited to sueh articles of personal property as the 
Secretary of War, in his di@cretion, shall decide to be rea-
sonable~ useful, necessary, and proper for such officer or 
soldier while in quarters, engaged in the public service, in the 
line of duty." 
It seems to us that the law makes it the duty of the Sec-
retary of War to determine in each case whether the prop-
erty for the lo8s of which indemnity is claimed is" reasonable, 
useful, necessary, and proper" for the claimant, and that 
there his authority under the act ends. 
The value oft he property so determined by the Secretary 
of War to be "reasonable, useful, necessary, and proper," 
and the question whether the loss happened under the cir-
cumstances set forth in the act, are, .in my opinion, to be 
determined by '' the proper accounting officers of the Treas-
ury." In other words, those officers must apply the statute 
to the particular facts of eaeh case. 
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If this view be correct~ the first question submitted has no 
relation to a matter that arises in the ad.ministration of the 
War Department, and for that reason I have no authority to 
answer it. Section 356, Revised Statutes, only authorizes the 
head of a Department "to require the opinion of the Attor-
ney-General on any questions of law arising in the adminis-
tration of his Department." (See also 6 Opin., 24; 13 Opin •• 
531, 568.) 
The second question I have answered already. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF WA.R. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Attorney-General declines to give an opinion upon a question as to 
the meaning of a Territorial statute, where the question does not ap-
pear to have arisen in the administration of the D~partment propos-
ing it. 
DEP .A.RTlUENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of November 5, instant, asks 
an opinion upon the meaning of certain language used in the 
funding law of the Territory of Arizona. 
It would give me pleasure to answer the question submit-
ted if I could do so without stepping beyond the limits within 
which Congress has restricted me, but as the question sub-
mitted does not appear to have arisen in the administration 
of the business of the Department of the Interior I am not at 
liberty to consider it. 
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes of the United States 
provides "That the head of any Executive Department may 
require the opinion of the Attorney-General on any questions 
of law arising in the administration of his Department." 
In se\~eral instances my predecessors as well as myself have 
felt com;trained to decline to give opinions askecl for by head8 
of Departments upon questions not ~rising out of matters be-
fore them for official action. For instance, Attorney-General 
Brewster declined to give an opinion at the request of the 
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Postmaster-General made by direction of a resolution of the 
House of Representatives, placing his refusal on the ground 
that the question submitted had no connection with a matter 
before the Post-Office Department. It may be added that~ 
on a previous occasion, Attorney-General Brewster declined 
to give an opinion on a question directly submitted to him 
by a resolution of the House of Representatives (18 Opin., 
107, 108; 14 Opin., 177; 6 Opin., 24). 
These authorities leave no alternative to the conclusiou 
above stated. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
It is not within the province of the Attorney-General to make a finding: 
of facts in a, case submitted for his opinion upon q u~stions of law aris· 
ing thereon. The facts of the case should be ascertained and preAented 
by the officer requesting the opinion. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 28, 1890. 
SIR : Your communication of November 5, instant, asking: 
an opinion as to whether the whistling buoy patent bas ex-
pired, after stating the facts upon which the question sub-
mitted arises, goes on to ask that these statements of fact. 
may be verified by me, and " if found to be true that the 
Department may be informed as to whether the Light-House 
Board may or may not manufacture this whistling buoy, or 
contract for its manufacture, without infringement on the 
rights of the deceased patentee, Courteney, or his heirs or 
assigns." 
I beg leave to say that it is not within my competency to 
make a finding of facts in any case, and tha I can only give 
an opinion on questions of law arising upon a state of facts 
presented to me by the officer requesting my opinion. · 
The rulings to this effect, as well by my predecessors as 
myself, are numerous. (10 Opin .. 267: 11 ib .• 189; 12 ib., 
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205; 18 ib., 487.) ~'Where," says Attorney-General Stan-
bery, "a question of law arises upon facts submitted to the 
Attorney-General, such facts must be agreed and stated as facts 
established." 
It will be my pleasure to pass upon the question submitted 
so Moon as the facts are presented in conformity to the long 
settled practice of the Attorney-General's office and the De-
partment of Justice. 
Very respectfully yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
IMPORTED MOLASSES. 
Imported molasses can not, under paragraph 241 of the act of October 1, 
1890, chapter 1244, be refined in bond without payment of duty be-
tween March 1 and April 1, 1891. The provisions of that paragraph 
are applicable only to sugars in solid form. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
N overnber 28, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication ( 5650, F.) submits for an opinion 
the questions, "whether imported molasses may be refined 
in bond, during the month of March, 1891, under the provis-
ions of paragraph 241 oftbe act of October 1, 1890, or whether 
said provisions must be restricted to sugars imported in the 
solid form." 
The law says (par. 241) that ''sugars not exceeding num-
ber aixteen Dutch standard in color may be refined in bond 
without payment of duty" between March 1 and April 1, 
1891. This provision clearly applies to sugars in solid form. 
The reference to ~' number sixteen Dutch standard in color'' 
seems to place this beyond question. 
Commercially, and under the act in question, sugar is one 
thing and molasses another thing. 
Paragraph 726 admits to free entry sugars not above a cer-
tain standard, and molasses ; and paragraph 241 declares 
"That the provisions of this act providing terms for the ad-
mission of imported sugars and molasses, and for the payment 
of a bounty on sugars of domestic production, shan take 
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effect on the first day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
one." 
To hold, then, that molasses may be refined in bond would 
be to confound the· distinction between it and sugar, known 
to commerce and recognized in the tariff, and would lead, 
necessarily, to the extension of the bounty on sugar to 
molasses. 
Paragraph 726, admitting to free entry sugar and molasses, 
already referred to, shows that Congress had no intention to 
include under the term "sugars" anything but sugar in the 
solid form. Its enumerations can be understood in no other 
way, it seems to me. This paragraph is as follows: 
"Sugars, all not above number sixteen Dutch standard 
in color, all tank bottoms, all sugar drainings and sugar 
sweepings, sirups of cane juice, rnelada, concentrated melada~ 
~nd concrete and concentrated molasses, and molasses." 
It results, therefore, that" molasses" can not be refined in 
bond under paragraph 2!1 of the tariff. 
Very respectfully, yours, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY oF THE TREASURY. 
LETTERS PATENT-APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL. 
Vhere letters patent were allowed on the original application, December 
9, 1887, but the fiual fee was not paid as required by statute; and the 
same were again allowed on a renewed application, under section 4897, 
:&evised Statutes, December 4, 18.::!9; and (payment of final fee as re-
~uired not having been made on the last allowance) a second applica-
tion for renewal, under said section, was filed June i, 1890: Advised 
that the:~ applicant i!i not entitled to an allowance of letters patent on 
such second application, the statutory limitation (two years) imposed 
by said section having attached before the filing thereof. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 29, 1890. 
SIR: Your letter of the 27th ultimo, inclosing a communi-
cation from the Commissioner of Patents addressed to you 
and bearing date October 23, is received. 
The case presented for an opinion is as follows : 
June 25, 1887, Ol.tarles Nicholson filed au application for 
letters patent 1or an improvement in motors. 
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December 9, 1887, letters patent were allowed on the ap-
plication and th~ applicant was duly notified to pay the final 
fee as providPd by law. 
This fee was not paid within the six months prescribed by 
statute. 
December 4,1889, the applicant paid $15 as a renewal fee, 
and renewed his application under section 4897, Revised Stat-
utes. 
December 11 the ap.Plication was duly allowed and the 
applicant was notified to pay the final fee under the statute. 
This the applicant neglected to do. 
June 7, 1890, the applicant filed a second application for 
renewal, accompanied with a renewal fee of $15. 
The question presented as limited by the case stated is 
whether under the circumstances detailed Nicholson is 
~ntitled to be allowed letters patent upon this application. 
Section 4897, under which this renewal is now sought, con-
tains this limitation: "But such second application must be 
made within two years after the allowance of the original 
applicatton." 
As the original letters were allowed December 9, 1887, 
while the application for renewal now claimed under was not 
filed until June 7, 1890, it is manifest that the statutory lim-
itation bad attached before such filing, and that the acts of 
Nicholson in the premises, after the expiration of the two 
years, were without e:fl'ect. 
I therefore hold that in the case presented the applicant is 
not entitled to allowance of ]etters patent. 
I do not deem myself called upon to pass upon the ques-
tion whether a second applieation for renewal filed within two 
years after the allowance of the original application, but 
after the forfeiture of the first renewal application, would be 
without effect, or otherwise, as the facts of the case submitted 
do not present such a case. 
In accordance with the rulings of learned predecessors (9 
Opin., 82; id., 421; 10 do., 220; and other cases), action is 
necessarily and properly limited to the aetual case submitted. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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\VORLD'S COLUMBIAN COMMISSION. 
Alaska is a Territory within the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of the act 
of April 25, 1890, chapter 156, and, as such, is entitled thereunder to 
be represented by two Commissioners in the \Vorld's Columbian Com-
mission. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE, 
December 19, 1890. 
SIR: Your communication of November 25 calling for a 
construction of certain clauses of sections 2 and 3 of the act 
of April25, 1890, entitled "An act to provide for celebrating 
the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America," 
etc., is received. 
The question presented is whether Alaska is entitled to be 
represented by commissioners under said sections 2 and 3 in 
the World'R Columbian Commission. 
These sections provide for commissioners from each State 
and Territory of the United States. 
Is Alaska a Territory under these provisions ·~ 
Title XXIII of the Revised Statutes (pp. 325-34:6) relates 
to "The Territories" and consists of three chapters, the third 
containing ''Provisions Relating to the Unorganized Terri-
tory of Alaska." 
The prO\·isions relate mainly to the extension of the cus-
toms laws of the United States, and to the management of the 
seal fisheries. 
The ceded territory is spoken of as the "Territory of Alas-
ka" and as ''Alaska Territory." 
This third chapter is mostly derived from the act of July 
27, 1868 (15 Stat, 240). A marked difference in designation 
appears between the act and the revision. 
Both refer to "the territory ceded to the United States by 
the Emperor of Russia." · 
The act of 1868 giveR the President power to interfere with 
the importation and use of fire arms and distilled spirits "into 
and within the said Territory," while section 1955, Revised 
Statutes, adopts precisely the same words in giving the same 
power, except the last clause reads "into and within the 
Territory of Alaska." Other similar changes also appear. 
, 
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The act of 1868 speaks of the "district of Alaska," but neither 
in its title or elsewhere does it speak of the ''Territory of 
Alaska," unorganized or otherwise. 
The act of l\Iay 17, 1884 (23 Stat., 24), entitled "An act 
providing a civil government for Alaska,'' enacts that "the 
territory ceded • • • shall constitute a civil and judicial 
district, the governm .. nt of which shall be organized and ad-
ministered as hereinafter provided." 
A governor, attorney, judge, marshal, and clerk, to be ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are 
duly authorized, and a "seat of go\"·ernment" is named. 
The general laws of the State of Oregon are made the laws 
of the district so far as applicable; and the Attorney-General 
is directed to compile laws of the United States applicable, 
and "furnish for the use of the officers of said Territory." 
It is directed that there shall be no legislative assembly in 
said district, and that no delegate shall be sent to Congress 
therefrom. 
A" report upon the condition of the Indians residing in said 
Territory," and other matters, by a commission, is directed, 
and it is also enacted, ''That the Secretary of the Interior 
shall make needful and proper provision for the education of 
the children of school age in the Territory of Alaska." • • • 
It is also provided that the provisions of chapter 3, title 
23, Revised Statutes, before referred to, "relating to the 
unorganized Territory of ..Alaska, shall remain in fu1l force, 
except as herein specifically otherwise provided." 
In the year 1883(22Stat., 548)and previously, Alaska is not 
cLtssified with the Territories in the ''legislative, executive, 
and judicial" appropriation bills, but in that of July 7, 1884 
(2:~ Stat., 177-179), under the general heading of ''Govern-
ment in the Territories," the" Territory of Alaska" is placed 
at the end of the list. 
In that of March 3, 1885 (23 Stat., 408), under the same 
general head, the "Territory of Alaska" is given its alph3-
betical order, and is placed first in this li~t of the Territories. 
The Congress which passed the act authorizing the Colum-
bian Exposition, in its legislative, judicial, and appropriation 
bill of July 11, 1890 (Stat. Fifty-first Congress, first session, 
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p. 24:9), makes use of the same words and arrangement, pro-
viding salaries, $22,000, and "for incidental and contingent 
expenses of the Territory" • • • $2,000. 
In the sundry civil bill of said year, August 30, 1890 (same 
Stat., p. 303), there is appropriat~d "for the industrial and 
primary education of the children of school age in the Ter-
ritory of Alaska, without reference to race, fifty thousand 
dollars." 
In the deficiency bill of the same year a similar designa. 
tion of Alaska as a Territory appears. (Same Stat., 541, 
54:7.) 
This unrestricted statutory de~ignation of Alaska as a Ter-
ritory has a reflected light thrown upon it by the fact that · 
this Congress in designating the Indian Territory in the Okla-
homa act, says that the same "shall, for the purposes of this 
act, be known as the Indian Territory." (Same Stat., sec. 2!l, 
p. 93). 
In view of the legislation referred to I am led to conclude 
that the Revised Statutes changed t.he pre existing designa-
tion of Alaska and placed it in the list of Territories, but left 
it in an unorgani-zed condition; that the act of May 14, 18~4, 
incorporated this territorial domain into land, judicial, and 
civil districts, and provided a limited Territorial government 
which authorized its recognition as oue of the Territories of 
the United States; that as Congress omitted to limit action 
under sections 2 and 3 of the Columbian Exposition law to 
Territories entitled to representation by a Delegate in Con-
gress, as might have been done readily if such a purpose llad 
existed, but on the contrary has recognized, classified, and 
designated Alaska as a Territory in subsequent le~islation, 
it must be held that Congress intended to permit the repre-
sentation in question and that Alaska is entitled to commis-
sioners in the World's Columbian Commission. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
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WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION. 
The power given the President by section 16 of the act of April 25, 1890, 
chapter 156, to "designate additional articles for exhibition," is not 
limited to articles belonging to the Executive Departments and insti-
tutions therein mentioned, but extends to such other articles aR he 
may deem :fit and proper to be designated ; and tllis power carries 
with it authority to employ such persons as shall be necessary to 
properly prepare and care for the articles which may be thus desig-
nated. 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTIOlil, 
December 22, 1890. 
SIR: Your letter of the 17th instant requesting my opin-
ion upon questions arising under sections 16 and 18 of the 
act of April 25, 1890, eutitled '' An act to provide for cele-
brating the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of 
America," etc., bas received due consideration. 
The principal question presented is whether under the 
provisions of said sections the President is authorized to 
•' designate additional articles for exhibition" not existing 
in au:v of the Executive Departments, and to employ per.sons 
outside of the Departmental force to prepare and care for 
such articles as may be so designated for exhibition. 
Section 16 provides for an exhibit by the Government. 
''There are to be taken from the Executive Departments, 
tbe Smithsonian Institution, tbe Fish Commission, and the 
National Museum" such "articles and materials as ill us-
- trate," ete.; and the board of management is provided for 
and is ''to be charged with the selection, preparation, 
arrangement, safe keeping, and exhibition of such articleR 
and materials as the heads of the ~evPral Departments and 
the directors of the Smithsonian Institution and National 
Museum may respectively decide shall be embraced in said 
Government exhibit." It is further provided that-
" The President may also designate additional articles for 
exhibition." 
In view of the magnitude and importance of the proposed 
"World's Columbian Exposition," and of the independent 
and specific authority granted to the President, it is improb-
able that OongresR intended to limit the action of the Exec-
utive to merely supplementing the selections of the heads of 
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Departments and said directors, in a field where their own 
right to select is unrestricted. 
I am therefore of the opinion that the power vested in the 
President includes, but extends beyond, the Departments 
and the institutions named, and that be is authorized to 
designate such ''additional articles for exhibition" outside 
of any Department as be may deem fit and proper. 
This grant of authority carries with it the power to employ 
such persons as shall be necessary to properly prepare and 
care for the articles so designated. 
A further inquiry is made as to whether the President 
may, under circumstances suggested, apportion the moneys 
referred to in the concluding clause of section 18. 
The act does not impose the duty of an apportionment or 
a division of the moneys upon the President, and I do not 
deem it advisable at this time to determine what rights the 
President may possess in the premises in virtue of his gen-
eral executive authority. 
It is probable that the attention of Congress should be 
called to the question of the division and application of the 
moneys to be appropriated, so that such legislative action 
may be bad as Congress shall decide to be proper. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ENTRY 01<, PUBLIC LANDS. 
The provision in the act of August 30, 1890, chapter 837, declaring that 
"no person who shall, aft~r the passage of this act, enter upon any of 
the public lands with a view to occupation, entry, or settlement under 
any of the land laws shall be permitted to acquire title to more thau 
320 acres in the aggregate under all of said laws," does not operate 
upon entries made prior to the date of the act. 
An applicant who, by such prior entries, bas already acquired title to 
320 acres is not thereby precluded from acquiring title to au additional 
quantity, notlexceeding 320 acres, by homestead entry, timber-land, or 
other claim under the land laws, filed subReql!lent to the date of the 
act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE, 
December 26, 1890. 
SIR: By letter of the 22d ultimo you submitted for the 
opinion of the Attorney-General the question whether in 
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construing the act of Congress approved August 30, 1890, an 
applicant who shows that he has title to 320 acres of land 
under the land laws of the United States previous to said 
August 30, 1890, can now initiate claims for and acquire 
title to 320 acres more; or, in other words, whether if a 
person perfected title to a pre-emption and timber-land claim 
of 160 acres each prior to August 30, 1890, he can now file a 
homestead entry, or other claim, for 160 acres each, and ac-
quire title thereto. 
The provision in the act of August 30, 1~90 (Laws first 
session 1890, chap. 837, p. 391, .Annual Laws), which gives 
rise to this question is as follows: 
''No person who shall, after the passage of this act, enter 
upon any of the public lands with a view to occupation, entry, 
or settlement under any of the land laws shall be permitted 
to acquire title to more than thrt>e hundred and twenty acres 
in the aggregate under all of said laws, but this limitation 
shall not operate to curtail the right of any person who has 
heretofore made entry or settlement on the public lands, or 
whose occupation, entry, or settlement is validated by this 
act." 
The question asked must be answered in the affirmative. 
The language of the provision will permit no other con-
struction. Its whole operation is prospective. The entries 
upon which the limitation is to operate are those made after 
the act. Those made before the act, though uncompleted, 
are expressly saved from the operation of the act by the 
proviso. The verbs used are all of the future tense. " No per-
son who shall after the passage of this act enter, etc., shall be 
permitted to acqu+re more than three hundred and twenty 
acres in the aggregate." The acquisition referred to clearly 
begins in the future. It is difficult to see why the limit 
upon such acquisition, in the absence of anything to the 
contrary, should not therefore be calculated from and after 
the passage of the act. 
Add to the force of the language of the act that of the well 
known rule of construction which requires that in the absence 
of express provision or necessary implication to the contrary, 
all statutes are to be given a prospective rather than a retro-
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spective operatiou, and the proper view of the provision 
under discussion is placed beyond doubt. 
The papers inclosed in your letter are herewith returned. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
COLLECTION OF HEAD-MONEY DUTY. 
The act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, known as the immigration act, 
confers power on the collector of customs, under proper regulations of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, to require the master of a vessel arriving 
within his collection district from a foreign country to detain all pas-
sengers on such vessel until they shall have been examined by the 
customs officers, for the purpose of determining the amount of head 
money collectible under that. act from the master. 
Section 3 of said act invests the Secretary of the Treasury with power 
to make all necessary regulations for carrying out its provisions; and 
under this power he may, by regulation, forbid. the landing by the 
master of any passenger from his vessel until an examination of an 
the passengers thereon is had, whether cabin or steerage. 
Detention of passengers for purposes of quarantine or tax charge is 
clearly within the power and duty of the mast.er, where it is required 
of him by law, or by regulation pursuant to law. 
Provisions of section 9, of the act of August 2, 1882, chapter 374, called 
the passenger act, considered. and construed in connection with the 
same subject. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 29, 1~90. 
SIR: By letter of the 14th of October, 1890, you requested 
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the power of the 
officers of the customs to require the master of a ship ar-
riving at the port of New York from a foreign country to 
detain all passengers upon such ship until they shall have 
been examined by the customs officers for the purpose of de-
terminiug what amount of head-money, under the immigra-
tion act of 1882 (22 Stat., 214), should be collected from 
the master. 
You first ask whether such power is conferred by section 
9 of the passenger act (22 Stat., 186), which provides that-
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"It shall not be lawful for the master of any such steam-
ship or other vessel, not in distress, after the arrival of the 
vessel within any collection district of the United States, to 
allow any person or persons, except a pilot, officer of the 
customs, or health officer, agents of the vessel, and consuls, 
to come on board of the vessel, or to leave the vessel, until 
the vessel has been taken in charge by an officer of the cus-
toms, nor after charge so taken, without leave of such officer, 
until all the passengers, with their baggage, have been duly 
landed from the vessel." 
By the same section the master is required to furnish a 
list of all the passengers on board, with their citizenship. 
T~e calculation of bead-money, under the immigration act, 
is in practice based on this list (Head-money cases, 112 U.S. R., 
530-531). 
I am of the opinion that section 9 is an express require-
ment that the master of any vessel therein refer-red to shall 
detain on board every passenger until permission is given to 
the master by the customs officers to allow him to land. It 
has been contended that the words " any person or persons" 
can not refer to passengers, on the ground that by substi-
tuting for" person or persons" "passengers," the result is 
that no passenger can leave the ship until all the passengers 
with their baggage have been duly landed....:..a result evi-
dently absurd. When, however, proper ~ffect is given to 
the words " without the leave of the customs officers," the 
absurdity is removed; for the clear meaning then is that the 
leave of the customs officer shall be necessary to the lawful 
landing of anyone, whether passenger or not, until by duck 
leave all the passengers have been landed. It was thereby 
intended to put the ship, with all its passengers and all the 
persons on board, under the control of th.e customs officers, 
by requiring the master to detain everyone on board until 
such examination is had as is necessary to determine whether 
the customs and immigration laws had been complied with, 
and this is notified to the master by the customs officers. 
By section 11 of the passenger act it is made the duty of the 
collector to direct an inspector, or other officer of the customs, 
· to compare the number of steerage pllSsengers found on board 
with the list of such passengers furnished by the master, and 
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to make a report of the same to the surveyor. It would be 
impossible to make such a comparison, unless after the ar-
rival of the vessel the steerage passengers could be held on 
board until they had been personally examined or inspected. 
It is true that this affects only steerage passengers, and pas-
sengers other than cabin passengers. Section 9 is not so 
limited, however. The expression there is " any person or 
persons," and the time fixed for a free· passage from the 
vessel to the shore and back again, without leave of the 
customs officers, is after "all the passengers," that is, both 
immigrant and cabin passengers, have been landed, with 
their baggage. It should be said that the passenger act of 
1882 refers to such steamships and sailing vessels as carry 
steerage passengers, and that the application of section 9 
would seem to be limited, therefore, to such ships, and would 
not extend to those ~arrying cabin passengers only. 
But, whatever the application of section 9 of tbe passenger 
act, the terms of the immigration act of 188:3 necessarily con-
fer a power on the collector, under proper regulations of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to require the master to detain all 
his passengers until tbey can be examined. The duty im-
posed by the immigration act on th~ collector of customs to 
collect a tax upon all citizens of foreign countries landing at 
a port in this country, from the master of the ship or the 
shipowner, implies the power in such collector to take the 
means necessary to determine what persons on board an in-
coming vessel are subject to the tax. It would obY'iously be 
impossible to determine the amount of tax due without sub-
jecting all the passengers to au examination as to their citi-
zenship, unless it is to be held that the list furnished by tl~e 
master is conclusive upon the officers of the Government as 
to the number of foreign ~itizens on board the ship. The act 
contains no such provision, and, in the absence of it, the con-
clusiveness of the list is not to be presumed. By section 3 of 
the act the Secretary of the Treasury is given power to make 
all necessary regulations for carrying out its provisions. He 
may therefore make a regulation that no yassenger shall be 
landed by a master of a ship until an examination of all the 
passengers may be had. 
The immigration act makes no distinction between cabin 
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and other than cabin passengers. The tax is to be imposed 
upon all citizens of foreign countries in any vessel landing 
at any port of the United States from any foreign port. It is 
mauifest that such passengers do not always travel ~n the 
steerage. Any regulation looking to a personal examination 
of the passengers for the purpose of determining whether 
they are citizens of a foreign country ought therefore properly 
to include those in the cabin as well as those in the steerage. 
Some argument seems to have been made by the collector 
and surveyor of the port of New York against the views here 
taken, on the ground that this construction of the passenger 
and immigration acts will result in an abridgment of the lib-
erty of the citizen. The liberty of the ·citizen will be no more 
abridged by such a regulation than is his right of property 
by detention of it for customs examina1;ion. While the pas· 
senger is on the ship he · is subject to the authority of' the 
master, who may restrJ.in him if he refuses to submit to the 
necessary discipline of the ship. (Kay's Law Relating to 
Shipmasters and ·Seamen, Vol. II, pages 815-818). It needs 
no argument to show that regulations for landing passengers 
are a part of the necessary discipline of the ship, and that a 
detention for purposes ot' quarantine or tax charge is clearly 
within the power of the master if it is required of him by law 
or lawful regulation. The power of Congress to prescribe the 
conditions under which foreigners may enter this country is 
plenary, because it has the power of absolutely excluding 
them. ( Ohinese Exclusion cases, 130 U. S. R., 531). The ex-
istence of such a power implies the ancillary power of detain-
ing all persons, whether they are citizens of the United States 
or not, a reasonable length of time until their citizenship 
may be established. 
The papers inclosed with your letter are herewith inclosed 
as requested. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. H. TAFT, 
Solicitor- GeneraZ. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
W. H. H. MILLER. 
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TIMBER UNLAWFULLY CUT ON INDIAN LANDS. 
Where a large quantity of staudingtimber (about 4,000,000feet) was un-
lawfully cut by trespassers on the Fond du Lac Indian Reservation, in 
Minnesota, and left lying thereon-the land from which the timber 
was cut being held in common by the Indian bauds for whom it was 
reserved by the ordinary Indian title: Advised, (1) that the United 
States have the absolute ownership of the timber thus cut; (2) that 
the Indians have no interest therein whatever, and that it in no way 
appertains to the Indian Bureau or its agents to assume charge there-
of; (3) that such timber may be sold for and on account ofthe United 
States, but that the sale should be made by the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office, under the supervision of the Secretary of the In-
terior. 
Opinion of Acting Attorney-General Jenks, of August 23, 1886 (18 Opin., 
434), concurred in. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 31, 1890. 
SIR: It appears by the communication of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Afl'airs dated September 23, 1890, accom-
panying your communication of October 17, 1890, that certain 
persons have unlawfully cut some 4,000,000 feet of timber 
standing on the Fond duLac Indian Reservation situate in 
the State of Minnesota, and an opinion is requested upon 
the following questions arising out of that wrong: 
(1) '•Can the Indian agent at the La Pointe Agency, to 
which agency the Fond du Lac Reservation is attached, 
under instructions from the Indian Office or Department of 
the Interior, dispose of and give a · valid title to the timber 
cut on the Fond du Lac Reservation as above stated, and 
now lying in the woods on said resenration, and not em-
braced in any suits now pending in the courts between the 
United States and the parties who cut the same¥ 
(2) "Should the proceeds of such sale (if the same be al-
lowable) be treated as belonging to the Indians occupying 
the reservation, or to the United States 1" 
The rights of the Fond d u Lac Indians in the reservation 
are defined by articles 2 and 3 of the treaty between the 
United States and the Chippewa Indians of the Mississippi 
and Lake Superior, proclaimed January 29, 1855 (Revised 
Indian Treaties, p. 224). 
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Article 2 sets apart several reservations for various bands of 
the Chippewas of Lake Superior, and sets out with the follow-
mg declaration, "The United States agree to set apart and 
withhold from sale for the Chippewas of Lake Superior the 
following described tracts of land," being part of the terri-
tory ceded by the Chippewas to the United States. 
Paragraph 4 of that article defines the boundaries of the 
reservation set apart for the Fond du Lac bands, and ar-
ticle 3 is in tlle followi11g words : 
''The United States will define the boundaries of the re-
served tracts, whenever it may be necessary, by actual sur-
vey, and the President may, from time to time, at his discre-
tion, cause the whole to be surveyed, and may assign to each 
head of a famiJy or single person over twenty-one years of 
age eighty acres of land for his or their separate use; and he 
may, at his discretion, as fast as the occupants become 
capable of transacting their own affairs, issue patents there-
for to such occupants, with such restrictions of the power of 
• alienation as he may see fit to impose. And he may also, at 
his discretion, make rules and regulations respecting the 
disposition of the lands in case of the death of the head of a 
family or single person occupying the same, or in case of its 
abandonment by them. And he may also assign other lands 
in exchange for mineral lands, if any such are found in the 
tracts herein set apart. And he may also make such changes 
in the boundaries of such reserved tracts or otherwise as 
shall be necessary to prevent interference with any vested 
rights. All necessary roads, highways, and railroads, the 
lines of which may run through any of the reserved tracts, 
shall have the right of way through the same, compensation 
being made therefor as in other cases." 
It does not appear that the timber in question was cut 
from land which had been set apart by the President to any 
"head of a family or single person over twenty-one years of 
age," and I am therefore ~o assume that the land from which 
the timber was cut was land held in common by the bands 
for which it was reserved. In other words, I am to assume 
that the title of these Indians was the ordinary usufructuary 
Indian title, the mere right to use and enjoy the land as 
occupants; for I can not see that the United States, in 
• 
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agreeing to hold the reservation for the use of these Indians, 
meant to do an_)'thing more than give them the usual rights 
of Indians on reservations as to lands occupied and enjoyed 
by them in common as tribes. In my judgment, it would 
be doing violence to the language of the treaty to make 
more out of it than this. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Indians ha\e no 
greater rights to timber standing on their lands than an 
ordinary tenant for life has, and, therefore, that they ba\e 
no authority to fell timber for the mere purpose of selling it, 
although they might do so for the purpose of using it, in a 
proper way, on the land, or for the purpose of opening land 
to cultivation, in good faith, and that, in case of an unau-
thorized cutting of timber, the United States llas; at once, 
the right to appropriate to itself the timber tllus cut (United 
States v. Cook, 19 Wall., 591.) This right of the United 
States follows from the established principle that the fee of 
the Indian lands is vested in the United States, subject to 
an occupation which may be said to be for the life of the 
several Indian tribes, and which is to cease when the tribes 
shall cease, respectively, whether by extinction or by aban-
donment of the tribal condition by the in~ividuals composing 
them. 
The Supreme Court having decided in United States v. 
Cook (sup, ra) that the respective rights of the United States 
and the Indians to timber standing on the Indian lands are 
precisely the same as those of a reversi'om~r or remainder-
man in fee and a life tenant, respectively, to timber growing 
on land subject to those estates, the question under consid-
eration may be disposed of by the application of well-settled 
principles. 
It is true that in the case of United States v. Cook (sup'ra) 
the timber was cut by the Indians occupying the land from 
which the timber was severed, while in the case before me 
the felling of the timber was the act of unauthorized white 
men. In either case, however, it is, in contemplation of law, 
waste attributable to the occupying Indians, for such is the 
law with regard to timber cut by a life tenant or by third 
parties who entered as trespassers on the land subject to his 
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life estate. It is no answer to say that the cutting was done 
through the connivance of the Indian agent, whose duty it 
was to prevent it, because it is well settled that the Govern-
ment is not to sufl'er through the negligence or wrongs of 
its officers. (JJiinturn v. United States, 106 U. S. R., 444 and 
cases cited; JJiojfatt v-. United States, 112 U. S. R., 2±.) 
That the United States, standing, as it does, in the relation 
of a rev-ersioner in fee to the Indian occupants, has the same 
right to appropriate to itself immediately timber cut down 
on Indian land by whole trespassers, as it has to appropriate 
such timber when felled without authority by the Indians 
themselves, would seem to be beyond doubt. 
The law on this subject is thus stated by the lord chancellor 
in Bewick v. Whitfield (3 P. Wms., 268): "The timber, while 
standing, is part of the inheritance; bnt whenever it is sev--
ered, either by the act of God, as by tempest, or by a tres-
passer, and by wrong, it belongs to him who has the first 
estate of inheritance, whether in fee or in tail, who may bring 
trov-er for it; and this was so decreed upon occasion of the 
great windfall of timber on the Cavendish estate." 
A few additional authorities may be citd to the same effect: 
Berry v. Bea'rd, Oro. Car., 242; Richardson v-. Yorke, 14 Me., 
216; Bulkley Y. Dolbeare, 7 Conn., 232; Jlfooers v-. Wait, 3 
Wend., 10-!; Lane 'T· Thompson, 43 N.H., 324; Lewis Bowles's 
Case, 11 Co., 81; S. 0. Tudor's Real Property and Convey-
ancing Cases, p. 93, note; Shult v. Barker, 12 S. & R., 272; 
Washb. Real Prop., vol. 1, p. 139 [120]. See also an opinion 
of Attorney-General Garland, dated November 20, 1888. 
Having shown that the timber in question is the absolute 
property of the United States, I proceed now to consider the 
first question, which is, substantially, whether the Indian 
agent at the La Pointe Agency, to which agency the Fond 
duLac Reservation is attached, can, under instructions from 
the Indian Office or Department of the Interior~ dispose of 
and give a valid title to the timber in question. 
It was held by Acting Attorney-General Jenks (18 Opin., 
434) that timber unlawfully cut from public lands in Montana 
Territory might be lawfully sold, at public or private sale, by 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office acting under 
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the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, and that the 
authority to sell such timber necessarily followed from the 
power over the public lands given those officers by section 
453 of the Revised Statutes. 
Concurring, as I do, in those conclusions and the reason-
ing supporting them, I am of opinion that the timber now in 
question may be sold, but that the sale should be made by 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office under the super-
vision of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The timber having been cut on lands which are none the 
less public because incumbered by the Indian right of occu-
pancy, its preservation and sal~ would seem to belong to the 
Commissioner of the General ) ... '1nd Office, who is required to 
perform, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, 
all executive duties "in any ~dse respecting" the public lands 
(R. S., sec. 453). Indeed, Congress has removed all doubt on 
the subject by repeatedJy recognizing the authority of the 
Secretary of the Interior, through the General Land Office, 
to seize timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, by appro-
priations to pay the agents employed from time to time to 
make such' seizures ( ~Vells v. N-ickles, 104, U.S. R., 447). 
It sufficiently appears, therefore, that the Indians have uo 
interest in this timber, and that it in no way apperta ns to 
the Indian Bureau or its agents to assume charge of the same. 
The second question is answered already; it bemg clear, if 
the above reasoning is sound, that the proceeds of the tim-
ber, when sold, will belong to the Government absolutely, 
This, I think, disposes of both questions. 
Very ~-espectfnlly, yours, 
W. H. H. :MILLER. 
The ~Jif.")~~TARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
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ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS. 
1. The adjustment of accounts for expenditures of the Post-Office De-
partment under the legislative, executive, and judicial appro-
priation bill can be done by such accounting officers in the 
Treasury Department as the Secretary of the Treasury may as-
sign to that duty. It is not required by statute to be performed 
by the Sixth Auditor. 30. 
2. The Secr~tary of the Treasury can not legally, by departmental 
order, change a practice or course of office prescribed by statute 
for the settlement of accounts. 177. 
3. A person to whom a pension certificate was granted as the widow 
of a soldier in the war of the rebellion was also granted a pension 
certificate as the widow of a soldier in the war of 1812, and drew 
pensions upon both certificates from March 9, 1878, to December 
3, 1883. The Commissioner of Pensions, on discovering this, re-
required her to make an election, and she having elected to hold. 
the first-mentioned certificate, he ordered the amount which had 
been paid to her upon the other certificate to be withheld in in-
stallments of $6 per month from payments thereafter, and issued 
an order to the pension agent accordingly: Advised that the order 
made in this case, being within the general jurisdiction of the 
Commissioner, is obligatory on the pension agent, and that the 
accounting officers of the Treasury have no power to disallow 
payments made by the agent pursuant thereto. 214. 
4. It is not within the province of the accounting officers of the Treas-
ury, upon learning of auy order made by the Commissioner of 
Pensions to a pension agent for the payment of pensions, to notify 
such agent of what their decision 'Will be upon his account when 
rendered. 215. 
5. The payment of accounts of land-grant railroads (i.e., such as have 
not received aid in Government bonds) for Army transportation, 
under the appropriation act of September 22, 1sr;s, chapter 1027, 
is not con trolled by the proviso in the acts of J nne 30, 1882, chap-
ter 250, and August 5, 1882, chapter 390, but is governed by the 
provisions of the act of 1888 alone ; and under these provisions 
such accounts can be lawfully paid by a quartermaster without 
previous action thereon by 'the accounting officers of the Treas-
ury. 264. 
6. The Secretary of the Treasury has power, under section 161, Re-
vised Statutes, to make a regulation which prescribes that the 
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oaths to be taken by an officer of the Revenue Marine Service, 
or an officer or employe in any branch of the customs service, to 
the correctness of his account for pay or salary, as required by 
sections 1790 and 2693, Revised Statutes, shall be taken ~efore 
some person authorized to administer oaths generally. 401. 
7. The fee paid by the officer or employe in such case for administer-
ing the oath does not constitute a proper charge against the Uni-
ted States, and if charged in his account should not be allowed 
in the settlement thereof. Ibid. 
i. P. served as a cadet at the Military Academy from July 1, 1865, to 
June 15, 15()9, when be was appointed a second lieutenant, and 
bas ever since served as a commissioned officer in the Army. In 
February, lt!84, he presented a claim for increased longevity pay 
under any law allowing credit for cadet service, and by settle-
ments made in April, 1885, be was allowed an increase commenc-
ing from February 24, 1881, on a construction of law since de-
clared by the Supreme Court, in the case of United States v. Wat-
son (130 U. S., 80), to be erroneous. After the decision in that 
casP. (March 11, 1889) he filed a claim for longevity pay due under 
said decision: Held that the settlements made in April, 1885, can 
not b<.1 reopened upon the ground that they proceeded on a mis-
taken view of the legislation governing the subject involved. 
439. 
9. The first clause of section 3622, Revised Statutes, which requires 
the rendition of accounts monthly, is applicable to every officer 
who receives advances of public money to be disbursed, and also 
to every officer who collects and receives fees and revenues 
which it is his duty to account for. 557. 
10. The requirement that officers render their accounts monthly is not 
subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, except-
ing in extraordinary cases, where he shall be of opinion that the 
statutory period ought to be enlarged to meet the special cir-
cumstances of such cases. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens 
of December 2, 1878 (1C Opin., 222), concurred in. Ibid. 
11. The accounting officers of the Treasury should allow a paymaster 
of the Army credit for payment to a soldier of his retained pay 
under section 1281, Revised Statutes, where the latter has re-
ceived an honorable discharge, although it may appear that 
after enlisting the soldier deserted, but was restored to duty 
without trial and served out the full term of his enlistment. 567. 
ACCRUED PENSION. 
See PENSION, 1, 2, 6, 7. 
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT. 
See APPOINTMENT, 6. 
ADJUSTMENT OJ<' RAILROAD LAND-GRANTS. 
See RAILROAD LAND-GRANTS, ADJUSTMENT OF. 
ADMINISTRATOR. 
Where a resident on the naval reservation at Pensacola, Fla., died 
intestate, po88essed of certain property• which is in the hands 
of the commandant of the yard : ~drisecl that the local probate 
court of the State may properly exercise jurisdictioa over the 
case, and that on the appointment thereby of an administrator 
of the estate of the deceased the property in the ha:od.s-of the 
commandant belonging to such estate should be turned over to 
the administrator. 176. 
See JURISDICTION. 
ADMIRAL'S SECRETARY. 
See APPOINTMENT, 9. 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
Section 853, Revised Statutes, is superseded by the act of June 
20, 1877, chapter 359, as regards the payment foradvertisements 
by the Meveral Departments of he Government. 59. 
See CONTRACT, 3, 4; STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 4. 
ALASKA. 
1. The laws relating to national banking associations are by virtue 
ofthe act of May 18, 1~4, chapter 53, in force in the Territory 
of Alaska, and sneh &8800iations may be lawfully organized in 
that Territory. 678. 
2. AlaBka is a Territory within the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of the 
act of April 25, 1890, chapter 156, and, as 11uch, is entitled there-
under to be represented by two Commissioners in the World's 
Colombian Commis<rion. 700. · 
ALIENS. 
1. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 340, forbidding 
aliens who have not declared their intention to become citi-
zens, and alien corporations, to acquire, b.old, or own real estate 
in the Territories, etc., apply to mines, these being real es-
tate. 26. 
2. But stock in a corporation is personalty, and consistently with 
those provisions an alien may hold shares of stock issued by an 
American corporation owning mi:nerallaBds in the Territories; 
yet where the holding by aliens exeeeds 20 per cent. of its stock, 
such corpor&tiou can neither own nor hold hereafter-acquired 
real estate while such holding by aliens in exce88 of 20 per cent. 
continues. Ibid. 
3. So an alien may hereafter advance money for the purpose of de-
velopi!lg mining property in the Territories; bot he can not 
thereby acquire any interest in such real estate. Ibid. 
4. An ali~n may lawfully contract with an American• ()Wner to work 
mines by a personal contract, contract for hire, or a bona fide 
lease for a reasonable time.. Ibid. 
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ALLOTMENT AND ALLOTTEE. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 1, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24. 
ALTERATION OF LICENSE. 
See STEAM ENGINEERS, 2. 
AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY OF NEW YORK. 
See SURETY, 2. 
APPEAL. 
The consideration and determination of appeals to the Secretary of 
the Interior from the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
may be made by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, under a 
regulation prescribed by the Secretary, pursuant to section 439, 
Revised Statutes. 133. 
APPOINTMENT. 
1. A vacancy in an office which happens during a session of the Sen-
ate, but remains unfilled until a recess of the Senate occurs, may 
be filled by the President during such recess by a temporary ap-
pointment. 261. 
2. The rule is the same in the case of a new office, which is not filled 
during the session in which it was created. 'l'he President may 
fill the original vacancy existing therein by a temporary appoint-
ment made during the recess of the Senate. Ibid. 
3. A retired officer of the Army is not ineligible to hold an appoint-
ment to a civil office. 283. 
4. By section 1754, Revised Statutes, it is made the duty of those 
making appointments to civil offices to give a preference, other 
things being equal, to the class of persons named in that section; 
but the matter of capacity and personal fitness for the place is 
for the determination of the appointing power. 318. 
5. T. was appointed a rail way postal clerk by the Postmaster-General 
on April 29, 1889, without having undergone a civil-service ex-
amination (none being then required for such appointment), but 
he did not take the oath of office and enter upon its duties until 
May 18, 1889. In the mean time, namely, on May 1, 1889, civil-
service rules for the Rail way Mail Service went into effect, re-
quiring an examination thereunder as a preliminary to making an 
appointment like the above: Held that T. was legally appointed 
on April 29; that his appointment was complete on that date, 
although he did not qualify by taking the oa.th of office until af-
terwards; and that no examination under the ci vii-service rules 
was required in his case. 410. 
6. The vacancy in the office of Paymaster-General, created by the re-
tirement of General William B. Rochester, may be filled by an 
ad intertm appointment under the provisions of section 179, Re-
vised Statutes. 500. 
7. Upon the facts submitted: Adt'ised that the appointment of certain 
railway transfer clerks, who had not been examined and cert1-
APPOINTMENT-continued. 
fied for appointment by the Civil Service Commission, was not 
within the amendment of clause 5 of Railway Rule II, adopted 
August 19, 1t!89, which excepts from examination clerks in the 
Railway Mail Service ~ho are "employed exclusively as porters 
in handling mail matter in bulk, in sacks, or pouches, and not 
otherwise.'' 583. 
8. Section 1019 of the Postal Regulations (edition of 1887) can n,ot 
prevail over, but must yield to the subsequently adopted amend-
ment of said clause 5, which should be strictly confined to the 
claAS of transfer clerks therein mentioned. Ibid. 
9. The appointment of the secretary allowed the Admiral ol the Navy 
by section 1367, Revised Statutes, does not belong to the Presi-
dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but devolves 
upon,the Admiral as one personal to himself; and the contem-
poraneous construction of the statute and uniform practice 
thereunder by the executive branch of the Government have 
accorded with this view. 589. 
10. There is no statutory provision aut~orizing the appointment of 
more than one deputy surveyor of customs, at the same time, at 
each of the ports named in section 2722, Revised Statutes. 629. 
11. An applicant tor appointment as an inspector of boilers, under 
section 4415, Revised Statutes, should have not only the technical 
knowledge, but the actual professional experience of a practical 
engineer on a steam-vessel. 632. 
APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE. 
See CUSTOMS LAws, 29. 
ARENAS KEY ISLAND. 
See JURISDICTION, 2. 
ARIZONA TERRITORY. 
See TERRITORIBS, 1, 3, 4, 6. 
ARMAMENT OF NAVAL VESSELS. 
See N.a..VY, 5. 
ARMS, DISTRIBUTION OF. 
See MILITIA. 
ARMY. 
1. L., a major in the Seventh Infantry, was, by direction of the Pres-
ident, dropped from the rolls of the Anny November 25, 1861, 
and W., a captain in the Fourth Infantry, was with the advice 
and consent of the Senate appointed maJor in the Seventh In-
fantry, vioe L., dropped. Afterwards, on November27, 1866, the 
President revoked the order dropping L., and directed that ht' 
be restored to his former commission to fill a vacancy of maJor 
in the Eighteenth Infantry, to date from July 28, 1866, and at 
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the same time, by direction of the President, L. was placed on 
the retired list as major: Advised that the action of the Presi-
dent on the 27th of November, 1866, was ineffectual to restore L. 
to the Army and place him on the retired list, and that he is not 
entitled to be borne thereon. 202. 
2. S., a captain in the Seventh Infantry, was summarily dismissed the 
service by direction of the President July 15, 1863, and notified 
thereof. Afterwards, on August 11, 1863, the order of dismissal 
was revoked; whereupon S. (the vacancy not having been filled 
in the mean time) returned to the position from which he was 
dismissed and continued to serve therein until December 30, 
1864, when, upon the finding of a retiring board, he was retired 
under the provisions of the act of August 3, 1861 : Advised that 
the dismissal of July 15, 1863, created a vacancy which could 
not otherwise be filled than by an appointment with the advice 
and consent of the Senate; that the subsequent revocation of 
that order on the 11th of August, 1863, was ineffectual to restore 
S. to his former position in the Army; that when, afterwards, he 
was put on the retired list he was not a commissioned officer of 
the Army, and therefore ineligible to a place thereon; and that, 
accordingly, he is not entitled to be borne on such list. 203. 
3. L., a first lieutenant in the Seventh Infantry, having been found 
by a retiring board "incapacitated for active service from in-
sanity, which insanity is not incident to the service," was, by 
direction of the President, retired July 31, 1H6R, on pay proper 
alone under the act of August 3, 1861. At L.'s request the order 
of retirement was, by direction of the President, on June 23, 
1869, so amended as to wholly retire him from the service with 
one year's pay and allowances. On April 2, 1878, by direction of 
the President, the order of June 23, 186~l, was declared void, on 
the ground that L. was insane when he requested it; and he was 
restored to the retired list in accordance with the original order ~ 
Advised that after the President had once acted upon the finding 
of the retiring board, by placing L. on the retired list with pay 
proper alone, his power over the case was exhausted, and the 
subsequent order wholly retiring L. was void for want of au-
thority thus to retire him; and that therefore L. is entitled to 
be borne on the retired list conformably to the order retir\ng him 
on pay proper alone. lbid. 
4. Under the act of February 14, 1889, chapter 166, S. was appointed 
from civil life to the position of major of engineers in the Army, 
and thereupon was placea on the retired list of the Army as of 
that grade : Advised, that be must take the oath required by sec-
tion 1756, Revised Statutes, and that this act would be in law a 
legal acceptance of the office, and, as such, a sufficient formal 
acceptance. 283. 
5. The provisions of sections 1259, 1763, 1764, and 1765, Revised Stat-
utes, do not require the annulment of the appointment held by 
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S. as agent in charge of river and harbor work at Wilmington, 
Del., and tha\i he be relieved from that work. Ibid. 
6. B., while a private soldier, received a. certificate of merit from the 
President for distinguished services, which entitled him, under 
section 1285, Revised Statutes, to "additional pay at the rate of 
$2 per month." He was discharged as such private soldier, and 
thereupon enlisted as a "general service messenger," agreeably 
to the provisions of the act of July 29, 1886, chapter 810: Held, 
that he is not entitled, as such general service messenger, in ad-
dition to the compensation provided for in that act, to the $2 per 
month provided for in said section li85. 471. 
7. The detail of an officer of the Army to report to the president of the 
World's Columbian Commission, with a view to his assignment 
by the latter to the duties of an engineer in the preparation and 
construction of buildings, grounds, etc., for the Columbian Ex-
position, is within the prohibition of section 12'~4, Revised Stat-
utes, provided that the performance of such duties require the 
officer to be separated from his company, regiment, or corps, or 
interfere with the discharge of his military duties. 600. 
8. Semble that where a leave of absence is asked by an army officer, 
for the very purpose of enabling him to undertake the employ-
ments prohibited by said sec~ion, the granting of such leave 
would be an evasion of the statute and be unwarranted. Ibid. 
9. B., a :first lieutenant in the the army, having been appointed assist-
ant secretary of legation at London, accepted the appointment 
on May 19, l!:l69, and entered upon the duties of the office on the 
31st of same month. On the 25th of same month he was placed 
on the retired list as a captain, to date from May 18, 1869, on ac-
count of disability. He resigned the office of assistant secretary 
oflegation December 6, 1869, and on April2?, 1870, was appointed 
consu\-general at London, which office he held until September 
16, 1881. His name was borne on the retired list continuously 
from the 25th of May, 1869, until May 7, 1878, when he was 
dropped from the Army, in conformity with an opinion of the 
Attorney-General, under section 1223, Revised Statutes. But his 
name was restored to the retired list July 3, 1878, by an order of 
the Secretary of War (on the assumption that his case was within 
the :first proviso to section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 
178), and is still borne thereon: Held (1) that when B. accepted 
the appointment to and assumed the duties of secretary of lega-
tion at London he thereby, by force and effect of section 2 of the 
act of March 30, 1868, chapter 38, ceased to be an officer of the 
Army, and his place as such officer became vacant; (2) that 
neither the said act of March 3, 1875, nor the action of the Secre-
tary of War above referred to, operated to reinstate him as such 
officer; and (3) that his name is not lawfully borne on the retired 
list of the Army. 609. 




as on the active list, and it made the acceptance of the diplomatic 
vacate the military office eo it1stanti; the vacancy thus created 
necessarily continuing until filled in the usual way. 610. 
11. The act of March 3, 1875, should be construed to have a prospective 
effect only. Ibid. 
ARREARS OF PENSIONS. 
See PENSION, 3. 
ARREST. 
See CoURT-MARTIAL, 2. 
ASSIGNMENT. 
See CONTRACT, 7. 
ATTACHMENT. 
Imported merchandise, while in the custody of the customs officers, 
is not subject to attachment at the suit of private parties; and 
those officers should pay no attention to process of that kind 
against such merchandise when served on them. 101. 
ATTESTATION OF CONSUL. 
See CusTOMS LAws, 27, 28. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
1. Where the question submitted by the head of a Department relates 
to duties of Territorial officers in a matter touching which such 
Department has no administrative concern, It is not deemed 
proper for the Attorney-General to give an official opinion 
thereon. 7. 
2. The Attorney-General deems it inexpedient to express an opinion 
upon certain questions proposed, relating to a right of fishery 
in the Klamath River, California, claimed in behalf of the Kla-
math Indians; such questions being justiciable m the appropri-
ate courts at the suit of the Indians themselves wllo are inter-
ested in them. 56. 
3. Where, from an examination of the papers submitted, it appeared 
that tlle question proposed (which involved the construction of 
a statute) did not spring out of any case actually existing in the 
administration of the Department seeking advice, the Attorney-
General deemed that it would be improper for him to give an 
official opinion thereon. 331. 
4. Where numerous papers relating to a claim against the District of 
Columllia were referred by the Secretary of the Treasury to the 
Attorney-General with request for an opinion of the latter as to 
what action the Secretary should take in respect to the payment 
of the claim, in view of all the facts presented m the papers, 
but no statement of facts and no question of law were submitted 
by the Secretary, the Attorney-General declined to express any 
opm10n in the matter as thus presented. 396. 
INDEX. 723 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-Continued. 
5. Where no actually existing case was presented, but the call appar-
ently was for an opinion in advance as to what would in the 
future be held upon indefinite aud varymg facts, the Attorney-
General returned the papers, declining to give an opinion on the 
matter submitted. 414. 
6. The questions submitted (which relate to timber cut on Fond du 
·Lac Indian Reservation) being unaccompanied by a statement 
of the facts upon which they arise, no opinion is expressed 
thereon. 465. 
7. The question whether a bond taken by the collector of a port from 
one of his own subordinates, for his own protection, is valid in 
the absence of a statute authorizing it, not appearing to be a 
question in which the United States are concerned or one arising 
in the administration of a Depaltment, the Attorney-General 
declines to give an official opinion thereon. 556. 
8. It is not within the province of the Attorney-General to consider 
questions looking to changes in maritime law to be accomplished 
by treaty with foreign governments. 598. 
9. It is deemed inexpedient by the Attorney-General, for reasons 
stated, to give an opinion upon the question whether an express 
company, in receiving from a lottery company letters and · 
packages declared unmailable by section 3894, Revised Statutes, 
as am.ended by the act of September 19, 1890, chapter 908, and 
forwarding them along the ordinary mail routes, violates sec-
tion 3982, Revised Statutes. 670. 
10. Where the consideration of questions of law submitted for his opin-
ion involved an examination of evidence and the settling of 
questions of fact, the Attorney-General declined to enter upon 
such examination for the reason that it did not fall within his 
province, and accordingly expressed no opinion on the questions 
submitted. 672. 
11. The Attorney-General declines to give an opinion upon a question 
as to the meaning of a Territorial statute, where the question 
does not appear to have arisen in the administration of the 
Department proposing it. 695. 
12. It is not within the province of the Attorney-General to make a 
finding of facts in a case submitted for his opinion upon ques-
tions of law arising thereon. The facts of the case should be 
ascertained and presented by the officer requesting the opin-
ion. 696. 
See COMPENSATION, 3. 
AWARD IN FAVOR OF SAMUEL STRONG. 
See PAYMENT, 4. 
BATTERY ISLAND, MD. 
Upon the facts presented touching the title to certain property at 
Battery Island, m the Susquehanna River, Maryland, occupied 
and used by the U. S. Fish Commission: .Advised ( 1) that the 
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BOND. 
legal title to such of the made land as is contiguous to the island 
is in the riparian proprietor; (2) that the legal title to such of 
the made land as is not contiguous to the island, but lies sepa~ 
rate therefrom, is in the State of Maryland, also the title to the 
soil on which the public works (cribs, breakwaters, etc.) are 
constructed; (3) that the United States have no title to any 
land within the lines of said works or upon the island, except-
ing the light-house site. 14!). 
1. The Secretary of the Navy bas power, under section 1383, Revised 
Statutes, to approve a pay-officer's bond in which the sureties 
are corporations, or a corporation joined with a natural person, 
if he deems such sureties sufficient. 175. 
2. There is no law requiring a United States judge or a United States 
attorney to certify as to the sufficiency of guarantors or bonds-
men offered in connection with proposals and contracts with 
the Navy Department, and no fees are chargeable against the 
Government for such service. 181. 
3. The expense of obtaining a certificate from the officer must be 
borne by the bidder or contra~tor as other expense" are incurred 
by him in the proper execution of the papers. Ibid. 
4. The provision in the act of June 30, 1890, chapter 639, entitled 
"An act making appropriations for the payment of invalid and 
other pensions,'' etc., requiring a new bond "from all pension 
agents now in office," is mandators, and applies to all pension 
agents then in office, without. any exception whatever. 581. 
BONDS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
1. The power given the Secretary of the Treasury by section 2 of 
the act of March 3, 1881, chapter 133, to purchase United States 
bonds with the surplus money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, does not include the payment of commissions to 
private parties to purchase for the Government. 279. 
2. Only the market price of the bond at the time of the purchase 
should be paid; no commissions in addition to the par value of 
the bond and the premium thereon can be lawfully paid. Ibid. 
BRIDGE. 
1. The plans for the bridge authorized by the act of March 3, 1887, 
chapter 356, to be built across the Missouri River between the 
cities of Omaha and Council Bluffs, should not be approved by 
the Secretary of War unless they provide for a structure of 
sufficient strength to bear trains of cars drawn by locomotives. 
29. 
2. Provision in the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 411, making an 
appropriation "for repairs to draw-pier of the Rock Island 
Bridge," etc., considered with reference to the duty thereby 
devolved upon the Secretary of War concerning its expenditure' 
BRIDGE-Continued. 
and the further duty to require of the Chicago, Rook Island 
and Pacific Railroad Company reimburaement of one-half of 
the expetl&eB incurred in said repairs. 375. 
3. The bridge over the Muskingum River at Taylorsville, Ohio, is a 
nuisance to navigation which ought to be abated. 599. 
4. The case of the county bridge over the Muskingum River at Ta.y-
lorsville, Ohio, on which an opinion of the Attomey-General 
was given July 19, 1890 (ate, p. 599), distinguished from the 
case of the bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern 
Railway Company acro88 the same river at ¥arietta, Ohio, sub-
sequently presented, and that opinion shown to be inapplicable 
to tlre latter case by reason of recent statutory amendments 
affecting it. 676. 
BRIG '' GENERAL ARMSTRONG." 
See CLAIMs, 2. 
BULLION. 
See EXCHAXGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GoLD COIN. 
CAVEAT. 
See PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, 1, 2. 
CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See 0LADI8 OF THB UNITBD STATBS; SINKING FVND. 
CERTIFICATE FOR REINSTATEMENT. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 1, 4, 5. 
CERTIFICATE OF SUFFICIENCY OF BONDSMEN. 
See BOND, 2, 3. 
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK. 
The provisions of the act of August 19, 11;90, chapter 806, entitled 
"An act to establish a National Military Park a~ the battle-fteld 
of Chickamauga," do not authorize the acquisition of the lands 
described therein, which are to constitute the proposed Dational 
park, in any other mode than by condemnation proceedings in-
stituted under the act of August 1, 1~, chapter 728. 6'73. 
CHINESE EXCLUSION. 
See CHINBS• LABORERS. 
CHINESE LABORERS. 
1. Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of Deeember 26, 1882 (17 
Opin., 483), touching the right of Chinese laborers to pass through 
the United States in the course of their journey to and from Qther 
countries, reaffirmed. 369. 
9. The application of that opinion to the case presented is unaft'eoted 
by the acts of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, and October 1, 1888, 
chapter 1064. Ibid. 
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~l. The certificate required of Chinese by section 6 of the act of July 
5, 1884, chapter 220, in order to establish a right to land in the 
United States, can not be dispensed with. It is the sole evi-
dence admissible to establish such right. 510. 
CHIRIQUI IMPROVEMENT COMPANY. 
See CONTRACT, 1, 2. 
CHOCTAW NATION,LAWS OF. 
1. Th'3 seventh section of the Choctaw intermarriage act of Novem-
ber 9, 1875, is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties ofthe United States. 109. 
2. That section is valid and binding on all citizens of the Choctaw 
Nation, but affects only their rights acquired under said act. 
Ibid. 
3. The fact that a white man was divorced from his Indian wife, 
upon her petition, is evidence that he parted from her without 
just provocation, and brings the case within the provision of the 
Choctaw act of October, 1840, declaring that any white man 
parting from his wife without just provocation shall b6 deprived 
of citizenship. Ibid. 
4. Claim of James Bragg to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation of 
Indians reconsidered; and advised that upon the record of the 
case as now made up he is entitled to such citizenship. Opinion· 
of March 1, 18~8 (ante, p. 109), cited. 179. 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE CHEROKEE NATION. 
1. Where a North Carolina Cherokee Indian removed into the Chero-
kee Nation and permanently located there subsequent to the 
date of the act of the Cherokee legislature of 1870, relating to 
the admission to citizenship in that nation of North Carolina 
Cherokees, and made proof as in said act is required, and was 
thereupon admitted to citizenship by the chief justice under its 
provisions, he thereby became fully invested with the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of Cherokee citizenship. 229. 
2. The action of the chief justice, under the act, is final, and leaves 
nothing for review. Ibid. 
3. The Interior Department is under no obligation to respect a later 
decision of the Cherokee authorities made pursuant to the order 
of a commission subsequently established. Ibid. 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE CHOCTAW NATION. 
See CHOCTAW NA1ION, LAWS OF. 
CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 17. 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. 
See CIVIL SERVICE. 
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CIVIL SERVICE. 
1. F., a clerk in the War Department, resigned June 30, 1888, and 
on November 2, 1888, was reappointed to a clerkship in the same 
Department on a certificate for reinstatement given by the 
Civil Service Commission under Departmental Rule X, but fail-
ing to avail himself of this opportunity to reenter the service, 
the last mentioned appointment was canceled January 28, 1889. 
On August 13, Hl89, the Secretary of War requested that F. be 
again certified by the Commission for reinstatement, but the 
Commission on August 25, 1889, declined to issue a certificate, 
on the ground that he had been separated from the service 
more than a year, and was not eligible for reappointment under 
said rule: Held that the decision of the Commission, namely, 
that a second certificate for reappointment could not issue to F. 
because he had been separated from the service for more than a 
year, was in accordance with Rule X. 416. 
2. Where one served in the war of the rebellion in the military or-
ganization known as "Quartermaster's Volunteers," or "Quar-
termaster's Brigade," and was honorably discharged from the 
service: Held, that he is entitled to the benefit of the proviso in 
Departmental Rule· X of the civil service, as one who "served 
in the military service of the United States in the late war of the 
rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom," within the 
meaning of that rule. 434. 
3. The proposed amendmentlofDepartmental Rule VII, and revocation 
of Departmental Rule II, of the regulations of the Civil Service 
Commission (with a view to provide for the employment of sub-
stitutes for clerks, copyists, n.nd other employes in the Depart-
ments, who are temporarily absent on account of sickness or 
other unavoidable cause, and for the selection of such substi-
tutes from persons regularly certified by the Civil Service Com-
mission), considered in connection with section 4 of the act of 
August 5, 1882, chapter 389, and section 4 of the act of March 3, 
11::!83, chapter 128, and advised that while the amendment pro-
posed is not beyond the power of this Commis&ion, with the ap-
proval of the President, to make, yet that such amendment 
would be inoperative whenever it should become necessary to 
make an additional expenditure for the employment of the sub-
stitutes. 507. 
4. A person who served as a contract surgeon, in the late war of the 
rebellion, with troops in the field and in hospitals, and by com-
pleting his contract was honorably discharged from the service, 
is within the prot'iso to Departmental Rule X of the Civil Serv-
ice Rules and Regulations, and entitled to the benefits thereby 
conferred. 533. 
5. H. served in the war of the rebellion in a New York regiment from 
May 12, 1861, to May 13, 1863, when . he was honorably dis-
charged. On the latter date he enlisted in the ''general serv-
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ice" of the Army, for clerical duty at headquarters, and was 
transferred to the Adjutant-General's office April 1, 1864, in 
which he served on clerical duty until May 13, 1868, when he 
was discharged through no delinquency or misconduct on his 
part. Application being now made by him for reinstatement 
under amended Departmental Rule X of the Civil Service Reg-
ulations, the Secretary of War requests that he be certified by 
the Civil Service Commission for reinstatement as a clerk in the 
War Department under said rule: Held that H., during the pe-
riod of his enlistment in the "general service" for clerical duty 
as above, was not in the classified departmental service, and 
that (be not having been separated from the latter Rervice) his 
case does not come within the provisions of said Rule X, and 
therefore that be can not be certified thereunder. 55~. 
6. The words ''departmental s_ervice" and ''the service," as used in 
the proviso in that part of the legislative, executi \Te, and judicial 
appropriation act of July 11, 1890, chap. 6117, which relates to 
the Civil Service Commission, mean the classified civil service 
as established by section 163, Revised Statutes, and section 6 of 
the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27. 624. 
7. The words in the same proviso, viz, "promotion or appointment 
in other branches of the Government,'' signify promotion or 
appointment in the classified service of some other Department 
than that to which the applicant may belong. Ibid. 
8. Semble that an application for a transfer is not within the excep-
tion of the proviso. Ibid. 
9. Congress not having designated in the proviso any particular 
county officer or officers who may make the certificate required 
to accompany the application, this matter must be presumed to 
have been left as a subject for regulation by the Civil Service 
Commission. Ibid. 
CLAIMS. 
1. The crew of an American vessel, wrecked on the South Pacific 
Ocean, were supplied with necessary clothing by a United States 
consul, who, on learning that wages were due them, applied to 
the master of the vessel to pay for the clo.thing out of the wages 
due, which the latter did. On their arrival in the United States 
the crew brought suit against the owners of the wrecked vessel 
for their wages, and recovered a judgment therefor: .ddvised, 
that such owners have no valid claim against the United States 
for the mon€y paid by the master, as above ; that their remedy, 
if any they have, is against the consul and the sureties on his 
bond. 22. 
Q, Consideration of a claim presented by Mr. S. C. Reid, jr., on ac-
count of alleged advances made by him as agent and attorney 
for claimants, in the prosecution of the claim of the owners, 
officers, and crew of the brig General A.nnstrong. 32. 
CLAIMs-Continued. 
3. The State of Kansas is not entitled, undet"< the third seotion of the 
aot of January 29, 1861, chapter 20, to 5 per centum of the pro-
ceeds of the sales of the Indian lands in that State, which pro-
ceeds the United States, as a consideration for the extinguish-
ment of the Indian title, agreed to receive, hold in trust, and 
pay over to the Indians. 117. 
4. The provision in the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 410, for pa1111ent 
to the State of Kansas of $43,790.32 on account of 5 pel' centum 
fund arising from the sale of public lands in said State, precludes 
all inquiry on the part of the accounting officers of the Treasury 
as to the legality and justness of the claim. It is their duty to 
allow and certify the claim for hat amount, "as per decision of 
the Fil'St Comptroller of the Treasury of date May 6, 1880, and 
as stated IJy the Commissioner of the General Land Oflloe." 362. 
6. Where a resolution of the Senate (dated January 10, 1589) di-
rected the Secretary of the Treasury " ru reexamine and audit 
the claim of the State of Pennsylvania for money expended in 
1864, for which reimbursement was provided by act of April12, 
1886," and it appeared by that act the claim was required to be 
"examined and settled by the Secretary of War," by whom this 
duty had been disch~ged: Held, that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury has not sufficient authority, under said resolution, to reex-
amine the claim in such sense ¥ would make of the reexamina-
tion an audit, acijudication, or settlement thereof. 385. 
6. A resolution of one House of Congress can not empower the head of 
a Department to reexamine and audit a claim whieh by statute 
is required to be examined and settled by the head of another 
Department. Ibid. 
7. By the act of March 3, 1~5, chapter 130, it was provided that the 
money appropriated for the erection of the building for the De-
partments of State, War, and Navy should be expended under 
the direction of the Secretary of War; and in March, 1877, C. 
{then a lieutenant-colonel in the Corps of Engineers), by order 
of the Secretary of War, took charge of the construction of the 
building and continued in charge thereof until May 31, 1888, 
when the building was completed. From July 1, 1878, until May 
31, 1888, by direction of the Secretary of War, C. disbursed the 
appropriations made from time to time for tHe building; and for 
this service he claims compensation at the rate of three-eighths 
of 1 per cent. upon the amount of money disbursed by him: Held, 
upon consideration of sections 1153 and 3654, Revised Statutes, 
and the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 131, that the claim is con-
trolled by the provisions of section 1153, Revised Statutes, and is 
not allowable thereunder. 425. 
8. K., a regularly appointed weigher in the customs service, was, on 
April 4, 1889, suspended from duty and pay by the collector, 
under article 1371 of General Regulations of 1884, pending the 
action of the Secretary of the Treasury upon a recommendation 
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of the eollector for the removal of K. On May 23, 1889, the Sec-
retary removed K., who received notice thereof on May 29,1889. 
K. claims compensation as weigher for the period from April4 to 
May 29. .Advised, that payment of the claim be declined until 
it shall have been judicially determined that be is entitled 
thereto. 463. 
9. The claim of the State of Massachusetts for reimbursement of ex-
penses incurred in the payment of State militia called out by 
the governor, at the request of the military authorities of the 
United States, to aid in suppressing the ''draft riots" in the city 
of Bosto;, is allowable under the provisions of the act of March 3, 
1863, chapter 75, and the egulations prescribed by the President 
agreeably thereto, as an expense connected with the enrollment 
and draft authorized by that act. 537. 
10. This claim is also within the scope of the act of July 27, 1861, 
chapter 21, and the supplemental resolution of March 8, 1862 
[No. 161, and may properly be examined and adjusted by the 
accounting officers of the Treasury under the provisions thereof. 
Ibid. 
11. The duty of the Secretary of War in the case of a claim under the 
act of March 3, 1885, chapter 335, is limited to the determi11ation 
of w bether the property for the loss of which indemnity is claimed 
was "reasonable, useful, necessary, and proper'' for the claimant. 
693. 
12. Whether the loss happened under the circumstances described in 
the statute, and comes within the provisions thereof, is a ques-
tion for the determination of the proper accounting officers of 
the Treasury, and so does not appertain to the administration of 
the War Department. Ibid. 
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The question considered whether, on the facts presented, an action 
could be maintainea by the United States against the Union Pa-
ci1ic Railroad Company, the Central Pacific Railroad Company, 
and the Western Uniou Telegraph Company, to recover back 
certain moneys paid for the transmission of Government dis-
patches over the bonded lines of said railroad companies. 76. 
CLASSIFICATION I<"'OR DUTY. 
See CusTOMS LAws, 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17. 
C<EUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION. 
See WASHINGTON A...""'D IDAHO RAILROAD COMPA.._-.qy, 
COINS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The provisions of section a510, Revised Statutes, do not authorize 
the Director of the Mint, with the approval of the Secretary ot 
the Treasury, to accept and pay for new designs for existing coins. 
His authority thereunder, as regards the preparation of original 
dies, is limited to those intended for new coins. 16. 
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COLLECTION OF DUTIES. 
See CusTOMS LAws. 
COMMISSIONER OE' GENERAL LAND OFFICE. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 3 j TIMBER TRESPASSES, 5. 
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS. 
Duty of the Commissioner of Pensions considered in connection 
with a statement of facts submitted by him, relating to the 
recovery of money paid on a pension certificate alleged to have 
be.en fraudulently obtained. 210. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 3, 4 j PENSION, 4. 
COMMISSIONERS OE' EMIGRATION. 
See IMMIGRANT. 
COMPENSATION. 
1. The Commissioners appointed under the act of February 4, 1887, 
chap. 104, creating the Interstate Commerce Commission, are 
entitled to draw pay only from the time they entered upon the 
discharge of their duties respectively. 47. 
2. District attorneys are entitled to special compensation for their 
services in examining titles to lands purchased by the United 
States. 63. 
3. The Attorney-General is invested with sole authority to employ 
and fix their compensation where the performance of such services 
by them is called for. Ibid. 
4. Expenses thus arising, including office fees for searches, copies of 
record, etc., being incidental to the purchase of the land, are 
ordinarily to be paid out of the appropriation made for the pur-
chase. Ibid. 
5. The elements necessary to justify the payment of compensation to 
an officer for additional services are: that they shall be performed 
by virtue of a separate and distinct appointment authorized by 
law; that such services shall not be services added to or con-
nected with the regular duties of the place be holds; and that 
a compensation ~bose amount is fixed by law or regulation shall 
be provided for tlleir payment. 121. 
6. A United States marshal, appointed an agent in pursuance of sec-
tion5276, Revised Statutes, to bring back a fugitive criminalfrom 
a foreign conn try, is entitled to receive compensation for this 
service out of the fund appropriated "for bringing home fugi-
tive criminals," where the amount of the compensation is fixed 
by regulation before his appointment; other't!Vise he is entitled 
to be paid his expenses only. Ibid. 
7. Where a district attorney instituted proceedings for the forfeiture 
under section 5239, Revised Statutes, of "all the rights, privi-
leges, and franchises" of a national banking association, by di-
rection of the Solicitor of the Treasury, agreeably to section 380, 
Revised Statutes: Advised that the account of the district at-
torney for his services, upon approval thereof by the Attorney-
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General, may properly be paid out of the appropriation for the 
payment of miscellaneous expenses authorized by the Attorney-
General. 152. 
8. By act of July U, 1888, chapter 614, the office of charge d'affaires 
to Paraguay and Uruguay, the salary of which was $5,000 per 
annum, was abolished, and provision made for representing the 
United States there by a minister at $7,500 a year. B., who at 
that time held the former office, was on the 11th of August, 188tl, 
appointed minister. He received his commission at his place of 
duty on the '3d of October, 1888, an<l on the latter date took the 
official oath and entered upon the duties of his office as minister: 
Advised that B. is entitled to draw his salary as minister from 
the :~d of October, 1888, the date on which he qualified for the 
office and entered upon its duties, and not from the date of his 
appointment (Aug. 11, 1888 ). 219. 
9. When the United States attorney at New York appears in the cases 
mentioned in section 827, Revised Statutes, by J.irection of the 
Secretary or Solicitor of the Treasury, a proper and reasonable 
allowance for his services in such cases may Le made to him by 
the Secretary of the Treasury under that section. 354. 
10. The allowance so made under section 827 is in addition to the an-
nual salary provided by section 770, Revised Statutes, for the 
ordinary official services of the district attorney. Ibid. 
11. Inspectors of customs are not entitled to receive a per diem compen-
sation under section 2733, Revised Statutes, for periods during 
which they are absent from duty on account of sickness or from 
any other cause. 420. 
12. The fourth section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, does 
not affect the provisions of said section 2733 regulating the com-
pensation of such inspectors. Ibid. 
13. B., while a private soldier, received a certificate of merit from the 
President for distinguished services, which entitled him, under 
section 1285, Revised Statutes, to ''additional pay at the rate of 
$2 per month." He was discharged as such private soldier, and 
thereupon enlisted as a "general service messenger," agreeably 
to the provisions of the act of July 29, 1886, chapter 810: Held, 
that he is not entitled, as such general service messeng~r, in 
addition to the compensation provided for in that act, to the $2 
per month provided for in said section 1285. 471. 
COMPROMISE. 
Where a judgment was recovered by the United States against a 
corporation in a suit for a penalty for violation of the provisions 
of the act of February 26, 1885, chapter 164, entitled "An act to 
prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens 
under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United 
States," etc.: Advised, that it is extremely doubtful whether the 
power given to the Secretary of th~ Treasury by section 3469, 
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Revised Statutes, to compromise "any claim," extends to a 
judgment such as the above- i. e., for a fine, penalty, or for-
feiture. 344. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW • 
. See POSTAL SERVICE, 4, 5. 
CONSTRUCTION 0~., STATUTES. 
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF. 
CONSUL. 
1. A foreign consul, resident in the United States, must look for pro-
teotion in his person and property to the laws of the State in 
which he resides. 16. 
2. Under the laws and usages governing the American coUJtular serv-
ice, the authentication, noting, etc., of marine protests are to 
· be regarded as official consular services. 196. 
3. The new edition of the Consular Regulations of 1888 contains pro-
visions making the fee for a consular certificate to an invoice of 
merchandise not subject to duty official and returnable to the 
Treasury. 225. 
4. The fee for such certificate may be rendered official by Executive 
order, and l!pecially included in the tarift" of official fees under 
the Revised Statutes. Ibid. · 
CONSULAR CERTIFICATES. 




1. The instrument signed by Ambrose W. Thompson, for himself and 
the Chiriqui Improvement Company, and Isaac Toncey, Secre-
tary of the Navy, dated May ~1, 1~9, is in no sense a contract 
obligatory upon the United States. 50. 
2. The appropriation of $200,000, made by the act of .March 3, 1881, 
chapter 133, "To enable the Secretary of the Navy to establish 
at the Isthmus of Panama naval stations and depots of coal for 
the supply of steamships of war," has no application thereto. 
Ibid. . 
3. The third section of the act of March 2, 1887, chapter 320, permits 
purchases not exceeding $3,000 in amount to be m$de in open 
mar):et without advertisement, in the discretion of the Secretary 
of the Interior, as often as a '' caee of exigency" exists, so that 
the gross purchases keep within the sum appropriated. 95. 
4. The Commission created by the act of April 15, 1886, chapter 50, 
may, in the construction of the Congressional Library Building, 
contract for personal services without previous advertisement; 
and within that dettcription of services come those rendered by 
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mechanics and laborers who may be employed to place the stone 
properly iu. the wall directly under the control and supervision 
of the Commission, its architect, or superintendent of construc-
tion. 96. 
5. Under the act of April 4, 188.8, chapter 59, the Secretary of the In-
terior is authorized to find that certam services rendered the 
Pottawatomie Indians were contracted for in good faith by per-
sons empowered to represent said Indians. 134. 
-6. The Postmaster-General may discontinue a contract for carrying 
the mail before expiration of the term thereof, allowing the con-
tractor one month's extra pay, when in his judgment the pub-
lic interests require such discontinuance, for the purpose of re-
ad vertising and reletting the service on an increased schedule, 
in preference to permitting the contractor to perform the in-
creased service at the pro rata to which he would be entitled 
under his contract. 146. 
'1. Under the act of August 3. 1882, chapter 376, and the contract 
made by the Secretary of the Treasury agreeably thereto with 
the commissioners of emigration of the State of New York, the 
latter are not bound to account for and pay over to the Treasury 
Department moneys received by them for privileges granted to 
individuals to transact in Castle Garden certain business with 
'the immigrants there. 155 . 
.S. A manufacturing company, after having entered into a contract 
with the Navy Department to deliver a large quantity of steel 
castings to be used in the construction of an armored cruiser, 
proposed to transfer the contract to another manufacturing com-
pany, which contemplated fulfilling the covenants of the former 
company with the Government, and asked the approval of such 
transfer by the Secretary of the Navy: Advised that, in view of 
the prohibition in section 3737, Revised Statutes, the proposed 
transfer can not lawfully be approved and recognized by the 
Navy Department. 186. 
9. Upon the facts stated: Advised that a contract entered into on the 
15th of December, 1887, between Charles Rohr and the Bureau 
of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture, may be 
considered rescinded and no longer binding upon said Bureau 
after June 30, 1888. 2~4. 
10. The Secretary of the Interior may approve a certain contract of E. 
John Ellis with the Pottawatomie Indians, as recommended by 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 242. 
11. Upon the facts submitted: Advised that the proposal made by 
Messrs. Mooney & Ferguson, dated February 17, 1889, to sell to 
the United States a site for a public building at Buffalo,~. Y., 
and the response of the Secretary of the Treasury thereto, dated 
March I, 181:!9, do not constitute a contract obligatory upon the 
United States. 269. 
12. The Secretary can not by contract hind the Government to exercise 
CONTRACT-Continued. 
its power of eminent domain to enable persons to sell to the Gov-
ernment land whioh they do not own. .Ibid. 
13. The Post-Office Department has no power, under existing lawa, to 
make contracts for the transmission of intelligence by telegraph, 
for the general public, as a part or branch of the postal service. 
650. 
CONTRACT SURGEON. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 4. 
CONVICT. 
1. There is no statute which authorizes a convict, sentenced to prison 
by a consular court of the United States, to be brought to the 
United States for imprisonment and there held to serve out his 
sentence; and in the absence of such a statute the removal of 
the convict to this country for that purpose would be unlawful. 
Opinion of Attorney-General Williams, of February 4, 1875 (14 
Opin.,"522), cited with approval. 377. 
2. The President, by. virtue of his office and without authority given 
by some statute, has no power to remove a convict from one 
prison to another. Ibid. 
COUNSEL. 
See EMPLOYMENT OJ!' COUNSEL. 
COURT-MARTIAL. 
1. An officer who is autho\'ized to order a general court-martial has 
no power under the 112th article of war to pardon or mitigate 
the punishment adjudged by it after confirmation by him of the 
sentence. 106. 
2. Upon consideration of articles 24, 43, and 44, for the government 
ofthe Navy (sec. 1&24, Rev. Stat.): Held, thattheremaybetwo 
arrests, namely, (1} an arrest in an emergency, or upon discovery 
of the alleged wrongdoing, with a view to a preliminary exami-
nation, and, if nece88ary, the formulation and specification of 
charges; (2) an arrest for trial: held, further, that article 43 in 
the provision declaring that " the person accused shall be ;rur-
nished with a true copy of the charges, with the specifications, 
at the time he is put under arrest," has reference to the arrest 
for trial, and not to the arrest in the first instance. 472. 
3. A naval court-martial, or jud.ge advocate thereof, has no power to 
compel a civilian who is not subject to the articles for the gov-
ernment of the Navy to appear and testify before such court. 
501. 
4. Neither article 42 nor article 57 in section 1624, Revised Statutes, 
gives the power to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses. 
Ibid. 
5. The provisions of section 1202, Revised Statutes, apply only to 
military (i. e. army) courts. Ibid. 
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COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 1, 18. 
CUSTOMS LAWS. 
1. The proviso in section 7 of the act of March :3, 1883, chapter 121,. 
subjecting to a duty of "100 per centum ad valorem upon the 
actual value of the same," coverings of imported merchandise 
designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation 
of such merchandise to the United States, etc., applies to free 
as well as to dutiable importatious. 18 . 
• Advised that the classification of roll paper heretofore adopted 
under paragraph 392, Tariff Index, new, should be adhered to. 59. 
3. Coriander seed should be classified under paragraph No. 636, Tariff 
Index, as "seeds, aromatic, which are not edible," etc. 75. 
4. Imported merchandise, while in the custody of the customs offi-
cers, is not subject to attachment at the suit of private parties; 
and those officers should pay no attention to processes of that 
kind against such merchandisA, when served on them. 101. 
5. Advised that iron-bar ends, consisting of the crop-ends, from 1 to 4 
inches long, cut off from the Swedish bar-iron in the process of 
manufacturing the bars, have not been "in actual use" so as to 
justify their classification as scrap-iron under Schedule "C ''of 
the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 103. 
6. Adt'illed that if certain lap-robes or carriage-robes, sometimes called 
rail way or traveling rugs, were commercially known at the time 
of the passage of the act of March 3, 188:3, chapter 121, as mats 
or rugs, they should be classified under a certain clause of Sched-
ule K of that act, providing for ''carpets and carpetings of wool, 
etc., and mats, rugs," etc.; but that if not so known, nor by any 
other designation provided for, they should be classified accord-
ing to the component material. 104. 
7. The phrase "forgings of iron and steel," as used in clauses Nos. 
163 and 167 (T. I., new), of the act of March 3, 1tl83, chapter 121r 
includes forgings made of iron and forgings made of steel, and 
is not limited to articles composed of both iron and steel com-
bined in the same forging. 157. 
8. A certified consu·lar invoice is required by law for the admission to 
entry of imported merchandise not subject to duty, excepting 
where Congress has expressly dispensed with that requiremen':. 
225. ' 
9. When a person at different times between April, 1882, and October, 
1887, paid to customs officers, by deductions from drawbacks 
allowed him, alleged illegal fees, but gave no notice of dissatis-
faction and took no appeal from the decisions of such officers to 
the Treasury Department: Advised th:~.t he can not recover back 
such fees by suit. 238. 
10. In February and March, 1886, certain liquors (which had been 
manufactured in the United States, in a bonded manufacturing 




vised Statutes, out of both domestic and imported spirits that 
were removed to such w rehouse without payment of either the 
internal-re,·enue or cu1:1toms duties, and which liquors had been 
exported therefrom) were imported into New York and assessed 
with the duty prescribed by the statute (Schedule H) as foreign 
liquors: Advised that-the liquors being of the manufacture of 
the United States and once exported-section 2500, Revised 
Statutes, affords the rule under which to levy duties thereon. 243 • 
11. That section does not contemplete the levying of different rates of 
duty on the several uifferent ingredients of which an article may 
be composed ; it is the product that is to L>e taxed, not its con-
stituent ingredients. Ibid. 
12. Classification, under the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, of Chinese 
shoes compm~ed of felt, leather, and cotton, and also Chinese 
13hoes in which silk is the component material of chief value, 
·considered. 272. 
13. Opinion of April 3, 1889 (ante, p. 272), respecting the classification 
for dnty of certain descriptions of Chinese shoes, explained; and 
advised that the opinion referred to does not justify any change 
in the administration of the customs laws, except as to importa-
tions like those concerning which it was written. 301. 
14. Advised that the decision of the Treasury Department of Apr!!, 
1871, holding that the article known as New Zealand flax is 
dut.iable as flax not hac.kled or dressed, should be modified so 
as to classify the article for duty under the provision for sunn, 
sisal-grass, and other vegetable substances not specially enu-
merated or provided for. 334. 
15. Sawed mahogany boards are not dutiable under ScheduleD (act of 
March 3, 1883, chapter 121) as "manufactures of mahogany," 
but are dutiable under the provision of that schedule '' for all 
other articles of sawed lumber," etc. Opinion of Attorney· 
General Garland of January 21, 1R87 (18 Opin., 535), concurred 
in. 366. 
16. Shellfish, such as oysters, Chinese abelones, etc., when prepared by 
drying or pickling, are entitled to free entry. 401. 
17. Steel chains used for bicycle gearing should be classified for 
duty under paragraph 171 (not under paragraph 216) of the act 
of March 3, 18i3, chapter 121. 527. 
18. Where philosophical instruments were imported in boxes about 8 
inches square, made of hard wood, stained and finely :finished, 
each box having a sliding lid and a metal handle, and being of 
dimensions sufficient to hold one instrument: .Advised that tliese 
boxes were intendeil to follow their contents into consumption, 
and to be used therewith both as a protection to them and as 
furnishing a convenient means of carrying them about, and 
therefore that they were "designed for use otherwise than in the 
bona fide transportation" of their contents to the United States, 




the proviso of the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883, 
chapter 121. 54:3. 
19. Merchandise which is in bond, or on shipl.Joard within the limits 
of a port of entry, on August 1, 1890, is not subject to duty upon 
a valuation that includes the roosts and charges mentioned in 
section 19 of the act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, 'entitled "An 
act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the rev-
enues." As to such merchandise the act of March 3, 1883, chap-
ter 121, by which the costs and charges referrbd to are excluded 
as au element of dutiable value, remains in force and deter-
mines the duty thereon. 602. 
20. Commissions on imported merchandise which do not grow out of 
the costs, charges, and expenses mentioned in said section 19 of 
the act of June 10, 1890, form no part of the dutiable value of 
merchandise under that act. Ibid. 
21. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized to employ any 
part of the appropriation for collecting the revenue from cus-
t0ms in the erection of a temporary structure at a collection port 
for the purposes of the cu::,stoms service. 607. 
22. No building, even of a temporary character, to be used for stor-
age purposes, can be erected at the public expense without spe-
cial authority from Congress. Ibid. 
23. Upon consideration of the provisions of section 3019, Revised Stat-
utes, allowing a drawback on all articles wholly manufactured 
of imported materials on which duties have been paid: Advised 
that the person entitled to the drawback under that section 1s 
the exporter of the goods-i.e., the owner and shipper or con-
signor thereof to the foreign port-and he may collect it by his 
duly authonzed agent. 638. 
24. Where the shipper acts only as the agent of the owner, the draw· 
back belongs to the latter; and if the shipper is without author-
ity from the owner to receive the drawback, it should be paid 
to the owner. Ibid. 
25. The power to make regulations for the ascertainment of the per-
son to whom the drawback is payable, conferreJ. upon the Sec-
retary of the Treasury by said Rectiou, is a power to declare the 
rules of evidence upon which the Government officers will act 
in determining who that person is; and the only limitation 
upon it is that its exercise shall be reasonable. Ibid. 
26. It would be a reasonable regulation to declare that the shipper 
(the consignor in the bill of lading), in the absence of any evi-
"<lence to the contrary, will be regarded as the owner or exporter 
of the goods and as entitled to the drawback. Ibid. 
27. The statement of the manufacturer of merchandise consigned by 
him or on his account for sale in the United Stat3s, declaring 
the cost of the production of such merchandise, which is 
required by section 8 of the act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, 




of the revenue," to be presented to the collector at the time of 
the entry of the merchandise, should be signed by the manufac-
turer himself. The signing of such statement by an agent is 
insufficient. 655. 
28. It is not neces~ary for the manufacturer to appear in person before 
the proper consular officer and sign the statement in h1s pres-
ence, in order that it may receive the attestation of such officer, 
• as required by the same sectwn,. Should tue consular officer 
certify that it has been satisfactorily shown to him that the 
statement is, as 1t purports to be, the act of the manufacturer, 
this would be an attestation of the statement, and meet the 
requirement of the statute. 656. 
29. Where, at the instance of the importer, a reappraisal of certain 
items of the in voice by the general appraiser was ordered under 
the proviswns of section 13 of the act of J nne 10, 1890, chapter 
407, entitled ''An act to simplify the laws in relation to the col-
lection oft he revenue," and the importer being dissatisfied with 
the reappraisal of such items thereupon made, the matter was 
referred to a board of three general appraiser~', under the pro· 
visions of the same section, who not only reappraised the items 
on which the appeal to them was taken, but reappraised and 
advanced in value other items of the invoice as to which there 
was no appeal: Held that, under said section, it was not within 
the competency of the board of general appraisers to pass upon 
any items which were not embraced in the case submitted for 
their examination and decision, and that the board should have 
confined itself to those items only which were covered by the 
importer's appeal. 665. 
30. Where the date of original importation of merchandise in bond was 
more than one year prior to August 1, 1890 (when the act of June 
10, 1890, chapter 407, entitled "An act to symplify the laws in 
relation to the collection of the revenue,'' went into effect): 
Advised, that such merchandise is subject to the "additional 
duty of 10 per centum" imposed by section 2970, Revised Stat-
utes, by Yirtue of the saving clause in section 29 of said act of 
June 10, 1890, which saves to the Government all rights that 
existed in 1ts behalf when that act took effect. 668. 
31. The provision in the act of March 3, H:!8a, chapter 121, allowing a 
drawback on bituminous coal imported into the United States, 
which is afterwards used for fuel on steam vessels of the United 
States engaged in the coasting or foreign trade, is repealed by 
the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244. 687. 
32. Smnble that the term" supplies," as employed in section 16 of the 
act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, includes coal. lbid. 
33. Under par.tgraph 199 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, 
imported lead ore is dutiable at the rate of lt cents a pound, 




34. The words " all other ores," as used in the proviso of that para-
graph, mean all ores other than those known commercially as 
lead ores. Ibid. 
35. Imported molasses .::an not, under paragraph 241 of the act of Oc-
tober 1, 1890, chapter 1244, be refined in bond without payment 
of duty between March 1 and April1, 1891. The provisions of 
that paragraph are applicable only to sugars in solid form. 697. 
DAKOTA LAND GRANT. 
1. Under the provisions f)f section 14 of the act of February 22, 18~9, 
chapter UlO, the States of North Dakota and South Dakota take 
each seventy-two sections of land for university purposes. 635. 
2. Lands which were selected for the Territory of Dakota under the 
act of February 18, 18~1, chapt•!r 61, and which lie within the 
State of South Dakota, should be certified to that State. Ibid. 
DEED. 
See FORT BROWN RESERVATION. 
DEPENDENT PARENT. 
See PENSION, 8. 
DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS. 
See MARINE CORPS, 3. 
DEPUTY SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS. 
There is no statutory provision authorizing the appointment of 
more than one deputy surveyor of customs, at the same time, at 
each of the ports named in section 2722, Revised Statutes. 629. 
DESIGNS FOR COINS. 
See COINS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
DEVICE FOR MARKING GOVERNMENT FIREARMS. 
Semble that the United States, having first appropriated the device 
of an eagle, with the letters U. S. under it, for the purpose of 
marking firearms manufactured by the Government, may pre-
vent any private manufacturer using the same device on fire-
arms manufactured by him, and thus falsely representingtothe 
world that his firearms were made by the United States. 361. 
DIPLOM~TIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS. 
See CO:\IPENSATION, 8. 
DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY. 
See CLAIMS, 7. 
DISBURSING AGENT. 
Upon consideration of the various statutory provisions in force re-
lating to disbursing agents for the payment of moneys for the 
construction of public buildings (sees. 3657, 3658, and 255, Rev. 
Stat.): Advised (1) that in the absence of any special designa-
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tion by the Secretary of the Treasury, the collector of customs 
of the district in which the building is being erected should act 
as such disbursing agent; (2) that it is competent to the Secre-
tary, in any case, to designate the collector or any other bon<leo 
officer to act; (3) that when such building is at a place in which 
there is no collector, the Secretary may, in his discretion, desig-
nate a private citizen to act. 393. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS TO THE MILITIA. 
See MILITIA. 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES REPORTS. 
See SUPREME COORT REPORTS . 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 
See COMPENSATION, 2, 3, 7, !), 10; NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIA-
TIONS, 1, 2. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
A notary public appointed for the District of Columbia has no 
power to take acknowledgments of deeds in foreign countries 
(where he may at the time be) for property situated in said 
District. Sl. 
DOUBLE PENSIONS. 
See PENSION, 4, 5. 
DRAWBACK. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
Power of the President considered with reference to the adminis-
tration of the eight-hour law. 685. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
See CoNTRACT, 12. 
EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSEL. 
The provision. in the act of July 18, 1888, chapter 677, making an 
appropriation "for carrying out the provisions of the act of 
May 29, 1884, establishing the Bureau of Animal Industry," does 
not authorize the Commissioner of Agriculture to employ coun-
sel for the defense of employes of the Bureau for acts done by 
them in carrying out such provisions under its direction. Em-
ployment of counsel in such cases is governed by sections 189, 
362, and 363, Revised Statutes. 328. · 
EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS. 






ESTATE OF THOMAS CONNER. 
See JURISDICTION. 
EXAMINATION, APPLICATION FOR. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 6, 7, 1:5, 9. 
EXCHANGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GOLD COIN. 
1. The words" are hereby authorized," in the act of May 26, 1882, 
chapter 190, providing for the exchange of gold bars for gold 
coin by the superintendents of the coinage mints and of the 
assay office at New York, are to be construed as mandatory upon 
those officers. 575. 
2 It is not descretionary with the Secretary of the Treasury to refuse 
such exchange, nor can he lawfully direct those officers so to do. 
Ibid. 
3. A charge for the preparation of the bars can not be exacted on an 
exchange thereof for coin under said act. Ibid. 
4. Opinion of July 1, 1890 (ante, p. 576), construing the act of May 26, 
18-52, chapter 190, with respect to the exchange of gold bars for 
coin, reaffirmed. 594. 
EXCLUSION FROM THE MAIL. 
See PosTAL SERVICE, 10, 11. 
EXTRA COMPENSATION. 
See COMPENSATION, 5. 
FEES OF CONSULS. 
See CONSUL, 3, 4. 
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. 
Opmwn of March 19, 1887, (U:! Opin., 584), namely, that the Sec-
retary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture of a 
vessel condemned for being engaged in unlawfully killing fur 
seals \the case not arising in either of the islands St. Paul and 
St. George), reaffirmed. 5. 
FOREIGN MAIL SERVICE. 
See POSTAL SERVICE. 
FORFEITURE. 
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. 
FORT BRADY. 
Upon the facts submitted: .Advised that, under the deed of Thomas 
Ryan and wife, dated December 18, 1886, granting to the Fnited 
States certain land at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., selected for a 
new site for Fort Brad~~, the title to the premises has become 
vested m the United States. 137. 
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FORT BROWN RESERVATION. 
The deed of conveyance to the United States from James Still-
man and Thomas Carson, administrator, etc., dated October 14, 
188i, which is offered for the aceeptance of the Government (to-
gether with the quitclaim deed of S. Josephine Allen, dated Oc-
tober 24, Ukl7, the quitclaim deed of Francis J. Hale et al., d 1ted 
November 15, 1887, the quitclaim deed of William H. Hale, dated 
December 3, 18lj7, and the quitclaim deed of Thomas Carson, 
dated Dec<:!mber 1~, 18tl7, are sufficient to pass a valid title to the 
tract of land known as the Fort Brown military reservation in 
Texas, and to extinguish all claims for the use and occupancy of 
said reservation by the United States. 82. 
FORT MISSOULA MILITARY RESERVATION. 
See LANDS, PuBLIC, 7. 
FRA:Z.,KING PRIVILEGE. 
Where the seat of a member of the House, as Representative from 
a certain Congressional district, was contested, and the contest-
ant, not the then sitting member, was adjudged by the House to 
have been elected a Representative from that district, and there-
fore entitled to the seat, whereupon be qualified and took his 
seat as such Representative: Held that the unseated member had 
no right thereafter to send public documents through the mall 
free of postage, undAr the proviso in the first section of the act 
of March 3, 1879, chapter 180. 592. 
FUR SEALS. 
Thf( Secretary of the Treasury derives no authority, under section 
1963, Revised Statutes, to make a new lease of the right to take 
fur seals on the islands of St. Paul and St. George, in Alaska, 
untH the expiration ofthe existing lease. 432. 
GOLD BARS. 
See EXCHANGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GOLD COIN. 
GRANT TO THE UNITED STATES. 
The grant to the Government of the site of the Hospital Point 
Light Station in Massachusetts, which is bounded by a line 
running to the shore and thence by the shore, etc., does not in-
clude the shore. 20. 
HEAD MONEY. 
See SHIPPING, 3. 
HOSPITAL POINT LIGHT STATION. 
See GRANT TO THE UNITED STATES. 
HUDSON RIVER, DUMPING MATERIAL IN. 
1. The authority conferred upon the Secretary of War by the act of 
J nne i9, 1888, chapter 496, does not extend to the waters of the 
Hudson River as far distant from . .New York Harbor as Troy, 
Albany, and New Baltimore. 317 . 
f 
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2. The term "tributary waters," as used in that act, covers only 
such parts of the river as, in a broad sense, can be regarded as 
connected with that harbor. Ibid. 
IMMIGRANT. 
1. Under the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, and the contract 
made by the Secretary of the Treasury agreeably thereto with 
the co111mil;sioners of emigration of the State of New York, the 
latter are not bound to account for and pay over to the Trea~:~ury 
Department moneys received by them for privileges granted to 
individuals to transact in Castle Garden certain business with 
the immigrants there. 155. 
2. In carrying out the provisions of the act of August 3, 1882, chap-
ter ;}76, the Secretary of the Treasury is not restricted to the 
employment of the means and agencies mentioned in the second 
and fourth sections of that act, but may, in his discretion, have 
recourse to other appropriate means and agencies. 486. 
INDIAN CONTRACT. 
See CONTRACT, 5, 10. 
INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS. 
1. The allotments of land to Indians provided for by the act of Feb~ 
ruary 8, 1887, chapter 119, should, under the requirements of the 
third section of that act, be made jointly by au agent specialls 
appointed for that purpose and the agent in charge of the reser-
vation. 14. 
2. The Klamath River, where it flows through the Klamath Indian 
Reservation, is a navigable stream, in which the Indians occu-
pying that. retiervation do not have an exclusive right to fish, 
but only a right in common with the public at large. 3.J. 
3. Under the act of June 1, 1886, chapter 3~5, authoriziug the Kansas 
and Arkansas Valley Railway Company to construct a railroad 
through the Indian Territory, that company has no right to go 
beyond the limits of the right of way therein prescribed for the 
purpose of taking timber or other materials for the construction 
of such railroad. 42. 
4. The courts named in the eighth section of that act have jurisdic-
tion over controversies between said company and the Cherokee 
Nation growing out of the taking of timber and other materials 
by the former beyond said limits. But the right of the Chero-
kees to go into court does not diminitih in any degree the duty 
of the Executive Department of the Government to use 1ts 
power for their protection. Ibid. 
5. The Attorney-General deems it inexpedient to express an opmion 
upon certain questions proposed, relating to a right of fishery m 
the Klamath River, California, claimed in behalf of the Klamath 
Indians; such questions being justiciable in the appropriate 
courts at the sutt of the Intlians themselves who are mterested 
in them. 56 
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6. (Jase of two brothers, W. C. Lykins and E. W. W. Lykins, claim-
ing to be members of the confederated tribes of the Kaskaskias, 
Peorias, We~, and Piankeshaws, considered. 115. 
7. Under the act of April 4, 1888, chapter 59, the Secretary of the In-
terior is authorized to :find that certain services rendered the 
Pottawatomie Indians were contracted for in good faith by per-
sons empowered to represent said Indians. 134. 
8. Lands entered and patented to Indians under the provisions of the 
act of March 3, 1875, chapter 131, before the act of July 4, 1884, 
chapter 180, became a law, are exempt from taxation for a period 
of :five years from the date of the patent issued therefor. 161. 
·9. The said act of July 4, 1884, is supplementary to the said act of 
March 3, 1875, and its provisions apply to all entries under the 
latter act for which patents had not issued when the former act 
took effect. Under the act of Hlt!4 the lands entered are exempt 
from taxation for a period of twenty-five years from the date of 
the patent. Ibid. 
10. Under the act of Jan nary 18, 1881, chapter 23, for the benefit of 
the Winnebago Indians~ the land entered is expressly exempt 
from taxation for twenty years. Ibid. 
11. Lands allotted to Indians under the provisions of the act of Feb-
ruary 8, 1887, chapter 119, are exempt from taxation for twenty-
five years. Ibid. 
12. Indians occupying reservations, the title to which is in the United 
States subject to their occupancy, have no right to cut andre-
move the dead and fallen timber thereon for the purpose of sale 
alone; such timber, where not used by the Indians for fuel or 
for agricultural or other purposes connected with the occupation 
of the land, being the property of the United States. 194. 
13. An Indian allottee of land under the act of February 8, 1887, chap-
ter 119, does not possess the right to cut and sell merchantable 
timber standing upon the land, excepting such as it may be neces-
sary to cut in clearing the premises for agricultural or grazing 
purposes, or to erect suitable buildings thereon. 232. 
14. Until the second patent provided for by the :fifth section of said 
act is granted, it is the duty of the Interior Department, by vir-
tue of the legal title remaining in the Government and the trust 
relation assumed by it, to prevent the cutting of timber except 
for the above-mentioned purposes, whether the land is or is not 
within an Indian reservation. Ibid. 
15. The Indian allot tees of the Kickapoo tribe, under the treaty of June 
28, 1862, take their rights to the tracts allotted to them, which 
have not yet been patented, under and by virtue of the said 
treaty as extended by the act of August 4, 1866, chapter 897, and 
not under act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119. 255. 
16. Patents to those allottees to whom certificates were given und~ 
said treaty, but who had not received patents, should be issued 
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under and in accordance with the terms of the treaty as extended 
by the said act of 1866. Ibid. 
17. The sixth section of said act of 1887, with respect to citizenship, ap-
plies to the Kickapoos who took allotments under the said treaty 
before the passage of that act as well as to those who have taken 
allotments since its passage and in pursuance of its provisions. 
But as the right of citizenship is only to be accorded after the 
patent is granted, the oath and proof required by the treaty, 
being prerequisites thereunder, must be taken and furnished. 
Ibid. 
18. The appropriation made by section 25 of the act of March 2, 1889, 
chapter 405, to be applied and used towards surveying the lands 
therein described as being opened for settlement, does not be-
come available until acceptance by the different bands of Sioux 
Indians of the terms of that act a::, provided in the twenty-eighth 
section thereof. 467. 
19. That act takes effect when, as matter of fact, the consent of the 
Indians thereto bas been obtained. The proclamation issuPd 
under the provisions of section 2tl of the act is only designed 
to be a public evidence of s~ch consent. Ibid. 
20. The Cherokee Nation of Indians can not make a valid lease of their 
lands without the consent of the Government. Opinion of At-
torney-Geceral Garland of July 21, 1885 (1!:! Opin., 235), re-
~ffirmed. 499. 
21. It is the duty of the Government to protect the Indian allottees 
under the act of March 2, J e89, chapter 412 in the enjoyment of 
their allotments, and in the discharge of that duty the military 
forces of the United States may, if necessary, be employed by 
the President for their protection. 511. 
22. An Indian allottee under the act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119, 
may remove and sell dead timber, standing or fallen, from his 
allotment. 559. 
23. Such allottee can not lawfully lease or rent t.he whole or any part 
of his allotment, either with or without the approval of the Sec-
retary ofthe Interior. Ibid. 
24. Nor can be lawfully impart to a third person, by contract, the 
right to erect upon his allotment mills for the manufacture of 
lumher or other products. Ibid. 
See CHOCTAW NATION, LAWS OF j CITIZENSHIP IN THE CHEROKEE 
NATION; OKLAHOMA. 
INDIAN SCHOOLS. 
The 8th section of the act of June 29, 1888, chapter 503, making 
appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the 
Indian Department, etc., had no effect on the then existing ap-
pointments of superintendents, teachers, etc ., connected with 
Indian schools wholly supported by the Government. The in-
cumbents of the various positions referred to were lawfully in 
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the ]Jnblic service after that act went into operation, and are 
legally entitled to be paid for their services during such 
period. 252. 
INDIAN SUPPLIES, PURCHASE OF. 
See CONTRACT, 3. 
INDIA~ TERRITORY. 
1. The marshal appointed under the act of March 1, 1889, chapter 
233, providing for the organization of a court in the Indian Ter-
ritory, has the same powers in that Territory which a sheriff in 
Arkansas has in his own county; and his power to appoint 
deputies is limited only by the necessity of the case. 293. 
2. He may call to his assistance, in the execution of the law, civilians, 
but not the military forces of the United States, the use of the 
latter as a posse comitatus being forbidden by the act of June 18, 
1~78, chapter 263. Ibid. 
3. It is competent to the President, under section 5298, Revised 
Statutes, to direct the military forces to render the marshal such 
aid as may be necessary to enable him to maintain the peace 
and enforce the laws of the United States in that Territory. 
Ibid. 
4. Upon consideration of the effect of certain provisions in treaties 
with the Creek Nation of Indians of August 28, 1856, and August 
11, 1866, which render inoperative in the Creek territory the 
various national bankin~ laws: Advised that a national bank 
can not lawfully be established at Muscogee, a town in the ter-
ritory of that nation. 342. 
5. The United States court for the Indian Territory is not invested 
with autl:..ority to appoint commissioners; and hence the ac-
counts of commissioners thereby appointed, for issuing writs for 
the arrest of persons charged with offenses, are inadmissible. 
443. 
6. Such writs are no protection to the marshal for anything he may 
do under them, nor is he entitled to compensation for serving 
them. Ibid. 
INFORMER. 
See TIMBER TRESPASSES, 3. 
INSPECTORS OF CUSTOMS. 
1. Inspectors of customs are not entitled to receive a per diem com-
pensation under section 2733, Revised Statutes, for periods dur-
ing which they are absent from duty on account of sickness or 
for any other cause. 420. 
2. The fourth section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, does 
not affect the provisions of said section 2733 regulating the com-
pensation of such inspectors. Ibid. 
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1. The notice for convening the "board of designators," provided 
for in section 4415, Revised Statutes, should be such as to give 
each member a reasonable time to be present at the meeting 
and a knowledge of its object; and though such notice is not 
required by the statute to be in writing, it would be advisable 
to require written notice by regulation. 648. 
2. The members should meet together as a board, organize as a board, 
and act as a board, in making the designation to fill the vacant 
or new inspectorship. Ibid. 
See APPOINTMENT, 11. 
INTERNAL REVENUE. 
See OKLAHOMA, 2. 4. 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
1. By the provisions of the act of February 4, 1887, chapter 104, creat-
ing the Interstate Commerce Commission, the terms of the five 
Commissioners first appointed thereunder must be computed 
from January 1, 1887, although their appointments were made 
March 22, 188i. 47. 
2. But they are entitled to draw pay only from the time they entered 
upon the discharge of their duties respectively. Ibid. 
IRRIGATING DITCH THROUGH MILITARY RESERVATION. 
See LICENSE. 
IRRIGATION. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 10. 
JUDGES, ASSIGNMENT OF IN ARIZONA TERRITORY. 
See TERRITORIES, 6, 7. 
JUDGMENT. 
See CoMPROMISE. 
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF CLAIMS. 
See PAYMENT, 3. 
JURISDICTION. 
1. C., having for several years been a beneficiary and resident in the 
United States Naval Asylum at Philadelphia, died in the asylum 
in August, 1888, intestate, leaving personal effects of the value 
of about $12,000, which were turned over to the proper officer at 
the asylum agreeably to regulations prescribed by the Secretary 
of the Navy under section 4811, Revised Statutes, for the dis-
position of the property of decedents in such cases. In Novem-
ber, 1b88, letters of administration were granted on C.'s estate 
under the law of Pennsylvania by the State court; and tn De-
cember, 1888, an inquisition in proceedings in escheat was had 
in the State court, whereby his estate purported to be escheated 
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to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The escheator and the 
administrator apply to the Secretary of the Navy for delivery of 
the personal effects of the decedent now in possession of the offi-
cer of the asylum. It appearing that in April, 1834, the State 
ceded to the United States jurisdiction over the land occupied 
by the asylum: Advised that the proceedings of the State court 
granting administration of the estate of C., and escheating the 
same, were void for want of jurisdiction, and that neither the 
administratvr nor the escheator has any right to the possession 
of such estate. 247. 
2. Upon the facts submitted in relation to the alleged abandonment 
upon the island of Arenas Key, Mexico, by the master of an 
American schooner, of three men, one of whom was killed by 
another of the three : Advised that if a crime was committed by 
one of the men on the island, it was committed within the juris-
diction of Mexico, and the courts of the United States have no 
jurisdiction over the same; furthermore, that the master and 
owners of the vessel do not appear to have committed any offense 
cognizable under the statutes of the United States. 391. 
3. No constitutional objection is perceived to a provision in the 
proposed consular convention between the United States and 
Great Britain, conferring upon the courts of each country juris-
diction of offenses committed on vessels of tbe other on the high 
seas. 644. 
See No MAN's LAND. 
KANSAS. 
See CLAIMS, 3, 4. 
KANSAS AND ARKANSAS VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 3, 4. 
KANSAS FIVE PER CENT. FUND. 
See CLAIMS, 4. 
KICKAPOO INDIANS. 
See INDIAN AND INDIAN LANDS, 15, 16, 17. 
KLAMATH INDIANS. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 2, 5. 
LAND-GRANT RAILROADS. 
1. The joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 378), added a second 
indemnity belt to the land grant made to the Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company by the act of July 2, 1864, chapter 217, such 
grant thus having two indemnity belts. 88. 
2. Indemnity selections within the first belt (i.e., that originally cre-
ated by the act of 1864) are not rest.ricted to the limits of the 
particular State or Territory in which the granted lands were 
lost, but may be made outside of those limits. Ibid. 
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3. The p1'ot:iso in section 23 of the act of March 3, 1871, chapter 22, 
excepts from the operation of the grant made by that section to 
the Southern Pacilic Railroad Company of California all lands 
within the primary limits of the road of said company which 
also fall within the primary or indemnity limits of the grant to 
the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company now forfeited, and 
such lands can be restored to settlement and entry under the 
general land laws. 134. 
4. The claim of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minueapolis and Omaha Rail-
road Company (successor of the Chicago and North western Rail-
road Company) to certain lands under the land grants made to 
the State of Wisconsin by the acts of June 3, 1856, chapter 43, 
and May 5, 1864, chapter 80, considered. 522. 
5. The transportation of an officer in the Corps of Engineers of the 
Army, while traveling in the discharge of duties connected with 
river and haruor improvements to which he has been assigned, 
comes within the provisions of the Michigan land-grant act of 
June 3, 1856, chapter 44, and of the act of July 3, 1866, chapter 
158, supplementary thereto, requiring the transportation of 
troops of the United States free from toll or other charge. 5i2. 
See PAYMENT, 2. 
LANDS, PUBLIC. 
1. Semble that as to the Nolan claim to certain land in New Mexico, 
known as claim No. 39, there has not as yet been any "final ac-
tion by Congress," as contemplated in the eighth section of the 
act of July 22, 1854, chapter 103. 8. 
2. The proviso in the fourth section of the act of July 1, 18iO, chap-
ter 202, confirming the Nolan grant, No. 48, does not include the 
auove-mentioned claim, No. 39. Ibid. 
3. Where a substantial allegation of fraud or mistake is made, the 
sustaining of which will restore to the public domain land 
wrongfully patented, or subserve the public interest or protect 
the public right, the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
may, in his discretion, direct a resurvey of patented land. 126. 
4. Such survey would not ba conclusive, but, ~n connection with 
other testimony, might be admissible as evidence to maintain 
the allegation. Ibid. 
5. In the case of a voidable entry of public land upon which a patent 
has already issued, where the action of the board of equitable 
adjudication is applied for with a view to obtaining the issue of 
a new patent by the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
under section 2456, Revised Statutes, a surrender of the outstand-
ing patent should accompany the application or be made before 
the entry is acted upon by the board. 188. 
6. The outstanding patent, when surrendered, need not be canceled 
until after confirmation of the entry; it is suffiCient if the can-




7. By Executive order of August 5, 1878, 50 acres of land were added 
to the Fort Missoula military reservation, which was onginally 
established with an area of 640 acres l1y Executive order of Feb-
ruary 19, 1877. The laud covered by these orders was formerly 
within the Territory of Oregon ; but under the act of March 2, 
18!)3, chapter 90, establishing the Territory ofWashington, it fell 
within the latter Territory; and when the Territory of Montana 
was created, by the act of May 26, 1tl64, chapter 95, It became a 
part of that Territory, and so remained at the time said orders 
were issued. By the act of February 14, 1853, chapter 69, it was 
provided that all reservations theretofore as was as thereafter 
made under the act of September 27, 1850, chapter 76 (which 
apphed to Oregon only), should as to forts be limited to not ex-
ceeding 640 acres at any one place; and the aforsaid act of May 
26, 1864, declared that all laws of the United States not locally 
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within the Ter-
ritory of Montana as elsewhere wlt,hin the United States: Held 
that the act of 1864 was intended to give effect in Montana only 
to such general la-ws of the United States as were not inapplica-
ble to that Territory, and not to legislation of a special or local 
character; that the limitation of 640 acres was not made opera-
tive thereby in 1\Iontana; that the President was fully empow-
ered to make the order of August 5, 1888; and that while such 
order remains unrevoked the land covered thereby is not open 
to entry or settlement. 370. 
8. The grant made by the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 152, of a 
right of way through the public lands, with the necessary land 
for stations, etc., was meant, for railroad compames mtending 
to operate roads as common carriers for the benefit and conve-
mence of the public, and not for the benefit of the companies 
solely. 546. ' 
9. Where a railroad made application to the Secretary of the Interior 
with a view to securing the benefit of the said act of 1875, and 
its articles of incorporation and map of definite location were 
approved by the Secretary, but it afterwards appeared that the 
action of the Secretary was based upon a mistake of fact caused 
by the representation of the railroad company itself, and that 
the application was for a purpose not within the statute; Held 
that it is competent to the Secretary to recall and annul h1s 
action approving the line of definite location of the road and 
entering the same on the pnbhc plats. 547. 
10. The provision in the act of October 2, 1888, chapter 1069, reserv-
ing from sale or entry lands designated or selected for reservoirs, 
ditches, or canals for irrigation purposes, and also lands made 
susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches, or canals, 
operates as an immediate withdrawal of the lands thus de-
scribed from entry and settlement. 564. 
11. The provision in the act of August 30, 1890, chapter 837, declaring 
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that "no person who shall, after the passage of this act, enter 
upon any of the public lands with a view to occupation, entry, 
or settlement under any of the land laws shall be permitted to 
acquire title to more than 320 acres in the aggregate under all 
of said laws," does not operate upon entries made prior to the 
date of the act. 704. 
12. An applicant who, by such prior entries, has already acquired 
title to 320 acres is not thereby precluded from acquiring title 
to an additional quantity, not 'exceeding 320 acres, by home-
stead entry, timber-land, or other claim under the land laws. 
filed subsequent to the date of the act. Ibid. 
LEASE. 
See FUR SEALS ; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 20, 23. 
LICENSE. 
Where application was made to the Secretary of War for license 
to construct and maintain an irrigating ditch through the mili-
tary reservation at Fort Selden, N.Mex., the licensee to fur-
msh free to the United States all water required for military 
purposes: Advised that, in view of the benefits to be derived 
by the fort from the use oft be water and other considerations, such 
license may properly be granted under well-considered restric-
tiOns and revocable at the will and pleasure of the Secretary. 
628. 
See STEAM ENGINEERS. 
MAIL CONTRACT. 
See CONTRACT, 5. 
MAIL MATTER, DIRECTIONS ON. 
See PosTAL SERVICE, 7. 
MANUFACTURER'S STATEMENT. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 27, 28. 
MARINE CORPS. 
1. The phrase, "by reason of absence from his command at the time 
he became entitled to his discharge," as used in the first section 
of the act of August 14, 1888, chapter 890, is to be regarded as 
equally applicable to the date when the term of enlistment of the 
applicant expired, and to the date when he would have received 
his discharge along with other enlisted men with w born he served, 
had he been present. 221. 
2. The proviso in the third section of that act is applicable to the lattet· 
section alone. Ibid. 
3. The act of February 9, 1889, chapter 119, "to provide for the de-
posit of the savings of seamen of the United States Navy," does 
not extend to enlisted men of the Marine Corps. 616. 
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4. The provtsions of section .1 of the act of June 16, 1890, entitll3d 
• 'An act to prevent desertions from the Army, and for other pur-
poses," are applicable to enlisted men of the Marine Corps by 
force and effect of section 1612, Revised Statutes; but those of 
sections 2, 3, and 4 of that act are inapplicable thereto. Ibid. 
~1ARSHAL. 
See COMPENSATION, 6. 
MARSHAL OF INDIAN TERRITORY. 
l;ee INDIAN TERRITORY, 1, 2, 3. 
MASSACHUSETTS, CLAIM OF. 
See CLAIM,., 9, 10. 
MEDICAL CORPS OF THE NAVY. 
See NAVY, 1, 2. 
MEMBER OF CONGRESS. 
See FRANKING PRIVILEGE. 
MILITARY FORCES, EMPLOYMENT OF. 
1. Question as to what extent and under what circumstances the mil-
Itary forces of the United States may bf> used for the protection 
of life and property in Alaska, considered ; and the views ex-
pressed in a former opinion, dated April 18, 1889 (ante, p. 293), 
submitted as covering the question. 368. 
2. The provision in section 15 of the act of June 1A, 1878, chapter 26;J, 
forbidding the employment of the Army as a posse comitatus for 
the purpo,;;e of executing the laws, does not abridge the power 
to use any part of the land or naval forces, or militia, for the 
purposes set forth in section 19i-!9, Revised Statutes. 570. 
MILITIA. 
1. Provisions of section 1661, Revised Statutes, and of the act of Feb-
ruary 12, 1887, chapter 129, touching the distribution of arms t() 
the militia of the several States and Territories, considered. 61. 
2. Where a State or Territory had an unexpended balance to its 
credit, under the old law, on June 30, 1887, which still remains 
available, such balance can be drawn upon to supply ordnance 
stores to it. Ibid. 
3. But where the quota belonging to any State or Territory, under 
the old law, has been overdrawn, the amount overdrawn is not 
to be charged to such State or Territory under the new law. 
Ibid. 
MOLASSES. 
See CUSTOMS LA \YS, 35. 
NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS. 
1. The expenses of proceedings instituted by the Comptroller of the 
Currency for the forfeiture of the charter of a national banking 
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association, inclndmg the fee of the United States attoruey for 
his services in such proceedings, should be defrayed out of the 
funds or assets of the association. 633. . 
2. What would be a reasonable fee for the services of the district at-
torney depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. 
Ibid. 
See ALASKA, 1; INDIAN TERRITORY, 4; OKLAHOMA, 3, 5. 
NAVAL ACADEMY. 
1. Where certain naval cadets were found deficient at the semi-
annual examination held at the Naval Academy in January, 
1t;89, and, without tlle recommendation of the Academic Board, 
were granted leaves of absence by the Secretary of the Navy 
with permission to report to the Superintendent of the Academy 
to join the next fourth class: Held t!:lat the Secretary had no 
power to continue these cadets in the Aeademy without the rec-
ommendation of the Academic Board. 302. 
2. Where a naval cadet tendered his resignation, and it was accepted 
by the Secretary of the Navy and the cadet duly notified thereof, 
but in a short time (about two weeks) afterwards the cadet 
made application to withdraw his resignation, which was 
granted b.l the Secretary, who at the same time instructed him 
to report to the Superintendent of the Academy : Held that by 
the resignation and its acceptance the r lations of the cadet 
with the Naval Academy were completely severed and his posi-
tion there became vacau t; that he could not be reinstated other-
wise than by an appointment in conformity to sections 1514 and 
1515, Revised Statutes; and that the action of the Secretary in 
permitting the withdrawal of the resignation after its acceptance 
had no legal effect whatever. 350. 
3. Where certain members of the graduating class at the Naval 
Academy were reported as physically disqualifie<l for the naval 
service, but as mentally and professionally quaJified, and were 
placed among the "surplus graduates:" Advised that under the 
acts of August 5, 1882, chapter 391, and March 2, li::i89, chapter 
396, they were each entitled as such surplus graduates to a 
certificate of graduation, an honorable discharge, and one year's 
pay, and that there is no authority in the law for stating in 
such certificate the physical disqualification of the graduate. 
358. 
NAVAL CADET. 




1. In the organization of the Medical Corps of the Navy a passed as· 
s1stant surgeon and an assistant surgeon are officers of one and 
the same grade, but belong to different classes m such grade. 169. 
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2. A passed assistant surgeon is simply an assistant surgeon who has 
been officially notified that he has passed successfully the exam-
ination necessary to be undergone before he can be appointed a 
full surgeon when a vacancy occurs. Ibid. 
3. The phrase, "by reason of absence from his command at the time 
he became entitled to his dischaJ;ge," as used in the first section 
of the act of August 14, 1888, chapter 890, is to be regarded as 
equally applicable to the date when the term of enlistment of 
the applicant expired and to the date when he would have re-
ceived his discharge along with other enlisted men with whom 
he served had he been present. 221. 
4. The proviso in the third section of that act is applicable to the latter 
section alone. Ibid. 
5. The words "exclusive of armament," as used in the first section of 
the act of August 3, 1886, chapter 849, are not to be undtlrstood 
as excluding the offensive armament, such as guns, torpedoes, 
etc., only; the term "armament" comprehending, besides those 
articles, such shields and protections as are directly and neces-
sarily connected with the efficient and safe working thereof. 235. 
NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OFFICERS IN. 
1. A naval officer assigned to duty as au assistant to the chief of a 
bureau in the Navy Department is not authorized by section 178, 
Revised Statutes, in case of t,he death, resignation, absence, or 
sickness of the latter (where the President has uot otherwise di-
rected, as provided by Sec. 179, Rev. Stat.), to perform the du-
ties of such chief until his successor is appointed or until his 
sickness or absence shall cease. 503. 
2. The phrase "assistant or deputy of such chief," etc., in said sec-
tion 178, is to be construed as including an assistant or deputy 
only whose appointment is specifically provided for by statute. 
Ibid. 
NAVY PENSION LIST. 
The revenue cutters emvloyed in carrying out the order issued by 
President Lincoln to the Secretary of the Treasury, dated .Tune 
14, 1863, were, while so employed, cooperating with the Navy 
by order of the President; and if any of the officers or seamen 
thereof, during such employment, were wounded or disabled in 
the discharge of their duty, they became entitled to be placed 
. on the Navy pension list at the same rate of pension and under 
the same regulations and restrictions as are provided by law for 
the officers and seamen of the Navy. 505. 
NOLAN LAND CLAIM. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 1, 2. 
NO MAN'S LAND. 
1. The strip of territory known as "No Man's Land" not being 
within any existing judicial district, punishment of crime com-
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mitted therein will not be within reach of the criminal law of 
the United States (see sixth article of amendments to the Con. 
::.titution) until legislative action 1s had ascertaining the district 
which shall embrace such strip. 66. 
2. Upon reexamination of the question whether the territory called 
"No Man's Land" lies within the boundaries of any judicial dis-
trict of the United States: Advised (1) that from January 6, 
1883, to March 1, 1889, said territory was included within the 
boundaries of the judicial district for the northern district of 
Texas; (2) that since March 1, 1889, it has Leen and is included 
in the judicial district for the eastern district of Texas; thus 
dissenting from the opinion of A.ttorney·General Garland of No-
vember 15, 1~~7, (ante, p. 66). 477. 
3. Violations of laws of the Uuited States committed within that 
territory are properly cognizaLle in the circuit and district 
courts of the United States for the eastern district of Texas. 
Ibid. 
NORTH DA.KOT A. 
See DAKOTA LA~D GRA~T 
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See LA~D-GRA~T RAILROADS, 1, 2. 
NOTARY PUBLlC. 
See DISTRICT of CoLUl\IBIA, 1. 
OBSTRUCTION TO NA V IGA.TION. 
1. The obstructions to navigation contemplated by sections 9 and 10 
of the act of August 11, 1881;, chapter 860, are such as pertain 
to the structure and plan of the bridge, 1n view of its location. 
Obstructions caused by fa1lure to promptly open the draw of 
the bridge for passing vessels are not within those sections. 395. 
2. The bridge over the Muskingum River at Taylorsville, Ohio, is a 
nuisance to navigation which ought to be abated. 599. 
3. The case of the county bridge over the Muskingl!m River at Tay-
lorsville, Ohio, on which an opinion of the Attorney-General 
was given July 19, 1890 (ante, p. 599), distinguished from the 
case of the bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Rail-
way Company across the same river at Marietta, Ohio, subse-
quently presented, and that opinion shown to be inapplicable to 
the latter case by reason of recent statutory amendments affect-
ing it. 676. 
OFFENSES ON THE HIGH SEAS. 





1. Tli.e Indian title to the lands within the Territory known as Okla-
homa having become extinguished, and the lands thrown open 
to settlement, that Territory has ceased to be "Indian country," 
and sections 2139 and 2140, Revised Statutes, are accordingly 
no longer applicable thereto; nor is the sale of spirituous liquors 
and beer in such Territory forbidden thereby. 306. 
2. Yet, for reasons stated, the Internal Revenue Department may 
decline to furnish special revenue stamps for the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors within that Territory until Congress shall have 
time to consider the subject. Ibid. 
3. Under existing legislation relating to the establishment of national 
banking associ~ions, and in the present condition of Oklahoma 
(beiugwithout a government and system of laws), such banking 
associations can not lawfully be authorize>d and established in 
the Territory known by that name. 315. 
• 
4. The act of May 2, 1890, chapter 182, entitled "An act to proviae 
a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma," etc.,, 
having an established organized government in that Territory 
no reason now exists for making any distinction between it and 
any other organized Territory with reference to the enforcement 
of the internal revenue laws. 569. 
5. In view of the provisions of the act of May 2, 1890, cJtapter 182, 
entitled "An act to provide a temporary government for the 
Territory of Oklahoma," etc.: Advised that there no longer exists 
any obstacle to the establish~ent of national banking associa-
/ associations in the Indian Territory. 58.~. 
6. Where the legislature of Oklahoma Territory, at its :first sessipn, 
took a recess for one or more days on account of an approaching; 
election : Advised, that the period covered by the recess should 
be counted as part of the one hundred and twenty days limited 
for such session by section 4 of the (organic) act of May 2, 1890, 
chapter 182. 682. 
OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE BY ALIENS. 
See ALIENS. 
PARDON. 
1. An officer who is authorized to order a general court-martial has 
no power under the 112th article of war to pardon or mitigate 
the punishment adjudged by it after confirJPation by him of the 
sentence. 106. 
2. The President has power to grant a pardon to a prisoner undergoing 
punishment for a contempt of court. 476. 
PATENT, LAND. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 5, 6; SWAMP-LAND GRANT. 
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS. 
1. By section 4902, Revised Statutes, the privilege of :filing caveats 




PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-Continued. 
limited to citizens of the United States, and aliens who have re-
sided therem one year and declared their intention to become 
citizens. 273. 
2. The second article of the convention entered into between the 
United States and certain other nations, proclaimed by the Pres-
ident on June 7, 1887, is not self-executing; and Congress hav-
ing passed no law for its execution, it can not be deemed to ex-
tend the privilege granted by said section 490~ to all subjects 
and citizens of the nations parties to said convention. 274. 
3. A naval officer or employe of the Government at a navy-yard who 
has in vented an article for use in the naval service and patented 
it, ifthe invention does not relate to a matter as to which he 
was specially directed to experiment with a view to rmggest im-
provements, is entitled to compem~ation from the Government 
for the use of such a ' ticle, in addition, to his salary or pay as 
such officer or employe. 407. 
4. It makes no difference that the invention consists of an improve-
ment upon an article already patented, and that when the im-
provement was patented the officer or employe was assigned to 
the duty of superintending for the Government the manufacture 
of the article improved upon. Ibid. 
5. The Secretary of the Navy can not legally contract with the pat-
entee for the purchase of his patent, or for a license to use it, 
under an appropriation limited to the purchase of material and 
the employment of labor in the manufacture of such article out 
of it. Ibid. 
6. Where letters patent were allowed on the original application, De-
cember 9, 1887, but the final fee was not paid as required by 
statute ; and the same were again allowed on a renewed appli-
cation, under section 4897, Revised StatuteR, December 4, 1889; 
and (payment of final fee as required. not having been made on 
the last allowance) a second application for renewal, under said 
section, was filed June 7, 1890: .A.lvised that the applicant is 
not entitled to an allowance of letters patent on such second ap -
plication, the statutory limitation rtwo years) imposed by said 
section having attached before the filing thereof. 698. 
PAYMENT. 
1. In September, 1887, H. eutereil into a contract with the Quarter-
master's Department to perform certain work, but afterwards, 
being in default, it was arranged that his bondsmen, C. and R., 
should take charge of anLl complete the work; and in pursuance 
of this arrangement H. executed and delivered a power of at-
torney to them, by which they were authorized to receive and 
receipt for the money due on the contract. C. and R. signed re-
ceipted vouchers for the balance due: Advised that the Depart-
ment may recognize the power of attorney of H., and that pay-
ment to C. aud R. upon the receipted vouchers thereunder will 
• 
discharge the Government. 239 . 
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2. The payment of accounts of land-grant railroads (i.e., such as have 
not received aid in Government bonds) for army transportation, 
under the appropriation act of September 22, 1888, chapter 1027, 
is not controlled by the p1·oviso iu the acts of J nne 30, 1882, chap-
ter 250, and August 5, 1882, chapter 390, but IS governed by the 
provisions of the act of 1888 alone ; ancl under these provisions 
such accounts can be lawfully paid by a quartermaster without 
previous action thereon by the accounting officers of the Treas-
ury. 264. 
3. Where a judgment against the United States was recovered in the 
Court of Claims, and a stipulation was made, which is of record 
in the case, to the effect that neither the plaintiff nor the de-
fendant would take au appeal from such judgment: .Advised that 
there is no legal oiJjection to payment of the judgment before 
the expiration of the ninety days allowed by statute for taking 
an appeal. 281. 
4. By a joint resolution passed July 10, 1888, Congress provided that 
the matters in controversy between S. and the District of Co-
lumbia should be submitted to the arbitration of three persons 
to be appointed by the President, whose award should be final 
and conclusive as to such matters, and directed the Secretary 
of the Treasury, in case the award should be in favor of S., ''to 
pay said award,'' m the same manner that judgments against 
the District of Columbia are paid when rendered by the Court 
of Claims. Arbitrators were duly appointed, who awarded S. 
the sum of $28,~!)7.~8 with interest from November 10, 1874, and 
the costs of certain suits then pending. Since the award was 
made suits in equity have been brought against S in the su-
preme court of the District of Columbia by parties clatming 
as assignees of his claim against the District, and injunctions 
have been issued in these suits enjoining him from receiving 
payment of the award. These suits being consoiidated, and the 
court having appointed receivers with power to receive payment 
of the award, the latter now formally demand of the Secretary 
of the Treasury payment of the award to them; S. also demands 
payment thereof to him; and his assignees demand that their 
rights as such shall be respected by the Secretary in paying the 
award: Advised that the Secretary can not properly pay the 
award to the receivers (inasmuch as he is not subject to the ju-
risdiction of the said court with regard to the fund in question, 
and it is only when payment is made under the compulsion of 
an order of a court of competent j urisdictiou that the party pay-
ing is relieved of liability as to t,he mo.lley paid); adt•ised fur-
ther that it would be improper, under the circumstances of the 
cases, for the Secretary to pay it to S., but that he should hold 
on to the fund until the controversy over it between S. and his 




5. The case of George H. Giddings (16 Opin., 367) distinguished from 
the present case. Ibid. 
See DRAWBACK 
PENALTY. 
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES. 
PENNSYLVANIA, CLAIM OF. 
See CLAIMS, 5. 
PENSION. 
1. The terms ''accrued pensions," as used m section 4718, Revised 
Statutes, mean the amount of money unpaid by the Government 
to which a -pensioner, or a person who had a valid claim for pen-
sion pending, was entitled at the time of his death. 1. 
2. The rece1pt by a pensioner of a check for the amount due him on 
his pension, which was mdorsed but not transferred by him in 
his lifetime, is not payment. The amount so due is accordingly 
"accrued pension," and is payable to those only who are 
entitled thereto under such section. Ibid. 
3. Where an application for a pension was made by letter, sufficient 
to Identify the claimant and the claim, and was placed on file as 
a part of the record of the case before July 1, 1880, ancl the claim 
was not abandouetl, but delay in its prosecution satisfactorily 
accounted for by sickness: .Jdvised that (the claim being subse-
quently established and allowed) such application by letter IS 
sufficient to warrant the granting of arrears of pension provided 
for by section 2 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 187. 190. 
4. A person to whom a pension certifioate was granted as the widow 
of a soldier in the war of the rebellion was also granted a pen-
sion certificate as the widow of a soldier in the war of 1812, and 
drew pensions upon l>oth certificates from March 9, 1A78, to 
December 3, 1883. The Commissioner of Pensions, on discover-
ing this, required her to make an election, and she having 
elected to hold the first-mentioned certificate, he ordered the 
amount which had been paid to her upon the other certificate to 
be withheld m installments of $6 per month from payments 
thereafter, an.d issued an order to the pension agent accordingly: 
Advised that the order made in this case, being within the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the Commissioner, is obligatory on the pen-
sion agent, and that the accounting officers of the Treasury 
have no power to disallow payments made by the agent pursuant 
thereto. 214. 
5 In the case above stated, the whole of the monthly pension under 
the certificate which the pensioner elected to hold should be 
withheld unt1l the amounts so withheld shall equal the sum paid 
the pensioner under the other certificate 215. 
6. The p1oriso in the act of March 1, 1889, chapter 332, authorizing 
payment to a deceased pensioner's legal representah ves, in cer-
INDEX. 
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tain contingencies, of the accrued pension due on his pension 
certificate at the time of his death, is to be construed as applica-
ble to all outstanding pension certificates, wh6ther issued before 
or sin~e the passage of the act. 359. 
7. But the pensioner must have died since the passage of that act to 
entitle his legal representatives to claim such accrued pension. 
Ibid. 
8. The first section of the act of J nne 27, 1890, chap. 634, entitled ''An 
actgrantingpensiona to soldiers and aailors who aremcapacitated 
for the performance of manual labor," etc., is to be regarded as 
anamendq1ent of section 4i0i, Revised Statutes; and so regarded, 
the word ''soldier" en~ployed therein should be construed to 
comprehend also sailor and marine-jhe term being used as a 
short axpression to embrace all the persons under section 4707 
whose death entitled their parents to a pension. 586. 




The special authority given by the act of July 11, 1888, chapter 
615", to appoint or detail five supervising examiners in the Bureau 
of Pension&, with headquarters J.n the District of Columbia, is 
prohibitory of tho appointment or detail of a greater number for 
the District or for places other than the District. 3-li'. 
POSSE COMITATUS. 
See INDIAN TERRITORY, 2; MILITARY FORCES, EMPLOYMENT 0,.,2. 
POSTAL CONVENTIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
See POSTAL SERVICE, 1, 4, 5, 6. 
POSTAL GUIDE. 
The determination of what shall be the contents of the Postal 
Guide rests en,tirely with the Postmaster-General. 521. 
POSTAL SERVICE. 
1. Under section 398, Revised Statutes, the Postmaster-General has 
power, with the approbation of the President, to conclude a 
postal convention with a .foreign country for admission to and 
transmission through the mails exchanged with su,ch foreign 
country of parcels of mail matter of either class exceeding 4 
pounds in weight. The limitation as to weight of mail pack-
ages in section 3879, Revised Statutes, applies only to domestic 
tnailservice. 39. 
~. Tht3 Postmaster-General may discontinue a contract for carrying 
the ·mail befQJ"e expiration of the term thereof, allowing the con-
tr8.9tor one month's extra pay, when in hisjudgmentthe public 
interests requtre such discontinuance, for the purpose of read-
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vertising and reletting the servwe on an increased schedule, in 
preference to permitting the contractor to perform the increased 
service at the pro rata to which he would be entitled under his 
contract. 146. 
3. The authority conferred upon the Postmaster-General by the act 
of March 2, 1889, chapter 374, to classify and fix the salaries of 
the clerks and employes in first and second class post-offices is 
not merely discretionary with him. It imports a duty to make 
the classification of such salaries which is provided for in the act. 
324. 
4. Upon a review of the legislation passed by Congress, from the be-
ging of the Government down to the present time, conferring 
upon the Postmaster-General power t<> make postal arrangPments 
and conventions with foreign countries, and the practice of the 
Government thereunder: Advised that such legislation aud prac-
tice sanction an interpretation of the Constitution different from 
that which might be reached by the ordinary rules of construc-
tion were the question a new one, and that the provisions of 
section 398, Revised Statutes, authorizing the Postmaster-Gen-
eral, with the advice and consent of the Presideut, to negotiate 
and conclude postal treaties and conventions between the United 
States and foreign countries, are not in conflict with that part 
of section 2, Article II, of the Constitution, giving the President 
' 'power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to 
make treaties," etc. 513 
5. SernlJle that the right of Congress to vest in the Postmast~r-Gen­
eral power to conclude conventions with foreign governments 
for the cheaper, safer, and more con>enient carriage of foreign 
mails may be derived from the authority given that body in the 
seventh clause of section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, to 
establ-ish post-offices and post-roads. Ibid. 
6. As to the power of the Postmaster-General to enter into conven-
tions with foreign governments touchmg the regulation of 
foreign parcels post, opinion of Attorney-General Garland of June 
30, 1887 (ante, p. 39), cited with approval. Ibid. 
7. The following words printed upon the wrapper of a newspaper 
sent by mail, namely, "Sample copy; if not called for Ly party 
to whom addressed postmaster please deliver to some local 
teacher," held to be a direction for delivery within the meaning 
of section 1 of the act of January 20, 1888, chapter 2, and there-
fore permissible. 596. 
8. The Post-Office Department has no power, under existing laws, to 
make contracts for the transmission of intelligence by telegraph 
for the general public, as a part or branch of the postal service. 
650. 
9. Mail matter, as defined by statute, does not include telegraphic 
correspondence, as such; nor does the power given the Postmas-
ter-General to contract for carrying the mail include authority 
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to contract for sending messages by telegraph for the benefit of 
the people at large. Ibid. 
10. Where a certain book was excluded from the mails on the ground 
of indecency, by an order of the Postmaster-General issued under 
the act of September 26, 1888, chapter 1039, and it appeared that 
certain newspapers were republishing the same book in install-
ments or parts: .Advised that the said order would not justify the 
exclusion from the mails of every copy of such newspapers, as 
some of the parts or installments of the book appearing therein 
may be unobjectionable. 667. 
11. Where a nAwspaper contained an advertisement offering in good 
faith a certain sum of money to tho3 sender of the first "guess" 
giving the correct or nearest n urn ber of votes w h i.ch each of two 
opposing candidates, of different political parties, for a desig-
nated State office, shall receive at the next ensuing election, the 
guessing period to end with the day on which the election takes 
place : Held that the scheme thus adve1·tised is not one offering 
a prize "dependent upon lot or chance," within the meaning of 
section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember 19, 1890. chapter 908, and that the newspaper containing 
the advertisement is not, by the provisions of said section, ex· 
eluded from the mail. 679. 
POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
The authority conferred upon the Postmaster-General by the act 
of March 2, 1889, chapter 374, to classify and fix the salaries of 
the clerks and employes in first and second class post-offices is 
not merely discretionary with him. it imports a duty to make 
the classification of such salaries which is provided for in the 
act. 324. 
See CoNTRACT, 6, 13; PosTAL SERVICE, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,·8, 9. 
POTTAWATOMIE INDIANS. 
See CoNTRACT, 5,10; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 7. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
1. In September, 1887, H. entered into a contract with the Quarter-
termaster's Department to perform certain work, bot afterwards, 
being in default, it was arranged that his bondsmen, C. and R., 
should take charge of and complete the work; and in pursuance 
of this arrangement H. executed and delivered a. power of attor-
ney to them, by which they were authorized to receive and 
receipt for the money due on the contract. C. and R. signed 
receipted vouchers for the balance due: .Advi1ed that the Depart-
ment may recognize the power of attorney of H., and that pay-
ment to C. and R. upon the receipted vouchers thereunder will 
discharge the Government. 239. 
2. A power of attorney given to collect a claim against the Government 
with an agreement that the donee of the power shall receive "a 
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sum equal to 50 per cent. ofthe amount allowed" on the claim, 
is not a power coupled with an interest, and is revocable. 483. 
3. The power having been given to a firm, one of the members of 
of which has since died, whereby the firm became dissolved, 
such power can not be executed by the surviving members. 
Ibid. 
4. Under the circumstances stated, the power should not be recog-
nized. Ibid. 
PRESIDENT. 
The President, by virtue of his office and without authority given 
by some statute, has no power to remove a convict from one 
prison to another. J77. 
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 2; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDs, 21; INDIAN 
TERRITORY, 3; LANDs, PuBLic, 7; QuARANTINE; WoRLD's Co-
LCMBIAN EXPOSITION. 
PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS IN NEW MEXICO. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 1, 2. 
PROCESS. 
See INDIAN TERRITORY, 5, 6. 
PROPERTY LOST IN THE MILITARY SERVICE. 
See CLAIMS, 11, 12. 
PUBLIC BUILDING. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 22; DISBURSING AGENT. 
PUBLIC LANDS. 
See LANDS, PUBLIC. 
:PURCHASE OF LAND. 
1. Advised that the provision in the act of August 5, 1886, chapter 929, 
namely: "Improving Great Kanawha River, West Virginia. 
Continuing improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thou-
sand :five hundred dollars," does not, by implication, authorize 
the purchatSe of land for said improvement. 34. 
2. The appropriation made by the act· of March 3, 1887, chapter 
362, "for the erection of monuments or memorial tablets for the 
purpose of marking the position of each of the commands of the 
regular army engaged at Gettysburg," is not applicable to the 
purchase of land for the sites of such monuments or tablets. 79. 
3. The act of March 5, 1888, chap. 23, entitled'' An act for the pur-
chase of a site, including the building thereon, etc., for the use 
of the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army," etc., does 
not carry with it an appropriation of money for the objects des-
ignated the!ein. 131. 
4. Upon the facts submitted: Advised that, under the deed uf Thomas 
Ryan and wife, dated December 18, 1886, granting to the United 
• 
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States eertain land at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., selected for a new 
site for Fort Brady, the title to the premises has become vested 
in the United States. 137. 
5. Upon the facts submitted: Advised that the proposal made by 
Messrs. Mooney & Ferguson, dated February 17, 18tS9, to sell to 
the United Atates a site for a public building, at Buffalo, N.Y., 
and the response of the Secretary of the Treasury thereto, dated 
March 1, 1889, do not constitute a contract obligatory upon the 
United States. 269. 
G. The Secretary can not by contract bind the Government to exer-
cise its power of eminent domain, to enable persons to sell to the 
Government land which they do not own. Ibid. 
7. The act of March 29, 1888, chap. 45, entitled" An act for the erec-
tion of a public building at Springfield, Mo.," authorizes the 
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase ''a site," and when this is 
done his authority in that regard is exhausted; he is not at lib-
erty to buy another site in addition to the first. 297. 
8. As such authority is limited to a single site, so the authority 
derived thereunder to select and contract for the purchase of a 
site is likewise restricted. Ibid. 
9. Assumini that the. contract to purchase a particular site, made 
with MeSBrs. Wooley, Porter & Hubbell, still exists, the Secre-
tary is without authority to select a seoond site and contract for 
its purchase. Ibid. 
10. Should that contract become rescinded, or otherwise determined, 
without any actual sale taking place, the authority to select and 
contract for the purchase of another site would revive. Ibid. 
11. The obligation to pay for the property arises when a valid title 
thereto is conveyed and becomes vested in the United States; 
hence not until acceptance of the deeds tendered by the vendors. 
Ibid. 
PURCHASE OF UNITED STATES BONDS. 
See BONDS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
QUARANTINE. 
Upon the facts submitted: Advised that the President has author-
ity to use so much of the unexpended balance of the sum appro-
priated by the joint resolutions approved September 26 and Oc-
tober 12, 1888, as may be necessary in his judgment for the pur-
pose of keeping the various quarantine stations open throughout 
the fiscal year 1889-'90. 399. 
QUARTERMASTER'S VOLUNTEERS. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 2. 
RAILROAD LAND-GRANTS, ADJUSTMENT OF. 
1. The terms ''bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed land," as used 
in the third proviso of section 3 of the act of March 3, 1887, chap-
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ter :nu, wean those persons who, without knowledge of wrong or 
error, have purchased from the railroad company lands which had 
been previously entered by a preemption or homestead settler, 
where entry hau been erroneously canceled as described in the 
first clause of that section, and which land the preemption or 
homestead settler did not elect to claim after the recovery by 
the proceedings prescribed by the second section of the act. 68. 
2. Patents, the issue whereof is provided for in the fourth section of 
the same act, are only intended to be issued after it shall have 
been legally determined, in the mode prescribed in the second 
section, that the certification or patent to the railroad company 
had been erroneously issued. Ibid. 
3. The word "grant," in the fifth section, should be construed to in-
clude (as it does in the preceding sections of the act) both the 
primary and the indemnity limits. Ibid. 
RAILWAY MAIL SERVICE. 
See APPOINTMENT, 5, 7, 8. 
REAPPOINTMENT. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 1. 
REEXAMINATION OF CLAIMS. 
See CLAIMS, 5, 6. 
REFUND OF HEAD TAX. 
See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 5. 
REFUND OF MONEYS IMPROPERLY EXACTED. 
See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 4. 
REFUND OF TONNAGE TAX. 
See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 6. 
REMISSION OF FORFEITURE. 
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES, 1. 
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING 0FFICKRS1 9, 10. 
REOPENING OF ACCOUNTS. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 8. 
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS. 
See FRANKING PRIVILEGE. 
RESERVATION. 
See FORT BROWN RESERVATION i LANDS, PUBLIC, 10. 
RESIGNATION. 
See NavAL ACADEMY, 2. 
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RESURVEY OF PATENTED LAND. 
1. Where a substantial allegation of fraud or mistake is made, the 
sustaining of which will restore to the public domain land wrong-
fully patented, or subserve the public interest or protect the 
public right, the Commissioner of the General Land Office may, 
in his discretion, direct are urvey of patented land. 126. 
2. Such survey would not be conclusive, but, in connection with 
other testimony, might be admissible as evidence to maintain 
the allegation, Ibid. 
RETAINED P.AY OF SOLDIERS. 
See AccoUNTS AND AccOUNTING OFFICERS, 11. 
RETIRED LIST. 
See ARMY, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11. 
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Page. 
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Section 161...... ...... .. . 40:~ 
Section 163 ..........•.. 555,626 
Section 164...... ...... .. 555 
Section 177 ............... 133,500 
Section 178 .....•••••.... 500,504 
Section 179 ..••....•. 133, 500, 504 
Section 1o9 ...•...•. 63,64,65,329 
Section 2 4. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 160 
Section 248...... .. • • .. . .. 388 
Section 255 .............. 394, 430 
Section 269.... ...... .... . 178 
Section 277 .......• 30,31,540,541 
Section 292............... 31 
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Section 294...... .. .. .. .. . 31 
Section 295............... 31 
Section 296...... . .. .. .. . . 31 
Section 317............... 178 
Section 343............... 578 
Section 345. .. • • • .. .. .. . • . 57 A 
Section 355.... .. .. .. .. .. . 63 
Section 356 ...... 57, 333,342,397, 
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Section 362. ...... .... .... 329 
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Section 377 ...... ......... 178 
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Section 416...... ••••••... 504 
Section 439. . . • • • • • • • • • • • • 133 
Section 442 .. .. • • • • • • • . • • . 81 
Section 443............... 82 
Section 444...... ..•••.••. 82 
Section 453............... 714 
Section 533............... 174 
Section fi63. .. . • .. .. .. • • .. 17 4 
Section 627...... .•••••••• 443 
Page. 
Section 629...... .... ..... 174 
Section 760. .. . • .. .. .. .. .. 444 
Section 767...... .. . .. . .. . 63 
Section 770 ....•. 153,154,355,356 
Section 771. .... •••••• •••. 355 
Section 787. . .. .. • . . .. .. .. 295 
Section 788 ..•........... 294,~5 
Section 823 ..•••• _........ 63 
Section 824 . . .. .. • .. .. • .. . 423 
Section 825............... 356 
Section 827 ...... 354,355,356,357 
Section ~33.......... ..... 356 
Section 834.. . .. . . .. .. • .. . 356 
Section 835...... .... .... . 63 
Section 843............... 63 
Section 846...... .. .. .. .. . 357 
Section 853 ....•••... 159,160,161 
Section 1094 ............. 283,535 
Section 1153 ...•. 427,429,430,431 
Section 1~02.......... .... 502 
Section 1222 ............. 600, 601 
Section 1223 ..••. 204,610,611,612 
Section 1224 ...••..•• 600,601,602 
Section 1242...... ........ 476 
Section 1259 ............. 285,500 
Section 1260.............. 500 
Section 1281 ...•• 567,568,622,623 
Section 12-!~. .. .. .. . .. .. . • 623 
Section 1283.............. 622 
Section 1285 ............. 471, 472 
Se tion 1290 ••••.•••• 568, 623, 624 
Section 134~........ • • • • .. 106 
Section 1362.............. 590 
Section 1367...... .. .. .. .. 590 
Section 1368...... .....•.. 169 
Seetion 1375.... • .. . • . .. .. li(J 
Section 1376 ••••••••••••• 170,172 
Section 1377 •.. 1 • • • • .. • • • • 170 
Section 1380.... • • • • • • • • • • 171 
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Section 1383 ...••.....••. 171,175 
Section 1390 .••••.••..•.. 171, 172 
Section 1392.. .••••. •••. .. 171 
Section 1410...... ...• •••• 592 
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Section 1963...... .••••... 432 
Section 1977 .••••• .•.••. .. 174 
Section 1989 .••••••••••.. 570,571 
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Section 241:'1...... ...•.. .• 381 
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Section 3433 . . . • • • • • . . . • . . 244 
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350 
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Section 3502.... ••••.. .... 578 
Section 3503...... .••. •••. 578 
Section 3504...... . • . • . • • • 578 
Section 3510.......... .••• 17 
Section 3524.............. 580 
Section 3577.............. 280 
Section 3n79.............. 280 
Section 3583 ..•••••.••••. 100,101 
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Section 3654.............. 429 
Section 3657.............. 394 
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Section 3679.. . • • . • • • • • • • • 653 
Section 3687.... • • • • • • • • • • 608 
Section 3691.... .••••••••• 74 
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See POWER Ol!' A'M'ORNBY, 2. 
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See TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES, 1, 2. 
RIGHT OF WAY. 
See WASHINGTON AND IDAHO RAILROAD COMPANY. 
ROCK ISLAND BRIDGE. 
See BRIDGE, 2. 
SEALS. 
See FuR SEALS. 
SEAMEN. 
See SmPPING. 1. 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
See CoNTRACT, 3. 10; INDIANS AND INDIAN L.ums, 7, 14; LANDS, 
PUBLIC, 9; WASHINGTON AND IDAHO RAILROAD COMPA.NY,1. 
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 




SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury can not legally, by departmental 
order, change a practice or course of office prescribed by statute 
for the settlement of accounts. 177. 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury has power, under sections 161, Re-
vised Statutes, to make a regulation which prescribes that the 
oaths to be taken by an officer of the Revenue Marine Service, 
or an officer or employe in any branch of the customs service, to 
the correctness of his account for pay or salary, as required by 
sections 1790 and 2693, Revised Statutes, shall be taken before 
some person authorized to administer oaths generally. 401. 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized to employ any 
part of the appropriation for collecting the revenue from cus-
toms in the erection of a temporary structure at a collection port 
for the purposes of the customs serv-ice. 607. 
4. Moneys improperly exacted from and paid by vessels proceeding 
under section 29 ofthe act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to un-
lade at places other than a port of entry, may be refunded by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, without formal protest by the ap-
plicant, in cases where application has been made within one 
year of auch payment. 646. 
5. Where a claim was made for a refund of "head tax" alleged to 
have been illegally exacted in August, 1890,. by the col lector at 
Baltimore in the case of the steamship Russia, under the provis-
ions of the act of Angust 3, 1882, chapter 376: Advised that the 
Secrfltary of the Treasury is authorized by section 26 of the act 
of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to refund the head tax thus ex-
acted, or so much thereof as he may think proper, if, on investi-
gation, be finds that the same was illegally, improperly, or ex-
cessively imposed. 660. 
6. And where a claim was made for a refund of "tonnage tax" al-
leged to have been illegally exacted from the steamer Cnba in 
August, 1890, by the collector at Philadelphia: Adt•ised, also, 
that the Secretary of the Treasury may, under said section 26, 
refund such tonnage tax if he finds that it was illegally, improp-
erly, or excessively imposed, and in case the Commissioner of 
Navigation shall have first decided, under section 3 of the act of 
July 5, 1884, chapter 221, that such tax was erroneously or illeg-
ally exacted. Ibid. 
7. Section 3 of the act of August 3, 1862, chapter 376, known as the 
immigration act, invests the Secretary of the Treasury with 
power to make all necessary regulations for carrying out its pro-
visions; and under this power he may, by regulation, forbid the 
landing by the master of any passenger from his vessel until an 
examination of all the passengers thereon is had, whether cabin 
or steerage. 706. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 10 i BONDS OF THE 
UNITED STATES; CO:\fPENSATION, 9; COMPROMISE; DISBURSING 
AGENT j EXCHANGE OF GOLD BARS FOR GOLD COIN, 2 j FINES, 
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PESALTIES, AND FORFEITURES j FUR SEALS i IMMIGRANT, 2; 
PAYMENT, 4 i PURCHASE OF LAND, 6, 7 j SINKING FUND. 
SECRETARY OF WAR. 
See CLAIMS, 11 j HUDSON RIVER, DUMPING MATERIAL IN ; LI-
CENSE i WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT TUNNEL, 1. 
SEIZURES IN INDIAN TERRITORY. 
In the case of a seizure of cattle in Indian Territory, alleged to 
be in violation of the treaties between the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States: Advised that the complainant should seek 
redress uot by application to the executive, but to the judicial 
department of the Government, the courts of the United States 
for the western district of Arkansas having full jurisdiction of 
the subject-matter. 173. 
SETTLEMENTS, REOPENING OF. 
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 8. 
SHIPPING. 
1. The shipping commissioners act of June 7, 1872, chapter 322 (Title 
53, Merchant Seamen, Revised Statutes), has no application to 
seamen employed on vessels engaged in the service of the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey. 182. 
2. Moneys improperly exacted from and paid by vessels proceeding 
under section 29 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to 
unlade at places other than a port of entry, may be refunded by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, without formal protest by the 
applicant, in cases where application has been made within one 
year from 8uch payment. 646. 
3. The act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, known as the immigration 
act, confers power on the collector of customs, under proper 
regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, to require the 
master of a vessel arriving within his collection district from a 
foreign country .to detain all passengers on such vessel until 
they shall have been examined by the customs officers, for the 
purpose of determining the amount of bead money collectible 
under that act from the master. 706. 
4. Section 3 of said act invests the Secretary of the Treasury with 
power to make all necessary regulations for carrying out its pro-
visions; and under this power he may, by regulation, forbid the 
landing by the master of any passenger from his vessel until an 
examination of all the passengers thereon is had, whether cabin 
or steerage. Ibid. 
5. Detention of passengers for purposes of quarantine or tax charge is 
clearly within the power and duty of the master, where it is 
required of him by law, or by regulation pursuant to law. Ibid. 
6.' Pro"'isions of section 9, of the act of August 2, 1882, chapter 374, 
called the passenger act, considered and construed in connection 
with the same subject. Ibid. 
See CLAIMS, 1. 
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SINKING FUND. 
1. The power conferred on the Secretary of the Treasury by section 5 
of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 345, tore-invest the'' sinking 
funds" mentioned in that section, extends as much to the United 
States bonds then held by him as part of the sinking fund under 
the "Thurman .Act," as to any money paid in from time to time 
for the purposes of that sinking fund. 491. 
2. The United States 'bonds now in such sinking fund may be sold and 
the proceeds thereof re-in vested in the :first mortgage bonds of any 
of the railroad companies referred to in the said act of March 3, 
1887, as having received aid from the Government in bonds. 
Opinion of .Attorney-General Garland, of March 31, 1887 (18 
Opin., 598), dissented from. Ibid. 
SIOUX RESERV .ATION. 
See INDIANS ..L'IJD INDIAN LANDS, 18, 19. 
SOUTH BOSTON IRON WORKS. 
Upon the statement of facts submitted: Advised that the right of 
the South Boston Iron Works to the possession and use of cer-
tain property (two lathes and a crane) belonging to the United 
States, derived under an agreement with the latter, dated Janu-
ary 21, 1885, has terminated, and that the right to the possession 
of the property is now in the United States exclusively. 73. 
SOUTH DAKOTA. 
See DAKOTA L..L"'iD-GR..L~T. 
SOUTHERN P .ACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 3. 
SPECIAL EXAMINERS. 
See PENSION OFFICE. 
STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF. 
1. The provisions of tle act of March 3, 1887, chapter 340, restrict-
ing the ownership of real estate in the Territories to American 
citizens, etc., apply to mines, these being real estate. 26. 
2. Advised that the provision in the act of August 5, 1886, chapter 
9~, namely: "Improving Great Kanawha River, West Virginia. 
Continuing improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thou-
sand five hundred dollars," does not, by implication, authorize 
the purchase of land for said improvement. 34. 
3. The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 362 ''for 
the erection of monuments or memorial tablets for the purpose 
of marking the position of each of the commands of the regular 
Army engaged at Gettysburg," is not applicable to the purchase 
of land for the sites of such monuments or tablets. 79. 
4. The words ''proper advertisements," as used in the act of April15, 
1886, chapter 50, mean advertisements for proposals in such cases 
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as the general provisions of law concermng public contracts re-
quire. 96. 
5. The act of March 5, 1888, chap. 23, entitled "An act for the pur-
chase of a site, including the building thereon, etc., for the use 
of the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army," etc., does 
not carry with it an appropriation of money for the objects des-
ignated therein. 131. 
6. The words "exclusive of armament," as used in the first section of 
the act of August 3, 1886, chapter 849, are not to be understood 
as excluding the offensive armament, such as guns, torpedoes, 
etc., only; the term "armament'' comprehending, besides those 
articles, such shields and protections as are directly and neces-
sarily connected with the efficient and safe working thereof. 235. 
7. The word ''sessions" iu section 1852, l~evised Statutes, as amended 
by the act of December 23, 1880, chapter 7, includes the whole· 
perwd between the time fixeu by law for the meeting of the 
legislative assemblies and their sine die adjournment: Sundays 
and intermediate adjournments not excepted. 239. 
8. The act of February 9, 1889, chapter 119, '·to provide for the de-
posit of the savings of seamen of the United States Navy," does 
not extend to enliste<l men of the Marine Corps. 616. 
9. The provisions of section! of the act of June 16, 1890, chap. 426, en-
titled ''An act to prevent desP.rtions from the Army, and for other 
purposes," are applicable to enlisted men of the Marine Corps by 
force and effect of section 1612, Revised Statutes; but those of 
sections 2, 3, and 4 of that act are inapplicable thereto. Ibid. 
10. The words "uepartmental service'' and "the service," as used in 
the proviso in that part of the legislative, executive, and Judicial 
appropriation act of July 11, 1890, chap. 667, which relates to 
the Civil Service Commission, mean the classified civil service 
as established by section 163, Revised Statutes, and section 6 of 
the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27. 624. 
11. The words in the same proviso, viz, "promotion or appointment 
in other branches of the Government," signify promotion or 
appointment in the classified service of some other Department 
than that to which the applicant may belong. Ibid. 
12. The words "all other ores," as used in the proviso of paragraph 
199 of the act of October 1, Ul90, chapter 1244, mean all ores 
other than those known commercially as lead ores. 690. 
STEAM ENGINEERS. 
1. Section 7 of the act of February 28, 1887, chapter 2i2, withdraws 
from the operation of section 6 of that act all steam engineers 
holding Federal or State licenses. 25. 
2. The alteration of a license issued under section 4441, Revised 
Statutes, is not au offense within sections 5418, 5479, or 5423, 
Revised Statutes. Revocation of the license, under section 
4450, Revised Statutes, seems to be the only punishment pro-
vided by law for such case. 649. 
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SUBSTITUTES, EMPLOYMENT OF. 
See CIVIL SERVICE. :3. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 
1. In making up complete sets of the Supreme Court Reports for the 
pla.ces to be supplied under the act of February 12, 1889, chapter 
135, the volumes heretofore distributed to the circuit and dis-
trict judges are not to be taken into account. 312. 
2. The distribution of the reports provided for by that act has no 
reference whatever to former distributions of reports to judges. 
Ibid. 
3. Where the circuit and district courts hold their sessions in the 
~;arne rooms, one set of reports only are to be provided for the 
places "here such courts sit. But where these courts hold, their 
sessions in different buildings, or in different rooms of the same 
huildiug, a set of reports are to be provided for the place where 
each court sits. Ibid. 
4. Places where the Territorial courts sit are not within the provi-
sions of the act. Ibid. 
SURETY. 
1. Under section 7 of the act of August 3, 1886, chapter 849, author-
izing proposals for certain work to be invited, which shall be 
subject to ''such provisions as to bonds and security for the 
quality and due completion of the work as the Secretary of the 
Navy shall prescribe," the Secretary may, in his discretion, ac-
cept as surety (instead of an individual) a body corporate em-
powered to assume that relation. 57. 
2. The American Surety Company ofNew York has power, under the 
laws of New York, to assume the relation of surety upon a bond 
to the United States conditioned for the faithful performance of 
a contract to furnish steel gun forgings to the latter. 66. 
3. The Secretary of the Navy has power, under section 1383 Revised 
Statutes, to approve a pay-officer's bond in which the sureties 
are corporations, or a corporatio.11 joined with a natural person, 
if he deemM such sureties sufficient. 175. 
SUSPENSION FROM DUTY AND PAY IN CUSTOMS SERVICE. 
See CLAIMS, 8. 
SWAMP-LAND GRANT. 
A bill in equity will not lie against the State of Minnesota for the 
purpose of vacating a patent issued to that State under the 
swamp-laud grant, on the mere ground that the land thus pat-
ented was not in fact swamp land. 684. 
TAXATION 01? INDIAN LANDS. 
See lXIJIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, i:!, 9, 10, 11. 
TAX ON NOTES USED FOR CIRCULATION. 
1. The tickets issued by certain ice companies (copies of which are 
giYen in the opinion) are not "notes" within the meaning of 
INDEX. 
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that term as used in section 19 of the act of February 8, 1875, 
chapter 36, and therefore are not subject to the 10 per centum 
tax imposed by that section. 98. 
2. Where a company or corporation made and paid out its own notes 
in the ordinary course of its bustness, not intending them to be 
used for circulation as money or currency, their use as such by 
other persons after they were paid out, without approval by the 
maker of such use, would not subject the maker to the tax. Ibid. 
3. No tax, as such, is imposed on those notes which are prohibited by 
section 3583, Revised Statutes. The violation of this section is 
vindicated by fine or imprisonment, or both. Ibid. 
TELEGRAPH. 
SEie POSTAL SERVICE, 8, 9. 
TELEPHONE LINES. 
Telephone companies are not within the provisions of title LXV 
of the Revised Statutes, or entitled to avail themselves of the 
privileges thereby granted. ~l7. 
TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE. 
See TERRITORIES, 1, 2, 3. 
TERRITORIES. 
1. The legislative assembly ef Arizona Territory can lawfully remain 
in session only for a period of sixty days' duration, such period 
including Sundays and all interm~diate adjournments. 259. 
2. The word " sesstons" in sect ion 1852, Revised Statutes, as amended 
by the act of December 23, 1880, chapter 7, includes the whole 
period between the time fixed by law for the meeting of the leg-
i~lative assemblies and their sine die adjournment, Sundays and 
intermediate adjournments not excepted. Ibid. 
3. Statutory provisions regulating the assembling of Territorial leg-
islatures reviewed ; and, upon consideration thereof, advised that 
the governor of Arizona Territory is without power to convene 
a special session of the Territorial legislature. 319. 
4. The act of the legislature of Arizona Territory, approved March21, 
1889, providing for the holding of a convention for the purpose 
of forming a State constitution to . be submitted to the legal 
voters of the Territory for their approval or rejection, is not in-
consistent with the organic act of the Territory or any other law 
of Congress, or with any provision of the Constitution, and is 
therefore valid. 335. 
5. Whether such legislation is "premature" is a question that ad-
dresses itself solely to the legislature that passed, the governor 
wi.o approved, and to Congress which had -the power finally to 
ratify or annul the measure. Ibid. 
6. Under the organic law of the Territory of Arizona and the statutes 
passed by the legislature thereof, the governor is not invested 
with power to assign to their respective districts the judges ap-
pointed for that Territory. 530. 
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7. The authority given the governor by section 1873, Revised Statutes, 
was intended to be exercised only during that period which is 
embraced between the date of the organization of the Territory 
and the time when legislative action was bad upon the subject· 
matter referred to in that section. After such action by the leg-
islature the authority terminated and the operation of the sec-
tion ceased. Ibid. 
See ALASKA j ALIENS j OKLAHOMA. 
TIMBER ON PUBLIC LANDS. 
See TIMBER TRESPASSES. 
TIMBER ON IXDIAN RESERVATIONS. 
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 12, 13, 14, 22 j TIMBER TRES-
PASSES, 5. 
TIMBER TRESPASSE~. 
1. The cutting or destroying of timber on lands which have been 
patented to individual Indians is not an offense punishable un-
der the act of June 4, 1H88, chapter 340, amendatory of section 
5388, Revised Statutes. 183. 
2. The provisions of sections ~461, 2462, ~63, and 4751, Revised Stat-
utes, are intended to protect and preserve live oak, red cedar, 
and other like timber, whether the same shall be upon l~nd re-
served or purchased by the United States for the purpose of sup-
plying such timber for the Navy, or whether it be upon other 
lands of the United States, provided only that the timber is live 
oak, or red cedar, or other like timber, such as would be useful to 
the Navy for naval purposes. 381. 
3. Where trespasses were committed in the State of Michigan, by 
cutting, destroying, removing, etc., live oak or red cedar trees, or 
other like timber useful for naval purposes, on and from lands 
belonging to the United States: .Advised that informers in such 
cases are entitled to one-half of the penalties, etc., recovered 
under section 4751, Revised Statutes, bearing in mind the power 
given to the Secretary of the Navy in that sect.ion. Ibid. 
4. Upon the statement of facts submitted respeP-ting the US6 by the 
Union River Logging Railroad Company (a corporatjon formed 
onder the laws of Washington Territory) of Government timber 
standing along the line of its roau : Advised that such use of the 
timber was wholly unauthorized, and that proper steps should 
be taken to secure indemnity to the Government, and to bring 
to justice the individuals who have been concerned in violating 
the law for the protection of its property. 546. 
5. Where a large quantity of standing timber (about 4,0001000 feet) 
was unlawfully cut by trespassers on the Fond du Lac Indian 
Reservation, in Minnesota, and left lying t.hereon-the land from 
which the timber was cut being held in common by the Indian 
bands, for whom it was reserved, by the ordinary Indian t1tle: 
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.AdW.ed, (1) that the United States have the absolute ownership 
of the timber thus out; (2) that the Indians have no interest 
therein whatever, and that it in no way appertains to the Indian 
Bureau or its agents to assume charge thereof; (3) that such 
timber may be sold for and on account of the United States, but 
that the sale should be made by the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office, under the supervision of the Secretary of the In-
terior. 710. 
6. Opinion of Acting Attorney-General Jenks, of August 23, 1886 (18 
Opin., 434), concurred in. Ibid. 
TONNAGE DUTY. 
Under the proclamation of the President, made on the 26th of Jan-
uar;r, 1888, in pursuance of the first provilo in section 11 of the 
act of June19, 1886, chap. 421, a ve8881 entered in a port of the 
United States from Bremen, via Southampton, is exempted from 
payment of the tonnage tax imposed by said section, although 
the ve888l may have taken on board cargo, pa888pgers, and mails 
at the last-mentioned ~rt. But if the vessel had entered at 
and cleared from Southampton it is liable to the duty. 128. 
TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 
1. The rightfand privileges granted to the subjects of Greece by the 
first article of the treaty between the United States and that 
country of December 22, 1837, are guarantied to them with all 
the force of law. 303. 
2. The word "subjects," in the treaty, embraces corporations, joint-
stock companies, and other associations, commercial and indus-
trial, constituted m conformity with the law of Greece. Ibid. 
3. No legal objection exists to the Secretary of State instructing the 
United States minister a.t Athens to give the Government of 
Greece an assurance that such corporations and associations may 
exercise in the United States all the rights and privileges 
granted, as above, subject to the appropriate la.waofthe UDited 
States and those of the several States. Ibid. 
4. No constitutional objection is perceived to a provision in the pro-
posed consular convention between the United States and Great 
Britain, conferring upon the courts of each country jurisdiction 
of offenses committed on vessels of th~ other on the high seas. 
644. 
See PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, 2. 
TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES. 
1. Article 38 of the treaty of April28, 1866, with the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws, which declares that "every white person who, hav-
ing married a Choctaw or Chickasaw, resides in the said Choo-
• taw or Chickasaw Nation, etc., is to be deemed a member of said 
nation," does not confer upon such white person the righ£ of 
sud'rage. 389. 
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2. Whether he is entitled to such right must be determined, not by 
that article alone, but by the provisions of the constitution of 
the nation in which he may be domiciled, and its laws relating 
to suffrage and elections. Ibid. 
TRANSFER. 
See ASSIGNMENT. 
TRANSPORTATION OF THE M:AIL. 
See POSTAL SERVICE, 2. 
TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS. 
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 5. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES; SINKING FUND. 
UNION RIVER LOGGING RAILROAD COMPANY. 
See LAND, PUBLIC, 9; TIMBER TRESPASSES, 4. 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. 
See DISTRICT ATTORNEY .. 
UNITED STATES COURT FOR INDIAN TERRITORY. 
See INDIAN TERRITORY, 5. 
VACANCY IN OFFICE. 
See APPOINTMENT. 
WASHINGTON AND IDAHO RAILROAD COMPANY. 
1. Unde_r the act of M:ay 30, 1888, chapter 336, granting to the Wash-
ington and Idaho Railroad Company a right of way through the 
Coour d'Alene Indian Reservation, the Secretary of the Interior 
has no authority to permit the construction of a railroad across 
the reservation prior to the ascertainment, :fixing, and payment 
of the compensation as provided for in section 3 of that act. 199. 
2. By that section three conditions precedent are annexed to the 
grant, namely: (1) the plats made upon actual survey for the 
definite locatwn of the road must be :filed; (2) those plats must 
be approved in writing by the Secretary of the Interior; (3) 
the compensation must be fixed and paid. Until all of these 
conditions are p~rformed no right of any kind respecting the 
right of way becomes vested in the company. Ibid. 
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT TUNNEL. 
1. The Secretary of War may extend the time for the completion of 
the work on the Washiugton Aqueduct tunnel, under the con-
tract with Beckwith & Quackenbush, in case the work is not 
completed by the 1st of November, 1888. 192. 
2. The clause in the act of March 30, 1888, chapter 47, namely, "all of 
said work to be completed by November first, eighteen hundred 
and eighty-eight," is to be understood as directory merely. Ibid. 
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3. Provisions of the contract with Messrs. Beckwith & Quackenbush,. 
entered into on October 29, 1883, for the construction of a. tunnel 
to increase the water supply of Washington, D. C., and of th& 
agreements supplementary thereto, considered with reference to 
certain inquiries propounded; and advi8ed (1) that should Major 
Lydecker, or his successor, lega.Uy appointed, with the sanction 
ofthe Chief of Engineers, annul the contract, and give notic& 
thereof to the contractors, the right of the latter to make good 
the defective work may legally be denied; but so long as th& 
contracts remain in full force the contractors hn.ve the right, at 
their own expense, within a reasonable time, to make the de-
fective work good; (2) should the contracts be annulled, as 
above, the contractors can not be legally compelled thereafter to 
make the defective work good, but they can be made liable for 
the actual necessary expenditure which the Government may 
incur in making it good; (3) that to meet such liability the Gov-
ernment may retain any money it now has, to which the con-
tractors would have been entitled had the work been good; (4} 
the expenditure authorized by the resolution of October 19, 1888, 
includes expenses attending the inspection of the repairs neces-
sary to protect and preserve the work already done, but not 
those attending the inspection of other work. 287. 
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. 
See CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN COMMISSION. 
See ALASKA, 2; ARMY, 7. 
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION. 
The power given the President by section 16 of the act of April25,. 
le90, chapter 156, to "designate additional articles for exhibi-
tion," is not limited to art.icles belonging to the Executive De-
partments and institutions therein mentioned, but extends to 
such other articles as he may deem fit and proper to be desig-
nated; and this power carries with it authority to employ such 
personA as shall be necessary to properly prepare and care for 
the articles which may be thus designated. 703. 
ZOOLOGICAL PARK. 
Under section 4 of the act of March 2, 1889, chap. 370, the Commis-
sion thereby created have authority to defray out of the appro-
priation for establishing the Zoological Park all necessary ex-
penses incidental to the selection and acquisition of the land for 
the park, but not to apply the appropriation. to laying out the 
land, erecting buildings thereon, etc. The provisions of that 
section extend no further than the selection and acquisition ot 
the land. 286. 
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